Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?

The controversial framework of interaction between Russia and Europe is defined by some enduring parameters—geographic realities, historical experiences, religious beliefs, normative values, psychological characteristics, behavioural patterns, cultural orientations. The incongruity between cultural/civilizational and geopolitical identities further complicates Russia's perceptions of, and attitudes to, Europe. Russia's initial pro-Western enthusiasm in the early post-Cold War period was soon overshadowed by serious difficulties in its adaptation to a reduced position in Europe, as well as by numerous grievances with respect to the West. As a result, Russia's attempts to develop a 'pan-European architecture', as well as its policy with regard to multilateral structures operating in continental Europe, have been marked by deeply contradictory patterns of promoting openness towards Europe on the one hand and keeping a certain distance from it on the other. The enlargement of NATO and especially recent NATO military operations in the Balkans have been perceived in Russia not only as confrontational but also as relegating it to the sidelines of European developments. Although Russia's long-awaited transition to the post-Yeltsin era and its new European perspective have been undermined by the war in Chechnya, President Putin's unexpected pro-Westernism (its pragmatism notwithstanding) is a promising sign of rapprochement with Europe.     

Europe—An historian's view

The late John Burrow, one of the most stimulating promoters of the distinctively interdisciplinary enterprise that is Intellectual History, was a vital member of what has become known as the ‘Sussex School’. In exploring the resonances of his singular and richly idiosyncratic contribution, this article places his unique historical sensibility within a series of interpretative contexts, demonstrating the vitality of writings that will continue to inspire and inform scholarship in the field for decades to come.     

Europe and the American mind∗†

Wells's The New Machiavelli (1911) offers an excellent case study of the use of anti-Machiavellian Machiavellism as both a philosophical and a rhetorical strategy. In Remington, Wells creates a protagonist who follows Machiavellian rules of behaviour and denounces those who do likewise. The novel is structured to show Remington's progress from an idealist refutation of Machiavellism, through a recognition of its necessity, to the formulation of a private and political method for the necessary pursuit of Machiavellian principles under the disguise of anti-Machiavellism, including trenchant criticisms of Fabians as anti-Machiavellian Machiavellians. These stages, culminating in complete personal and public failure, are reflected in Remington's party allegiances, and broadened by Wells into an account of British party ideologies around the turn of the twentieth century. Wells's rhetorical design for mapping and assessing anti-Machiavellian Machiavellism is paralleled by an exploration of that technique in himself, attested by the predominance of autobiographical elements in The New Machiavelli, and by similarities between Remington's and Wells's own deception of others and themselves. Far from incidental, anti-Machiavellian Machiavellism is the motif that unites the shifting party allegiances, political conceits and moral hypocrisies, and private and public failures of Wells, Remington, and of the period of British politics that they intend to encapsulate.     

New Labour - New Europe?

The key question often asked of the new Labour government’s approach to Europe is whether this is new Labour, new Europe or new government, old Britain? There are three routes into the EU which Britain could follow: (1) it could play a lading part in the definition of a new political role and vision for an enlarged EU in the twenty-first century; (2) it could be a constructive and pragmatic participant in EU policy discussions, but without an overall vision for the EU; 93) it could become a side player within the EU, left behind as Europe develops in directions it cannot support. In its tone and rhetoric, the new government is certainly aiming for the first of these roles. On policy substance, however, its approach is somewhat cautious and pragmatic. In the four policy areas examined in this article - employment, the single currency, enlargement and institutional reform - some striking changes in tone and emphasis are not wholly matched by new policy innovations. This indicates continued caution over public opinion and the question of sovereignty. However, as the authors argue in the final section, British public opinion allows considerable scope to define a new role for Britain in the EU, while domestic constitutional reform could begin to change the nature of the sovereignty debate.     

Vers une Europe de la culture ?

Au Conseil de l'Europe et dans la Communauté européenne, les sens de “culture”, “civilisation” et de “identité culturelle” européennes sont a priori difficiles â identifier et évoluent sur la période 1949–93. L'étude vise, en s'aidant d'une méthode de décompte des mots et d'un rapide examen de l'évolution historique et scientifique de “culture” et “civilisation”, á dégager certains de leurs traits particuliers, au‐delà de la confusion traditionnelle entre “culture” et “civilisation” européennes et entre “culture” et “identité culturelle” européennes. “Civilisation européenne” a pris peu á peu une signification supranationale et s'est raréfiée, tandis que “culture européenne” s'est rapidement divisée en “cultures infranationales”. Les institutions montrent aussi leurs tendances plus ou moins favorables á l'unité européenne, par leur propre utilisation des concepts devenus des éléments “test”.     

Eastern Europe and ‘legitimacy crisis’

An unexpectedly swift collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe amidst flares of mass dissent raises doubts about the accuracy of explanations of the persistence of these regimes in terms of ‘legitimacy’ and their fall in terms of ‘legitimacy crisis’. Such explanations are criticised and rejected as theoretically inadequate and lacking empirical support. It is argued that East European regimes had never developed mass legitimacy, and that even before the current upheavals they showed clear symptoms of non‐legitimate domination. In order to suggest an alternative interpretation of their persistence and fall, the paper clarifies the meaning of the term ‘legitimacy’, suggests reasons for the popularity of ‘legitimacy interpretations’, and critically assesses the empirical evidence for the alleged legitimacy and ‘legitimacy crises’. The concluding section outlines the bases of (non‐legitimate) communist domination and looks at the problems of (re‐establishing legitimate authority by the post‐communist East European regimes.     

Ismail Kadere’s Idea of Europe

The aim of this article is to reconstruct and pinpoint the peculiarities of Ismail Kadare’s idea of Europe. Kadare’s idea of Europe, it is argued, differs from the ideas of Europe embraced or presumed by intellectuals like Paul Valéry, Georg Simmel, Danilo Ki?, Václav Havel, Adam Michnik, or Milan Kundera, or from that of the European Union. For Kadare it is literature rather than the polis or its particular ideology that is the guardian of European values. Thus the European legacy, in his view, is primarily Homeric rather than Socratic. I suggest first that the persecution of writers and the repression of literature in totalitarian regimes underlies Kadare’s idea of Europe. I then further characterize Kadare’s theme of persecution as a dialectic between regime and culture. Finally, I reconstruct Kadare’s narrative of Albania’s “return to Europe” as the struggle for recognizing Albania as the birthplace of European culture.     

Jewish-Christian relations in Europe, 840–1096

The Jews of Europe enjoyed a period of efflorescence and stability under the Carolingians; a century and a half later they were massacred during the First Crusade. Historians have explained the transition from tranquillity to massacre by positing that a series of events during the intervening period heralded a downturn in the political fortunes of the Jews, as well as rising anti-Jewish agitation among Christians. This study closely analyses the supposed signposts of destruction and demonstrates that the evidence does not support the notion of adumbration.