“Transcending Without Transcendence”: Utopianism and an Ethos of Hope

Human geography has recently witnessed an emergent interest in the intertwined problematics of how to be utopian and how to remain hopeful or optimistic. This paper aims to introduce a type of immanent utopianism that follows from a dynamic, open, conception of utopia. It revolves around thinking through how an ethos of hope functions in relation to the multiple problems and tasks of utopia/utopianism. The paper describes how Ernst Bloch re‐defined the utopian as a type of process and then outlines a style of immanent utopianism based on an explicit ethos of hope. The result is a sensitivity to matter as utopological, as containing an immanent reference to a not‐yet beyond, that obliges us to practice a utopianism that intervenes in the emergence, and change, of something better in a world that takes place “in hazard”. In conclusion the paper argues for a utopic geography based on being, and becoming, hopeful that is itself a response to an ethical imperative to give and find hope in the context of the tragedy and injustice of suffering.     

Further Forms of Faithfulness

Abstract

In light of recent rehabilitations of the theological doctrine of creation ex nihilo by Jean-Luc Nancy, Slavoj Zizek and others, the present essay examines whether that doctrine can or cannot be a resource for the critique of capitalism. Agreeing with Nancy and Zizek that the doctrine can be of use in the critique of capitalism, the essay takes up their discussions and adds to them by analyzing the relationship between the doctrine and Marx's treatment of human agency and capitalism. By situating Marx's philosophy in relation to Aristotle's and Hegel's discussion of the infinite, I contend that, despite Marx's overt rejection of creation ex nihilo, human activity is conceived by him according to it, and that capitalism, as he presents it and as supplemented with Nancy and Zizek, can be understood to be a "decreation" of the worldhood of the world.     

Religion and communism: Feuerbach,Marx and Bloch

Whilst Marx made scattered positive remarks about the details of communist society, he also made important negative indications. Religion features in this negativity: his critique of religion is withering, there is no mention of religious life in communism, and he is emphatic that religion will play no role in such a society. For Marx, one of the tangible freedoms of communism was freedom from religion. The critique of religion is fundamentally inscribed in the very genesis of Marx's thought, and Feuerbach is crucial to understanding Marx's strictures on religion. Yet Feuerbach also figures in Ernst Bloch's very positive approach to religion, which argues that communism involves the freedom to be religious, in the sense of opening up oneself and society to the gold-bearing seams of the religious experience. This essay explores how such different conceptions of the relationship between religion and communism both draw sustenance from Feuerbach.     

Utopia and Pluralism: Demanding Too Much in the Name of Justice

ABSTRACT

In recent literature on utopianism, in particular non-ideal and realist work, the distinction between scepticism and non-scepticism has been to the fore. The main concern of this article, in contrast, is to show the importance of the distinction between pluralist and monist approaches. Firstly, pluralists can identify when utopian projects are guilty of demanding too much even when those projects are, all things considered, legitimate. Secondly, monists are unable to discern such prima facie wrongs, even when monism is combined with a sceptical critique of ideal theory. I advance this argument through a novel reading of Judith Shklar’s work, specifically her arguments concerning Rousseauian utopianism. In sharp contrast to the prevailing view in the literature, I maintain that the pluralism and scepticism of her early work is replaced by a monist scepticism in her mature work, a transformation that itself demonstrates the benefits of pluralism over (sceptical) monism.     

In defence of utopian urbanism: imagining cities after the 'end of utopia'

What is the role of utopian visions of the city today? What is their use at a time when, for many people, the very concept of utopia has come to an end? Taking a wide perspective on contemporary debates, this paper addresses the general retreat from utopian urbanism in recent years. It connects it with the so–called crisis of modernist urbanism in the capitalist West as well as forms of 'utopic degeneration', and assesses some of its implications. Arguing against the abandonment of utopian perspectives, it advocates a rethinking of utopianism through considering its potential function in developing critical approaches to urban questions. The authoritarianism of much utopian urbanism certainly needs acknowledging and criticising, but this need not entail a retreat from imagining alternatives and dreaming of better worlds. Instead, it is necessary to reconceptualise utopia, and to open up the field of utopian urbanism that for too long has been understood in an overly narrow way. The paper suggests the potential value of developing, in particular, modes of critical and transformative utopianism that are open, dynamic and that, far from being compensatory, aim to estrange the taken–for–granted, to interrupt space and time, and to open up perspectives on what might be.     

Dewey's Materialist Philosophy of Education: A Resource for Critical Pedagogues?

This article looks at some similarities and differences between key elements of Karl Marx's critique of capital and John Dewey's philosophy of education, both substantively and methodologically. Substantively, their analyses of the relation between human beings and the natural world—what Marx calls concrete labour and Dewey generally calls action—converge. Similarly, methodologically they converge when looked at from the point of view of their analysis of the relation between earlier and later forms of life. In Marx's case, it is his comparison of the relation between capitalist society and earlier societies. In Dewey's case, it is his comparison of the relation between adult experience and childhood experience. Dewey's practical realization of his distinction of adult and childhood experience in the creation of a materialist curriculum embodied in the Dewey laboratory school in Chicago (of which Dewey was director from 1896 to 1904) also accords in many ways with Marx's theory of concrete labour. On the other hand, their analyses diverge substantively when viewed from the point of view of their critique of capitalist society; Marx united concrete labour with his concept of abstract labour to provide a basis for criticizing modern society on its own terms rather than in terms of Dewey's concept of a cultural lag. The divergence is explained by their divergent methodologies in analyzing modern capitalist society. Despite this difference, the article concludes that critical pedagogues would do well to incorporate Dewey's materialist curriculum into their own practices—with modifications.     

In defence of utopian urbanism: imagining cities after the 'end of utopia'

What is the role of utopian visions of the city today? What is their use at a time when, for many people, the very concept of utopia has come to an end? Taking a wide perspective on contemporary debates, this paper addresses the general retreat from utopian urbanism in recent years. It connects it with the so–called crisis of modernist urbanism in the capitalist West as well as forms of 'utopic degeneration', and assesses some of its implications. Arguing against the abandonment of utopian perspectives, it advocates a rethinking of utopianism through considering its potential function in developing critical approaches to urban questions. The authoritarianism of much utopian urbanism certainly needs acknowledging and criticising, but this need not entail a retreat from imagining alternatives and dreaming of better worlds. Instead, it is necessary to reconceptualise utopia, and to open up the field of utopian urbanism that for too long has been understood in an overly narrow way. The paper suggests the potential value of developing, in particular, modes of critical and transformative utopianism that are open, dynamic and that, far from being compensatory, aim to estrange the taken–for–granted, to interrupt space and time, and to open up perspectives on what might be.     

Drug or medicine? China's experience of Marx's opium thesis on religion

This paper tracks the changes in the influence of Marx's celebrated opium thesis in China. Marx's view that religion is “the opium of the people” was first introduced into China through propaganda associated with the Russian revolution. It became very influential among Chinese intellectuals and dominated the religious policy of the CCP for a long period. However, as the revolutionary party became the party in power after 1949, it was obvious that the opium thesis alone would be insufficient to deal with the religious situation in a socialist country. Although the “five natures” of religion thesis was proposed to explain the persistence of religion in socialist China, the opium thesis proved more powerful politically and resulted in a general attack on religion during the Cultural Revolution. Not until the era of reform and “opening up” was the opium thesis questioned. After the release of a major document entitled “The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during our Country's Socialist Period” in 1982, the opium thesis was viewed as too simplistic an instrument for understanding “the problem of religion.” Scholars have argued that religion contains important cultural elements and can make a positive contribution to a socialist society in certain respects. After lengthy discussion, a consensus was reached that Marxist views on religion should keep up with the times and that the opium thesis was no longer compatible with contemporary Chinese society. Although different voices can still be heard on the issue, religion is no longer viewed as just a “drug” but rather as a kind of “medicine.” Marx's opium thesis has been replaced in China by a new theory, one that emphasizes that religion should and can adapt to the needs of a socialist society.     

No Place for Women? Anti–utopianism and the Utopian Politics of the 1890s

The word 'utopia' can mean both good place and no place, and the common–sense meaning of 'utopian' is unrealistic. This article argues that common–sense assumptions of the impossibility of utopia are ideological, and constructed in part by the way experiments in utopian living have been represented. Historical accounts suggest utopias are doomed to inevitable failure. In fiction and autobiography, committed participants in such experiments as well as outside observers use narrative structures which distance utopian spaces from 'real life'.
Using historical research and textual analysis, this argument is illustrated by discussing several women involved in utopian politics in 1890s England. Four of them, Helen and Olivia Rossetti, Edith Lees, and Gertrude Dix later wrote novels which re–created but also distanced their experiences. This distancing is partly a function of gender: for them utopia was no place for real women. This paper analyses the construction of utopian spaces in their novels, particularly the gendered relationship between domestic and political space. Narrative structure, imagery and humour are all used to undermine a sense of the possibilities of utopian living. These fictionalised accounts are compared with Nellie Shaw's more positive non–fiction account of life in the utopian community Whiteway. Although writing as a committed utopian, she, too, creates an account that distances readers. The critical analysis of such representations can begin to challenge anti–utopianism.     

No Place for Women? Anti–utopianism and the Utopian Politics of the 1890s

The word 'utopia' can mean both good place and no place, and the common–sense meaning of 'utopian' is unrealistic. This article argues that common–sense assumptions of the impossibility of utopia are ideological, and constructed in part by the way experiments in utopian living have been represented. Historical accounts suggest utopias are doomed to inevitable failure. In fiction and autobiography, committed participants in such experiments as well as outside observers use narrative structures which distance utopian spaces from 'real life'.
Using historical research and textual analysis, this argument is illustrated by discussing several women involved in utopian politics in 1890s England. Four of them, Helen and Olivia Rossetti, Edith Lees, and Gertrude Dix later wrote novels which re–created but also distanced their experiences. This distancing is partly a function of gender: for them utopia was no place for real women. This paper analyses the construction of utopian spaces in their novels, particularly the gendered relationship between domestic and political space. Narrative structure, imagery and humour are all used to undermine a sense of the possibilities of utopian living. These fictionalised accounts are compared with Nellie Shaw's more positive non–fiction account of life in the utopian community Whiteway. Although writing as a committed utopian, she, too, creates an account that distances readers. The critical analysis of such representations can begin to challenge anti–utopianism.     

MISREPRESENTING MARX: A LESSON IN HISTORICAL METHOD

In this book Jonathan Sperber deploys his extensive knowledge of nineteenth‐century European social and political history, and his diligent research into sources that have become readily available only recently, to produce a substantial biography of Karl Marx. We find, however, that Sperber is mistaken in his treatment of Marx's ideas and of the intellectual contexts within which Marx worked. In fact, we suggest that he is systematically mistaken in this regard. We locate a root source of the error in his reductive approach to theoretical ideas. In section I we focus on the claim, taken for granted in the book, that Marx's ideas are instantiations of “materialism.” By detailed reference to the record of Marx's writings, we show that there is no justification for describing Marx as a “materialist” in the usually accepted senses of that term. In section II we review how Soviet and other interpreters of Marx, taking their lead from the later Engels, insisted that “materialism” was fundamental to Marxism. We suggest that Sperber's presentation of Marx's thinking as “materialist and atheist” aligns far better with such interpretations than it does with what Marx actually wrote. In sections III and IV we criticize Sperber's “contextualist” approach to dealing with ideas in history. His approach may seem reminiscent of Quentin Skinner’ s, but where Skinner deploys the discursive conventions prevailing in a past time to illuminate theoretical ideas, Sperber reduces theoretical ideas to context. We name Sperber's approach “theoretical nominalism,” a term that we use to denote the view that theoretical ideas are nothing but interventions into particular situations. We end by suggesting that greater attentiveness to philosophy and theory would have enriched Sperber's efforts in this book.     

Agents of knowledge: Marxist identity politics in the Revisionismusstreit

To be Marxist at the turn of the twentieth century was highly contested. During this crisis of Marxism, identity politics were acute, exemplified by the private and public debate between Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky. With Bernstein's celebrated turn away from the Marxist theory of his day, the grounds for being Marxist were at stake. Was it possible to criticise Marx's analysis of industrial capitalism, his account of historical change and his hard-nosed class politics, and yet still be in a position to carry his name forward? Moreover, the springing-up of another identity, Revisionist, suggested that being Marxist was ambiguous. If one accepted Bernstein's and the Revisionists' point that Marxists had become too orthodox, leaving Revisionists as the true heirs of Marx's critical socialist spirit, then the Marxist identity was so open as to be meaningless. In this article, I contend that the name-calling of this period, the Revisionismusstreit, should be seen as creative. In contrast to politico-ideological perceptions of the Streit, which construe the clash of Marxist and Revisionist as representative of foundational Social Democratic party political realities, I highlight the manner in which being Marxist—the veneration of Marx's and Friedrich Engels's word into a Marxology of sorts by Marxists and Revisionists alike—held a certain epistemic value in its own right.     

Whispered Utopia: Dreams,Agendas, and Theocratic Aspirations in Yehud

ABSTRACT

To provide collective meaning to displacement and subsequent immigration, the authors of the Persian-period Hebrew texts such as Ezra-Nehemiah construct a schema of theocratic utopia. To be clear, however, the expressed theocratic aspirations of the golah community can only be de-scribed in utopian terms because a theocracy had never existed previously in the histories of Israel or Judah. Using Thomas More's model of Utopia this article compares the agendas and aspirations recorded in relevant Persian-period Hebrew texts to selected components or structures of Utopia. It will al-so express a working definition of theocracy and explain why it should be read in utopian terms. While the similarities will be informative, the differ-ences will reveal different visions of utopia; More's will stem from a more social-economic base while that portrayed in the Hebrew texts will stem from a particular religious base. For both, visions of a utopian society are encour-aged by circumstances in which conflict appears to balefully outweigh con-sensus.

A utopia is literally a “nowhere land,” an ideal society in another place, where justice prevails, where people are perfectly content, and from which sadness, pain and violence have been banned. Utopias, although fictions, are characterized by a conviction that the envisioned society will in fact be with-out problems. Other distinguishing features of utopias are that they are ex-tremely critical in regard to the present society, and contain the “blueprints” for a completely new state. (Marius de Geus)

The trebling of the population in this small and impoverished country, flowing with milk and honey but not with sufficient water, rich in rocks and sand dunes but poor in natural resources and vital raw materials, has been no easy task: Indeed, practical men, with their eyes fixed upon things as they are, regarded it as an empty and insubstantial utopian dream. (David Ben Gurion, NY Herald Tribune 28 Apr 63)

Vtopia priscis dicta, ob infrequentiam, Nunc ciuitatis aemula Platonicae,

Fortasse uictrix, (nam quod illa literis Deliniauit, hoc ego una praestiti, Viris & opibus, optimisque legibus) Eutopia merito sum uocanda nomine. (Anemolius [in T. More, Utopia])     

FROM LEFT‐WING TO COMMUNIST MELANCHOLY: TRAVERSO'S WAGER

Enzo Traverso's inspired book Left‐Wing Melancholia revisits iconic representations of revolutionary hopes and defeats not to draw up an inventory of what has been lost but rather to remind his readers that past defeats also contain the traces of unfulfilled possibilities. After the end of the Soviet Union and the global triumph of neoliberal capitalism, the communist utopian imagination of a classless society, Traverso suggests, can be reignited through memorial practices of resilient, resistant melancholy. Traverso's argument draws on Walter Benjamin's notions of materialist history, redemptive memory, and knowing melancholy. Yet the nameless vanquished masses to whom Benjamin's concept of history seeks to do justice remain marginal in Traverso's book. Instead, revolutionary defeat is cast in the tragic mold of succeeding by failing, a trope exemplified by figures such as Auguste Blanqui, Charles Péguy, or Daniel Bensaïd. In response to Traverso's reliance on the transhistorical category of the tragic, this essay argues for a more abstractly theoretical understanding of left‐wing melancholy as conditioned by historically specific class relations that constrain and challenge the engaged intellectual. Moreover, this essay questions Traverso's dualistic treatment of politically committed (Benjamin, Brecht, C. L. R. James) and elitist intellectuals (Adorno) and concludes that the concept of left‐wing melancholy must ultimately be interrogated against the backdrop of a lingering uncertainty about the relationship between theory and praxis that, as Adorno claims, one can already find in Karl Marx—an uncertainty that is hence inscribed into the history of any Marxist theory of revolution and history.     

From the ‘spirit of capital’ to the “spirit” of capitalism: The transition in German economic thought between Lujo Brentano and Max Weber

I dedicate this essay to the memory of the late Wolfgang Mommsen—the subject would have been congenial to him. It is one of a series of offshoots from a central project: a scholarly edition of Max Weber's Protestant Ethic with commentary. When I first told Prof. Mommsen of my plan in 1994 he looked me full in the face and gave a characteristic growl: “All that work!” Here was a man who knew what he was about. My thanks to Ross McKibbin and Keith Tribe for reading this paper in draft.

The article begins by examining Max Weber's relations with Lujo Brentano, much the most important “precursor” to Weber in the field of economics. In particular, Brentano conducted a form of parallel inquiry into the rise of ‘the spirit of capital’ in England 35 years before Weber looked for the origins of “spirit” of capitalism there, and the contrast between these two ideas casts much light both on Brentano and on Weber's Protestant Ethic. This personal history leads into a broader history of the transition in German economic thought between the 1860s – the formative decade for Brentano but also the era of Marx's Capital – and that of Weber's generation coming to maturity c.1890. Marx and Weber remain the two great canonical thinkers and original minds; but any authentic historical comparison between Marx and Weber must take in Brentano. The essence of the contrast between the generations is that between Weber's novel conception of an ethical ‘capitalism’, and the materialism and naturalism underpinning Brentano's and Marx's ‘capital’, although Weber and Brentano are alike as liberals, democrats and bourgeois.     

Liberty and Community: A Liberal Resolution

Much has been written in the last few years regarding Leo Strauss's political attachments, especially with respect to his purported influence over American neoconservatives. Problematically, Strauss scrupulously avoided explicit ideological entanglements, rarely addressed particular policy debates, and left little guidance for the statesman or thoughtful commentator interested in drawing practical political inferences from his philosophical writing. To add further ambiguity to already muddy waters, Strauss's discussion of the relation between prudence and philosophic insight coupled with the many and incompatible roles he assigns to the philosopher within the city make it unclear if there is anything at all that philosophy can teach us of political significance. The following essay aims to explain Strauss's view of the political function of philosophy in light of his distinction between classic and modern utopianism and what he calls in On Tyranny "philosophic politics."     

THE COMMONPLACES OF “REVISION” AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR HISTORIOGRAPHICAL UNDERSTANDING

Recognizing the contingent entanglement between historiography's social and political roles and the conception of the discipline as purely factual, this essay provides a detailed analysis of “revision” and its connection to “revisionism.” This analysis uses a philosophical approach that begins with the commonplaces of our understanding as expressed in dictionaries, which are compared and contrasted to display relevant confusions. The essay then turns to examining the questions posed by History and Theory's Call for Papers announcing its Theme Issue on Revision in History, and, where philosophically relevant, answers them. The issue of paradigm change proved to be quite significant and required particular attention. A “paradigm” is analyzed in terms of Quine's “web of belief,” and that web is itself explained as an ongoing process of revision, in analogy with Rawls's concept of pure procedural justice. Adopting this approach helps clarify the entanglement between politics and historiographical revision.     

Counterfactualism,utopia, and historical geography: Kim Stanley Robinson's The Years of Rice and Salt

Though counterfactual histories are treated with suspicion by some historians, they can be both useful and politically progressive. In fact it is possible to argue that counterfactual historical geographies might even be utopian. Though this seems counter-intuitive (how could alternative histories imagine a better future?), both histories and utopias encourage a kind of popular historicism, a sense that things have been (and could be) different. Whether this makes counterfactual fictions utopian depends on how you define utopia. Recent critical re-appraisals of the concept have suggested that we might think of it as a process, an ongoing critique of the present, not as an end in itself. Counterfactual histories can be utopian because they encourage a critique of teleology and determinism; their geographies can also be utopian because they remind us that spaces are multiple and open. A close reading of Kim Stanley Robinson's Years of Rice and Salt (2002), a novel that describes a world without Europe after a more virulent version of the fourteenth-century plague kills everyone west of Constantinople, demonstrates that counterfactual historical fictions present an unequalled opportunity to reflect upon the practice of history. The novel also suggests that counterfactual historical fictions also allow for a critical evaluation of the nature of space. The paper concludes by demonstrating the value of counterfactual fictions through their representations of history, and of spaces of movement, multiplicity, and agonistic encounter.     

Marx,Engels, and the Ethics of Violence in Revolt

Marx and Engels's thought—combined with the way in which it has been interpreted—has tended to militate against discussion of an ethics of violence in revolt. Along with Sorel and Fanon, their attitude towards violence is often seen simply as one where the ends justify the means and where violence in pursuit of a just society is necessarily defensible. However, we can (and should) look to certain sources within Marx and Engels for inspiration for an ethics of violence in revolt, which places emphasis on the humanizing aspects of their work, on the core ideas of freedom, moving beyond dehumanization and moving beyond violence. I argue that this approach suggests an abhorrence of any violence and can thus be combined with a pacifist-influenced approach to the ethics of violence in revolt. This is compatible with Ernst Bloch's interpretation of Marxism, which he describes as “concrete utopianism.” Classical Marxism can, then, offer fruitful pointers to an ethics of violence in political change, although Marx and Engels's texts must be used with considerable care and must be combined with the work of other thinkers, in particular those who display more explicit moral objection to violence of any kind.     

The Durham Gentry and the Scottish March, 1370–1400: County Service in Late Medieval England

Abstract

The study of landed society has moved beyond the polarizing paradigms of 'community' and 'affinity', and now ensures a healthy respect for regional variation based upon numerous variables. In the North-East, it has long been understood that great landlords, secular as well as ecclesiastics, were critical to the defence of the Scottish March and were thus vested with a great deal of authority by Crown and country. It would therefore be very much to be expected that local landed society and politics would be dominated by the region's great affinities, such as those of the Nevilles and the Percies, along with that of the bishop of Durham. But close study of the landed community reveals a more complex picture, one in which members of the region's gentry often achieved real measures of independence, many attending their affairs far outside these great baronial retinues and households, and building wealth and careers over time independent of the region's great magnates, who exercised such a profound influence over national affairs. Their holdings, careers, and political activities are the main subjects of this essay.