The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence

NATO's nuclear deterrence posture has since the late 1950s involved risk‐and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Since 1991 gravity bombs, deliverable by US and allied dual‐capable aircraft, have been the only type of US nuclear weapons left in Europe. Although many other factors are involved in the alliance's deterrence posture and in US extended deterrence—including intercontinental forces, missile defences, non‐nuclear capabilities and declaratory policy—recent discussions in the United States about NATO nuclear deterrence have focused on the future of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. The traditional view has supported long‐standing US and NATO policy in holding that the risk‐ and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on US nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence and war prevention; provide assurance to the allies of the genuineness of US commitments; and make the extended deterrence responsibility more acceptable to the United States. From this perspective, no further cuts in the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe should be made without an agreement with Russia providing for reductions that address the US—Russian numerical disparity in non‐strategic nuclear forces, with reciprocal transparency and verification measures. In contrast, four schools of thought call for withdrawing the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe without any negotiated Russian reciprocity: some military officers who consider the weapons and associated arrangements unnecessary for deterrence; proponents of ambitious arms control measures who accept extended deterrence policies but view the US weapons in Europe as an obstacle to progress in disarmament; nuclear disarmament champions who reject extended nuclear deterrence policies and who wish to eliminate all nuclear arms promptly; and selective engagement campaigners who want the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies on the grounds that they could lead to US involvement in a nuclear war.     

US missile defence and China's nuclear posture: changing dynamics of an offence–defence arms race

This article examines the rising prominence of strategic nuclear deterrence in Sino‐US relations. China is the only major nuclear power that has been actively expanding its offensive capabilities. Its nuclear modernization has inevitably caused concerns in the United States. The article suggests that China's nuclear programme is driven significantly by US missile defence, which has fundamentally altered the incentive structures for Chinese nuclear deterrence. The article also assesses the latest Chinese perception of US strategic adjustment under the Obama administration and its potential impact on arms control. It reveals that recent measures by the United States to restrain its missile defense could be conducive for achieving a strategic nuclear understanding between the two countries. The article then suggests a number of concrete actions for China and the United States to realize such an understanding.     

Extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia: redundant or resurgent?

A number of commentators have claimed that the strategic relevance of extended nuclear deterrence is declining in the twenty‐first century. This claim is based on three key arguments. First, that the positive effects of extended nuclear deterrence have been exaggerated by its proponents; second, that the rational actor logic underpinning extended nuclear deterrence is increasingly redundant; and third, that extended deterrence using conventional weapons is equally, if not more, effective as extended nuclear deterrence. This article applies these arguments to East Asia, a region where nuclear weapons continue to loom large in states' security equations. In applying each of the above arguments to the East Asian context, the analysis finds that not only is extended nuclear deterrence alive and kicking in the region, but also that in the coming decades it is likely to become more central to the strategic policies of the United States and its key allies, Japan and South Korea. Despite predictions of its demise, US extended nuclear deterrence remains a critical element in East Asia's security order and will remain so for the foreseeable future.     

Nuclear Order and Disorder

After a decade of great progress in diminishing the risks posed by nuclear weapons, international nuclear relations came unstuck in the late 1990s. Why did this happen? This question is best answered through an understanding of how a ‘nuclear order’ was constructed during the Cold War, how it developed in the early post‐Cold War period, and how confidence in it dissipated as the 1990s wore on. After considering how the nuclear order was founded upon linked systems of deterrence and abstinence, the article explains how both were destabilized in the mid‐ to late 1990s—cause and effect of the United States shifting its ordering strategy towards protection (through missile defences) and enforcement. Can confidence in nuclear order be restored? How should we regard the recent agreement among States Parties to the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Agreement to press for complete nuclear disarmament?     

Managing escalation: missile defence,strategy and US alliances

Missile defence plays an increasing role in NATO and in most US alliances in Asia, which raises the question of what impact it has on the management of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence relies on the threat of escalation. Since the costs of escalation are different for different allies, the management of extended deterrence is inherently difficult. Missile defence shifts the relative costs of conflict, and therefore also impacts on the alliance bargains that underpin agreement on extended deterrence strategy. Although increased defensive capacity is a clear net benefit, the strategic effects of its deployment and use can still be complex if, for example, missile defence increases the chances of localizing a conflict. The article discusses the role of missile defences for the US homeland, and of the territory and population of US allies, for extended deterrence credibility and the reassurance of US allies in Asia and in NATO. It argues that there is increased scope in strengthening deterrence by enmeshing the defence of the US homeland with that of its allies, and that allies need to pay closer attention to the way the deployment and use of missile defence influence pressures for escalation. In general, missile defence thus reinforces the need for the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia to negotiate an overall alliance strategy.     

New approaches to deterrence in Britain, France, and the United States

The three western nuclear powers have in recent years been more preoccupied with threats from regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction than with potential major power threats. London, Paris, and Washington have each substantially reduced their deployed nuclear forces and sharply cut back their range of delivery systems since the end of the Cold War in 1989‐1991. While each has manifested greater interest in non‐nuclear capabilities for deterrence, each has attempted, with varying degrees of clarity, to define options for limited nuclear use. All three have articulated their nuclear employment threats within a conceptual framework intended to promote deterrence. Despite the differences in their approaches and circumstances, the three western nuclear powers are grappling with tough and, to some extent, unanswered questions: what threat will deter? To what extent have the grounds for confidence in deterrence been diminished? To what extent has it been prudent to scale back deployed nuclear capabilities and redefine threats of nuclear retaliation? To what extent would limited nuclear options enhance deterrence and simplify nuclear employment decisions? What level of confidence should be placed in the full array of deterrence and containment measures? To what extent is deterrence national policy, and to what extent is it Alliance policy?     

The US Nuclear Posture Review and the NATO allies

The 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review called for reducing operationally deployed US strategic nuclear warheads by almost two-thirds over the decade ending in 2012; emphasizing the development and/or improvement of capabilities other than nuclear forces, including missile defences, non-nuclear strike forces, and a responsive infrastructure; and placing nuclear and other capabilities within the framework of new concepts such as dissuasion and capabilities-based planning. The reductions foreseen in the NPR furnished the basis for the May 2002 Moscow Treaty. Allied observers have welcomed this treaty as a political substitute for the ABM Treaty and START negotiations, but have found it disappointing as an arms control measure. While allied observers have expressed reservations about combining nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces in a single notional leg of the 'New Triad' and about increasing readiness for possible nuclear testing, they have endorsed unprecedented steps in the defensive area, notably with respect to ballistic missile defence. Some new US concepts have been relatively uncontroversial because they represent continuity, but others (such as dissuasion and deterrence by denial) have evoked scepticism.     

Nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use

The two books under review, The tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons , by T. V. Paul and Deterrence: from Cold War to long war. Lessons from six decades of RAND research , by Austin Long, highlight the continued interest in the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Long traces the RAND Corporation's research on the subject, exploring the role that nuclear deterrence has played as a strategy of the Cold War. The author goes on to argue for the relevance of nuclear deterrence to the future strategic environment, considering threats from peer-competitors to non-state actors. By contrast Paul considers the rise and persistence of a tradition, or informal social norm, of non-use which has encouraged self-deterrence. Employing a series of examples, Paul argues that this tradition best explains why, since 1945, nuclear states have not used nuclear weapons against non-nuclear opponents. Taken together, these books encourage further consideration of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the two practices can successfully coexist if non-nuclear states have, as Paul suggests, already begun to exploit the existence of a tradition of non-use. Such deterrence failures, real or perceived, have profound implications for relationships between nuclear and non-nuclear states.     

More is more: Scaling political ecology within limits to growth

This piece responds to the article Is less more… or is more less? Scaling the political ecology of the future, where Paul Robbins (2019) discusses degrowth and modernism as two competing political imaginaries with regard to the growth-technology-environment nexus. Arguing from the perspective of ecological economics, I engage with the literature on political ecology to discuss the notions of limits to growth, Malthusianism, austerity and scarcity, as well as the role of technology as both environmental problem and solution. The paper exposes key divergences between different traditions in political ecology with regard to technological and economic scale. First, against the argument that limits to growth is a mere social construct, I call attention to research on ecological thresholds and to the perils of epistemic relativisms in a post-truth era. Second, against the idea that limits represent an elitist discourse, I call attention to long-standing traditions in emancipatory politics that defend limits in the name of justice. Third, against the thesis that more is less, I refer to mounting empirical evidence indicating that more is more (growth brings more environmental destruction, not less). I contend that political ecology can have much to gain from engaging with the political utopia of degrowth, but far less so from the technological utopia of modernism, which –I argue– reinforces status quo and offers false solutions to the environmental challenges of our time. Emancipation, I claim, is not about bringing more to more, but about bringing enough to everyone.     

The moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence: A critique

Theorists within the just war tradition of ethics differ in their conclusions about nuclear warfare and nuclear deterrence. This paper examines three arguments for the conditional moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence—those of the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops in their pastoral letter, of J. Bryan Hehir, and of Michael Walzer—and argues that none of the three constitutes intellectually compelling and practically useful moral advice. The bishops fail to convince us that nuclear use can ever fulfil the requirements of proportionality, and therefore that the intention to use nuclear weapons can ever be justified. Hehir fails to convince us that nuclear deterrence policies in fact distinguish categorically between intention and use. Walzer's case that deterrence is bad but necessary is more convincing but it, like Hehir's, does not constitute coherent moral advice for the citizen, soldier or government official. I conclude that, given the inadequacy of attempts to justify nuclear deterrence, even conditionally, we have a strong moral obligation to pursue alternatives.

The level of citizen concern about the dangerous possibility of nuclear war has become greatly heightened in Europe and the United States in the 1980s. This is probably due to at least three factors: the significant technological developments in nuclear weaponry that have occurred during the last decade, the increased fear of Soviet military strength, and the concentration of recent U.S. administrations on developing and improving a nuclear war‐fighting capability. But even before the growth of the peace movement since 1980, a ‘new debate’ about the morality of nuclear weapons and deterrence policy had begun in academic and theological circles. In this paper, I will analyze three arguments of moral philosophers and theologians, all working within the ‘just war’ tradition, about whether nuclear deterrence, in any form, can be morally justified.     

Three visions of the bomb: Australian thinking about nuclear weapons and strategy

This article argues that, over the decades, Australians have held three different, coherent, long-lived ‘visions’ of nuclear weapons and strategy. Those visions—which we have labelled Menzian, Gortonian and disarmer—compete on four grounds: the role that nuclear weapons play in international order; the doctrine of deterrence; the importance of arms control; and the relevance of nuclear weapons to Australia's specific needs. We believe this ‘textured’ framework provides a richer, more satisfying, and more accurate understanding of Australian nuclear identity, both past and present, than previous scholarship has yielded. Moreover, the competition between the three visions might not be at an end. Changes in international norms, in proliferation rates, in regional strategic dynamics, or even in the deterrence doctrines of the major powers could easily reawaken some old, enduring debates. Australian nuclear identity faces an uncertain future.     

The fuzzy limits of self-reliance: US extended deterrence and Australian strategic policy

As a close US ally, Australia is often seen as a recipient of US extended deterrence. This article argues that in recent decades, Australian strategic policy engaged with US extended deterrence at three different levels: locally, Australia eschews US combat support and deterrence under the policy of self-reliance; regionally, it supports US extended deterrence in Asia; globally, it relies on the US alliance against nuclear threats to Australia. The article argues that in none of these policy areas does the Australian posture conform to a situation of extended deterrence proper. Moreover, when the 2009 White Paper combines all three policies in relation to major power threats against Australia, serious inconsistencies result in Australia's strategic posture—a situation the government should seek to avoid in the White Paper being drafted at the time of writing.     

A nuclear North Korea and the stability of East Asia: a tsunami on the horizon?

This article aims to assess the strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear development. It calls into question the conventional wisdom that Pyongyang's atomic weapons will not only undermine the state of deterrence on the Korean peninsula, but also will trigger a nuclear domino effect throughout East Asia. A nuclear-armed North Korea, I argue, still cannot win a major victory over the South and the United States; Pyongyang's bombs somewhat decrease—rather than increase, as many believe—the risk of US preventive attack. And the regional US military presence as well as the available missile defence technology is sufficient to persuade Seoul and Tokyo not to pursue nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future. While I reject the alarmist view, I find that North Korea's armament nevertheless carries two significant—albeit less grave—risks that have received little scholarly scrutiny. First, I argue that the risk of inadvertent war through pre-emption will increase with Pyongyang's armament. I also argue that the strengthening of US alliances in the region as well as the US development of a missile defence capability in response to the North Korean threat could exacerbate the security dilemmas among major powers. I conclude, however, that these potential dangers do not markedly threaten regional stability.     

Missile defence and the transatlantic security relationship

This article examines the re-emergence of ballistic missile defence (BMD) as a contentious issue in US-European security relations since 1999. It begins by outlining three phases in the recent evolution of US missile defence policy from 1995 to mid-2001. The article then examines five key factors that have dominated European views and concerns in relation to BMD: a divergence between European and American assessments of the emerging ballistic missile threat; concern over the implications for nuclear arms control stemming from Russian and Chinese opposition to BMD; the impact of missile defence on deterrence and the Atlantic alliance; scepticism about the technological feasibility of BMD; and the potential opportunity costs associated with resource allocation to missile defence. It is shown that European anxieties have been exacerbated by a perception of a growing unilateralism in American security policy in recent years. The article proceeds by arguing that the US-European debate over BMD looks set to evolve in one of two directions. The more likely and most desirable scenario would involve the US reaching an understanding with its European allies on the way forward. The less desirable scenario would involve key European countries, such as France and Germany, deciding ultimately to withhold their political support for BMD, which would have the potential of causing significant rifts in both transatlantic and intra-European security relations. In both cases, it is argued that the BMD debate will be defined by the interaction of several key variables. These include the extent to which the Bush administration engages in meaningful consultations with the Europeans; the administration's ability or otherwise to reach an agreement with Russia on the way ahead; the architecture options of a future allied or global BMD system; the related issues of technological feasibility and financial cost; and the evolving missile threat.     

The challenges confronting US extended nuclear assurance in Asia

This article aims to explore the credibility of future US extended nuclear assurance in Asia. Extended nuclear assurance, all too frequently confused with extended nuclear deterrence, faces a daunting series of challenges: a US strategic mainstream fractured on the roles and purposes of nuclear weapons; an Asia where assurance demands are high during a period of strategic uncertainty; and a US theatre‐ and tactical‐range nuclear arsenal much depleted from its heyday. Meanwhile, nuclear latency is growing in Asia as more countries reach the technological level that the US attained in 1945, as nuclear skill sets become more prevalent, and as delivery vehicles appropriate to nuclear weapons become more typical in regional arsenals. The US now provides extended nuclear assurance to nearly 40 countries worldwide, agreeing to run nuclear risks on behalf of its allies and friends. The bulk of those assurances derive from the NATO alliance, but it is the non‐NATO‐related assurances—and settings—that seem likely to be the more controversial ones over the next decade or two. Asia is coming into its own at a time when extended nuclear assurance needs reinvigoration as a key ingredient in US strategic policy.     

Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War?

The Bush administration is trying to persuade itself and everyone else that the ‘global war on terrorism’ (GWoT) will, like the Cold War, be a ‘long war’ requiring sustained mobilization against an implacable foe. It has had some success in projecting this idea, and if it takes root the GWoT could indeed become a durable, dominant, unifying idea that would enable Washington to reassert and legitimize both its special claims as the sole superpower and US leadership of global security. The question is: how likely is this to happen? By looking at the surrounding events and contexts that could support or undermine the elevation of the GWoT to the status of the new Cold War, the author argues that it is not all that likely. Many factors could undermine it, not least that most of the strategies on off er corrode the liberal values that they are supposed to defend.     

Restructuring the US-South Korea alliance to deal with the second Korean nuclear crisis

As the US-South Korea alliance faces the second Korean nuclear crisis, Seoul and Washington no longer share a common unifying threat perception of North Korea. This divide has allowed North Korea to advance its interests by playing a 'South Korea card' against the United States in the nuclear standoff. The divide is not a transient problem that can be ignored or addressed with ad hoc fixes but a secular phenomenon rooted in South Korea's growing wealth and deepening democracy. What is needed now is more distance in the alliance. The alliance must be restructured to reflect the reality that South Korea can defend itself against North Korea without the help of the United States. For both Seoul and Washington, the restructured alliance would produce a more complete and robust set of options to advance their respective North Korea policies.     

Lord Falmouth and the Parallel Political Worlds of Ultra‐Toryism, 1826–32

The parallel political worlds of ultra‐toryism were those of Westminster and the provinces. Hoping to defend the protestant constitution from what they regarded as ruinous attacks, between 1826 and 1832 many ultra‐tories were unrelenting parliamentary opponents of constitutional change. However, far less is understood about their simultaneous involvement in the political world away from Westminster, apart from analysis of the duke of Newcastle's electoral activities and several county studies. This article examines the 1st earl of Falmouth's dogged ideological defence of the protestant constitution, as well as exposing his political pragmatism in Cornwall, thereby highlighting the lengths to which some ultras were prepared to go in pursuing their beliefs. Falmouth also exemplifies those ultras who, from March 1827 when Lord Liverpool resigned, became far more prominent in the struggle against ‘Revolution by due course of law’, beginning with their opposition to Canning becoming prime minister. Furthermore, a study of Falmouth's career between 1826 and 1832 at Westminster and in Cornwall, also highlights several of the ideological tensions within ultra‐toryism at this time.     

The wrong plan: some thoughts on National Missile Defense

Abstract

The current proposals to construct a system of hit to kill interceptors as a safeguard against missiles which might be launched against the USA by a rogue state are shown in this paper to be badly flawed. Any nation with the ability to develop and construct an intercontinental ballistic missile would also likely be capable of employing countermeasures against interception. In short, the system would be unlikely to work against a missile travelling unpowered at great speed through space. If the USA is determined to have protection against such attack it would be far cheaper and more efficient to employ antimissile devices nearer to potential sources and to intercept hostile projectiles at the booster stage. It might even be possible to collaborate with Russia on such a scheme, which would not violate the spirit of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.