Edward I’s armies

This article reassesses some of the evidence for Edward I’s armies, and suggests that the extent to which these armies anticipated the organisation and tactics used in the Hundred Years War should not be exaggerated. Cavalry numbers are hard to calculate, but historians may have underestimated the quantity of support staff. While horses were imported at the time of the Welsh wars, there is little evidence for this in Edward’s later years. Infantry forces were large and well organised in theory, but desertion was a major problem. Commanders, especially castle constables, had considerable experience. For some, pay and rewards were inadequate. Engineers were highly skilled, with notable achievements in castle warfare and bridge building. The crown’s chief concern in providing supplies was to ensure that there was sufficient for the royal household and for castle garrisons. Battles were few, and evidence for innovative tactics is thin. Bannockburn provided a test for the type of army developed under Edward I, a test which was failed. After 1314 new solutions were needed.     

The Kosovo—and Montenegro—effect

The post‐communist space continues to generate new internationally recognized states while incubating unrecognized but de facto states. Recent movement in the Balkans—the independence of Montenegro and the arduous deliberations over Kosovo's future —have variously encouraged other secessionist people and would‐be states, particularly in the former Soviet Union. This article analyses the impact of developments in Montenegro and Kosovo on several levels, including: their usage by de facto states; the reactions to them by central governments; Russian policy; and western and intergovernmental responses to these challenges. The article further argues that the Russian position on Kosovo and on the so‐called ‘frozen’ or unsettled conflicts neighbouring Russia could ultimately backfire on it. Western policy towards both Kosovo and on the post‐Soviet frozen conflicts will be best served by signalling to Russia, irrespective of the exact form of Kosovo's independence, that neither its own interests nor broader western‐Russian relations are served by using or reacting to any Kosovo ‘precedent’.