Oversimplifying the Supreme Court

I cannot tell you what a pleasure it is to be at the Supreme Court Historical Society. Of course, the Supreme Court is fortunate to have a Chief Justice who is also Chief Historian. I have read each of Chief Justice Rehnquist's books on the Court, and they are engagingly written narratives filled with a love and knowledge of this institution. The Chief Justice is steeped in the folklore of this remarkable Court as few have ever been. This is just one reason those of us throughout the federal judiciary admire and love the Chief. He has shown kindness to me ever since I was a young law clerk for Justice Lewis Powell. I don't know if it's appropriate or not to dedicate a speech, but I am going to do so anyway. This speech is for him.     

The Judicial and Ancient Game: James Wilson,John Marshall Harlan,and the Beginnings of Golf at the Supreme Court

Golf has a long history at the Supreme Court simply as an entertaining pastime for some of its members. Yet the Justices' interest in the sport can also be viewed as a reflection of the evolving work and culture of the institution and of the nation it serves. This article revisits a few early developments involving the first golfer on the Court (Justice James Wilson), the first golf enthusiast (the first Justice John Marshall Harlan), and the first golfing majority (October Term 1906).     

Heterogeneous Presidential Source Cue Effects on Public Opinion: The Case of the Sotomayor Nomination to the Supreme Court

Do presidential source cues affect public opinion? If so, which types of voters are most susceptible to presidential source cue effects? This study uses a split-ballot experimental design embedded into a nationally representative survey to test for presidential source cue effects, using the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court as the test case. Results detect significant presidential source cue effects. Two factors, respondents' political predispositions and educational level, mediate those cue effects. The conclusion discusses the real world implications of the findings and offers suggestions to improve the use of experiments to test for presidential impacts on of public opinion.     

Supreme Court Declinations

Recently the nation has been awash in matters relating to the complex and sometimes mysterious processes governing the nomination and confirmation of Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. But as our history abundantly shows, by no means every person offered a seat on the Court has decided to accept it.     

Punctuated Equilibrium and the Supreme Court

In the legislative and executive branches, policy scholars have used punctuated equilibrium (PE) theory to describe and explain patterns of change. However, there has been little examination of how PE might apply to courts and legal policy change. This article addresses that gap by providing evidence that legal policy change—here conceptualized as changes in what precedents the Supreme Court most often cites—is governed by PE theory. After making a prima facie case for the applicability of PE theory to the Court, I leverage network rankings of Supreme Court decisions to create a proxy for legal policy change that improves on existing measures. Using both a stochastic process model and an analysis of the punctuations the measure uncovers, I find strong evidence of PE processes.     

The Other Supreme Court

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Pivotal Politics,Presidential Capital,and Supreme Court Nominations

We analyze the Supreme Court nomination process in order to provide a general explanation of presidents' propensity to win confirmation battles even in the face of an ideologically hostile Senate. The analysis serves two purposes. First, we argue that employing the conventional measure of the Senate's power to constrain the president's choice of nominees–the median senator–provides an inaccurate picture of this process. In its stead we argue that the filibuster pivot (or the sixtieth most liberal or conservative senator) more accurately captures the Senate's power over the president (Krehbiel 1998). Second, we argue that even under this more stringent spatial constraint, presidents still have the ability to win most confirmation battles with the Senate. Indeed, our results indicate that presidents often overcome situations where the Senate should reject their nominees, or where it should force them to make a less desirable choice, by invoking political capital.     

The Supreme Court and Juvenile Justice

For so many things I thank the Historical Society profoundly, but place right at the top of my list the delightful opportunity your invitation has given me to read the prior Annual Lectures—interesting, exciting, thoroughly intimidating—touching on the Court's history, its cases, its people, even its wives (the subject of Justice Ginsburg's 1999 lecture). Wholly apart from the Society's many initiatives to preserve the Court's history and increase public awareness of its contributions to our nation, the now nearly three dozen Annual Lectures alone offer an amazing insight into this great institution.