The ‘new historians’ and the origins of the Arab/Israeli conflict

This article traces the debate surrounding the ‘new historians’ which has continued in Israel since the release of Simha Flapan's work The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities in 1987. Since this time numerous Israeli scholars have entered the discussion around the birth of the State of Israel, representing a large array of viewpoints, factual findings and conclusions. The paper investigates the wider implications of this debate within Israel and how it has profoundly affected not only the way Israelis view their past but, just as importantly, how they look to their future.     

The crystallization of Israeli policy against a return of the Arab refugees: April‐December, 1948

Anti-Americanism has been part of Europe's elite discourse at least since the founding of the United States of America in 1776. However, the congruence of antipathy towards America on the mass and elite levels stems largely from events since 1990. While the policies of the administrations of George W. Bush have contributed to this convergence between elite and mass attitudes, its main reasons have been structural. European anti-Americanism has been accompanied by manifestations of anti-Semitism since the nineteenth century. However, the acuity and acerbity of this link is also a phenomenon of the last fifteen years.     

Socio‐spatial mix and inter‐ethnic attitudes: Jewish newcomers and Arab‐Jewish issues in the Galilee

Urban and regional planners tend to recommend spatial mix of socially diverse populations as an appropriate strategy to achieve social equity and improve inter‐group relations. However, the actual impact of such a mix on social relations in general, and inter‐ethnic attitudes in particular, has been subject to on‐going, yet inconclusive, debates among social scientists. This paper adds to the study of these issues by examining the inter‐ethnic attitudes of residents in Jewish ‘new settlements’ (elsewhere termed ‘community settlements’, or ‘mitzpim'), which were established some 15 years ago among the Arab villages of Israel's central Galilee region. We found that despite certain strands of ethnocentrism, most Jewish settlers hold significantly more moderate views on Arab‐Jewish issues than: (a) the general (non‐Galilee) Jewish public in Israel; and (b) the region's Arab population. The influence of the socio‐spatial mix on the moderation of hostile attitudes, at least among the Jews, is analyzed and explained by comparing our data with the findings of previous research on the topic. On the basis of that comparison we conclude that the Arab — Jewish mix in the Galilee, along with socio‐economic characteristics of the Jewish population and the existence of a ‘penetrating group phenomenon’, have combined to moderate Jewish attitudes in the study region. Planners are called upon to use this knowledge.     

‘A Local Terrorist Made Good’: the Callaghan government and the Arab–Israeli peace process, 1977–79

The British government had played an important role during the 1950s and 1960s as a mediator in the Arab–Israeli conflict, most notably through the development of Project Alpha between 1954 and 1956, and through the negotiation of United Nations Security Council resolution 242 in 1967. Between 1977 and 1979, British Prime Minister James Callaghan played a supporting role to US President Jimmy Carter as he negotiated the Camp David Accords of 1978. Callaghan adopted a pro-Israeli stance, cultivating close relations with the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and defending Begin’s position over key issues, particularly his reluctance to remove settlements from the occupied territories. In this respect Callaghan’s government departed from established British policy, even abstaining over United Nations Security Council resolution 446 in March 1979 which condemned continuing Israeli settlement activity. This resulted in damage to Britain’s relations with moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan.     

Attempts at an Arab‐Jewish agreement in Palestine during the thirties

The article argues that a central aspect of Israeli-Polish relations before 1967 was their tripartite nature, involving the two states and Polish Jewry. The main goal of Israeli diplomacy in Poland, to which it subordinated a variety of interests, even those that were central to Israel's foreign policy, was the immigration to Israel of Polish Jewry. The three elements of the triangular relations (Israel, Poland, and Polish Jewry) influenced one another through their policy and behavior, monitored each other, interpreted each other's actions, and reacted accordingly. The aliyah from Poland engendered a new dynamic in the relations. Israel was able to implement its nation-building policy through the immigration of a desired element, and the Polish authorities, by allowing emigration of an unassimilable ethnonational minority, homogenized the nationalizing Polish state. After the massive emigration of the Jews, another element connecting and reshaping the three sides of the triangle emerged: the competition to represent the memory of Polish Jewry, conceived, too, as an instrument in the nation-building process of both states.     

British-Israelists and the “State of Israeli” in the Twentieth Century

British-Israelism was a significant movement in British culture in the twentieth century. At its high-point in the mid-twentieth century, card-carrying members of the British-Israel World Federation numbered in the tens of thousands. Several members of the royal family — including King George VI — publicly declared their adherence to British-Israelist doctrine. They have shared this belief with lawmakers and generals, poets and television personalities. British-Israelists believe that the descendants of the biblical polity of Israel are the Anglo-Saxon people of Britain. As such, the British occupation of Jerusalem in 1917 was seen by British Israelists as an event of incomparable prophetic significance. This article explores the ways in which British-Israelists responded to the changing status of Palestine over the course of the short twentieth century. Drawing on the insights of Zygmunt Bauman and of Andrew Crome, I contend that British-Israelism — at times philo-Semitic, at times anti-Semitic — is fundamentally allosemitic in its attitude towards Israel and the Jews. As such, to paraphrase Crome, British-Israelists can “never interact with Israel on its own terms.”     

Post‐conflict Heritage and Tourism in Cambodia: The Burden of Angkor

The World Heritage Site of Angkor is enduring one of the most crucial, turbulent periods in its 1200‐year history. Since the early 1990s over 20 countries have contributed millions of dollars to help safeguard and restore its temples. As one of Southeast Asia’s premier destinations, Angkor has also seen a 10,000% growth in international tourist arrivals in just over a decade. The challenges arising from the intense convergence of these two paradoxical and unstable agendas—heritage conservation and tourism development—are greatly compounded by Cambodia’s need to recover from war and turmoil. This paper explores the critical trends that have surfaced at Angkor and why the challenges posed by surging tourism have been inadequately addressed. It argues Angkor’s dominant role within Cambodia’s post‐conflict heritage and tourism industries requires closer, more critical attention given recent events in the country. This article is the summary of Winter's book Post‐conflict Heritage, Post‐colonial Tourism (Routledge 2007).     

Israeli Intelligence and the leakage of Khrushchev's “Secret Speech”

Khrushchev's “Secret Speech” of 1956 not only marked a major radical change in the USSR, but when it was published outside the USSR it brought upheaval all over the world. According to conventional knowledge the text of the speech was obtained by the Mossad (the Israeli foreign-intelligence organization) and transmitted to the CIA. A critical examination of the published evidence and accounts contradicts this version and suggests a number of points: the Secret Speech was not secret; Israel was not the single and perhaps not the first source for the text to reach the West; the speech was intended by Khrushchev and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to be disseminated to all communist parties around the world; and it was covertly brought to the knowledge of Western intelligence organizations and the world press by Soviet political and intelligence agencies.