Peleliu 1944: The Archaeology of a South Pacific D-Day

Abstract

In September 1944, US Marines invaded the tiny Micronesian island of Peleliu in the Palau group, held by the Japanese. It would become one of the worst battles of the Pacific War, but the struggle for Peleliu was afterwards largely overlooked in the public consciousness in favour of the better- known conflicts on Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima. Tourist impact on the island, with its community of only six hundred native Palauans, poses acute issues of heritage management relating not only to the integrity of the sites but also to the hazards of unexploded ordnance that is present in massive quantities. This paper presents the preliminary results of an archaeological investigation of the best-preserved battlefield of the Pacific theatre.     

State functioning and state failure in the South Pacific

The South Pacific region features enormous variation in state performance. While Polynesian nations such as Samoa have proved to be relatively successful post-colonial states, Melanesian countries like the Solomon Islands are increasingly categorised as 'weak', 'failing' or 'failed' states. Drawing on a range of comparative studies by economists and political scientists in recent years, this article argues that cross-country variation in ethnic diversity between much of Polynesia and Melanesia is a key factor in explaining differences in state performance across the South Pacific. It shows how different kinds of ethnic structure are associated with specific political and economic outcomes, including variation in political stability, economic development, and internal conflict from country to country. In so doing, it helps explain why some parts of the South Pacific appear to be failing while others are relative success stories - and why this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.     

China and the emerging regional order in the South Pacific

As China rises, it has become increasingly aggressive in applying its soft power in the Pacific. What does China's arrival mean for the emerging regional order in the Pacific? What is it up to in the strategic backwater of the Pacific, which has traditionally been regarded as an ‘American lake’ and Australia's ‘special patch’? Setting my analysis in the broad context of China's new global diplomacy, I argue that the pattern of China's assertive behaviour in the Pacific is no different from its approach to other regions in the global South. I further argue that with only limited strategic, diplomatic and economic investment in the Pacific, China has become a regional power by default. The arrival of China, therefore, is unlikely to provoke any new round of great power competition. Rather, it offers opportunities for the world's second most formidable development challenge.