Understanding Saudi Arabia's Influence on Pakistan: The Case of the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism

The launch of the Saudi‐led so‐called Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) in 2015 tested the strong strategic alliance between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In light of concerns about the positioning of the coalition of 41 states against Iranian interests in the Middle East, Pakistan's initial response to the Saudi demand to join the war in Yemen was a polite refusal by means of a unanimous decision of the parliament. However, under tremendous pressure from Riyadh and other Gulf States, Islamabad later capitulated and backtracked from its initial decision. This paper analyses the unique nature of the relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia through a dissection of the various dimensions of the Kingdom's cultural and political influence on Pakistan. It also illuminates Saudi hegemonic strategies and the manner in which Islamabad adjusts and is influenced as well as coerced to revise its foreign policy choices. This paper argues that Saudi's diplomatic strategies, political pressure and pledges of generous financial assistance ensured Pakistan's participation in IMAFT.     

Making of the Seventh NWS: Historiography of the Beginning of the Nuclear Disorder in South Asia

ABSTRACT

Efforts to explore Pakistan's nuclear weapons options had been underway since 1972 alongside Pakistan's quest for nuclear energy. However, the American concerns about Pakistan developing a nuclear weapons capability did not surface until after the Indian test in May 1974. The Indian nuclear test marked the beginning of the nuclear disorder in South Asia and paved way for Pakistan's nuclearization. This article assesses US non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under the Gerald Ford administration from 1974 to 1977. The administration attempted to curb Pakistan's latent proliferation potential by pressuring France and Pakistan to cancel their plutonium reprocessing agreement. Though it remained unsuccessful in its attempts to restrain Pakistan's nuclear development, the administration tried to develop a quid pro quo with Pakistan by pushing the country to choose military aid over bomb. Pakistan chose the bomb for it felt that US non-proliferation policy in South Asia was skewed in favor of India.     

The trials and travails of the Islamic State in Pakistan

While Pakistan is in many ways an ideal location for transnational terrorist groups due to state weakness, Islamic State has had difficulty making headway in the country. In this article, the authors argue that Islamic State’s failures in Pakistan are due to competition from other groups. Drawing on the terrorist competition literature and interviews with Pakistani counterterrorism officials, the authors find that the presence of other groups in Pakistan meant there was little demand for what Islamic State offered. Islamic State relied on splinter groups and defectors for recruitment, which alienated mainstream groups and harmed the group’s capacity. Islamic State’s competition problems were exacerbated by its internationalist ideology, which was at odds with that of many groups in Pakistan, and allowed opposing groups to present themselves as reasonable alternatives to other actors. Despite Islamic State’s lack of success, it and its allies have still engaged in extreme violence in Pakistan as a result of attempts to outbid other groups. This article has implications for fighting terrorism in Pakistan and more generally.     

Nuclear fears,hopes and realities in Pakistan

In the four decades since Pakistan launched its nuclear weapons program, and especially in the fifteen years since the nuclear tests of 1998, a way of thinking and a related set of feelings about the bomb have taken hold among policy‐makers and the public in Pakistan. These include the ideas that the bomb can ensure Pakistan's security; resolve the long‐standing dispute with India over Kashmir in Pakistan's favour; help create a new national spirit; establish Pakistan as a leader among Islamic countries; and usher in a new stage in Pakistan's economic development. None of these hopes has come to pass, and in many ways Pakistan is much worse off than before it went nuclear. Yet the feelings about the bomb remain strong and it is these feelings that will have to be examined critically and be set aside if Pakistan is to move towards nuclear restraint and nuclear disarmament. This will require a measure of stability in a country beset by multiple insurgencies, the emergence of a peace movement able to launch a national debate on foreign policy and nuclear weapons, and greater international concern regarding the outcomes of nuclear arms racing in South Asia.     

Muslim Selbstverständnis: Ahmet Davutoğlu answers Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences

In formulating his understanding of Islamic history, thought and politics, the Turkish Muslim thinker Ahmet Davuto?lu approves and adopts the German philosopher Edmund Husserl's formulation of phenomenology — or, philosophy of consciousness. Both Husserl and Davuto?lu perceive a crisis in humanity and identify its causes in scientism and logical positivism, against which they develop their respective phenomenological alternatives. This article places in parallel Husserl's stylised history of Western thought and Weltanschauung method with that of Davuto?lu's Muslim worldview, in order to illuminate the latter's putatively comprehensive interpretation of Islam, diagnosis of the ills of secularism, modernisation, and crisis of values he finds in Muslim societies; and his prescribed treatment for those ills: the privileging of ontology over epistemology, and the full unfolding of core theological concepts of revelation, monotheism, and prophecy. Davuto?lu seeks to reconcile tensions and disputes within Islamic intellectual traditions concerning the nature of God and God's attributes, and the tension between mysticism and rationalism, and the historical and the atemporal. In summary, Davuto?lu's intervention in Islamic traditions is interesting in the effort it makes to appropriate elements of both Husserl and GWF Hegel for the purpose of reconciling a phenomenological reading of Islam with established Islamic authorities and commitments.     

The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA,Pakistan

Abstract: This paper provides a critical analysis of how and why US‐led drone warfare is conducted in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. First, we provide detailed statistics on the scale and funding of US drone operations, noting a rapid acceleration of its adoption by the military. This is then situated within an overarching narrative of the logic of “targeting”. Second, we study a legal document called the “Frontier Crimes Regulation” of 1901 that defines the relationship of FATA to the rest of Pakistan as an “exceptional” place. In the third section, we argue that the drone is a political actor with a fetishized existence, and this enables it to violate sovereign Pakistani territory. In this sense, the continued violence waged by robots in Pakistan's tribal areas is a result of the deadly interaction between law and technology. The paper concludes by noting the proliferation of drones in everyday life.     

Islamic Banking in Practice: the Case of Pakistan

In Islamic banking rules apply which differ from those in traditional banking. This article first discusses the consequences of Islamic banking for financial operations in general, then goes on to examine the Islamic procedures introduced in Pakistan's banking sector since 1985. Considering the drastic change in procedures, the effect of Islamization on this sector has been moderate. One reason for this is that banks in Pakistan have consistently opted for financial instruments closely resembling interest-based finance. Another reason is that their behaviour has been determined to a large extent by the fact that they are state-owned.     

The Making of an ‘All Weather Friendship’ Pakistan,China and the History of a Border Agreement: 1949–1963

China and Pakistan share what is widely known as an ‘all weather friendship’. The historical roots of this friendship can be traced to 1963, when the two countries entered into a border agreement that divided territory in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Since then, China has provided missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan. It has limited the potential for escalation in the time of war between India and Pakistan and is the largest economic investor in Pakistan. The benefits of this friendship for Pakistan are clear. Yet, there is little detail on what led to the making of the ‘all weather friendship’. This article provides a detailed account of Sino–Pakistani relations between 1949 and 1963. It argues that whilst the 1963 agreement led to a turning point, the Pakistani establishment – military and civilian – sought to engage China since 1949. They did so to create strategic options for themselves in the event that the US and the UK – Pakistan's main allies following independence – limited or worse, ended their support for Pakistan in its troubled relations with India. This article is based on primary sources available in the US, Britain, as well as recently declassified and hitherto unused papers in India.     

Erdoğan’s pragmatism and the ascension of AKP in Turkey: Islam and neo‐Ottomanism

This article aimed to analyze the ascension of Justice and Development Party—Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi (AKP)—in Turkey and its political measures regarding both Islam and the country's Ottoman past, in order to comprehend the party's role in a potential shift of Turkish national identity and in Turkey's relationship with the Middle East. The article does this through a content analysis of decrees, laws, and other measures taken by the AKP that emphasizes its cultural and religious policies, as well as revisiting literature produced about the subject. Analyzing Recep Tayyip Erdo?an's government during his time as Prime Minister (2003–2014), two noteworthy features come to light: its Islamic influence and its so‐called neo‐Ottomanist outlook. However, this article argues that besides an identity‐ and ideology‐based motivation, the AKP had pragmatic intentions in adopting such approaches, aiming to gather support both domestically and regionally.     

Antipode to Terror: Spaces of Performative Politics

Focusing on Pakistan we address the human geography of politics and violence to argue that organized political violence is not only about death and destruction but also, more importantly, about the control of the public sphere, and vitally, the reorganization of space. To make this argument we also extend Arendt's thesis on totalitarianism and the human condition. Our argument is grounded in a review of the activities of Tehrik‐e‐Taliban, Pakistan's (TTP) during their brief control of the Swat valley in Pakistan. We argue that TTP's spectacular violence eliminates “worldliness”, plurality and life, so that spontaneous action is denied and the public sphere is destroyed through the universalization of terror. The practical implication of our argument is that, in significant contrast to state and military actions to date, productive measures to resist violence should protect the performance of politics in an extended public sphere.     

‘It is because of our Islam that we are there’: The Call of Islam in the United Democratic Front Era

Abstract

This article examines the South African Islamic anti-apartheid organisation, the Call of Islam, in order to understand how progressive South African ‘ulama navigated the contested territory of Islam through an interpretation of the Qur'an that demanded a Muslim alliance with the oppressed in the anti-apartheid struggle and a South African Islam. The emergence of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 in reaction to the apartheid government's Tricameral Parliament created a space in which South African Muslims could enter the national anti-apartheid struggle according to their religious rather than ethnic identity. To illustrate the historical development of the Call of Islam and its affiliation with the UDF, the article will first outline the formation of the UDF in the Western Cape, the geographical area with the largest concentration of Muslims in South Africa. The focus will then turn to the impact of the UDF on the Cape's Muslim community, particularly the divide that developed amongst its ‘ulama over the stance of Muslim participation in the anti-apartheid struggle. The following section will analyse the emergence of the Call and how the questions of its founders concerning the religious Other led to an examination of Islam in its South African context. The final section will then look at the sources that the Call used to show it was indeed because of their South African Islam that they affiliated with the UDF and the oppressed.     

Why the Pakistan army is here to stay: prospects for civilian governance

This article explores the prospects for civilian governance over Pakistan's military in the policy‐relevant future. After reviewing the Pakistan army's past interference in the country's judicial and political affairs, it turns to the ongoing political maneuvering of the current Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, despite Pakistan's ostensible democratic dispensation. The article dilates on the impact of US engagement on the robustness of the Pakistan army's dominance and questions the newfound US commitment to promoting democratization and civilian control. The article argues that while conventional wisdom places the onus disproportionately upon the military's penchant for interventionism, the army has intervened only with the active assistance of civilian institutions, which are subsequently further eroded with every military takeover. It concludes with a consideration of whether or not genuine civilian control would result in a significant change in Pakistan's foreign and domestic policies, particularly Pakistan's well‐known utilization of Islamist militants in India and Afghanistan.     

From Islamism to nationalism in Aceh,Indonesia

ABSTRACT. This article analyses a dramatic political transformation in Indonesia's Aceh province. In the 1950s, an Islamic rebellion (Darul Islam) aimed not to separate Aceh from Indonesia, but rather to make Indonesia an Islamic state. A successor movement from the 1970s was GAM, the Free Aceh Movement. GAM, however, was essentially secular‐nationalist in orientation, sought Aceh's complete independence and did not espouse formal Islamic goals. The transformation is explained by various factors, but the key argument concerns the relationship between Islam and nationalism. The defeat of Darul Islam had caused Aceh's Islamic leaders to focus on what they could achieve in Aceh alone, ultimately giving rise to Acehnese nationalism and the secessionist goal. However, Islam remained a point of commonality with, rather than difference from, majority‐Muslim Indonesia. The logic of nationalist identity construction and differentiation thus caused Aceh's separatist leaders, despite being personally devout, to increasingly downplay Islamic symbols and ideology.     

Ramadan Blues: Debates in Popular Islam during Ramadan in Amman,Jordan

Within the context of the contemporary Middle East and the post‐Islamic Resurgence, avoiding music has become associated with a rise in religiosity and normative Islam. As a result, residents of Amman, Jordan actively avoid consuming music during Ramadan. A large‐scale survey and ethnographic data, including participant observation with employees in an Islamic bank, confirm that avoiding music is a public ethic of Ramadan that is temporally specific and in wide use during the month. In this article, I argue that the tensions surrounding the debates of music's compatibility with normative Islam are enacted in terms of a conflict between cultural and Islamic authenticities. These tensions are resolved temporarily during Ramadan through altered consumption in which one ethical, “Islamic” framework that regards music as haram, or “forbidden,” eclipses another, more diverse “cultural” framework, and does so largely without inducing crisis or controversy. This is because the two realms are not articulating with each other; rather, claims of a normative Islamic authenticity overwhelm the possibilities for a more diverse cultural authenticity. Outside of Ramadan, however, these two competing authenticities often spark tensions and conflicts between family members, neighbors, and coworkers. This article concludes by exploring the implications of ordering morality for religious life in this assertive, even illiberal fashion for diversity in belief and practice.     

Between Islam and the nation; nation-building,the ulama and Alevi identity in Turkey

This article analyses the relationship between Islam and nationalism by considering the role of the ulama in Turkey, housed within the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA). The ulama – religious scholars and experts of Islamic law – in Muslim majority contexts are typically closely linked with the state and play a key role in shaping the boundaries of Islam and of what is Islamically acceptable. However, this is also of consequence for the boundaries of the nation, since in Turkey Islam and nationalism has been intertwined, with Islam playing a central role in nation-building, as a basis of ethnic identity formation and a source of symbols and myths. This articles shows, firstly, that the PRA has acted as a carrier and preserver of Sunni (Hanefi) Muslim identity in continuity with the Ottoman ulama and, secondly, that it has delimited nation-building, by considering its approach to and interventions against Alevi identity.     

Interventions against forced marriage: contesting hegemonic narratives and minority practices in Europe

Muslims in western countries are routinely depicted as non-liberal minorities through representations of homophobia, honour killings and forced marriage within their communities. This presents a practical challenge to face up to non-liberal practices where they do exist, but without demonising an entire faith community. It also raises conceptual questions about mainstream western values. In the context of forced marriage, liberal principles (such as an individual's right to choose their own marriage partner and to decide whether to marry) appear to clash with postcolonial sensibilities including a valorisation of multiculturalism (which might recognise the rights of minorities to practice different marriage customs). These questions are examined through a case study involving Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond (SPIOR), a Muslim-identified organisation that works against forced marriage. Based in the Netherlands and active in six other European countries, SPIOR has worked with people potentially affected by forced marriage and also communicated its projects – and the progressive vision of Islam they advance – to wider audiences. Its experiences suggest that tensions between secular majorities and Muslim minorities, and between liberal and postcolonial values and sensibilities, are less fundamental than they sometimes appear, and more navigable.     

Jihadism au rebours: Orientalism and Occidentalism for a Counter‐Hegemonic Liberation Theology

Following its colonial project, Western Europe imposed a political and cultural understanding of state nationalism and religious homogeneity on the entire world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In parallel with this twofold process, “Religious Nationalism” emerged during the Cold War, affecting the Middle East and framing an updated Abrahamic version of religious supremacism: Wahhabi Islam, the Iranian Revolution, and Israeli Orthodox Judaism were politically backed, becoming the frontrunners of a new Global‐Religious narrative of conflict. This article aims to critically analyse the Western‐Islamic manipulation of “Jihadism” as an artificial and fabricated product, starting from the “deconstruction” of Jihad–Jihadism as an anti‐hegemonic narrative. The anti‐colonial “Islamic” framework of resistance to the Empire (United States) has effectively adopted the same colonial methodology: using violence and sectarianism in trying to reach its goals. Is the Islamic Supremacist “narrative” more influenced by Western thought than by a real understanding of Islam? At the same time, this article aims to stress the historical reasons why the Arab world has been artificially affected by a peculiar form of “Religious Revanchism” which can be understood only if O. Roy's Holy Ignorance dialogues with Steve Biko's Consciousness in emphasising the need for an updated Islamic Liberation Theology.     

‘Zero Plus Zero Plus Zero’: Pakistan,the Baghdad Pact,and the Suez Crisis

The Suez crisis of 1956 created a grave challenge to the fledgling Baghdad Pact. Each of the four Muslim members of the alliance, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey, faced domestic pressures to withdraw after the United Kingdom joined Israel and France in attacking Egypt. For the Pakistani government, the crisis came at an important juncture in its national development. After a decade of championing pan-Islamic causes, Pakistani foreign policy had, by 1955, shifted to a much more openly pro-Western position, highlighted by Pakistan's joining ofboth the Baghdad Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The Suezcrisis threatened to undermine this new policy and the fragile coalition government led by Prime Minister Suhrawardy. After an initial period of equivocation, Suhrawardy emerged as a staunch defender of the Baghdad Pact, hoping to save his government, but in the process opening deep rifts within his own party.     

Negotiating Difference in a Muslim Society: A Longitudinal Study of Islamic and Secular Discourses in Turkey

This article explores the changes in attitudes among Islamic and secular groups in Turkey through an analysis of their discourses regarding Islam, democracy, secularism, and dialogue. We present the findings of a longitudinal study (Q study) conducted in Turkey in 2002 and 2007. The time period under investigation marks the first uninterrupted five‐year‐long term of an Islamic‐leaning government, Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party), in office since the inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923. We suggest that the continuous electoral success of the AKP has played an important role in shaping Islamic and secular discourses in the Turkish public sphere. In contrast with its predecessor, the AKP has employed a rights‐based paradigm when defining the place of Islam in a secular society. This, we suggest, has softened the divide between Islamic and secular discourses in Turkey. In this article, after defining the core characteristics of both discourses that remained the same in both 2002 and 2007, we focus on the major shifts in discourses that have occurred during these five years. Our research reveals that during this time, both Islamic and secular discourses underwent important shifts with respect to Islam's place in a democratic society. We interpret the AKP's discursive shift toward a rights‐based paradigm and the increasing emphasis on dialogue in both Islamist and secular discourses as promising signs for expanding the scope for democratic polity in Turkey.     

A bargain between the secular state and Turkish Islam: politics of ethnicity in Central Asia

Abstract. This paper reveals and analyses the ethnic politics mobilised by a fast‐growing Islamic movement, the Gülen movement, which emerged in the 1980s in Turkey and expanded to Central Asia in the mid‐1990s. Following the micro‐sites, where nationness is reproduced as an everyday practice, my ethnographic research in Almaty‐Kazakhstan explored the emergent Islamic sensibilities for the nation and ethnic identity. Revivalist Islam has often been essentialised as incompatible with nationalism, since it has been widely associated with the Muslim community rather than nations and nation‐states. I argue that this bias is facilitated and maintained by the deep division in the literature. Scholarly work on both Islam and nationalism are split into two opposing approaches, state‐centered and culture‐centered. The findings of the present study challenge the binary thinking that juxtaposes politics against culture and dichotomises ethnic and state‐framed base of nationalism and nationhood. My major finding is that the Gülen movement has not only inherited the symbols and myths of descent from the founding fathers of the Turkish state, but it is also currently reproducing the related ethnic politics in cooperation with–not in opposition to–the secular states in the post‐Soviet Turkic world. The study reconciles ethno‐symbolic and state‐centered approaches in explaining the convergence between Islamic and secular nationalism in the formation of ethnic politics in Almaty‐Kazakhstan.