Five Factions,Two Parties: Caucus Membership in the House of Representatives, 1994–2002

This paper examines the extent of ideological cohesion and distinction of two Republican congressional factions (the conservative Republican Study Committee and the moderate Republican Main Street Partnership) and three Democratic congressional caucuses (the moderate Blue Dog Coalition, the liberal Congressional Black Caucus, and the liberal Congressional Progressive Caucus) in the House of Representatives from 1994 to 2002. Whereas much of the literature on congressional caucuses has focused on the reasons members join such groups and the policy and political orientations of those groups, this paper examines how much unity exists in the voting behavior of the members of Congress who join caucuses in comparison to their fellow partisans not in a faction. Although political parties are still a major unifying force for their respective party members, we do find that factional members are more ideologically cohesive than are nonfactional members. Joining a faction is not an insignificant activity for members. Factions allow like-minded colleagues to come together and vote on common issues, at times against direction of their party.     

Congress and Foreign Policy: Toward a More Functional Analysis

Crabb, Cecil V., Jr., and Pat Holt, eds. Invitation to Struggle: Congress, The President and Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980. Pp. xii, 234. $9.75, paper. Franck, Thomas M. and Edward Weisband. Foreign Policy by Congress. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Pp. ix, 357. $15.95, hardbound. Spanier, John, and Joseph Nogee, eds. Congress, The Presidency and American Foreign Policy. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981. Pp. xxxii, 211. $30.00, hardbound; $10.95, paper. Whalen, Charles W., Jr. The House and Foreign Policy: The Irony of Congressional Reform. Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Pp. x, 207. $18.95, hardbound; $9.95, paper.     

Ethics and the Party Brand: The Case of the Office of Congressional Ethics

Dating back to its creation in 2008, the independent Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) has faced criticism from the very members of Congress it is tasked with investigating. Despite this criticism, a majority of House members both voted to create OCE in 2008 and have ultimately backed away from any efforts to rein in the office. Why? Through an examination of both the passage of OCE in 2008 and subsequent efforts to rein in its power, this article argues that partisan considerations and pressure from party leaders played a critical role in OCE's creation and survival. The creation of the independent commission in the House thus demonstrates the power of the party valence brand in the contemporary Congress.     

Owning Valence Issues: The Impact of a “Culture of Corruption” on the 2006 Midterm Elections

The 109th Congress commenced with a huge ethical cloud hanging over the Capitol. In January 2005, prominent Washington lobbyist Jack Abramoff admitted conspiring to defraud Native American tribes and corrupt public officials. As a result, the Democratic Party chose to adopt corruption as a central theme of their 2006 congressional campaign. They argued that the scandal resulted from a “culture of corruption” fostered by Republicans, who controlled Congress. Although past research shows that voters do punish at the polls congressional incumbents under criminal investigation, little is known about whether the mere appearance of wrongdoing can be assigned to an entire party and cost its candidates votes. Utilizing data from a variety of sources, we find that systemic efforts by House Democratic leaders to frame Republicans as “owning” the scandal—whether individual members actually received Abramoff funds or not—were largely successful in the polls and at the ballot box. These findings suggest that scholarly views of the influence of corruption may have been overly restrictive and that voters are willing, at least in this case, to punish public officials who “appear” to be corrupt.     

A Review of “The Co-Presidency of Bush and Cheney”

Craig, Barbara Hinkson. The Legislative Veto: Congressional Control of Regulation. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xviii, 176. $16.00.

George C. Edwards III. The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. x, 276. Hardbound, $16.95; softbound, $8.95.

Goldenberg, Edie N., and Michael W. Traugott. Campaigning for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984. Pp. 192, Bibliography, Index. $9.50.

Kau, James B. and Paul H. Rubin. Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors: Determinants of Roll Call Voting in the House of Representatives. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 1982. Pp. ix, 160. $25.00.

Melnick, R. Shep. Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983. Pp. x, 404. Hardbound, $22.95; softbound, $11.95.

Shelley, Mack C. II. The Permanent Majority: The Conservative Coalition in the United States Congress. University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1983. Pp. 201. $24.50.

Sinclair, Barbara. Congressional Realignment: 1925-1978. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982. Pp. 201. $25.00.

Spitzer, Robert J. The Presidency and Public Policy: The Four Arenas of Presidential Power. University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1983. Pp. 189. $18.75.

Turner, Michael. The Vice President as Policy Maker: Rockefeller in the Ford White House. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. xviii, 252. Hardbound, $29.95.     

House Appropriations After the Republican Revolution

This article applies the theory of “conditional party government” (CPG) to the interaction between the majority party and the Appropriations Committee in the period following the Republican Revolution of 1995. We extend the analysis of Aldrich and Rohde (2000b) by examining how actions within the committee have changed over time and analyzing whether behavior and outcomes continue to match the expectations of CPG theory, particularly with respect to the times in which power in Congress switched from the Republicans to the Democrats and back. The conditions of the CPG theory continued to be met so that we can continue to test the theory's predictions. We show that following the Republican Revolution, the role of the party remained paramount and the party leadership maintained its influence over the direction of policy. While in the majority, both parties used the Appropriations Committee as a vehicle for policy change and the party leadership monitored committee actions, either by blocking policy shifts away from what the majority party wanted or facilitating changes in the desired direction.     

A Review of “The Power of Money in Congressional Campaigns, 1880–2006”

Bader, John B. Taking the Initiative: Leadership Agendas in Congress and the "Contract with America." Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1996. Pp. xiv, 278. $19.95, softbound.

Campbell, James E. Cheap Seats: The Democratic Party's Advantage in U.S. House Elections. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1996. Pp. xxiv, 336. $22.00, softbound.

Evans, C. Lawrence and Walter J. Oleszek. Congress Under Fire: Reform Politics and the Republican Majority. New York: Houghton Miffin Company, 1997. Pp. xiii, 190. $15.56, softbound.

Koopman, Douglas L. Hostile Takeover: The House Republican Party, 1980-1995. Lanham, MD: Rowman &; Littlefield Publishers, 1996. Pp. viii, 181. $21.95, softbound.

Loomis, Burdett A. The Contemporary Congress. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. Pp. xii, 196. $45.00 hardbound, $21.95 softbound.     

Review Essay on Zero-Base Budgeting

House Committee on the Budget, Zero-Base Budget Legislation , 94th Congress, 2nd Session
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Sunset Act of 1977 , 95th Congress, 1st Session
Senate Committee on Government Operations, Government Economy and Spending Reform Act of 1976 , 94th Congress, 2nd Session
Senate Committee on Government Operations, Compendium of Materials on Zero-Base Budgeting in the States , 94th Congress, 2nd Session     

The State of Research on Gender and Political Participation

Woodrow Wilson declared the early Gilded Age to be a time of Congressional Government, when the legislature “reigned supreme” and was the federal polity's “motivating force.” Yet that same Congress, and era, have been immortalized pejoratively as bastions of corruption; of politicos, spoils–and, most especially, of omnipotently evil lobbyists. This essay argues that both lobbying and the notoriety it aroused in the Grant years were essentially by-products of systemic change. Corruption did exist, but much of what contemporaries saw as illicit was merely new; neither Washington nor the polity as a whole had yet devised mechanisms, or even language, appropriate to emerging conditions. In fact, lobbying was a necessary and even beneficial force in post-Civil War America, one that actually helped officials and citizens to function as the scope, procedures, and agenda of governance underwent dramatic transformation.     

Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government and the Modern Congress: The "Universal Principle" of Change

In Congressional Government Woodrow Wilson analyzes change in Congress during its first century of development. This essay argues that Wilson's analysis of the 19th century Congress, which explains congressional behavior as an outgrowth of both institutional and societal forces, provides a more useful interpretation of change than the institutionalist perspective dominant in the specialized studies of the modern Congress. The essay illustrates the value of Wilson's analysis to contemporary scholars by tracing its impact on the evolution of the author's interpretation of the congressional reforms and changes of the 1970s. The essay attributes the continuing value of Congressional Government to its broad and unified portrait of Congress as a whole.     

Congressional Position Votes in the Truman Administration, 1947–52: A View from the White House

Scholars have routinely overlooked Harry Truman in analyses of presidential position votes in Congress. The principal data source for longitudinal studies of executive-legislative relations, Congressional Quarterly, did not regularly begin compiling presidential position votes until 1953. Yet position votes for the Truman administration do exist. Archival research at the Harry Truman Presidential Library and Museum in Independence, Missouri, revealed that the president commissioned his White House staff to undertake an analysis of position votes spanning the 80th, 81st, and 82nd Congresses (1947–52). This research note analyzes Truman's success rate on this set of domestic and foreign policy votes and provides details on the 83 House and 99 Senate position votes for future use by researchers.     

Journalists,Social Scientists and Public Affairs

Grossman, Michael B., and Martha J. Kumar, Portraying the President: The White House and the News Media. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. x, 358. $26.50 hard-bound; $9.95 soft-bound. Hess, Stephen. The Washington Reporters. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981. Pp. 173.. $17.95 hard-bound; $6.96 soft-bound. Paletz, David L., and Robert M. Entman, Media Power Politics. New York: The Free Press, 1981. Pp. xii, 308. $16.95 hard-bound; $9.95 soft-bound. Robinson, Michael J., "Three Faces of Congressional Media," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., The New Congress. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981. Pp. 400. $9.50 soft-bound.     

Coalition-Building by Party Leaders: A Case Study of House Democrats

This study explores the process by which party leaders build winning coalitions. Focusing on House passage of impoundment legislation in the 93rd Congress, the essay documents the extensive efforts of Democratic leaders to create a viable bill and persuade party members to support it. Analyses of whip counts demonstrate that the leaders passed the impoundment bill in part because they could bargain with and convert “successful” party members whose past career advancement and future achievements depended in part on leadership assistance. The essay concludes by identifying six conditions that nurtured the bargaining capacity of the Democratic leaders and fostered their coalition-building success.¹     

Race-based districting: does it help or hinder legislative representation?

This paper assesses the impact of using race-based districts on membership diversity of the US Congress and state legislative chambers as well as on electoral competition and voter participation in US Congressional and state legislative elections. In the 1990s membership diversity has increased in the US House of Representatives and state legislative chambers due to increased reliance on the use of race and ethnicity in drawing Congressional and legislative districts. But anecdotal evidence suggests that the creation of more homogeneous districts may lead to a decline in electoral competition, and thus a decline in voter participation in elections held within those districts. Uncompetitive Congressional or state legislative districts are posited to reduce the incentives for candidates or parties to mobilize voters and to restrict the electorate to habitual voters only. A lack of incentives to vote in district elections may diminish overall participation and have consequences in elections for statewide offices. I examine electoral competition and voter participation in recent Congressional and state legislative elections to determine whether electoral competition and voter participation have decreased, and whether that decrease can be linked to changes in the homogeneity of districts. I conclude by suggesting that bodies who adopt districting plans as well as those charged with a review of such plans take into account how line drawing affects electoral competition and voter participation as well as membership diversity.     

Notes from the Book Review Editor

Robert A. Wilson, ed. Power and the Presidency. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 1999. Pp. xii, 162. $20.00 hardbound.

Rosen article for the New Republic, "The Supreme Court Commits Suicide," next to a Weekly Standard piece by Nelson Lund lauding the Court's "Act of Courage."

Charles O. Jones, ed. Preparing To Be President: The Memos of Richard E. Neustadt. Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2000. Pp. vii, 194. $25.00 hardbound.

Dennis L. Soden, ed. The Environmental Presidency. Albany: SUNY Press, 1999. Pp. xi, 366. $73.50 hardbound, $24.95 softbound.

Judy Schneider and Michael L. Koempel. Congressional Deskbook 2001-2002: 107th Congress. Alexandria, VA: The Capitol.Net, Inc., 2001. Pp. xxviii, 610. $79.50 softbound.

Diana Dwyre and Victoria A. Farrar-Myers. Legislative Labyrinth: Congress and Campaign Finance Reform. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000. Pp. xii, 291. $22.95 softbound.     

Rules to Live By: Agenda Control and the Partisan Use of Special Rules in the House

A great deal of research in the 1990s was devoted to exploring the consequences of the ceding of greater agenda control to the majority leadership in the House during the era of Democratic control. The intent of this article is to build on that earlier work to discuss the continuing consequences of strengthened parties for decision making from the 1990s onward. Specifically, we find that as the parties became increasingly homogenous over time, partisan conflict over special rules votes grew as well. After the 1970s reforms, with the Democratic majority more homogeneous and the leadership having more influence over committees, the content of legislation coming out of committees became steadily more satisfactory to the majority (and less so to the minority) over time. These expectations did not change with the advent of a Republican majority, and the subsequent results did not change either. The Gingrich and Hastert speakerships continued the trend of increasing levels of partisanship on rules votes and majority control of satisfactory committee outcomes. We also find that a switch back to Democratic control in 2006, did not lead to lower levels of partisanship. The data suggest that Democrats were just as successful, if not more so, in using rules to control the legislative agenda during the 110th Congress as the Republicans were in the 109th.     

评析美国安乐死合法化的进程

二战后的美国安乐死运动是民主权利运动与医疗技术革命的产物,经历了"死亡权利"运动与"尊严死亡"运动两个阶段。"死亡权利"运动推动各州制定《自然死亡法》,确认病人有拒绝治疗的死亡权利。"尊严死亡"运动以创制公民投票法案方式在俄勒冈和华盛顿州成功制定《尊严死亡法》,实现医生协助晚期病人自杀合法化。文章还分析了安乐死的道德及权利之争,同时也探讨了联邦最高法院认可俄勒冈等州依法进行的协助自杀合法化实验。     

A Voice for Black Interests: Congressional Black Caucus Cohesion and Bill Cosponsorship

This study enhances our understanding of the vexing dilemma (i.e., the crosspressures emanating from individual goals and collective aspirations) confronting black legislators. Extant research based on roll call votes or on interest group scores that are also based on roll call votes is limited in what it can tell us about African-American representation in Congress. By examining African-American representatives' cosponsorship of legislation, this study uses a more accurate measure of members' legislative behavior and thus overcomes the "censored sample problem" associated with roll call data. Bill cosponsorship is a good indicator of a representative's intensity of commitment to constituent interests. We examine public bills cosponsored by African-American representatives from 1971 through 1993. The analysis finds that the cohesiveness of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) transcends policy arenas, notwithstanding higher rates of cosponsorship on social issues, and that the number of bills cosponsored by the CBC is noticeably higher after 1982. In addition, analysis suggests that CBC members, just like all members of Congress, respond to the structure that governs the House and the political forces that shape their electoral fortunes.     

Enduring Rivals: Presidential Success and Support in the House of Representatives

We compare presidents' legislative support and success at the vote level of analysis. In so doing, we remind readers that these two outcomes measures, collected by Congressional Quarterly, Inc., may or may not reflect presidential agenda preferences. Success refers to a victory for the president on his vote positions, while support refers to margin of legislators taking the same position on the vote as the president. The vote level provides numerous characteristics of the legislation itself that serve as useful predictors of these two presidential position outcomes. These include its substantive nature, the stage of the vote on the floor, and the issue area of the vote. In addition to the characteristics of the votes themselves, we also incorporate presidential resources and environmental conditions. Virtually all of the component variables within these three concepts contribute to explaining presidents' legislative success and support in the House. We also find that, while models of overall House success and support perform similarly, controlling for party coalitional support dramatically alters the observed relationships. Therefore, without this further analysis, scholars risk misinterpreting the relationship between the president and Congress. Although we have not measured influence, we believe that these findings raise important implications for scholars of presidential-congressional relations and also suggest avenues for further research.