Pivotal Politics,Presidential Capital,and Supreme Court Nominations

We analyze the Supreme Court nomination process in order to provide a general explanation of presidents' propensity to win confirmation battles even in the face of an ideologically hostile Senate. The analysis serves two purposes. First, we argue that employing the conventional measure of the Senate's power to constrain the president's choice of nominees–the median senator–provides an inaccurate picture of this process. In its stead we argue that the filibuster pivot (or the sixtieth most liberal or conservative senator) more accurately captures the Senate's power over the president (Krehbiel 1998). Second, we argue that even under this more stringent spatial constraint, presidents still have the ability to win most confirmation battles with the Senate. Indeed, our results indicate that presidents often overcome situations where the Senate should reject their nominees, or where it should force them to make a less desirable choice, by invoking political capital.     

Heterogeneous Presidential Source Cue Effects on Public Opinion: The Case of the Sotomayor Nomination to the Supreme Court

Do presidential source cues affect public opinion? If so, which types of voters are most susceptible to presidential source cue effects? This study uses a split-ballot experimental design embedded into a nationally representative survey to test for presidential source cue effects, using the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court as the test case. Results detect significant presidential source cue effects. Two factors, respondents' political predispositions and educational level, mediate those cue effects. The conclusion discusses the real world implications of the findings and offers suggestions to improve the use of experiments to test for presidential impacts on of public opinion.     

Here Lies the Supreme Court: Revisited

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Wilson, Brandeis, and the Supreme Court Nomination

In late January 1916, many readers of the New York World chuckled as they looked at Rollin Kirby's editorial cartoon entitled, "The Blow that Almost Killed Father." In the drawing, Kirby showed a Wall Street big-shot—one who looked a little like J. P. Morgan—prostrate in his desk chair, the ticker-tape machine broken and leaning against the desk, a picture of the New York Stock Exchange askew on the wall, and a newspaper dropped to the ground, its headline blaring " Brandeis for the Supreme Court ."     

Many Voices,One Court: The Origin and Role of Dissent in the Supreme Court

E pluribus unum—out of many, one—is the phrase emblazoned on the Seal of the United States, which refers to the notion that a single American voice emerges from the many diverse groups that constitute the nation. The legislative and executive branches of government often act as one voice through legislative bills and executive acts, aggregating diverse interests that reflect the national will. The notion of e pluribus unum, however, is not often applied to the judiciary, a branch of government the members of which are viewed, not as outlets for the will of the people, but as gatekeepers of the rule of law. But while the Supreme Court may not speak directly for the people, its opinions speak to the people, and the methods used by the Justices to express those opinions have revealed changes in the conception of the Court's voice throughout history.     

The Nominations Presidents Make: Appointing Supreme Court Justices

This paper tests the hypothesis that presidents are more successful in Congress during their first hundred days in office. Analyzing an original dataset composed of the bills on which presidents took official positions, it finds that presidents indeed have higher success rates during the first hundred days of their first year than they do later during their first year or during the first hundred days of noninaugural years. This effect is strongest for presidents who face divided government.     

Jefferson's Legacy to the Supreme Court: Freedom of Religion

Except for Rhode Island, each of the thirteen American colonies created some form of established religion. The English venturists who undertook settlements in New England and Virginia simply assumed that religion would be inextricably tied to their colonial enterprises. ¹ The 1606 charter creating the Virginia colony required that all ministers preach Christianity that followed the “doctrine, rights, and religion now professed and established within the realme of England”—in other words, the Church of England. ² To bolster the struggling Jamestown settlement, in 1610–11, Sir Thomas Dale promulgated “Articles, Lawes, and Orders, Divine, Politic, and Martiall for the Colony in Virginia.” Clergymen were to read “Dale's Laws,” as they were labeled, to assemblies every Sabbath. The thirty‐seven rules included eight that specifically referred to God and prohibited impiety, blasphemy, sacrilege, and irreverence toward preachers or ministers. The sixth law was particularly notable for its strict religious requirements and harsh penalties for violations: “Every man and woman duly twice a day … shall … repair unto the Church to divine service upon pain of losing his or her days allowance for the first omission, for the second to be whipped, and for the third to be condemned to the Gallies for six months. Likewise no man or woman shall dare to violate or break the Sabbath by any gaming … but duly sanctify and observe the same, both himself and his family, by preparing themselves at home with private prayer, that they may be better fitted for the public according to the commandments of God and the orders of our Church. …” ³ Colonists faced the death penalty after the third offense of missing morning and afternoon Sunday devotional services.