Earmarks and Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives

Popular treatments of earmarks abound with allegations that members of Congress use them to aid their reelection campaigns, but the academic literature has yet to examine whether earmarking influences elections. To begin to fill this void, we search for relationships between earmarking and several facets of electoral competition and outcomes in the 2008 and 2010 House elections. There are three principal findings. First, in both election years, active earmarkers faced weaker primary election competition than other members. Second, in 2008 there was a positive correlation between earmarking and campaign receipts. Third, both of these correlations exist only among Democrats. These findings suggest that earmarks critics might be correct in charging that members, particularly Democrats, benefit from the earmarks they place into spending bills.     

Identifying the Critical Members of the House of Representatives

This article combines the historical record of presidential-congressional relations with previous scholarly findings to develop a model that identifies the members of Congress whose support is critical to the president's ability to build enacting coalitions. It then analyzes the relationship between President Obama and the House of Representatives during the 113th Congress as a case study that demonstrates the model's utility. Conventional wisdom and political pundits suggest that presidents working in divided government will have impossible difficulty working with Congress, but history suggests otherwise. The president's ability to successfully build enacting coalitions during divided government requires him to perform two rather disparate tasks. First, the president must minimize the amount of presidential party members who cross party lines to vote against the president's position. Second, the president must entice at least some opposition party members to cross party lines and support the president's position. Using data from 1981 to 2015, I find that representatives’ behavior on presidential support votes are related to constituency-level presidential strength, electoral vulnerability, ideological moderation, and ideological extremity. I use these results to identify the critical members of the 113th Congress. When a majority of these critical members supported President Obama's positions his legislative efforts were successful. When a majority of these members opposed the president's positions, the House Republican majority defeated the president.     

Leaving on a Jet Plane: Polarization,Foreign Travel,and Comity in Congress

No political observer, politician, or political scientist doubts that party polarization has weakened the social fabric of Congress. Measuring that effect, however, is exceedingly difficult. In this article, we operationalize the congressional social fabric by examining the foreign travel behavior of members of Congress over time. We evaluate the social disintegration in Congress by examining if and whether changes in member travel can explain why the social connectedness of members has waned. Using a unique dataset of foreign travel for House members from 1977 to 2012, we find that Republican House members, in particular, have altered their foreign travel patterns. Ideologically extreme members have always been less likely to take foreign trips, but extremely conservative Republican have become much more likely to travel only with co-partisans as polarization has increased in Congress. Ideologically moderate Republicans, while still traveling as members of bipartisan delegations, have also increased their willingness to travel only with fellow Republicans. Our results suggest that bipartisan foreign travel is a victim of the partisan war waging in Congress.     

Party Leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives: Making Theoretical Sense of Ambition and Context

This article focuses on the policy-making activities of House Republicans in their early transition to power (104th Congress) as well as in their settling in (105th Congress). Key components of House governance, as practiced by the Democrats in the 103rd Congress, serve as a benchmark for comparison. The analysis reveals substantial differences between the size, scope, and thrust of the leaders' issue agendas. Over time, decision-making apparatus and strategies for building floor coalitions and publicizing party views vary as well. Using data from interviews with the principals and a host of sources from the government and the media, I find evidence that draws attention to the power of personal ambitions and political contexts.     

Coalition-Building by Party Leaders: A Case Study of House Democrats

This study explores the process by which party leaders build winning coalitions. Focusing on House passage of impoundment legislation in the 93rd Congress, the essay documents the extensive efforts of Democratic leaders to create a viable bill and persuade party members to support it. Analyses of whip counts demonstrate that the leaders passed the impoundment bill in part because they could bargain with and convert “successful” party members whose past career advancement and future achievements depended in part on leadership assistance. The essay concludes by identifying six conditions that nurtured the bargaining capacity of the Democratic leaders and fostered their coalition-building success.¹     

Owning Valence Issues: The Impact of a “Culture of Corruption” on the 2006 Midterm Elections

The 109th Congress commenced with a huge ethical cloud hanging over the Capitol. In January 2005, prominent Washington lobbyist Jack Abramoff admitted conspiring to defraud Native American tribes and corrupt public officials. As a result, the Democratic Party chose to adopt corruption as a central theme of their 2006 congressional campaign. They argued that the scandal resulted from a “culture of corruption” fostered by Republicans, who controlled Congress. Although past research shows that voters do punish at the polls congressional incumbents under criminal investigation, little is known about whether the mere appearance of wrongdoing can be assigned to an entire party and cost its candidates votes. Utilizing data from a variety of sources, we find that systemic efforts by House Democratic leaders to frame Republicans as “owning” the scandal—whether individual members actually received Abramoff funds or not—were largely successful in the polls and at the ballot box. These findings suggest that scholarly views of the influence of corruption may have been overly restrictive and that voters are willing, at least in this case, to punish public officials who “appear” to be corrupt.     

"Don't Go Changing to Try and Please Me": A Preference-Consistency Analysis on Trade Policy in the U.S. House

Trade voting in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1993 to 2001 provides an opportunity to move beyond examining the determinants of trade voting on single bills and to focus on the consistency members of Congress demonstrate in their trade preferences. We find that while a significant percentage of House members are consistent in their trade preferences during the time period, a surprising percentage of those members serving over the entire period are inconsistent, affecting important changes in U.S. trade policy. Ideological, partisan, and constituency- based factors prove significant cross-pressures on House members' trade preferences throughout the time period; however, we unearth differences in effects between the two parties. It is these cross-pressures that lead to inconsistent preferences among some legislators.     

Explaining Congressional Staff Members’ Decisions to Leave the Hill

The high turnover of congressional staff members can have a negative effect on the functioning of Congress as an institution. Though junior staff turnover is not considered a significant concern, the high turnover of senior staff members is problematic. Using data from a survey of staff members located in the Washington personal offices of House of Representatives members, this article investigates what factors influence the likelihood to leave congressional employment. Specifically, I explore how solidary, purposive, and material work incentives influence staff members’ plans to exit. The results of two different models—one for junior and mid-level staff members and one for executive staff members—indicate that purposive incentives, and material incentives that accrue for future employment opportunities, carry the most weight across both models. Current salary has a significant effect on executive staff members, but not on their lower-level counterparts. Following this analysis, I propose actions that congressional offices might take to retain staff.     

The Politics of Credit in Presidential Signing Statements

The separation of powers often makes it difficult to understand who is responsible for legislative outcomes. Both members of Congress and presidents seek to shape perceptions of policy responsibility to their advantage. Yet, the relative size of the president's rhetorical stage gives him disproportionate influence in molding these discussions at critical moments. Given these circumstances, how, when, and why, do presidents claim credit for themselves and attribute credit to members of Congress for legislation? Using an original dataset based upon a content analysis of all presidential signing statements from 1985–2008, we find that presidential strategies to claim and attribute credit for laws are greatly impacted by both political context (approval, divided government, midterm elections, and party power) and bill-specific attributes (appropriations, salience, and veto threats). The theory and results highlight the importance of taking multiple institutions into account when thinking about credit.     

Trade politics in the American Congress:: a study of the interaction of political geography and interest group behavior

Political geography plays an important role in influencing how industries build coalitions to secure desired trade benefits in American politics. The political geography of an industry is defined as the intersection of its economic geography, i.e. the location of its means of production, and the institutional structure of the political system in which it operates. In the case of the United States, trade-sensitive industries lobby the bicameral Congress and the executive branch for beneficial trade policies, and their geographic location strongly influences the strategies they adopt. Industries concentrated across heavily populated states will be more powerful in the House of Representatives than in the Senate. They will therefore ground their efforts in the House and form coalitions with industries that are powerful in the Senate. Industries that are concentrated across less populated states will be stronger in the Senate and will seek to form coalition partners that are strong in the House. A theory of political geography is used to explain the behavior of import/export sensitive industries in the 1980s and 1990s. The findings suggest that these industries choose coalition partners who bolster their political weakness in the House or Senate by extending, rather than replicating, their geographic base of support.     

Policy Coalitions in the U.S. Congress: A Spatial Duration Modeling Approach

This paper applies spatial duration models to the analysis of cosponsorship coalitions in the U.S. House of Representatives. This approach provides a unique and simultaneous statistical analysis of ideological space (specifically, coalition formation) and geographical space. Typically, duration models are associated with temporal longitudinal data, but recently have been adapted to the spatial domain (Pellegrini and Reader 1996). In this paper, spatial duration models are further adapted to examine ideological space including a consideration of unobserved sources of spatial variation (or omitted variable bias). We examine two features of cosponsorship coalitions, breadth and clustering. Breadth is defined as the ideological distance between the two most extreme members of the coalition which is an important “signal” to the rest of Congress regarding the scope and broad appeal of the proposed legislation. In contrast, clustering refers to the distance between individual members of a coalition and reveals the tendency, or not, of ideologically similar members of Congress to support various bills. To examine breadth and clustering, we employ spatial duration models of cosponsorship that permit a multivariate analysis incorporating both the characteristics of members of Congress and the geographical regions they represent. Results indicate that cosponsorship coalition patterns are primarily determined by the content of the legislation, not the actions of the coalition leadership. While the leadership characteristics of sponsors have a limited effect on cosponsorship breadth, the size of the coalition is the primary determinent. Leadership characteristics also have little effect on cosponsorship clustering. Rather, clustering is due to members' policy preferences, as measured by distance to the coalition leader. In addition, the duration analysis results suggest that geographical proximity between members of Congress “overcomes” ideological distance. Finally, the spatial duration approach is noted as a fruitful methodology for examining explicitly spatial patterns in both ideological or geographical space.     

Impeachment Practice in the Era of Lethal Conflict

The purpose of this article is to question the widely-accepted notion that the basic norms of the United States Congress have undergone a dramatic change. In the face of an increased workload, a more divisive political environment, and significant alterations of the formal rules, this article suggests that the basic "folkways" of the House and Senate in the 1980s are remarkably similar to those described by students of Congress three decades ago. Despite some interview evidence to the contrary, patterns of legislative behavior, distinctions between "insiders" and "outsiders," and the pathways to legislative power continue to be defined in terms of such basic norms as reciprocity, apprenticeship, and specialization.     

The campaigns and elections of congresswomen Edith Green and Julia Butler Hansen

The Third Congressional Districts of Oregon and Washington face each other across the Columbia River. It is not surprising that for more than a decade each district had been represented in Congress by the same representative or that they were both Democrats. Though Oregon's Third District is much more urban and compact than Washington's, they share some of the demographic and economic characteristics which are usually associated with Democratic constituencies outside of the South, namely, a relatively high proportion of persons employed in manufacturing or other heavily unionized occupations, who are relatively mobile, or of fairly recent ethnic stock. What is not so expected is that both incumbent Congressmen were Congresswomen — Edith Green of Oregon and Julia Butler Hansen of Washington. Mrs Green and Mrs Hansen were chosen as the specific subjects of this study because they had both demonstrated political longevity in retaining Congressional office throughout see‐sawing political changes in party domination in both their states and the national administration. They were both longstanding members of the Democratic Party. They were both from the Pacific Northwest, giving them common regional interests, and indeed, while from different states, their districts are continuous with the Columbia River as a common boundary adding specific common district interests. Each had attained what are generally recognized as powerful positions within the structure of the Congress as chairpersons of important subcommittees: Mrs Green as Chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor; Mrs Hansen as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Interior and Related Agencies of the House Appropriations Committee. And finally, both women were in their early sixties.     

Balancing Multiple Goals: Analyzing Votes on Free Trade Agreements in the U.S. House of Representatives

Despite increasing polarization in the House of Representatives, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) often pass not only with, but often because of, support from both parties. What explains these patterns? When do members cross party lines to support (or oppose) trade legislation? We argue that members are both ideologically and electorally motivated. Further, we argue that the relative balance of these incentives varies across the membership in meaningful ways. We examine House votes on 11 PTAs and find that ideology and district trade position have independent effects on support for free trade. We also find that the effect of trade position is conditioned by the ideology of the legislator; moderates are more responsive to their constituents' interests on trade.     

Gerald Ford,the Mayaguez Incident,and the Post-Imperial Presidency

In 1975 Gerald Ford became the first President bound by the War Powers Resolution. Enacted in 1973, members of Congress, still fuming over the revelations crystallized by the Pentagon Papers that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was a sham, sought to prevent future Presidents from starting future Vietnam Wars. Though Ford voted against the measure twice as a Congressman, as President he respected the law and Congress enforcing it. This article explores Ford's efforts and actions as he complied with the law. Ford's attitude and acquiescence reflected his efforts he heal the nation.     

Unlikely Abolitionist: William Cushing and the Struggle Against Slavery

One of the striking differences between the federal Union established under the Constitution and the Confederation of States established under the Articles of Confederation is the creation under Article III of a judicial power of the United States and of a Supreme Court to exercise that power. Acting pursuant to its power to determine the structure of that Court, Congress determined that the Court should consist of one Chief Justice and five Associate Justices. The six lawyers President Washington named to the Court ¹ were leading members of the bar, yet none achieved lasting distinction by reason of his service on the Court. Chief Justice Jay, for example, is best remembered for the treaty with England which bears his name; and when he resigned in 1795 following his election as Governor of New York, local papers referred to his new office as "a promotion." ²     

Business Backgrounds and Congressional Behavior

In the following paper, we analyze whether the behavior of members of Congress with business backgrounds differs from that of other legislators, and we find that it does. Specifically, House members with business backgrounds have closer relationships with business interests (as measured by larger contributions from corporate PACs) and demonstrate more probusiness roll call voting. We also find that members making a direct transition from a business career to the House sponsor more business-focused legislation. The significance of a business background is consistent across different forms of behavior, though the magnitude of effects is generally modest. Our findings contribute to a growing body of literature emphasizing the importance of legislator backgrounds to their behavior in office.

Republican Pete Coors brings it up in nearly every campaign speech: There are too many lawyers in the U.S. Senate.... His point is that he'd like to see more successful businesspeople running the country the same way they guide their companies. (Florio 2004)     

The Multiple Roots of Party Loyalty: Explaining Republican Dissent in the U.S. House of Representatives

Why does any member of Congress choose to be loyal to one's party? The conventional wisdom is that party loyalty stems from constituent expectations, electoral concerns, or a lawmaker's ideological beliefs. However, this neglects two other, less-instrumental reasons for sticking with a political party: partisan identity and personal connections with party leaders. I test these alternative theories as well as conventional ones on a set of key moments in the 113th Congress (2013–2014) when rebellion against House Republican leadership by the rank-and-file was especially noteworthy. The results provide some support for both the party identity and personal connection hypotheses. They also indicate that although constituency characteristics help predict the likelihood of dissent from GOP leaders, there is little evidence for the electoral hypothesis, while cross-cutting ideological preferences as well as preferences along the traditional left-right spectrum prove statistically significant. In short, evidence reveals both personal and instrumental roots of party loyalty in Congress.     

A Voice for Black Interests: Congressional Black Caucus Cohesion and Bill Cosponsorship

This study enhances our understanding of the vexing dilemma (i.e., the crosspressures emanating from individual goals and collective aspirations) confronting black legislators. Extant research based on roll call votes or on interest group scores that are also based on roll call votes is limited in what it can tell us about African-American representation in Congress. By examining African-American representatives' cosponsorship of legislation, this study uses a more accurate measure of members' legislative behavior and thus overcomes the "censored sample problem" associated with roll call data. Bill cosponsorship is a good indicator of a representative's intensity of commitment to constituent interests. We examine public bills cosponsored by African-American representatives from 1971 through 1993. The analysis finds that the cohesiveness of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) transcends policy arenas, notwithstanding higher rates of cosponsorship on social issues, and that the number of bills cosponsored by the CBC is noticeably higher after 1982. In addition, analysis suggests that CBC members, just like all members of Congress, respond to the structure that governs the House and the political forces that shape their electoral fortunes.     

Five Factions,Two Parties: Caucus Membership in the House of Representatives, 1994–2002

This paper examines the extent of ideological cohesion and distinction of two Republican congressional factions (the conservative Republican Study Committee and the moderate Republican Main Street Partnership) and three Democratic congressional caucuses (the moderate Blue Dog Coalition, the liberal Congressional Black Caucus, and the liberal Congressional Progressive Caucus) in the House of Representatives from 1994 to 2002. Whereas much of the literature on congressional caucuses has focused on the reasons members join such groups and the policy and political orientations of those groups, this paper examines how much unity exists in the voting behavior of the members of Congress who join caucuses in comparison to their fellow partisans not in a faction. Although political parties are still a major unifying force for their respective party members, we do find that factional members are more ideologically cohesive than are nonfactional members. Joining a faction is not an insignificant activity for members. Factions allow like-minded colleagues to come together and vote on common issues, at times against direction of their party.