Organizing for British national strategy

In December 1968 Ernest May asked how the US government could gain access to ‘long‐headed’ staffers to provide greater strategic depth to foreign policy. The challenge of long‐term strategy persists: how should government be organized to support it, how can the right people be found to staff it and how can political leaders make time for longer‐term policy‐making given the challenge of the immediate? The policy planning staff in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have traditionally had the task of supporting longer‐range, broader foreign policy. A small group of diplomats—later leavened by externals from the media, non‐profit and private sectors—was meant to generate an improved approach to British interests and policy. As Robert Wade‐Gery recalls of its role in the 1960s, there was a push to forge fresh links with outside thinking. Did it work? Former policy planners can be circumspect about its achievements. One former British planner said he felt like ‘a spare part rattling around in a tin’, while former American planners have written about the challenge of injecting fresh thinking when detached from decision‐making. Other planners were dragged into operational work or speechwriting. Many planners nonetheless enjoyed the opportunity to think more broadly. Policy planning can be intellectually rich without being the source of actionable strategic thinking about the long‐term national interest. This article suggests that a greater focus on people rather than systems might help to foster more strategic, anticipatory and innovative thinking about the national interest.     

'When the shooting starts': Atlanticism in British security strategy

The evolution in the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity has led to shifting patterns of alliances in world politics. Since 9/11, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use its overwhelming military power to deal with potential or real threats. Contrary to its policy of embedded power in the economic and security institutions of the post‐1945 period, the United States increasingly views the multilateral order as an unreasonable restraint on the exercise of hegemonic power. What does this new context mean for Britain? Going back to 1997, the first New Labour government added an internationalist dimension to the traditional roles of acting as a loyal ally to the United States and serving as a bridge across the transatlantic divide. The Iraq war of 2003 showed that the bridge could not bear the weight of the disagreement between ‘Old Europe’ and the new conservatives in Washington. The Prime Minister's decision to be there ‘when the shooting starts’ shows that Britain continues to place the bilateral connection with the United States above all other obligations. This article questions whether the Atlanticist identity that underpins the strategic rationale for the special relationship is likely to succeed in delivering the interests and goals set out in the recent UK security strategy document.     

The naval battles of Roger of Lauria

Roger of Lauria's family was exiled from the kingdom of Sicily by Charles I of Anjou for its support of the Hohenstaufen cause but in the service of Aragon he became the most feared and renowned warrior of his generation. His six great naval victories during the War of the Sicilian Vespers closely determined the outcome of that struggle.Lauria's fame has been diminished by the minor place awarded to the War of the Vespers by modern medievalists and by its overshadowing by the Hundred Years War. But in fact it was an extremely important war in medieval history, witnessing the decline of the papacy and the kingdom of Sicily and the rise for a brief time of a new power in the Mediterranean: Aragon. Moreover, it was in this war that medieval warfare first began to acquire attributes characteristics of the later middle ages: supremacy of archers and infantry over mounted and mailed knights, appearance of disciplined and professional companies of mercenaries led by professional war leaders, and decline from chivalric warfare into nationalistic hatred and ferocity.Lauria's success lay in the superior qualities of his crews and in his own genius. Handling galley fleets successfully required mastery of the difficult nexus between land and sea for Mediterranean galley warfare was more amphibious than naval in the modern sense of the word. Lauria proved to be the greatest master of the science in the middle ages; a war leader deserving to be ranked with Richard Coeur de Lion, the Black Prince, and Nelson.     

The naval battles of Roger of Lauria

Roger of Lauria's family was exiled from the kingdom of Sicily by Charles I of Anjou for its support of the Hohenstaufen cause but in the service of Aragon he became the most feared and renowned warrior of his generation. His six great naval victories during the War of the Sicilian Vespers closely determined the outcome of that struggle.Lauria's fame has been diminished by the minor place awarded to the War of the Vespers by modern medievalists and by its overshadowing by the Hundred Years War. But in fact it was an extremely important war in medieval history, witnessing the decline of the papacy and the kingdom of Sicily and the rise for a brief time of a new power in the Mediterranean: Aragon. Moreover, it was in this war that medieval warfare first began to acquire attributes characteristics of the later middle ages: supremacy of archers and infantry over mounted and mailed knights, appearance of disciplined and professional companies of mercenaries led by professional war leaders, and decline from chivalric warfare into nationalistic hatred and ferocity.Lauria's success lay in the superior qualities of his crews and in his own genius. Handling galley fleets successfully required mastery of the difficult nexus between land and sea for Mediterranean galley warfare was more amphibious than naval in the modern sense of the word. Lauria proved to be the greatest master of the science in the middle ages; a war leader deserving to be ranked with Richard Coeur de Lion, the Black Prince, and Nelson.     

The naval reform of Emperor John II Komnenos: a re-evaluation

The eleventh and twelfth centuries have traditionally been interpreted as the era when the Byzantine navy declined, and then was allowed to disappear. Historians often mark the death knell of the Byzantine navy with Emperor John II Komnenos ending the collection of taxes for localized defence fleets. Niketas Choniates describes the act as a money-hungry measure devised by the finance minister John of Poutza, whereby fleet taxes would be collected and spent centrally, leading to the end of localized fleets as funds were diverted to other sectors. This reform has traditionally been interpreted as one that led to losing a war with Venice in the 1120s, provincial insecurity, the eventual outsourcing of the Byzantine navy to the Italians, and finally the sack of Constantinople itself by the forces of the Fourth Crusade when the Italians turned against them.Such an interpretation does not however sit easily with the reign of John II Komnenos, during which on numerous occasions the navy is referenced as playing a crucial part in the emperor’s campaigns, a feature that began in Alexios’ reign and continued into Manuel’s. Though Pryor and Jeffreys have previously expressed doubt that such a centralising naval reform could really spell the end of the Byzantine fleet, and possibly the empire itself, this paper will build upon that doubt with evidence that necessitates a re-evaluation of the traditional interpretation. First, the narrative of John’s war with Venice in the 1120s will be examined, followed by how the subsequent naval reform was shaped by these events, which themselves only confirmed the experiences of the Byzantine Navy in previous decades, and so highlighted the need for reform. This analysis will demonstrate that a centralising reform was a coherent measure undertaken to increase the efficiency of the fleet, and to recognize officially trends in organization that had already emerged under Alexios. Subsequent fleet operations in John and Manuel’s reigns reveal that the role of the navy did indeed change in the early twelfth century, but the narrative of decline is false. Throughout this section it will also be shown that analysis of the Byzantine navy has been overly shaped by use of hostile sources. The second part of this paper will then move on to highlight three major uses of the fleet that have been undervalued by scholars focused on traditional sea battles: its use on rivers as well as the sea, its use for transport and logistics, and its ‘soft power’ diplomatic capacity. The combination of these factors reveal a Byzantine navy that was a crucial part of the Komnenian restoration of Byzantine fortunes in the twelfth century, and that its decline after the death of Manuel must be seen as a product of other factors, rather than a cause of the late twelfth-century imperial decline in itself.     

大英博物馆 世界上第一座国家博物馆

<正>世界上第一座国家博物馆大英博物馆,从不为人关注到成为英国的国家文化载体、大众的文化空间,在这一历程中如何发挥国家在文化载体、民族文化建构上的主导作用,以及实现国家与民众之间的互动,相信会给中国的文化建设以一定的启示。