Unipolar Dispensations: Exceptionalism,Empire, and the End of One America

Public and political discourse around the 2016 US Presidential election constructed it as a time of crisis for America. Yet, while over 80% of white evangelicals voted for Donald Trump, religion’s role in this crisis has been marginalized. Analyzing Trump’s support among premillennial dispensationalists, this article explores connections between dispensationalist discourses of divine providence and constructions of Trump’s election as a “turning point” for America. Charting links between conflicts over domestic cultural homogeneity and attempted impositions of US power over global “deviants” (terrorists, rogue states), it argues that the crisis of American identity figured by Trump’s election is tied to religious and secularized soteriologies emerging from notions of American exceptionalism and empire inaugurated by the end of the Cold War.     

Trump’s populism: lessons from Latin America

This paper compares left-wing Latin American populism with Donald Trump. Despite their different social bases and economic policies, they use a similar logic to construct politics as an antagonistic struggle between two camps. Left-wing and right-wing populists aim to rupture existing political institutions to give power to the people, yet they differ in how they construct this category. Whereas Trump used ethnic criteria to differentiate the people from three out groups – Mexicans, Muslims, and African-American militant organisations – left-wing Latin American populists used political and socio-economic criteria. Despite their democratising promises, Latin American populists like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador undermined democracy from within. Even though stronger institutions might protect American democracy, Trump has disfigured democracy.     

Liberal nationalism and Central American refugees: What is America's national responsibility?

In an era of unprecedented numbers of migrants from the global south to the global north, nationalism has become synonymous with liberal states' ethnocentric, xenophobic, and racist immigration policies. The Trump administration's treatment of Central American refugees has been taken as a prime example. By focusing on liberal cultural nationalism, this paper demonstrates that these prevailing perceptions about nationalism are unfounded. Although liberal cultural nationalism has been accused of endorsing restrictive immigration policies, the degree to which liberal cultural nationalism's immigration policies are restrictive is context dependent; under certain circumstances, liberal nationalism may call for relaxing immigration policies to admit certain types of immigrants by invoking the idea of national responsibility. Consequently, liberal cultural nationalism offers one of the strongest liberal arguments for admitting certain kinds of migrants from the global south. The Central American refugee crisis at the U.S. southern border is analysed as a case study to illustrate this.     

National indifferences during everyday nationalism: Experiencing the nation in Finland in the aftermath of the Second World War

Our article discusses the adaptability of the concept of national indifference to the context of post-war Finnish society and everyday nationalism. This period witnessed a transformation of previously exclusive and aggressive nationalism into a tempered and relatively inclusive version. Within this historical context, national indifference became an entangled category that could not be clearly attributed to a specific group of people but which carried with it a gradual change in subjective attitudes and consciousness. The case of post-war Finland demonstrates that just as nationalism changed its shape over time, becoming subtly embedded in everyday life, so too did national indifference. The article thus argues that an increase in the level of national indifference could actually make space for national integration and, furthermore, that any given expressions of nationalism, as well as the lack of them, must be studied against the background of people's experiences, which lend historically conditioned meaning to national sentiment and indifference alike.     

Living with Giants and Inconvenient Truths: The US,China, and Everyone Else

ABSTRACT

The Trump administration is redefining the traditional post-World War II approach to American foreign policy, preferring an “America First” approach instead. At the same time, China is becoming increasingly assertive on the world stage, willing to throw its weight around and threaten smaller countries over any perceived slight. For the smaller countries who viewed the United States as a reliable security partner and China as an increasingly important trade partner, the world is looking increasingly uncertain. This uncertainty is compounded by the Trump administration’s more confrontational approach in its China policy. Other states, including Canada, are trying to navigate between a reluctant Washington and a temperamental and brash Beijing. This article argues that a major reset of US-China relations was both inevitable and needed. That said, it is not so much what the Trump administration is doing, but how it is doing it that is the problem. With its heavy-handed “America First” policies, the Trump administration risks losing the support of other states needed to push back against China.     

Trumping foreign policy: public diplomacy,framing, and public opinion among middle power publics

Even as the world’s sole superpower, the United States requires the cooperation of other states to achieve many of its foreign policy objectives. The President of the United States thus often serves as ‘Diplomat in Chief’ in public diplomacy efforts to appeal directly to publics abroad. Given Donald Trump’s antagonistic approach to foreign relations and widespread lack of popularity, what are the implications for support for US policy among publics abroad – particularly among middle power states allied to the US? While previous research on public opinion relying on observational data has found that confidence in the US President is linked to support for American foreign policy goals, the mechanisms at work remain unclear. Using original data from survey-based experiments conducted in Canada and Australia, this article seeks to clarify the effect of ‘presidential framing’ (presenting a policy goal as endorsed or not endorsed by Trump) on attitudes toward key policy issues in the Canada–US and Australia–US relationships. Results point to a negative ‘Trump framing’ effect in Canadians’ and Australians’ trade policy attitudes, but such an effect is not observed in other policy domains (energy policy in Canada, and refugee policy in Australia).     

Cruel and unusual

From early April to late June 2018, the nearly 2,600 immigrant children – mostly refugees fleeing violence and poverty in Central America – were forcibly taken from their parents at the United States’ southern border following implementation of the Trump administration's ‘zero tolerance’ policy. The policy took effect when the US Justice Department began aggressively prosecuting undocumented immigrants crossing the US‐Mexico border. Following a public outcry and growing protests, President Trump issued an executive order declaring an end to family separations on 20 June. Several days later, a federal court mandated that the government reunite those immigrant families affected by the ‘zero tolerance’ policy. In mid‐August, more than 550 children who had been detained following the implementation of the policy remained in federal custody. Thousands more ‘unaccompanied minors’ – typically teenagers who were caught crossing the border without adults –remain in indefinite detention. This editorial analyzes this situation from an anthropological perspective by reviewing relevant ethnographic literature on undocumented Latin American immigrants in the US.     

Trump,the authoritarian populist revolt and the future of the rules-based order in Asia

In this short article, the authors analyse the implications of the election of Donald Trump for the future of the liberal rules-based order, with specific emphasis on its implications for the Asian region. Departing from the institutional fetishism that figures prominently in the literature, the authors argue that this liberal order needs to be conceptualised in terms of its social foundations. Particularly important to consider, in terms of understanding these social foundations, is the nature of social relations in the USA. The election of Trump reflects the deep crisis of the US state and the rise of a new ‘authoritarian populism’. The authors trace the roots of this authoritarian populism to patterns of global capitalist transformation, the crisis of the US state and the modes of crisis management that this has generated. They then explore the implications of Trump’s authoritarian populism for the region.     

Possibilities and pitfalls of the concept of national indifference

This introduction to the themed section ‘The history of national indifference. A critical appraisal’ explores the challenges and possibilities of the concept of national indifference. It starts from the premise that national indifference remains a very useful concept to avoid falling into teleological narratives of nationalism. The central argument is that national indifference needs to be theorized as a non-binary, relative concept that is not the complete opposite of national identification. Indeed, the contributions show that national indifference has gradations and can coexist with explicit, banal or everyday forms of nationalism, both among elites and ordinary people, both in and outside of East Central Europe, both before and after the Two World Wars. This central argument results from an engagement with three areas of debate surrounding the national indifference literature, which all relate to its (inadvertent) reproduction of binary understandings of nationalism: the dichotomous conceptualization of east versus west, nationalisation versus non-nationalisation and elites versus masses.     

The Trump administration and outer space: promoting US leadership or heading towards isolation?

In a relatively short period of time, the Trump administration has been fairly active in the field of space. The reconstitution of the National Space Council, under the direction of Vice President Pence, the President’s signing of Space Policy Directive 1, that calls for the return of humans to the Moon, and the announcement of a National Space Strategy that calls for an ‘America first’ approach in space, have been the highlights of this process. A key component of the administration’s approach has been the promotion of commercial (private) space activities through an effort of regulatory reform intended to facilitate free enterprise and individual initiative in space.

Overall, it is evident that the Trump administration views a consolidated US leadership in space as instrumental to ‘Make America Great Again’. However, due to the lack of cohesion in the management of the US space program, the controversial interpretation of international principles and the US-centred view of space endorsed by the administration, doubts remain as to whether the space policy of the Trump administration will foster US leadership in space or lead to its progressive isolation.     

Hayden White: The Form of the Content

Hayden White's perhaps richest and most profoundly argued book, The Content of the Form, touches many nerves in the American historicalprofession. The entirety of the book, from its premises through its most thoughtful exegeses of historical writing, insists that linguistic form is the primary carrier of content in historical writing, indeed, in historical knowledge. This insistence on a respectful and careful attention tothe formal usages of nonfiction prose, truth-claiming language, goes well against the grain of American tastes. As de Tocqueville presciently and correctly predicted, when Americans take to literature in a serious way, they won't have much patience with precise matters of form.Hayden White's narrative theory has had uphill work to penetrate this pervasive indifference, especially among historians.
He has been joined in recent decades by Paul Ricoeur, whose Time andNarrative , beginning from different premises and a slightly different question, arrives at a sympathetic and complementary analysis of historical narrative. In spite of White's published hesitations about the political/philosophical tendencies of Ricoeur's work, I amconvinced that their books are mutually supporting and, in an important cultural sense, belong together.
Altogether, however, I do feel that the main import and justification of this presentessay must rest on my quite serious reading of Hayden White's best joke, a profound shaggy dog story about the historian monk of St. Gall.     

Symbolic versus material concerns of rural consciousness in the United States

A potential explanation for the U.S. urban-rural political divide is a definition of rural consciousness comprised of three subdimensions: a feeling that ruralites are underrepresented in decision-making (“Representation”) and that their way of life is disrespected (“Way of Life”) – both symbolic concerns – and a more materialistic concern that rural areas receive less resources (“Resources”). However, it is unclear whether these different aspects of rural consciousness predict expected political preferences nationally, or whether they uniquely explain these preferences when evaluated alongside similar symbolic concepts like rural identity and moral traditionalism. We expect symbolic concerns (especially Way of Life) to particularly predict rural support for Donald Trump, Republican partisanship, and conservative ideology. Using a novel survey measure developed and tested across three original survey data sets, we find that only the symbolic subdimensions of rural consciousness positively and significantly correlate with Trump support, while the material subdimension either negatively correlates with Trump support or is not statistically significant. A similar tendency occurs when predicting symbolic ideology, except when controlling for moral traditionalism. Rural consciousness and its subdimensions do not significantly predict partisanship. These relationships hold for all respondents and for rural-only respondents. We conclude that rural consciousness may matter politically along symbolic dimensions, rather than materialistic grievances, for recent anti-establishment political support as opposed to standard left-right measures. We recommend that survey analyses of rural consciousness should separately analyze symbolic and materialistic aspects. Future studies should further investigate traditionalism vis-a-vis rural consciousness and explore non-rural people high in rural consciousness.     

What it means to be a “true American”: Ethnonationalism and voting in the 2016 U.S. presidential election

A number of important factors predicted white people vote choice in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, including voters' economic assessments, sexist attitudes, racial resentment, and status threat. In this paper, I establish that ethnonationalism—a set of beliefs concerning what it means to be a “true” American—was also a significant factor in the estimations of White Americans when casting their vote for president in 2016. Data from a nationally representative sample of White Americans show that ethnonationalism was a robust predictor of vote choice for Trump even after controlling for predictors known to shape vote choice, including economic assessments, sexist attitudes, racial resentment, status threat, and sociodemographic indicators. These results indicate that ethnonationalism, although correlated with some of these factors, operated primarily as an independent factor that shaped White vote choice. The findings have important implications concerning the electoral activation of White majorities concerned about the perceived threat that demographic change poses to American national identity.     

How to gauge banal nationalism and national indifference in the past: proletarian tweets in Belgium's belle époque

Michael Billig's theory of banal nationalism involves the assumption that the absence of an explicit discourse on the nation should be interpreted as the unmindful presence of nationalism and that the mass media faithfully represent or reflect the discourses of ‘ordinary people’. Recent historical research of ‘national indifference’ in imperial Austria has inverted the correlation between the ubiquity of nationalist discourses and their impact in society. This article assesses these conflicting frameworks and refutes AD Smith's critique of everyday nationalism research as necessarily ahistorical and presentist. This case study of the rank‐and‐file of the social‐democratic Belgian Workers' Party at the close of the nineteenth century uses a unique source of working‐class voices: the so‐called ‘propaganda pence’ or ‘proletarian tweets’ from the Flemish‐speaking city of Ghent. Hot, explicit nationalism was absent from these sources, which begs the question: is this proof of banal nationalism or national indifference? A historically contextualized analysis of the absences shows that workers expressed national indifference towards Belgian, but not towards Flemish ethnicity. In Rogers Brubaker's terms: Flemish ethnicity was a relevant social category, but only in a very restricted number of social contexts could it become a basis for ‘groupness’ or political mobilisation in daily life.     

US grand strategy and national security: the dilemmas of primacy,decline and denial

The foreign policy crises that the USA has confronted under the administration of President Barack Obama have generated profound uncertainty about whether the USA can maintain what has been its consistent grand strategy since the end of the Cold War: primacy. The authors argue, drawing on a neoclassical realist framework, that this uncertainty has been driven not so much by fundamental changes in the international system itself, but rather by how such changes have been interpreted by the Obama administration and its critics. US grand strategy is now caught between approaches best described as the ‘decline management’ of the Obama administration and the ‘decline denial’ of president Donald Trump, which reflects the fracturing of the domestic ‘political support system’ that has underpinned primacy since the end of the Cold War.     

Sub-national cultural policy--where the action is: Mapping state cultural policy in the United States

Abstract

This paper argues that cultural policy analysts should turn their analytical attention towards the cultural policies of sub-national levels of government. State level cultural policy has become an increasingly important locus of interest for those who are concerned with the health and stability of the arts, culture, and humanities in American life, and the same is undoubtedly true elsewhere. This rise in the importance of cultural policy at the state level has not been accompanied by a similarly evolving understanding of the cultural policy system that has developed at this sub-national level. Cultural policy at the level of an American state has been the sum total of the more or less independent, uncoordinated activities of a variety of state agencies and allied organizations and institutions. This paper lays out a number of hypotheses concerning what we might be likely to find in such an inquiry and reports some preliminary findings from a cultural policy mapping project in the State of Washington.     

Why US-Sino strategic competition is good for Australia

ABSTRACT

Faced with an increasingly authoritarian and assertive China, the United States (US) under President Trump administration’s has embarked on a course toward a more openly competitive US–China relationship. However, the debate in Australia has viewed the new era of US-Sino strategic competition mostly negatively. Indeed, arguments have been made for a need to ‘radically’ rethink Australia’s defence policy in order to prepare for a ‘post-US-led’ regional order. For some analysts, Canberra has even no other choice than to adopt a strategy of ‘armed neutrality’ to deal with an emerging China-dominated regional order and a declining US, confused and unwilling to defend its allies. In contrast, this article argues that on balance Trump’s course correction on China is positive for Australia as the US is likely to maintain its robust engagement in the Indo-Pacific. While the president’s inconsistencies partly undermine US declaratory statements in regards to greater competition with China, a bipartisan consensus is likely to continue to shift US policy in this direction. While greater US-Sino competition requires Australia to assume greater responsibilities for regional security, radical changes to its defence policy and security alignment are not needed.     

White western teenage girls and urban space: Challenging Hollywood's representations

This article explores fictional cinematic representations of the world of white female adolescents in the USA. It argues that Hollywood has disseminated an oversimplified image of teenage girlhood that reinforces the notion that girls participate only peripherally in the daily life of exterior urban spaces. An analysis of nine Hollywood teen movies, from the 1980s and the 1990s, reveals a limited palette of spaces appropriated by predominantly white middle-class American adolescent girls. The analysis, within the broad categories of retreat space, liminal space, and interaction space, suggests alternatives for understanding how adolescent girls use urban space.     

Eine handgreifliche Geschichtslüge. Wie Martin Luther zum Gegner des copernicanischen Weltsystems gemacht wurde.

Martin Luther has been severely criticized for an offhand remark about Copernicus. In the most frequently cited version of this statement, Luther is alledged to have branded Copernicus as a fool who will turn the whole science of astronomy upside down. This disparaging judgment on Luther prevails in many publications by respected historians of science of the 20th century, although since the early thirties, it has been convincingly demonstrated that the famous citation from Luther's table talk is next to worthless as an historical source, that Luther never referred to Copernicus or to the heliocentric world system in all of his voluminous writings, and that there is no indication that Luther ever suppressed the Copernican viewpoint. His attitude towards Copernicus was indifference or ignorance, but not hostility. In this paper, it is shown that the story of Luther's anti‐Copernicanism emerged in the second half of the 19th century. It was invented by Franz Beckmann and Franz Hipler, two Prussian Catholic historians who were engaged in the conflict between the German government under Bismarck and the Catholic Church (Kulturkampf), and it was disseminated by influential German and American historians like Leopold Prowe, Ernst Zinner, and Andrew D. White. In the second half of the 20th century, many historians of science relied on the authority of these authors, rather than studying the sources or the secondary literature in which it has been proved that Luther's anti‐Copernicanism is an outright falsification of history.     

Exceptionalism of a kind: the political historiography of US foreign relations

The recent US mid‐term elections have not only dented President Obama's image at home and abroad, they have seen the return to ‘divided government’ whereby one party controls the Executive and the other controls either the Senate or the House of Representatives or both. Such divided government has been quite frequent since the Second World War; but the situation is often portrayed by political scientists as dysfunctional, even as they acknowledge that the Founders of the Republic deliberately created a federal system which would minimize concentrations of political power. Yet divided government is only one complaint among many levelled by American commentators at their political system. This article examines such criticisms both theoretically and historically, and also develops a historical approach which discusses American attitudes to the past, particularly US foreign relations. Here the emphasis is upon the ideologies that have powered American expansion, first across the North American continent and then overseas. A peculiar, even ‘exceptional’ aspect of this expansion has been its rhetorical form, in particular the invocation of past presidents to justify contemporary actions and the creation of a doctrinal canon (classically expressed in the Monroe doctrine). While these two lines of enquiry (emphasizing history and political science) are the methodological double core of the article, they are not treated discretely; rather the focus is on the interplay between the two.