A REGIONAL ECONOMY,LAND USE,AND TRANSPORTATION MODEL (RELU‐TRAN©): FORMULATION,ALGORITHM DESIGN,AND TESTING*

ABSTRACT RELU is a dynamic general equilibrium model of a metropolitan economy and its land use, derived by unifying in a theoretically valid way, models developed by one of the authors [ Anas (1982) , Anas–Arnott (1991, 1997) , Anas–Kim (1996) , Anas–Xu (1999) ]. RELU equilibrates floor space, land and labor markets, and the market for the products of industries, treating development (construction and demolition), spatial interindustry linkages, commuting, and discretionary travel. Mode choices and equilibrium congestion on the highway network are treated by unifying RELU with the TRAN algorithm of stochastic user equilibrium [ Anas–Kim (1990) ]. The RELU‐TRAN algorithm's performance for a stationary state is demonstrated for a prototype consisting of 4‐building, 4‐industry, 4‐labor‐type, 15‐land‐use‐zone, 68‐link‐highway‐network version of the Chicago MSA. The algorithm solves 656 equations in a special block‐recursive convergent procedure by iterations nested within loops and loops within cycles. Runs show excellent and smooth convergence from different starting points, so that the number of loops within successive cycles continually decreases. The tests also imply a numerically ascertained unique stationary equilibrium solution of the unified model for the calibrated parameters.     

Leaving on a Jet Plane: Polarization,Foreign Travel,and Comity in Congress

No political observer, politician, or political scientist doubts that party polarization has weakened the social fabric of Congress. Measuring that effect, however, is exceedingly difficult. In this article, we operationalize the congressional social fabric by examining the foreign travel behavior of members of Congress over time. We evaluate the social disintegration in Congress by examining if and whether changes in member travel can explain why the social connectedness of members has waned. Using a unique dataset of foreign travel for House members from 1977 to 2012, we find that Republican House members, in particular, have altered their foreign travel patterns. Ideologically extreme members have always been less likely to take foreign trips, but extremely conservative Republican have become much more likely to travel only with co-partisans as polarization has increased in Congress. Ideologically moderate Republicans, while still traveling as members of bipartisan delegations, have also increased their willingness to travel only with fellow Republicans. Our results suggest that bipartisan foreign travel is a victim of the partisan war waging in Congress.