中国共产党与中国电影文化运动

以成立中国电影文化协会为标志的中国电影文化运动,是20世纪30年代中国左翼文化运动的重要组成部分,这一运动从兴起到抗战全面爆发,始终得到中国共产党的积极支持和直接领导,无论是电影创作与生产,还是电影理论批评,都显示出中国电影发生了巨大转变.很多本身即为共产党人的左翼文艺工作者,通过与电影界的交往、合作,广泛吸纳电影界人士加入左翼阵营;而当时的电影演员也大多直接或间接参与了这一运动,他们通过发表电影评论,开展电影创作,使左翼电影深入社会各阶层,大大传播了中共的主张,发扬了进步电影艺术,推动了中国早期电影的发展,显示了中共夺取新的文化阵地的力量.     

李德来华的身份及任务新探

从20世纪80年代开始,一些回忆和研究文章认为,李德的真实身份是苏联情报人员,他任中共中央军事顾问不是共产国际派遣的,而是中共临时中央负责人博古邀请的。近年来俄罗斯公布的档案资料证明:李德到达中国后的身份是苏联红军参谋部第四局人员。苏联红军参谋部第四局的确是情报部门,但其对中国的工作性质与共产国际有着密不可分的关系。李德是被苏联红军参谋部第四局派到远东局工作的,任务是整理中国苏区的军事报告,供联共(布)、共产国际高层进行有关决策参考;并作为中共中央军事顾问组成员,协助远东局书记埃韦特指导中国苏区的军事行动。李德到中央苏区指导军事工作是经远东局提议共产国际批准的,不是应博古邀请而去的。     

20世纪30年代自由主义者对中国共产党的批评与指责--以《独立评论》为例

《独立评论》周围的一些自由知识分子,在严重外患的背景下,站在民族主义立场上,逐渐认同国民党而反对共产党;同时本来根深蒂固的自由主义立场,自然也使他们对中共进行了许多批评;此外。在国民党统治区的言论环境中,他们对中共的认识还很难摆脱偏见和错误。具体把握30年代这些自由知识分子对中共的态度,对认识这一群体在中国现代史上的政治特征及政治走向具有重要意义。     

抗战后期美洲洪门致公堂的政治参与——以“美洲《十报宣言》事件”为中心的考察

论文依据国民政府应对“美洲《十报宣言》事件”的往来函电,结合美国联邦调查局对该事件的调查报告,探讨抗战后期美洲洪门致公堂作为华侨社团的政治参与及国共两党的回应,说明以美洲洪门致公堂为代表的美洲华侨对中国共产党民主理念的认同。“美洲《十报宣言》事件”,是抗战胜利前夕美洲洪门致公堂办的报纸与中国共产党党员所实际负责的报纸联合发表宣言,号召中国国民党结束一党专政,成立民主政府的事件。该事件涉及抗战后期美洲华侨中的三股主要力量——中国共产党、中国国民党以及以美洲洪门致公堂为代表的美洲华侨主体,引起蒋介石与国民政府的高度关注和直接干预。在美洲洪门致公堂以社团形式还是政党形式存在的问题上,中国国民党与美洲洪门致公堂出现了无法调和的矛盾。相较于中国国民党不愿承认致公堂作为独立政治团体的身份,中国共产党联合政府口号则使致公堂看到回国参政的可能性,由此获得了致公堂的政治认同。     

Leadership transfer in the Asian revolution: Mao Zedong and the Asian Cominform

On the eve of the victory of the Chinese revolution, Mao Zedong became interested in creating an Asian Cominform. Although Stalin agreed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) should lead the Asian revolution and agreed in principle to the idea of an Asian Cominform, he was not in favour of immediate action. After hearing Moscow's opinion, the CCP started to train communist cadres from Asian countries. The CCP gained actual leadership of the Asian revolution after China's entry into the Korean War. Although the Asian Cominform was not formally established, China became the centre of the Asian revolution in the 1950s.     

Boosting nationalism with non‐nationalist ideology: A comparative biographical analysis of the Chinese communist revolutionaries

This article conducts a comparative biographical analysis to explain why the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) revolutionaries used non‐nationalist Marxism to boost a nationalist movement. It argues that these people, based on their own observations of the precommunist Chinese nationalism, thought that China lacked structural conditions for making a solid nationalist movement such as cultural homogeneity, mass literacy, and a shared pride in modern history. They thus turned to seek a non‐national ideology that could still fulfil the functions of integrating leading elites, mobilizing the masses, and motivating the patriots themselves. Then, to explain why the CCP leaders particularly adopted Marxism, this article draws comparison with the Kuomintang (non‐communist nationalists) elites who advocated for more patience and insistence to develop regular nationalism. The comparison shows that the CCP's impatient jump stemmed from their disadvantaged backgrounds that had limited their ideological horizon: lower‐class origins, narrow overseas experiences, poor education, and weak attachment to traditional culture. To pre‐existing literature, this article makes three contributions: (1) provides a more detailed interpretation of the CCP's diagnosis of Chinese nationalism; (2) explains why the same structural dilemmas produced nationalist and non‐nationalist responses alike; and (3) draws a biographical database of the CCP and the Kuomintang.     

The cultivation of Communist cadres during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression

During the Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made great progress in its cultivation of cadres. The favorable environment of the National United Front made it possible for the CCP to successfully train a large number of cadres with intellectual backgrounds while continuously using and promoting those who came from worker or peasant backgrounds. By so doing, the CCP raised the quality of its cadres. The CCP’s cultivation of its cadres during the War of Resistance was a systematic undertaking, with interrelated and mutually reinforcing components of education, training, examination, criticism, and self-criticism. Based on cadre self-consciousness and training, a regularized yet not rigid process of cadre cultivation was established. During the same period, the CCP also launched a rectification campaign (Zhengfeng yundong) to further unify and transform the Party. This important movement also left a deep mark on the cultivation of Communist cadres.     

Soviet–Japanese relations and the strategic interests of the Guomindang and the CCP – Chiang Kai‐shek's planning of sanctions against the CCP in 1943

When in 1943 the Guomindang launched its third wave of anti‐communist campaigns, Mao Zedong considered that Chiang Kai‐shek had acted in the belief that Japan would soon invade the Soviet Union. Hitherto, Chinese historians have either ignored Mao's judgment or failed to provide convincing explanations for it. There are two reasons for this attitude: first, historians have failed to appreciate the strategic implications of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan for relations between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); and second, relevant evidence regarding the events has not been available in document on Chiang. This essay answers questions raised by both points. Most commentators have claimed that this third anti‐Communist push ended by the middle or late July of 1943. However, Chiang in fact continued to make plans to mop up Shaanbei (the Communist‐controlled northern Shaanxi area) and impose sanctions on the Communists. The formulation, revision and eventual abandonment of Chiang's plans are also addressed in this essay.     

Sharing a similar fate: the historical process of the Korean Communists’ merger with the Chinese Communist Party (1919–1936)

In their early history, the Chinese and Korean Communists had little contact with one another. However, similar fates brought them together, and some Korean revolutionaries in China voluntarily joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After a futile effort to establish a Communist party in Korea, the Korean Communists shifted their attention to Chinese Manchuria. Under extremely difficult circumstances, different factions of the Korean Communist organizations either willingly or under force disbanded. However, after winning support from the Comintern, the CCP recruited a substantial number of Korean Communists. Thus, within a short period of time, the CCP expanded its strength in Manchuria. It also shouldered responsibility for assisting the Korean Communists in their efforts to establish their own party. In the aftermath of the September 18th Incident in 1931 the CCP Central Committee called for an armed struggle against the Japanese invaders. The Korean Communists in Manchuria became a force to be reckoned with. After the CCP gradually shifted the focus of its policy toward the War of Resistance against Japan, the Korean Communists in China became integrated into the CCP army.     

走向分裂:从暗中斗争到公开论战——1960年代中苏关系研究之二

1961年后期,为了将中苏关系缓和的局面继续维持下去,中共中央对苏共二十二大采取了暗中斗争的方略,对定性为是集修正主义之大成的苏共新党纲不做公开直接的批判。其后,随着中国国内经济状况的好转,中共从维护阿尔巴尼亚党人手,开始着手与苏共进行新一轮意识形态斗争。中苏关系缓和的局面结束。1962年新疆中国边民外逃苏联的伊塔事件、中苏在加勒比海危机和中印边界战争期间的外交较量,不同程度地影响了中共中央对中苏关系性质的认识,影响了两党继续务实地寻求共同利益,求同存异,保持关系的基本稳定。特别是毛泽东把中共党内反省三年来政策失误时显露的否：毫“大跃进”、人民公社、总路线的倾向,当作是对赫鲁晓夫关于中共国内政策批评的呼应,进而：重新检讨与苏关系问题,警惕国内外修正主义分子勾结起来进行颠覆活动。与此同时,国际左派队伍的形成使中共领导人认为,中共作为共运领导中心的条件已具备、时机也已成熟。中共做出了中苏两党矛盾已成为敌我性质、赫鲁晓夫已成为资产阶级代言人的判断。毛泽东最终调整对苏方针的基调,改以妥协、让步、缓和关系为主为以主动进攻、做针锋相对的斗争为主。中共开始与苏共进行关于国际共运总路线的大论战。中苏两党关系的破裂成为定局。     

Li Hanjun's views on socialism

This article examines Li Hanjun's views on socialism. Li Hanjun was one of the main founders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and expressed his vision and ideas of socialism during the 1920s. Like many other Communists in the early CCP, he was convinced that China should take a socialist road. Yet, in respect to how to realise socialism and what kind of socialist society should be built, Li held a view different from most of them. In his opinion, the governing institutions in a socialist society should be democratic and autonomous rather than centralist and bureaucratic; production and distribution should be administered and managed by an association of free and equal producers in the form of cooperatives instead of by the state and its officials. These views were quite distinct from the Soviet centralised state socialism and the dictatorship by a ruling elite. However, his ideas and designs of the economic and political institutions in socialist society were consonant with Marx on many points. Besides examining Li Hanjun's socialist views, this research also attempts to explore his philosophical inclinations and political orientation, in order to explain why he could conceive such special ideas of a socialist fabric.     

试论“党内合作”的历史局限性——党内合作限制了中共对领导权的争取

党内合作是第一次国共合作所采取的形式,但这种合作形式也存在着明显的历史局限性,即限制了中共对统一战线领导权的争取.这种限制作用突出表现在:孙中山坚持国民革命应由国民党领导,决不放弃对国民党的领导权;国民党始终保持着对共产党人的防范心态,不允许共产党在国民党内坐大;国民党组织力的加强,为推动国民革命所必须,却又强化着对中共活动的约束;共产党的发展却催生着统一战线走向瓦解乃至最终破裂.中共争取领导权斗争的挫败,决定了国民革命失败的结局.     

Building a Venture Capital Market in Vietnam: Diffusion of a Neoliberal Market Strategy to a Socialist State

Abstract

Vietnam’s venture capital (VC) industry took shape in the late 1990s during a period of exceptional economic growth in the country and the development of its high-technology sector. High growth rates and technological advances have typically coincided with both strong VC market activity and state support of equity financing. This, however, has not been the case in Vietnam. In this article a policy diffusion framework is used to investigate the international and domestic origins of Vietnam’s nascent VC policies, and how they became part of the agenda of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) as credit-based, rather than equity-based, solutions. The article argues that Vietnam’s heterodox approach to VC policy results from both external forces from donors and from domestic factors. In particular, Vietnamese policymakers have a preference for credit-based SME financing solutions and Vietnam’s official development assistance providers diffuse expertise on loans, not equity investments, to the Socialist Republic. The only donors recommending VC and equity-based financing in Vietnam have gone “around the state” rather than through it by working directly with the private sector. As a result, Vietnam’s SME financing initiatives have significantly diverged from international VC policy patterns.     

战后自由主义者民族复兴的路径选择(1945—1949)——以自由主义期刊中的中共形象为中心

抗战胜利后,中国面临民族复兴的重要时代机遇,自由主义者以"中间道路"相号召,形成了不同于国共两党的民族复兴的蓝图设计。本文以自由主义政论期刊对中共的评价为切入点,从分析共产党的社会主义理论与新民主主义路线、共产党的性质、共产党现行政策及其政绩三方面展现自由主义期刊中的中共形象,并以此为视角,从一个侧面彰显和印证自由主义者特有的民族复兴的路径选择。     

The evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's policy on the bourgeoisie (1949–1952)

From its very beginning, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had a shifting policy towards the bourgeoisie. Until the early 1940s, it maintained a relatively stable policy which successfully isolated the monied classes in China and helped it overthrow the rule of the KMT. But with the establishment of the new regime, the CCP Central Committee came under conflicting pressures: on the one hand it continued its former policy out of political expediency; on the other hand, based on traditional socialist political theory and Soviet experience, it kept a close watch on the bourgeoisie and even proposed targeting them as the chief enemy of next revolution. After the establishment of the PRC, as a result of the failing economy and the new government's lack of economic support and political experience, the CCP firmed up its policies on the bourgeoisie. However, with the bourgeoisie and capitalism still prominent elements in Chinese society, the communists became uncertain about which direction to take. As the CCP Central Committee had anticipated, officials of both the party and the government often gave way to corruption after taking over major cities. The Central Committee regarded this particular combination of money and power as a “violent attack” against the new communist regime by the bourgeoisie as a whole. In order to tighten its grip on national power, the Central Committee launched two anti‐corruption movements known as the Three‐Antis and the Five‐Antis. These movements were in fact aimed at the bourgeoisie as a whole, and succeeded in destroying the basis for capitalist business in the New China. Encouraged by this outcome, the CCP launched a policy of socialist transformation aimed at depriving Chinese capitalists of their means of production. Thus the CCP gradually and inevitably moved away from its original policy of cooperation with the national bourgeoisie.     

The political commentary on May Fourth in 1950s Hong Kong and Taiwan

Abstract

“May Fourth” has long been considered a turning point for modern China, resulting in continuous heated discussion on the topic since the 1920s. These discussions not only reexamine culture but also have political intent. Many recent scholars have discussed the “ideologization” of May Fourth from the perspective of “memory politics.” They argue that “May Fourth discourse” was not only used to understand and recapture the past, but also to help one’s own cherished values occupy a core position in modern Chinese history, thus using historical interpretation to create a compass for China’s future that conforms to historical tides. From the four great philosophies of modern China, the Nationalists and Communists have incorporated May Fourth into the “Three People’s Principles” and “New Democracy,” respectively. Liberals held up democracy and science as a need for China’s future, and made efforts to propagate and practice democracy in Hong Kong and Taiwan after 1949. As for New Confucians who had continuously criticized May Fourth for being anti-tradition, they supported traditional values but also believed that democracy and science were a “priority and necessity for China's cultural development,” and hoped to use the spirit behind this ideal. They along with liberals criticized the Nationalist and Communist autocracy for departing from May Fourth ideals, and especially noted how May Fourth created fertile ground for the rise and expansion of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), “resulting in the growth of the Communist Party,” and the Nationalist government’s move to Taiwan. After 1949, Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and the Guomindang (GMD) Nationalist Party he led primarily assessed the May Fourth Movement by synthesizing the views of the liberals and New Confucians. They highlighted the slogans of saving the nation, ethics, democracy, and science to promote ethical education and “national spirit education” as top-priority cultural policies. The focus of this article is to examine how liberals and New Confucians used the topic of May Fourth to criticize the CCP and GMD in Hong Kong and Taiwanese political commentary magazines during the 1950s (approximately 1949–1960). It also explores how the GMD synthesized liberal and New Confucian views to lay out their own position. This discourse shows how May Fourth had diverse interpretations under the context of conflict between the liberals and the New Confucians as well as Nationalists and Communists. The criticism of the ideologization of May Fourth in recent years is actually an important turning point in the scholarly study of May Fourth.     

The effect of the telegraph on law and order,war, diplomacy,and power politics

Abstract

Until the invention of the electric telegraph in the 1830s, transferring messages at speeds greater than that of a galloping horse was on the whole an unreliable process and one that could produce ambiguous results. The electric telegraph was pioneered on the Continent, but commercialisation was left to the Englishmen Charles Wheatstone and William Fothergill Cooke, who built the first public line in 1839. From that date until well after the end of the First World War, the British dominance of worldwide telegraph cable production and ownership was overwhelming. This article traces some of the more significant effects of the telegraph in general, and of the British telegraphic hegemony in particular, in the spheres of politics, international diplomacy, and law and order.     

Disciplined love: the Chinese Communist Party’s wartime restrictions on cadre love and marriage

ABSTRACT

During the Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the Civil War, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) imposed restrictions on the marriage of its cadres, so as to maintain the Party’s effective control and combat cohesion. The Central Committee of the CCP did not issue uniform regulations on this topic; most decisions were made by the base areas, with the indirect support of the Central Committee. Marriage and love are personal matters, and the restrictions certainly caused emotional suffering for ordinary cadres affected. However, there were important reasons for the CCP’s implementation of these measures. Through punishment and guidance, these restrictions were carried out smoothly and did not cause great upheaval. As love and marriage became areas subject to the political power of the CCP, they unexpectedly became a focal point of the collision between individuality and Party spirit and between the individual and the group.     

中共十六大与八大的比较研究

八大是中国共产党成为执政党后召开的第一次全国代表大会,这次代表大会分析了生产资料所有制的社会主义改造基本完成后的形势,提出了全面开展社会主义建设的任务,在指导思想、政治路线和组织路线上都有重要建树,对探索中国特色社会主义的道路产生了深远的影响。十六大是中国共产党执政52年后在新世纪召开的第一次全国代表大会,也是中国共产党在开始实施社会主义现代化建设第三步战略部署的新形势下召开的一次具有深远影响的重要大会。对八大和十六大进行比较研究,可以发现其一脉相承的内在联系,可以加深对十六大确立的指导思想、奋斗目标、组织路线的认识。     

Market Creation by Leninist Means: The Regulation of Financial Services in the People’s Republic of China

Abstract

Within the process of China’s transition from a centrally-administered to a more market-oriented economy, financial services have played a very special role, but in a counter-intuitive way: what looks like Western market economics turns out to be a Leninist regulatory model. Even as international financial service providers and regulatory communities are invited to play a role in the creation of a Chinese market in financial services, the Communist Party has strengthened its control of top personnel, the judiciary and the media. The reform of the central bank and the establishment of technically independent regulatory agencies seemed to have taken China down the path of OECD economies. The model of a very specific post-regulatory state with Chinese characteristics, however, has not fully incorporated the notion of private authority. Such an acceptance would pose a threat to the CCP monopoly on political power. The attempt to use only semi-private organisations to develop financial markets undermines the long-term stability of the political and economic order.