Pakistan,militancy and identity: parallel struggles

This article focuses on the dominant and parallel struggles that have been carried out in Pakistan in terms of its Islamic identity since 9/11. It argues that the Pakistan government has legitimised and explained its partnership with the US government in countering terrorism through a discourse that makes use of Islamic symbols. The Islamists have engaged in a similar process, arguing for jihad against the enemies of Islam. Simultaneously, a tension has persisted between liberal/progressive and orthodox notions of being a Pakistani Muslim, which has been reflected in, for example, the debate on the blasphemy law in Pakistan. It is important that strategies to strengthen Pakistan also creatively empower groups subscribing to liberal/progressive ideas so as to succeed in the struggle against militancy in the long term. The argument is developed in three parts, starting with a discussion of opposing views on Pakistan's identity and the place of Islam as the context for the Pakistan government's participation in the War on Terror. The second part explores features of the opposing discourses adopted by Islamabad and jihadi groups. The third part discusses the parallel tensions between alternative understandings of Pakistan's Islamic identity at the societal level with reference to the blasphemy law. The concluding section suggests a carefully crafted approach to assisting Pakistan at this stage in its history that could also respond to the subordinate tensions.     

Mapping the thematic landscape of Dabiq magazine

This article presents a thematic network analysis of Dabiq—a prominent English-language e-magazine produced by the Islamic State. Through formal qualitative analysis, the article examines the e-magazine’s first 13 issues in order to better understand its structure, evolution and intended audiences. In terms of structure, thematic network analysis provides a comprehensive and holistic understanding of Dabiq’s themes, identifying a range of concerns that are broader and more complex than is often supposed by academic and professional commentators. In terms of evolution, this analysis reveals a thematic landscape that has demonstrated considerable dynamism over four distinct phases throughout the magazine’s publication. In terms of understanding audiences, it is argued that Dabiq has been particularly engaged with the manipulation of group-level identities in an apparent attempt to garner support from global audiences. Themes related to allegiance, the group’s strengths and victories, and territorial expansion all feature consistently and prominently. They seek to create an in-group identity centred on victory, and to frame the Islamic State’s expansion and successes as a group achievement on behalf of Islam itself. Additionally, Dabiq provides the Islamic State with an opportunity to justify its actions and its religious authenticity to a broader Muslim audience, and thus provide the Islamic State with legitimacy beyond its borders. Recognising these thematic dynamics will be important for those engaged in counter-messaging and the development of counternarratives.     

The Islamic State lexical battleground: US foreign policy and the abstraction of threat

This article suggests that President Obama's consistent references to the extremist Sunni group as ‘ISIL’ (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) is not a trivial matter of nomenclature. Instead, the Obama administration's deliberate usage of the ISIL acronym (as opposed to other commonly‐used terms such as ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ or ‘ISIS’, ‘Islamic State’, ‘IS’, ‘so‐called Islamic State’ and ‘Daesh’) frames the public perception of the threat to avoid engagement with the requirements of strategy and operations. Both the labelling and the approach could be defended as a response to the unique challenge of a transnational group claiming religious and political legitimacy. However, we suggest that the labelling is an evasion of the necessary response, reflecting instead a lack of coherence in strategy and operations—in particular after the Islamic State's lightning offensive in Iraq and expansion in Syria in mid‐2014. This tension between rhetoric, strategy and operations means that ‘ISIL’ does not provide a stable depiction of the Islamic State. While it may draw upon the post‐9/11 depiction of ‘terrorism’, the tag leads to dissonance between official and media representations. The administration's depiction of a considered approach leading to victory has been undermined by the abstraction of ‘ISIL’, which in turn produced strategic ambiguity about the prospect of any political, economic or military challenge to the Islamic State.     

Kuwait,Political Violence and the Syrian War

Kuwait’s support of civilians in war-torn Syria has been commended by the international community. In addition, the Gulf state has joined US-led coalitions against the ‘Islamic State’ and affirmed many international agreements designed to choke off international assistance to militias operating in Syria. In 2015, Kuwait paid a heavy price for its involvement, becoming a victim of IS-affiliated terrorism. Whilst this suggests that Kuwait’s position on radical Islamist movements involved in the Syrian conflict is clear cut, this article will argue that Kuwait’s government has had to balance this official position against domestic support for elements of the radical Islamist opposition in Syria. These cross-cutting tensions were underscored by the US designation of the state as the ‘epicentre’ of private fund raising for militias in Syria. To explore these contradictions, this article will analyse Kuwait’s engagement with the Syrian war, its new anti-terror legislation and the tensions between the official and unofficial views on support for foreign militias. This analysis will highlight the challenges the Kuwait government has faced in addressing unofficial Kuwaiti engagement with the radical Islamist opposition in Syria.     

Drones: disembodied aerial warfare and the unarticulated threat

The Obama administration's controversial use of drones in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen has made the subject a hot topic of political and academic discourse. While most of this debate has focused so far on the legal, ethical and prudential use of large armed aerial vehicles, this article seeks to address the potential wider impact of this new technological innovation. The article argues that drones constitute a new and disruptive technology not just in the way that they have been used to enable a new form of counterterrorism. Instead, it argues that drones pose a new form of terrorist threat against the West which is at present under‐analysed, unarticulated and underestimated. Part of the reason for this underestimation is the failure to appreciate the scale and scope of drone use for commercial purposes which is about to unfold. Technological innovation now means that drones will be capable of many jobs currently performed by small planes and helicopters, but more cheaply and easily—in addition to many other new applications. The proliferation of this cheap and easily available technology will make its application for terrorist use easy to achieve and difficult to counter. The ability of drones to penetrate traditional defences and established conceptions of what constitutes a plausible threat is a challenge which so far has gone unheeded. This article seeks to challenge that complacency.     

The Taliban,Public Space,and Terror in Pakistan

Two UK-based specialists on terrorism in Pakistan use empirical evidence to document and analyze the Pakistani Taliban's (Tehrik-e-Taliban) practice of targeting spaces of public interaction for terrorism intended to suppress expressions of public unity and restrict venues for open discussion. In tracing the rise of the Taliban in Pakistan, the authors review the country's history of state and civil society formation, its relations with Afghanistan, and U.S. and Western policy in the region. The authors present timely information and insights that enhance understanding of the recent surge in terrorist attacks on civilians in Pakistan and its ties to the eastward spread of conflict from neighboring Afghanistan.     

Military dominance in Pakistan and China–Pakistan relations

ABSTRACT

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been touted as the centrepiece of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the key to its strategic partnership with Pakistan. Notwithstanding claims about the CPEC’s economic potential, however, Islamabad’s economy continues to be dire. This article attempts to better understand the ramifications of Pakistan’s economic viability and its consequences for China. It does so by examining China–Pakistan relations from the lens of Pakistan’s civil–military relations, paying attention in particular to what the Pakistan Armed Forces (PMA)’s domestic dominance means for China’s interests, including economic interests, in Pakistan. We suggest that PMA preponderance and its attendant influence on the country’s economic performance bring another dimension to interpreting Sino-Pakistani relations. As Beijing’s most trusted political partner in Pakistan, the PMA’s local dominance has considerable benefits for China, particularly in the security and political aspects of its interests. However, this dominance also entails a number of complications for Chinese economic interests, a factor that has implications for the future of China’s CPEC investments and their financial sustainability.     

The cultural paradiplomacy of Barcelona since the 1980s: understanding transformations in local cultural paradiplomacy

This article seeks to explain the conditions for the emergence and institutionalization of the cultural paradiplomacy of the city of Barcelona and its local effects. The recognition of the city as an active participant on the international stage is based on its evolution from an industrial to a service economy. Against this backdrop, Barcelona’s city council, in common with many other city authorities operating in the world’s metropolises during the 1980s, initiated its own cultural paradiplomacy as a strategy for attracting capital and promoting local development. This policy became established as part of a new multilevel system of governance. This article analyzes the causes of the institutionalization of this activity from an intergovernmental perspective. It concludes that in the context of economic globalization, the emergence of cities’ cultural paradiplomacy is strongly related to the restructuring of the State and its external administration and to the intensification of the ‘cultural branding’ of cities as a tool for global competition.     

The Islamic State,the Kurdistan Region and the future of Iraq: assessing UK policy options

The fall of Mosul in June of 2014 was followed in July by the establishment of a self‐proclaimed Caliphate by the Islamic State of Abu Bakr al‐Baghdadi. Since then, the Islamic State has continued to expand its operations, persistently pushing into Sunni‐dominated parts of Iraq and Syria, nearly defeating the Kurds of Iraq, and moving against the Kurds of Syria, in Kobani, as well as army units of the Syrian state. By doing so, it has maintained an astonishingly high tempo of operations and has shown itself capable, agile and resilient. It has also proved itself to be adept at utilizing social media outlets, and in pursuing brutal tactics against civilians and prisoners that have been aimed at shocking adversaries—potential or actual—and observers both in the region and beyond. The rise of the Islamic State poses a challenge not only to the security of Iraq and Syria, but to the state system of the Middle East. Western powers have been drawn into a conflict in a limited fashion—through air strikes and advising ground forces; the UK, while engaging slightly later than other countries against the Islamic State, has followed this pattern, though targeting Islamic State forces solely in Iraq. This article considers the nature and scale of the threat posed by the Islamic State, and assesses three possible areas of further policy engagement that they UK may, or may have to, follow.     

Fighting the Taliban: Pakistan at war with itself

Some new groups calling themselves Pakistani Taliban with links to the Afghan Taliban have asserted themselves in the tribal areas of Pakistan. This has complicated the internal security scenario for Pakistan. This article traces the roots of the problem and argues that the State with its confessional character emits strong Islamist impulses making it easy for Taliban-like forces to take roots in Pashtun dominated areas in Pakistan. While the process of Talibanisation may not succeed in engulfing the entire state of Pakistan, it will certainly pose a critical internal challenge, contributing to its fragility and compelling Pakistan to stay perennially engaged with its internal security. Roll back is difficult but not impossible. This will involve the strong commitment of the State to take steps to bring about social, economic and political transformation in the Taliban-infested areas, and an effort on the part of the international community to help Pakistan in this critical endeavour.     

Osama or the Georges: Shifting Threats and State Policy towards Civil Society in Uzbekistan

In examining the relationship between the War on Terror and restrictions on civil society, Uzbekistan is an important case, given its emergence as a key player in the operations in Afghanistan, its own terrorist threat, and its particularly stringent policy towards civil society. This article argues that while the ‘crackdown’ on civil society has followed a similar pattern to that of other countries where civil society is perceived as harbouring a threat, there has been a significant shift since the War on Terror began as to the perceived nature of the threat. At the time of 9/11, the government of Uzbekistan took Islamic terrorism to be the main threat; yet within the space of just over two years a new threat was perceived. Western support for civil society, a concession made to the US‐led coalition in return for support against Islamic terrorism, emerged as an even greater threat to the regime. It is this perceived threat that has primarily driven state policy towards civil society, raising important questions about how democracy promotion can be best taken forward in the post‐9/11 world.     

Islamic Banking in Practice: the Case of Pakistan

In Islamic banking rules apply which differ from those in traditional banking. This article first discusses the consequences of Islamic banking for financial operations in general, then goes on to examine the Islamic procedures introduced in Pakistan's banking sector since 1985. Considering the drastic change in procedures, the effect of Islamization on this sector has been moderate. One reason for this is that banks in Pakistan have consistently opted for financial instruments closely resembling interest-based finance. Another reason is that their behaviour has been determined to a large extent by the fact that they are state-owned.     

Ten years on: Obama's war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice

Ten years after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on September 11, 2001, the United States remains embroiled in a long‐term struggle with what George W. Bush termed the existential threat of international terrorism. On the campaign trail, his successor as US President, Barack Obama, promised to reboot the ‘war on terror’. He claimed that his new administration would step back from the rhetoric and much of the Bush administration policy, conducting a counterterrorism campaign that would be more morally acceptable, more focused and more effective—smarter, better, nimbler, stronger. This article demonstrates, however, that those expecting wholesale changes to US counterterrorism policy misread Obama's intentions. It argues that Obama always intended to deepen Bush's commitment to counterterrorism while at the same time ending the ‘distraction’ of the Iraq War. Rather than being trapped by Bush's institutionalized construction of a global war on terror, the continuities in counterterrorism can be explained by Obama's shared conception of the imperative of reducing the terrorist threat to the US. The article assesses whether Obama has pursued a more effective counterterrorism policy than his predecessor and explores how his rhetoric has been reconstituted as the actions of his policy have unfolded. By addressing his policies toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, Guantánamo Bay and torture, the uses of unmanned drone attacks and domestic wire‐tapping, this article argues that Obama's ‘war’ against terrorism is not only in keeping with the assumptions and priorities of the last ten years but also that it is just as problematic as that of his predecessor.     

Talking to the Muslim world: how,and with whom?

The struggle against terrorism in the Middle East, and the success of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in its use of social media to spread its ideas, has led to a search for new messages to counter the appeal of violent extremists. Thus far, United States counter‐messaging has failed to articulate a normative position that is compelling to its target audiences. The US has also not found an effective way to speak to and with other parts of the Muslim world. The article shows that these failures are not accidental but reflect profound factors in American culture and society. The US’ normative position has also failed to take into account the crucial differences between ‘liberals’ and ‘moderates’ in the Muslim world. To proceed one must acknowledge that there are two fundamentally different interpretations of Islam, both of which are supported by a close reading of the Qur’an and other major texts. To draw on that difference, the article shows, requires drawing on voices and resources not available in the US. The article proposes a way forward that both acknowledges the inherent weaknesses and liabilities of the US government as a messenger and points to more credible messengers within the Muslim world.     

Terror or Terrorism? The “Islamic State” Between State and Nonstate Violence

As a non‐state actor that claims its own territory, the “Islamic State” utilizes a spectrum of very different kinds of coercion and violence. Considering the group's aspirations to govern the territories controlled by it, any clear distinction between uses of force and coercion that states typically claim as their legitimate right, and implement terrorist non‐state violence, tends to blur right before our analytically‐focused eyes. This contribution discusses how the group challenges the distinction between “terror from above” and “terrorism from below” as well as the meaning of the dual character of Daesh's belief system between the ideological and the religious for Daesh's repertoire of violence.     

An analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine

This article analyses Dabiq magazine to explore the strategic logic of Islamic State (IS) appeals to English-speaking Muslims. It offers the field a conceptual framework through which to analyse IS’s communications strategy and a top-down empirical study of Dabiq’s contents. This paper argues that Dabiq appeals to its audiences by strategically designing in-group identity, Other, solution and crisis constructs which it leverages via value-, crisis- and dichotomy-reinforcing narratives. By fusing identity- and rational-choice appeals, IS provides its audiences with a powerful ‘competitive system of meaning’ that is designed to shape its readership’s perceptions, polarise their support and drive their radicalisation.     

Walter the Chancellor on Ilghazi and Tughtakin: a prisoner’s perspective

This article concerns two leading Turkish rulers, active in the Near East during the crusading era: Tughtakin of Damascus and Ilghazi of Mardin. They were important commanders, but the surviving sources create difficulties when outlining the contours of characters and cultural perspectives. Muslim authors typically present them as idealised Islamic rulers and yet it is difficult to accept such stereotyped portraits. This article sheds new light on these men, seeking to understand how far they had transitioned from the steppe culture of their forefathers into a more distinctively Islamic mould. It focuses in particular on the Antiochene chronicle written by Walter the Chancellor. He witnessed both rulers at first hand when he was their prisoner in Aleppo in 1119, an experience which left him deeply scarred. This is tainted evidence, yet it will be shown that many of Walter’s observations also provide invaluable insights that deserve to be taken seriously.     

A forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East: US democracy promotion and the ‘war on terror’

Following the 11 September terrorist attacks, a belief has emerged that one of the root causes of Islamic extremism lies in the repressive nature of the regimes that populate the Middle East. Thus the spread of democracy has become a major component of the Bush administration's ‘war on terror’ Previously dismissed as Wilsonian idealism, the promotion of democracy is now considered a strategic necessity to address the threat posed by terrorism. Despite the significant role democracy promotion has played in the present foreign policy of the United States, the focus has tended to be on the more controversial policies of preventive warfare and coalitions of the willing. The purpose of this article is to help rectify this imbalance by examining the role the promotion of democracy plays within the current administration's foreign policy in the Middle East. It considers the logic behind America's ‘forward strategy of freedom’ in the Middle East as well as the likelihood of this strategy succeeding.     

The Abbott government and the Islamic State: a securitised and elitist foreign policy discourse

This article analyses the foreign policy discourse that surrounded the Abbott government’s 2014 decision to fight the Islamic State (IS). An analysis of parliamentary Hansard reveals that the debate featured three prominent axes: the legacy of the 2003 Iraq War; the strategies and objectives of the 2014 mission; and Australia’s domestic terror threat level. Throughout, the Abbott government not only marginalised dissenting views, but also justified its renewed engagement in the Middle East via a highly securitised and elitist foreign policy discourse. This finding has consequences beyond the battle against the IS. It reveals a deep-seated tension between the ideals of democratic pluralism and the reality that securitised and elitist foreign policy discourses protect governments from serious scrutiny.     

State Failure and the Clash of Civilisations: An Examination of the Magnitude and Extent of Domestic Civilisational Conflict from 1950 to 1996

This study quantitatively examines Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' theory using data from the State Failure dataset which focuses on intense and violent internal conflicts between 1950 and 1996. The proportion of state failures which are civilisational has remained mostly constant since 1965. The absolute amount of civilisational conflict has dropped considerably since the end of the Cold War. There is no clear evidence that the overall intensity of civilisational state failures is increasing in proportion to non-civilisational state failures. Also, the predictions of Islam's 'bloody borders' and the Confucian/Sinic-Islamic alliance against the West have not yet occurred. In fact, Islamic groups 'clash' mostly with other Islamic groups. However, the majority of the West's civilisational conflicts, during the Cold War and to a lesser extent after it, are with the Islamic civilisation. Thus it is arguable that Huntington's prediction that the Islamic civilisation is a potential threat to the West is probably more due to the end of the relevance of the Cold War paradigm than any post-Cold War changes in the nature of conflict. This highlights the potential influence of paradigms on policy and should serve as a caution to academics and policy makers to be more aware of the assumptions they make based on any paradigm.