When Will New Programs be Mandatory? Determinants of the Decision Between the Mandatory and Discretionary Budget Designs

When creating a new program, an authorizing committee must choose a budget structure, either using mandatory funding or creating an authorization for appropriations to enable the appropriation committees to use discretionary funding. One hypothesis we examine is based on the strategic interplay by congressional committees seeking to control their policy domains. Based on expected purposes of a nascent program, an authorization committee must calculate, whether, if a program is designed as requiring appropriations for spending, will the appropriators provide the funds? Or if instead, a program is funded through mandatory spending, will those funds be blocked by appropriators? For example, when a new program is likely to offer credit claiming opportunities to Congress, such as through legislative earmarks, the authorization committees are less likely design a program to rely on mandatory funding. An alternative hypothesis is that where there is greater expected difficulty in predicting likely program needs—e.g., predicting the annual spending needs for unemployment insurance—a mandatory structure would be expected. We find that the hypothesis associated with the committees' pursuit of autonomy is supported, whereas the rational design hypothesis associated with reduced transaction costs is not supported.     

The Origins and Implications of the Breton Buckler Motif

The 'buckler' motif appears isolated in the naturalistic milieu of the earliest Breton art but there are problems with a symbolic interpretation. If instead it is considered in naturalistic terms it can be demonstrated to bear a close resemblance to a form of grain store made of straw rope that was used in parts of Ireland until this century. The likelihood of above ground grain storage in the Neolithic is considered and the potential archaeological evidence for such features is reviewed. Finally reasons are advanced for the motif being centred in the Morbihan region.     

Heritage designation and scale: a World Heritage case study of the Ningaloo Coast

As heritage research has engaged with a greater plurality of heritage practices, scale has emerged as an important concept in Heritage Studies, albeit relatively narrowly defined as hierarchical levels (household, local, national, etcetera). This paper argues for a definition of scale in heritage research that incorporates size (geographical scale), level (vertical scale) and relation (an understanding that scale is constituted through dynamic relationships in specific contexts). The paper utilises this definition of scale to analyse heritage designation first through consideration of changing World Heritage processes, and then through a case study of the world heritage designation of the Ningaloo Coast region in Western Australia. Three key findings are: both scale and heritage gain appeal because they are abstractions, and gain definition through the spatial politics of interrelationships within specific situations; the spatial politics of heritage designation comes into focus through attention to those configurations of size, level and relation that are invoked and enabled in heritage processes; and researchers choice to analyse or ignore particular scales and scalar politics are political decisions. Utilising scale as size, level and relation enables analyses that move beyond heritage to the spatial politics through which all heritage is constituted.     

History, Time, and Knowledge in Ancient India

The lack of interest in history in ancient India has often been noted and contrasted with the situation in China and the West. Notwithstanding the vast body of Indian literature in other fields, there is a remarkable dearth of historical writing in the period before the Muslim conquest and an associated indifference to historiography. Various explanations have been offered for this curious phenomenon, some of which appeal to the supposed currency of certain Indian philosophical theories. This essay critically examines such "philosophical explanations."
I argue that it is not true that there was no history in ancient India, and it is not surprising that there was no developed historiography or scientific history. It is both true and surprising that there was no real importance attached to history in ancient India. An adequate philosophical exxplanation for this historica phenomenon, however, is not to be found in appeals to the influence of indigenous metaphysical theories about time and the self. A much more plausible philosophical explanation appeals instead to certain features of classical Indian epistemology.