The long goodbye: Hugo Grotius’ justification of Dutch expansion overseas, 1615–1645

This article examines Grotius’ lifelong support for Dutch expansion overseas. As noted in other publications of mine, Grotius cooperated closely with the directors of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in the years 1604–1615. Right up to his arrest for high treason in August 1618, he contributed towards Dutch government discussions about the establishment of a West India Company (WIC). Three years of imprisonment at Loevestein Castle and, following his escape, long years of exile could not weaken his dedication to the cause. His relatives in Holland, in particular his brother Willem de Groot and his brother-in-law Nicolaas van Reigersberch, kept him up-to-date on the fortunes of the VOC and WIC. His expertise on maritime affairs was in high demand. For example, Cardinal Richelieu invited him in November 1626 to become actively involved in the establishment of a French East India Company. As itinerant ideologue of empire, Grotius sought to further his own career and those of his nearest family members, without damaging the interests of the United Provinces. Through Willem de Groot and Nicolaas van Reigersberch, he provided informal advice on Dutch imperial policy to the VOC directors and government officials in The Hague. He was rewarded with the appointment of his brother and his second son, Pieter de Groot, as VOC lawyers (ordinaris advocaten) in 1639 and 1644, respectively. They served as his proxies in diplomatic disputes involving the VOC, the States General and the Portuguese ambassador in autumn 1644, when Pieter and Willem de Groot wrote a defense of VOC claims to the cinnamon-producing areas of Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka), liberally citing De Jure Belli ac Pacis. Grotius’ vision of empire hardly changed in the course of 40 years. In his view, the Dutch had gone to the Indies as merchants, not conquerors, and should regulate themselves according to natural law and the law of nations. Thus he contributed to the creation of two political orders, one for Europe and one for the Indies. European diplomatic relations counted for little beyond the Line. VOC and WIC officials could act as judges and executioners in their own cause, without reference to indigenous rulers, other colonial powers, or even the political authorities back home.     

LIFETIME MOBILITY: INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF LABOUR MOBILITY, RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY AND HOUSEHOLD CYCLE

The existence of interrelations between different mobility forms is generally recognized, but they are not often studied. This article attempts to disentangle the complicated ways in which mobility decisions regarding labour, the house, and home-work travelling are related to each other and to phases in the life cycle. An empirical analysis is carried out from the perspective of individual life histories of employees in the medical sector. Their mobility careers are followed while their biographies unfold through a succession of socio-economic and demographic stages. It is shown how motives and patterns of mobility create and change the composition of certain social life-stage groups and determines who belongs to them.
L'existence d'interrelations entre formes de mobilité différentes est, en général, acceptée mais elle n'est pas souvent investiguée. Cet article vise à décrire d'une manière plus simple les décisions par rapport à la mobilité de travail, au logement et aux dieAplacements logement-travail, ainsi que leurs associations et leurs relations avec les étapes dans le cycle de vie. Une analyse empirique est menée dans la perspective des histoires de vie individuelle des employés du secteur médical. L'his-toire de leur mobilité est tracée et les biographies dévoilées selon une succession d'étapes socio-écono-mique et démographique. II est démontré comment les motifs et modèles de mobilité sont créés et comment ils changent la composition et l'appartenance à certains groupes sociaux durant leur vie.     

NEGATIVE FEEDBACKS IN THE ECONOMY AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION*

ABSTRACT. Incorporating regional asymmetry and negative feedbacks (congestion) in a model of economic geography and international trade shows that complete specialization of production at one location is unlikely. We identify an agglomerating force: the home market effect, and two spreading forces, competition for demand from immobile sectors of production and congestion. We demonstrate that negative feedbacks can explain the economic viability of small industrial regions observed in the real world. Simulations clarify the basic structure of the model.     

Die Berechnung von Wasserfluten. Tideforschung in den Niederlanden, 1920–1960

In the first half of this century a computing problem became evident in the course of preparatory research for major hydraulic projects in the Netherlands. One of the most novel problems was to predict the changes in the tidal movements caused by hydraulic works in coastal waters. Between 1920 and 1960 several solutions were proposed and put into practice: numerical methods, contracting young men for the calculations, analogue electronical networks and large scale models. The amount of computing labour played a decisive part in the choice between these methods. After a storm surge in 1953 causing estensive inundations in the southern part of The Netherlands, the requirements of the Delta Works project gave an enormous impetus to all three types of methods.     

Spatial Moving Behavior of Two-Earner Households

Economic theory suggests that job choice, residential choice and commuting behavior are simultaneously determined. The case of two-earner households deserves special attention because the two wage earners share a dwelling but have different workplaces. We base our analysis of spatial moving behavior on search theory. We demonstrate that job mobility depends positively on the distance between the workplaces of the two wage earners. Residential mobility seems to be negatively influenced by the distance between the workplaces of the two wage earners. The search model also indicates that two-earner households will, on average, move less often than single wage earners.