Stephen Pinker and the long peace: alliance,deterrence and decline

It is now widely accepted, at least among academic students of war, that there has been a great and generally benign transformation in the character of war. The sort of big wars involving the world's greatest powers, those that in practice or in prospect dominated international affairs from the rise of Napoleon to the collapse of communism, are now considered to be essentially obsolescent. But to what extent is that really true?     

Walking a Fine Scientific Line: The Extraordinary Deeds of Dutch Neuroscientist C. U. Ariëns Kappers Before and During World War II

Dutch neuroscientist Cornelius Ubbo Ariëns Kappers is famous for pioneering neuroembryological work and for establishing the Amsterdam Central Institute for Brain Research. Less well known is his anthropological work, which ultimately played a role in saving Dutch Jews from deportation to their deaths during the Holocaust. Ariëns Kappers extensively campaigned against anti-Semitism and Nazi persecution during the 1930s. During World War II, he utilized his credentials to help create anthropological reports “proving” full-Jews were “actually” partial- or non-Jews to evade Nazi criteria, and at least 300 Jews were thus saved by Ariëns Kappers and colleagues. His earlier work demonstrating differences between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jewish skull indices became the focus of an attempt to save hundreds of Dutch Portuguese Jews collectively from deportation. Ariëns Kappers and colleagues brilliantly understood how anthropology and neuroscience could be utilized to make a difference and to save lives during a tragic era.     

Philosophy as a cultural resource and medium of reflection for Hermann Weyl

In a talk given at Zurich in the late 1940s, Hermann Weyl discussed Ferdinand Gonseth's dialectical epistemology and considered it as being restricted too strictly to aspects of historical change. His experiences with post-Kantian dialectical philosophy, in particular Johann Gottlieb Fichte's derivation of the concept of space and matter, had been a stronger dialectical background for his own 1918 studies in purely infinitesimal geometry and the early geometrically unified field theory of matter (extending the Mie-Hilbert program). Although now Weyl distantiated himself from the speculative features of his youthful philosophizing and in particular from his earlier enthusiasm for Fichte, he again had deep doubts as to the cultural foundations of modern mathematical sciences and its role in material culture of high modernity. For Weyl, philosophical «reflection» was a cultural necessity he now turned towards Karl Jaspers' and Martin Heidegger's existentialism to find deeper grounds, similar to his turn towards Fichte's philosophy after World War I. The discussion in the late 1940s can be read as a kind of post-World-War-II «Nachtrag» to Weyl's more widely known philosophical comments on mathematics and the natural sciences published in the middle of the 1920s.     

Albert Lautman et le souci brisé du mouvement

We locate Albert Lautman's work as a sort of agent of the break of symmetry in the framework of the traditional opposition of speculative philosophy and the physico-mathematical sciences. The stakes for philosophy are, with very rare exceptions, very poorly perceived. On this level, we return to the question of Lautman's supposed «Platonism» and we confront it with its fundamental reading of Martin Heidegger. The consequences of this insertion in the heideggerian furrow are fundamental for a just restitution of this thought and this philosophy into what they retain in current thought. On the other side, that of Lautmanian entries in the field of mathematical physics, we insist on the extreme prospective alacrity of his gaze, his philosophic power which comes to reinforce this strange sensibility toward what constituted the essential part of theoretical mathematics and physics in his time. In this sense, his position occupies actually one of the nodal points of the «surrationalistic» landscape.     

Présence de Ferdinand Gonseth dans la pensée de Gaston Bachelard

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the influence of Ferdinand Gonseth's epistemological and philosophical reflection on Gaston Bachelard. This will be done on at least two levels: on the one hand, on the level of direct quotations of Gonseth's texts and notions made by Bachelard; on the other, on the level of an agreement between the two conceptions concerning some central issues— agreement that lets one suppose an influence of Gonseth on Bachelard or an identity between their views. One concludes recalling the notion of «subjectivité quelconque», suggested to Bachelard by the gonsethean idea of «logique comme physique de l'objet quelconque», and seeking to grasp the differences between Bachelard's notion of «sujet quelconque», and Gonseth's one ofhomo phenomenologicus. One could define Bachelard's and Gonseth's epistemologies as two phenomenologies of the man of science: this is their main common feature.