The China factor in the US–South Korea alliance: the perceived usefulness of China in the Korean Peninsula

Over the past 10 years, South Korea has chosen inconsistent strategies with respect to the US–South Korea alliance. On the one hand, Seoul disagreed with Washington about the extended role of United States Forces Korea and the deployment of US missile defence systems in East Asia. On the other hand, these problems ironically coincided with South Korea's strong support for the USA in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. What explains the inconsistency of South Korea's alliance policies? Major schools of thought in international relations have offered explanations, but their analyses are deficient and indeterminate. This article looks at the South Korea–China–North Korea triangle as a new approach to explaining the puzzling behaviour of South Korea. The model shows that South Korea's alliance policies are driven by two causal variables. First, North Korea is an impelling force for South Korea to remain as a strong US alliance partner. This encourages Seoul to maintain cooperation with Washington in wide-ranging alliance tasks. Second, South Korea's policies are likely to reflect the way the nation perceives how useful China is in taming North Korea. The perceived usefulness of China causes Seoul to accommodate China and decrease cooperation with the USA. This might strain the relationship with the USA should South Korea evade alliance missions that might run contrary to China's security interests.     

‘An ally for all the years to come’: why Australia is not a conflicted US ally

In 2011, Australia communicated a clear choice about its strategic future. It would continue to cleave tightly to the US alliance, expand its military links and work to advance the USA's conception of regional order. Given its economic interests, why has Australia bound itself to the US alliance? What lies behind this strong commitment and what would it take for Australia to change its relationship with the USA? This article presents an analysis of the current state of the US–Australia alliance and argues that Canberra's pursuit of close relations with the USA reflects the interaction of a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of the alliance with a set of resolutely political factors that have produced the current policy setting. The article first assesses the security cost and benefit behind the alliance. It then argues that the move also derives from the strong domestic support for the US alliance, a sharpened sense that China's rise was generating regional instability that only the US primacy could manage and the realisation that the economic fallout of such a move would be minimal. It concludes with a brief reflection on what it might take to change the current policy settings.     

Central Asian and Russian perspectives on China's strategic emergence

This article employs fieldwork research and literature analysis to examine contemporary perceptions of China's emergence in popular and elite opinion in Russia and the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan. It initially establishes a framework for understanding China's emergence, emphasizing a trilateral dynamic between the hegemonic position of the US in Asia, the evolution of the strategic choices of China's neighbours and the development of strategic regionalism as a mechanism for managing regional spaces. Choosing to take the Commonwealth of Independent States as a particular case of this framework, it argues that the interaction between Russia, China and the US remains highly fluid, particularly under the conditions ‘of re‐setting’ the US‐Russian relationship. This means that regional contexts are highly significant; and it establishes Central Asia as an important new strategic region for working out relations between Russia, China, and the US through their interactions with regional states. The second part of the article examines Russian and Central Asian responses to China's emergence. It looks at three categories of motivation in China's regionalism: its system for accumulative growth; its problems with weak constitutionality and transnational security in its western regions; and its concern with US/NATO encroachment on its western frontier and the US attempt to turn Central Asian elites away from their traditional alignments. The third part looks at China's promotion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as its mechanism for strategic regionalism in Central Asia. The article questions the SCO's significance in terms of its capacity for governance and functionalism, and points to the problem of institutional competition, notably with Moscow's preferred structure of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that China will be an unconventional superpower that presents different facets of itself in different regional contexts. There will not be a single model of China's emergence and it will continue to develop its international role through a mix of adaptation and experimentation. However, China's strategy will pose a problem for Russia and Central Asia since it seeks to create a strategic space that does not challenge the West, but exists substantially outside the West. Russia, in particular, has to decide whether it will be able to maintain its current stance of independence between Europe and Asia as China's rise shifts the frontiers between East and West.     

'When the shooting starts': Atlanticism in British security strategy

The evolution in the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity has led to shifting patterns of alliances in world politics. Since 9/11, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use its overwhelming military power to deal with potential or real threats. Contrary to its policy of embedded power in the economic and security institutions of the post‐1945 period, the United States increasingly views the multilateral order as an unreasonable restraint on the exercise of hegemonic power. What does this new context mean for Britain? Going back to 1997, the first New Labour government added an internationalist dimension to the traditional roles of acting as a loyal ally to the United States and serving as a bridge across the transatlantic divide. The Iraq war of 2003 showed that the bridge could not bear the weight of the disagreement between ‘Old Europe’ and the new conservatives in Washington. The Prime Minister's decision to be there ‘when the shooting starts’ shows that Britain continues to place the bilateral connection with the United States above all other obligations. This article questions whether the Atlanticist identity that underpins the strategic rationale for the special relationship is likely to succeed in delivering the interests and goals set out in the recent UK security strategy document.     

China's Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia and the Middle East

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims at connecting the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa through a combination of infrastructure projects and soft‐power programs. All of the six land bridges and maritime routes under the BRI extend westward, mostly passing through Central Asia and the Middle East on land or by sea. Cooperation with countries in these regions will, according to China's design, meet its domestic energy needs, and grow the country's economy. China recognizes, however, that in Central Asia and the Middle East, the risks posed by what it calls the “Three Evils” — terrorism, extremism, and separatism can impact the success of the BRI. They can also impact stability in its own adjacent areas, including Xinjiang. Therefore, in concert with the BRI, China is also identifying and deploying bilateral and multilateral diplomatic mechanisms aimed at security coordination with BRI countries in these two volatile regions. This article provides an overview of BRI developments in the two regions and examines some of the diplomatic mechanisms China is using to coordinate security and reduce risks.     

From Idealism to Pragmatism: An Analysis of China's Policies toward the Middle East

After World War II, the Middle East stage attracted Beijing's attention. While Israel and China proved at that time to be too diverse, through the 1950s China made inroads with Arab countries. Egypt became the first to recognize the P.R.C., which, however, suffered rebuffs as anti-Communist forces generally prevailed in the Middle East. Beijing supported the people of Palestine. After the Soviet Union had become China's enemy, China tried to unite the Third World against the two superpowers. With Deng in 1978, China's Middle Eastern policy became more pragmatic, tilting toward the developed countries and economic cooperation rather than ideology (e.g., with Yemen). China enhanced relations with Gulf states; cooperated with the United States in supporting the Afghan mujahedin; and declared neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War, although economic alliance with Iran grew. The Gulf War affected Beijing's attitudes toward weapons technology and toward the United Nations and China's role in it. Israel is currently viewed as a channel for possible influence with the West. Overall, China's basic policy now is to watch and wait.     

Turning Foe to Friend? US Objectives in Including Russia in Post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic Security Co-operation

This article scrutinises four moments in the post-Cold War era where the United States engaged to include Russia in Euro-Atlantic security forums: the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; Partnership for Peace; Permanent Joint Council; and the NATO-Russia Council. The overall puzzle is: why did consecutive US administrations aim to formalise co-operation between NATO and Russia? Current tensions highlight the issue's significance, yet in the literature, there is no study looking specifically at these episodes of US efforts to integrate Moscow. Building on a broad set of primary sources, this article determines what we can now know of US objectives concerning the role of Russia in Euro-Atlantic co-operation. It concludes that US objectives moved from seeking new and stable relations between former adversaries, to facilitating US objectives in the Euro-Atlantic context with NATO enlargement, to expressing more global interests in confronting emerging crises and challenges, amongst others in the war on terror. Co-operation was limited to where interests were overlapping. Russia would not be placed in a position to influence NATO as an alliance. US officials remained hopeful that co-operation with Russia was possible, and would benefit all. At the same time, decisions would serve US interests should relations sour.     

China Gazes West: Xinjiang's Growing Rendezvous with Central Asia

A senior American specialist on the geography of China surveys that country's enduring interest and involvement with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, increasingly on the basis of Xinjiang's role as a bridgehead for economic linkages. Among the key features of this growing involvement reviewed in the paper are the establishment in 2001 of a regional security alliance (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) to combat Islamist extremism as well as separatist activities; growing commercial linkages (especially with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) in tandem with improved transport links and increasing crossborder movements of merchants, traders, and tourists; and China's growing need for oil and increasing reliance on Kazakhstan as a key source for petroleum. China's growing engagement with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries is examined within the context of both opportunities as well as challenges, the latter reflecting the increasing complexity of Han Chinese and Uyghur/Turkic relations owing to increased Uyghur ties to affiliated populations in the Central Asian states.     

Assessing China's approach to regional multilateral security cooperation

This article analyses factors that cause China to have different approaches to different regional multilateral security institutions. Current research not only has little to say about China's motivation to participate, but also little regarding the level of its participation in or support for regional security institutions. To explain why China's post-cold war participation in regional multilateral security institutions varies, this article argues that threat levels help explain China's conditions for participating in multilateral security institutions, and security interests help explain China's behaviour as a member of such institutions. The author stresses that these are useful variables that can explain China's behaviour with respect to regional multilateral security institutions. In the foreseeable future, China's general posture toward regional multilateral security cooperation will be passive participation and strong support. Australia should not only consider strategies which emphasise strengthened bilateral relationships between Canberra and Beijing, but also continue to positively support regional multilateral security institutions.     

Managing escalation: missile defence,strategy and US alliances

Missile defence plays an increasing role in NATO and in most US alliances in Asia, which raises the question of what impact it has on the management of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence relies on the threat of escalation. Since the costs of escalation are different for different allies, the management of extended deterrence is inherently difficult. Missile defence shifts the relative costs of conflict, and therefore also impacts on the alliance bargains that underpin agreement on extended deterrence strategy. Although increased defensive capacity is a clear net benefit, the strategic effects of its deployment and use can still be complex if, for example, missile defence increases the chances of localizing a conflict. The article discusses the role of missile defences for the US homeland, and of the territory and population of US allies, for extended deterrence credibility and the reassurance of US allies in Asia and in NATO. It argues that there is increased scope in strengthening deterrence by enmeshing the defence of the US homeland with that of its allies, and that allies need to pay closer attention to the way the deployment and use of missile defence influence pressures for escalation. In general, missile defence thus reinforces the need for the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia to negotiate an overall alliance strategy.     

US missile defence and China's nuclear posture: changing dynamics of an offence–defence arms race

This article examines the rising prominence of strategic nuclear deterrence in Sino‐US relations. China is the only major nuclear power that has been actively expanding its offensive capabilities. Its nuclear modernization has inevitably caused concerns in the United States. The article suggests that China's nuclear programme is driven significantly by US missile defence, which has fundamentally altered the incentive structures for Chinese nuclear deterrence. The article also assesses the latest Chinese perception of US strategic adjustment under the Obama administration and its potential impact on arms control. It reveals that recent measures by the United States to restrain its missile defense could be conducive for achieving a strategic nuclear understanding between the two countries. The article then suggests a number of concrete actions for China and the United States to realize such an understanding.     

Asia's century and the problem of Japan's centrality

Japan has long been regarded as a central component of America's grand strategy in Asia. Scholars and practitioners assume this situation will persist in the face of China's rise and, indeed, that a more ‘normal’ Japan can and should take on an increasingly central role in US‐led strategies to manage this power transition. This article challenges those assumptions by arguing that they are, paradoxically, being made at a time when Japan's economic and strategic weight in Asian security is gradually diminishing. The article documents Japan's economic and demographic challenges and their strategic ramifications. It considers what role Japan might play in an evolving security order where China and the US emerge as Asia's two dominant powers by a significant margin. Whether the US–China relationship is ultimately one of strategic competition or accommodation, it is argued that Japan's continued centrality in America's Asian grand strategy threatens to become increasingly problematic. It is posited that the best hope for circumventing this problem and its potentially destabilizing consequences lies in the nurturing of a nascent ‘shadow condominium’ comprising the US and China, with Japan as a ‘marginal weight’ on the US side of that arrangement.     

Australia,the United States and a 'China growing strong': Managing conflict avoidance

How to deal with a rising China constitutes one of the most seminal challenges facing the ANZUS alliance since its inception a half a century ago. Australia must reconcile its geography and economic interests in Asia with its post-war strategic and historic cultural orientation towards the United States. It must succeed in this policy task without alienating either Beijing or Washington in the process. The extent to which this is achieved will shape Australia's national security posture for decades to come. Three specific components of the 'Sino-American-Australian' triangle are assessed here: the future of Taiwan, the American development of a National Missile Defence (NMD), and the interplay between Sino-American power balancing and multilateral security politics. The policy stakes for Australia and for the continued viability of ANZUS are high in all three policy areas as a new US Administration takes office in early 2001. The article concludes that Australia's best interest is served by applying deliberate modes of decision-making in its own relations with both China and the US and by facilitating consistent and systematic dialogue and consultations with both of those great powers on key strategic issues.     

In defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia's new strategic map

The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper categorically termed Australia's zone of strategic interest the Indo-Pacific, the first time any government has defined its region this way. This raises questions about what the Indo-Pacific means, whether it is a coherent strategic system, the provenance of the concept and its implications for Asian security as well as Australian policy. Indo-Pacific Asia can best be understood as an expansive definition of a maritime super-region centred on South-East Asia, arising principally from the emergence of China and India as outward-looking trading states and strategic actors. It is a strategic system insofar as it involves the intersecting interests of key powers such as China, India and the USA, although the Indo-Pacific subregions will retain their own dynamics too. It suits Australia's two-ocean geography and expanding links with Asia, including India. The concept is, however, not limited to an Australian perspective and increasingly reflects US, Indian, Japanese and Indonesian ways of seeing the region. It also reflects China's expanding interests in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that the Chinese debate may shift towards partial acceptance of Indo-Pacific constructs alongside Asia-Pacific and East Asian ones, despite suspicions about its association with the US rebalance to Asia. Questions about Australia's ability to implement an effective Indo-Pacific strategy must account for force posture, alliance ties and defence diplomacy, as well as constraints on force structure and spending.     

Beyond win–win: rethinking China's international relationships in an era of economic uncertainty

China is the least disadvantaged major economy in the current era of global economic uncertainty. Thus it is becoming the focus of attention of its neighbours and is achieving a prominence in the world political economy unparalleled in its modern history. To a great extent, China's success is the result of ‘good neighbour diplomacy’ such as ‘win–win’ and the policies of reform and openness of the past thirty years. However, despite continuity in policy, China's ‘peaceful leap forward’ since 2008 has changed the context of its external relationships. The increasing asymmetries between China and its neighbours, as well as decreasing asymmetry with the United States, require an adjustment of win–win values beyond mutual benefit to credible reassurance. As China's neighbours become more dependent, they also become more anxious concerning their interests. Meanwhile, China's relative gain on the US requires a different kind of confidence‐building diplomacy.     

Japan's response to China's rise: regional engagement, global containment, dangers of collision

Japan and China's ability to manage their bilateral relationship is crucial for the stability of the East Asian region. It also has a global impact on the security and economic development of other regions. For just as China's rise has inevitably involved an expansion of its global reach, so Japan's responses to the challenges posed by China have increasingly taken a global form, seeking to incorporate new partners and frameworks outside East Asia. Japan's preferred response to China's regional and global rise in the post‐Cold War period has remained one of default engagement. Japan is intent on promoting China's external engagement with the East Asia region and its internal domestic reform, through upgrading extant bilateral and Japan–China–US trilateral frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, and by emphasizing the importance of economic power to influence China. Japan is deliberately seeking to proliferate regional frameworks for cooperation in East Asia in order to dilute, constrain and ultimately engage China's rising power. However, Japan's engagement strategy also contains the potential to tilt towards default containment. Japan's domestic political basis for engagement is becoming increasingly precarious as China's rise stimulates Japanese revisionism and nationalism. Japan also appears increasingly to be looking to contain China on a global scale by forging new strategic links in Russia and Central Asia, with a ‘concert of democracies’ involving India, Australia and the US, by competing for resources with China in Africa and the Middle East, and by attempting to articulate a values‐based diplomacy to check the so‐called ‘Beijing consensus’. Nevertheless, Japan's perceived inability to channel China's rise either through regional engagement or through global containment carries a further risk of pushing Japan to resort to the strengthening of its military power in an attempt to guarantee its essential national interests. It is in this instance that Japan and China run the danger of a military collision.     

Not-so-new silk roads: Japan's foreign policies on Asian connectivity infrastructure under the radar

Scholarly narratives concerning China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) tend to contextualise this project within China's rivalry with the United States and Japan. Such interpretations often reduce and misconstrue Japan's initiatives in Asian infrastructure finance as mere reactivity to China's advances. This paper will showcase Japan's own foreign and financial policies regarding infrastructure in Asia and the New Silk Road regions since the end of the Cold War. I argue that Japan's presence in that field is underappreciated and under-researched, as Japan's infrastructural footprint in the New Silk Road significantly pre-dates the BRI. Furthermore, I stress the fact that Japan's foreign policy in Asian infrastructure finance featured important cooperative postures toward China, especially within multilateral development banks. The paper makes a contribution to emerging scholarship on the BRI—often reliant on strategic communications and projections—by highlighting Japan's role in regional infrastructure to show how our understanding of international relations and international political economy in Asia can be better informed by economic history and area studies.     

中苏同盟在抗美援朝战争中的作用

1950年2月14日中苏两国政府缔结的《中苏友好同盟互助条约》,虽然不是针对美国的,但中苏同盟的建立在中国人民抗美援朝战争中发挥了极为重要的作用。苏联是中国人民进行抗美援朝战争的强大后盾。《中苏友好同盟互助条约》在抗美援朝战争中有力地牵制了美国,使其不敢将战争扩大到中国境内;苏联对中国和中国人民抗美援朝战争提供了有力的军事援助;苏联积极帮助中国打破西方国家的经济封锁,大力援助中国建设工业基础;苏联在外交上坚决同美国孤立中国的政策作斗争。这些对中国人民取得抗美援朝战争胜利和完成国民经济恢复,提供了强有力的支援和保证。     

Invasion by invitation: the role of alliances in the Asia-Pacific

Alliances continue to occupy a prominent place in the Asia-Pacific's security architecture. For many regional states such as Australia and Japan, their respective alliances with the USA are the unchallenged foundations of their security. But when the rise of China is causing major change in the region, and when many countries are increasingly reliant on China economically, is the region's network of alliances any longer appropriate or useful? This article reviews alliances in theory and practice, and argues that, while alliances are unlikely to disappear, their utility is nothing like as clear-cut as many of their supporters would have one believe.     

Rules of engagement: America's Asia-Pacific security policy under an Obama administration

The United States’ strategy in the Asia-Pacific stands at a historic juncture. How the new Obama administration conceives and implements its Asia-Pacific policy during its first term of office will have major and enduring ramifications for America's future. The new administration must have a clear vision of its country's national security interests in the Asia-Pacific as well as a better appreciation of the evolving dynamics of the region. To this end, it should continue to underwrite its bilateral security commitments, albeit through a less threat-centric lens, and be more cognisant of the region's multilateral overtures by further anchoring US participation in regional multilateral institutions. This shift from a position of bilateral primacy to one of engaged bilateral and multilateral partnership—a ‘convergent security’ approach—is the best strategy for Washington to advance its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific.