Conservative Party Agents in Second World War Britain

The Second World War placed great pressures on the machineryand personnel of all political parties. Conservatives formedthe view that their own machine had been especially hard hitby the challenges of the war years, and that this was a majorreason for the party's 1945 general election defeat. A supposeddecline in the number of full-time, salaried constituency agentswas a key component of this narrative of decline. This articleinvestigates what happened to the Conservative agency in wartime,using an unusually wide range of sources, including those ofaround a hundred constituency associations. It shows that thenumber of agents did fall as a result of the war, but that associationsoften worked hard to keep their agents, or to mitigate the effectsof their departure. It also explains the failure of headquarters'wartime efforts to reform the agency and centralize the employmentof agents. Although the party's relative organizational declinedid have significant emotional and practical consequences forit in 1945, Conservatives tended, post hoc, to overstate theextent of their wartime organizational collapse, in part becauseit allowed them to avoid damaging recriminations about the realreasons for their defeat. Ultimately, though, the war's effects,while significant, were essentially transient. Constituencycontrol of agents remained, and a professional standard wasmaintained. The Conservatives emerged from the war with an agencythat was different in detail from, but recognizably similarin form to, that which had predated the war.     

Australia's Nuclear Horizon: Moving Beyond the Drumbeat of Risk Inflation

The 2006 Switkowski review report commissioned by the Howard government highlighted some of the economic and foreign policy benefits that could flow from a major expansion of Australia's uranium export program. It also identified the long-term advantages for Australia's energy security flowing from the development of a national nuclear industry. The report has been condemned by anti-nuclear groups, who argue that proposals for Australia's continuing and, possibly, deeper involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle are unacceptable. The primary risk identified is that Australian uranium exports will contribute to global nuclear proliferation pressures, but claims concerning nuclear-related terrorism are also an increasingly common theme in anti-nuclear commentary. These arguments, in turn, are framed within a broader set of assumptions about the ‘immoral’ nature of any engagement in the nuclear fuel cycle. This article examines the most prominent claims put forward by anti-nuclear proponents and argues that many of them are based on an unnecessary inflation of risk.     

Book reviews

Regions in Europe. Patrick Le Galès and Christian Lequesne (Eds). London, Routledge, 1998, 305. pp., ISBN 0 415 16483 4

Unemployment and Social Exclusion: Landscapes of Labour Inequality. Paul Lawless, Ron Martin and Sally Hardy (Eds). London, Jessica Kingsley 1998, 280 pp., £17.95 pb, ISBN 1 85302 341 8

Cities Back from the Edge. Roberta Brandes Gratz (with Norman Mintz). Chichester, John Wiley, 1998, £24.95, ISBN 0 471 14417 7     

Aspects of the history of the nerves: Bell's theory, the Bell-Magendie law and controversy, and two forgotten works by P.W. Lund and D.F. Eschricht

The French physiologist Fran?ois Magendie showed, in 1822, that the anterior roots of the spinal nerves are motor and the posterior sensory. The English anatomist Charles Bell claimed the discovery, but his claim was based on republications of papers in which the wording had been altered to be consistent with Magendie's findings. Bell also appropriated Herbert Mayo's discoveries of the functions of the fifth and seventh cranial nerves. Bell repeated his claims in a number of influential publications, supported by his brothers-in-law John and Alexander Shaw. And for a century and a half, Bell figured as the discoverer in most references to the subject. During this period, several reviewers did go back to Bell's original papers, disclosing Bell's falsifications in the republished texts. But Magendie was not definitely acknowledged as the discoverer of the function of the spinal nerve roots until Cranefield's (1974) treatise. Cranefield, as did all other reviewers, overlooked accounts from 1825 by P.W. Lund and F.D. Eschricht. They critically reviewed Bell's early publications and reached conclusions similar to those of Cranefield concerning the roles of Bell and Magendie in the discovery of the function of the spinal nerve roots.