STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING MODELS OF STOCHASTIC NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM*

ABSTRACT. Boyce et al. (1981, 1983) have proposed and implementd the use of observed entropy levels to estimate the travel-cost coefficient in mathematical programming models of network equilibrium which involve logit route-choice probabilities. This so-called “dispersion-constrained” model is shown to give severely biased and statistically inefficient underestimates. A natural counterpart, the entropy-maximizing model, is proposed here and overestimates the travel-cost coefficient with much lower bias and much higher statistical efficiency. Even though the two models are mathematically homeomorphic in some respects, they have vastly different statistical properties. It follows that the use of observed entropy levels is undesirable and should be avoided, since maximizing entropy provides an unambiguously superior alternative.     

TRAFFIC EXTERNALITIES AND SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSE PRICES*

ABSTRACT. This study is the first to lend empirical support to the common belief that traffic intensity affects property values. Using a standard hedonic pricing model, this paper investigates the price effects on housing of traffic within a neighborhood. Results using data on single-family housing transactions for two different locations in a medium-sized city show a substantial negative price effect of traffic externalities. The magnitude of the effect is shown to be location specific.     

Framed for Compromise? The Role of Bill Framing in State Legislative Behavior on Natural Gas Policy

State legislative decision making on natural gas policy has become a balancing act, as legislators are forced to grapple with tensions between economically beneficial policies and environmental impacts. Despite increased public attention to the benefits and costs related to hydraulic fracturing, there has been little scholarly attention paid to how policy framing affects legislator behavior on this issue. We analyze recorded votes on bills relating to natural gas policy in Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico between 1999 and 2008; a time period spanning the recent boom. Using a novel database of bill frames, we create a ratio measure that accounts for the proportion of environmental to economic arguments within each piece of legislation. We find status quo–challenging, anti‐development policies can receive bipartisan support, as long as economic frames balance or are greater than environmental frames. Framing natural gas as a win‐win scenario where economic benefit and environmental protection can be achieved simultaneously is an effective legislative strategy. Using the case of natural gas policy, this study demonstrates bill framing substantively affects state legislator vote choice and implies bipartisan compromise is possible given the right balance of frames.     

Governed by Experience: Political Careers and Party Loyalty in the Senate

In this article, we study the U.S. Senate to understand how legislators' previous experiences in elected office influence their political behavior. We posit that, as a result of their experiences in office, former governors in the Senate are less partisan than their colleagues. We code the political jobs held by senators between 1983 and 2015 and analyze the effects of these careers on party loyalty in Senate floor votes. We find that gubernatorial service is associated with a 7–8% decrease in Party Unity. We test several hypotheses for the observed “governor effect” and find that, relative to their colleagues, former governors are supported by donor networks that are less ideologically extreme. We conclude that the unique experiences associated with serving as governor, along with the personalized nature of governors' electoral support coalitions, affect a senator's relationship with the party. Ultimately, our analysis illuminates how personal attributes, such as prior experience in elected office, can inform the study of legislative behavior.