George W. Bush,Barack Obama and the future of US global leadership

The foreign policy world views of George W. Bush and Barack Obama differ dramatically. Bush made terrorism the focal point of his foreign policy and dismissed the idea that either allies or international institutions should constrain America's freedom of action. Obama sees terrorism as one of many transnational problems that require the cooperation of other countries to combat and, as a result, the United States must invest more in diplomatic efforts to build partnerships. Despite these differences, both presidents share one common conviction: that other countries long for US leadership. Bush believed that friends and allies would eventually rally to the side of the United States, even if they bristled at its actions, because they shared America's goals and had faith in its motives. Obama believed that a United States that listened more to others, stressed common interests and favored multinational action would command followers. In practice, however, both visions of American global leadership faltered. Bush discovered that many countries rejected his style of leadership as well as his strategies. Obama discovered that in a globalized world, where power has been more widely dispersed, many countries are not looking to Washington for direction. The future success of US foreign policy depends on the ability of policy‐makers to recognize and adapt to a changing geopolitical environment in which the US remains the most significant military, diplomatic and economic power but finds it, nonetheless, increasingly difficult to drive the global agenda.     

George W. Bush, Idealist

There is much anger and confused grumbling these days outside the United States—and in Europe in particular—about the character of the Bush administration's foreign policy. Perceived American unilateralism is raising hackles and questions. This article contends that current trends in US foreign policy can be better understood by realizing that many senior Bush administration officials are not 'realists', at least as that philosophy of world politics is classically understood. Many of the resulting views—that, for example, threats to security often originate in ideology rather than material strength—are demonstrably correct and even hopeful in their faith in long-term historical trends. But there may be no getting around the essential contradictions required of US foreign policy in an age when America is the leading power, when a new global community of trading democracies is emerging, and yet when a number of distinctly old-style threats to the peace remain very much in evidence. Washington could do more to smooth the edges of those contradictions in order to point up the idealism and hopefulness of US policy.     

Hegemonic constraints: The implications of 11 September for American power

At the heart of the post-11 September world lie several critical issues surrounding US power: its unprecedented primacy, the way in which it is exercised, and how it is perceived and received around the world. Even as US primacy and 'hard' power projection have been reinforced, the terrorist attacks and Washington's responses have adversely affected the vital 'soft' foundations of its power: the appeal of American values and culture; the perception that US hegemony is benign; and the apparent legitimacy of the exercise of American power. These trends will, in the longer term, constrain US hegemonic power by limiting the effectiveness of foreign and security policies. At the international level, Washington will experience increased friction and costs in dealing with its allies and other friendly states; and at the domestic level, the Bush and subsequent administrations will have to take into account rising domestic costs of 'blowback'.     

Engagement or empire? American power and the international order

Three recent surveys of American foreign relations lie at the intersection of topical academic and policy debates. Robert Lieber's Eagle rules? makes a case for American primacy as a precondition for global stability, and in so doing reflects an agenda for US foreign policy that is broadly associated with the current Bush administration. By contrast, Joseph Nye's The paradox of American power argues against US unilateralism, and may be read as an implicit critique of the apparent recent shift in American strategy. Nevertheless, both Lieber and Nye make a case for extensive American engagement with the world as a basis for international stability. By contrast, Chalmers Johnson's Blowback views America's global ‘engagement’ as a thinly disguised diplomatic veil for imperialism. Although they make very different arguments, these three books are usefully considered together. Nye's stress on the importance of soft power, multilateral diplomacy and wider structural changes in the nature of world politics is a useful corrective to Lieber's emphasis on US primacy. But Johnson is right to criticize the excessive and ultimately counter‐productive level of military involvement of the United States around the world. In the absence of a more effective global balance of power, the preconditions for a robust system of international diplomacy as well as the management of globalization will not be satisfied.     

Myths, Motivations and 'Misunderestimations': the Bush Administration and Iraq

This article explores the myths and motivations behind US foreign policy towards Iraq in America's 'war on terrorism'. It argues that the foreign policy of the Bush administration is widely misunderstood and that much of the debate about Iraq policy that has taken place has been conducted at an unhelpful level of analysis. It addresses arguments that the Bush administration is motivated by oil, revenge or hubris as well as the more mainstream arguments that an attack on Iraq would provoke instability through the entire Middle East, as well as encouraging further acts of and support for murderous terrorism; that there is no urgency to act against Iraq as containment and deterrence remain adequate means to manage this threat; and that Iraq should be a lower priority than dealing with North Korea. It does this by analysing the development of American foreign policy thinking on the war on terrorism, what motivates it, and why it rejects the arguments of its critics. The article explains the intellectual process by which the US decided upon this course of action and how Europe's failure to understand this process added to its incomprehension of American policy. It does not argue that European's opposition would have been swept aside had they better understood the Bush administration, the central disagreement about the necessity and prudence of military action versus containment remains, but that such an understanding would have allowed for a better and more focused level of debate than the one which has got us to this point. Nor does it argue that the Bush administration approach is necessarily persuasive or justified, merely that its case is reasoned and explicable in terms of America's foreign policy traditions.     

War in Iraq, Revolution in America

In this lecture in honour of John Whitehead, Strobe Talbott reflects on the history of the international system, the emergence of the nation-state and the role the US has played in the formation of post-Second World War international institutions. He draws a distinction between the typical Westphalian nation-state, exemplified in Europe, and the United States, a nation based on the 'exertion of political will and championship of political ideas'—a distinction that helps to account for the strain of 'exemplary exceptionalism'; in the history of US foreign policy. Turning to a dichotomy of approach in the foreign policy of the current Bush administration, the author draws attention to the continuation of a tradition of 'moral clarity' on the one hand and on the other hand the introduction of a new concept that saw the preeminence of American power reordering a dangerous world. He believes the Bush 'revolution' in foreign policy reached its peak with the Iraq war and that there is now hope the US will recommit itself to the international institutions severely damaged over the past two years and will begin a new era in which America takes a leading role within a multilateral framework.     

Neo-conservatives and their American critics

This review article examines four recent American books relating, in very different ways, to the rise of unilateralism and neo-conservatism in the United States. Richard Perle and David Frum, former advisors to George W. Bush robustly present the 'neo-conservative' case. Max Boot, another unilateralist, argues from the experience of American history that small wars have often been as important as big wars in projecting American power; and he suggests that this experience has a present-day relevance. Ivo Daalder (who served in the Clinton administration) and his co-author James Lindsay, set out to explain the 'Bush revolution' in foreign policy and put it in context. They insist that Bush is not a mere tool of his advisors, who are in any case not homogenous. His foreign policy strategy is indeed new, although it has given rise to certain unresolved problems. Robert McNamara (a former US Defense Secretary) and James Blight, share the fear of nuclear terrorism but argue that it can only be contained through the universal elimination of weapons of mass destruction, under the supervision of a possibly reformed UN. They oppose the unilateral use of force by the US except when America itself is attacked. They also argue that the US must change its posture from 'deterrence' to 'reassurance' and show more empathy in addressing the concerns of other countries and communities.
The review concludes that America is now deeply divided over its foreign policy and that events, rather than arguments, may decide the outcome of the debate.     

The double interregnum: UK–US relations beyond Blair and Bush

The downturn in relations between the UK and the US under the premiership of Gordon Brown presents an interesting opportunity to analyse the nature of the relationship between the two states. Brown's policy of creating distance between his approach and that of his predecessor, Tony Blair, and between himself and President Bush, offers a case‐study in whether it is possible to be cool towards an incumbent leader while remaining close to the state he leads. In other words: is it feasible to be anti‐Bush and pro‐American? It also provides an opportunity to analyse the role of political timing in inter‐state relations. By appearing driven by reaction to the events of 2003 despite taking office in 2007, Brown put himself out of step with the prevailing mood of the time. By also acting as if the Bush administration was a lame duck counting out its time to retirement in 2009, Brown allowed himself to be outmanoeuvred in his bid for America's attention by the conciliatorily pro‐American new leaders of France and Germany. By acting as if the Bush administration is a political interregnum, the Brown government has invited the United States to treat his own administration the same way. The result is a dual interregnum in UK–US relations, with each incumbent leader awaiting the political demise of the other before better relations can be resumed.     

UN transformation in an era of soft balancing

Between 2003 and 2006 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan pursued the most ambitious overhaul of the United Nations since its inception. This transformation effort aimed to make the UN more effective in addressing non‐traditional threats and to persuade the United States to re‐engage with the world body. Launched during a time that was unpropitious for achieving far‐reaching change, the effort nonetheless produced some surprising agreements. Several factors prevented greater achievement: the episodic attention of the Bush administration and the personal agenda of John Bolton, the US permanent representative to the UN; the failure of the UN Secretariat to pursue a capital based strategy that engaged heads of state and foreign ministers; and the decision by many member states that they would rather have an ineffective United Nations than an effective one that furthered the interests of the Bush administration. Whether future efforts to transform collective security will fall victim to the same fate depends in part on the actions and words of a new American president in 2009.     

9/11 and the Past and Future of American Foreign Policy

Does the national security strategy of the Bush administration constitute a radical new departure or does it possess clear links to past American policies? Is the Bush strategy motivated by the perception of threat, the pursuit of power, or the quest for hegemony? This article argues that the policies of the Bush administration are more textured and more conflicted than either its friends or its foes believe. They are also less bold and less likely to offer enduring solutions. In fact, they constitute a surprising departure from the ways most former US administrations have dealt with ‘existential’ threats in the twentieth century. By championing a ‘balance of power favouring freedom’ and by eschewing the ‘community of power’ approach propounded by Woodrow Wilson, Bush and his advisers are charting a unilateralist course for times of crisis, a course neither so popular nor so efficacious as its proponents think. But the unilateralism is prompted by fears and threats that must not be dismissed or trivialized by critics of the administration.     

‘Quacking like a duck’? Bush II and presidential power in the second term

It seems a truism of American politics that second presidential terms are destined to be less successful than the period of office which they follow and yet there is very little academic analysis as to why this is the case. Whether there are inherent or structural features of the US political system that unduly affects second-term presidencies and what impact these features might have on the remainder of the Bush administration is the subject of this article. While the impact of this phenomenon is analysed in general, particular attention is focused on the effect of American foreign policy since the Bush presidency, because of Iraq, this subject will ultimately determine the success or failure of the second term. This focus also reflects the fact that second-term administrations tend to be dominated by a focus on foreign policy. The article argues that despite being returned to power with a considerable number of political advantages compared with previous presidents at this stage of their tenure, the Bush administration is already displaying many of the characteristics of an underachieving second term. The article consists of three sections: part one examines the presidential record and analyses the contention that second terms are somehow different; part two sets out the reasons that might account for this factor; and part three applies these factors to the Bush administration to see which of these features apply to the present incumbent and thus what can be expected for the remainder of his second term in office until January 2009.     

US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001: a critique

Promoting democracy in the Middle East has been a key foreign policy objective of the Bush administration since n September 2001. Democratizing the Arab world, in particular, is seen as an important instrument in the ‘war on terror’. To help democratize the Arab Middle East, the US initiated a number of policies which, it claims, have encouraged reform. But what has really been the impact of US initiatives? This article examines the implementation of US democracy promotion policies across the Arab region, and in particular Arab countries, and argues that it has had mixed results. The article suggests three reasons why this is so. First, democracy is part of a wider set of US interests and concerns with which it is frequently in contradiction. Second, the Bush administration conceives democracy as a panacea: it overlooks the problems its implementation may cause and lacks clear ideas about achieving this implementation. Third, democracy promotion policies have limited outcomes because neither a politically neutral nor a more interventionist approach can initiate a reform process if it is not already underway for domestic reasons. On the basis of the three critiques, the article concludes with recommendations for US policy.     

The war on terror in American grand strategy

The 9/11 attacks made the war on terror the central plank of American grand strategy. Yet despite its importance in shaping US policy choices, there has been considerable confusion over how the war on terror relates to foreign policy goals. This article attempts to locate the war on terror within American grand strategy and makes three claims. First, it argues that the Bush administration's approach to the war on terror rests on a false analogy between terrorism and fascism or communism. This has led to misinterpretations of the goals of the war on terror and to a persistent misuse of American power. Second, it suggests that the central purpose of the war on terror should be to de‐legitimize terror as a tactic and to induce states to assume responsibility for controlling terrorists within their borders. American grand strategy should be focused on creating a normative anti‐terror regime with costly commitments by linchpin states—defined as great powers and crucial but endangered allies such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—rather than on conducting regime change against rogue states on the margins of the international system. Success in the war on terror should be measured not by the perceived legitimacy of discrete US policy choices, but by the number of these crucial states who accept the de‐legitimation of terrorism as a core foreign policy principle and act accordingly. Third, it argues that bilateral enforcement of an anti‐terror regime imposes high costs for US power and puts other elements of American grand strategy— including the promotion of democracy and the promotion of human rights—at risk. To reduce these costs and to preserve American power over the long‐term, the US should attempt to institutionalize cooperation in the war on terror and to scale back ambitious policy choices (such as achieving a democratic revolution in the Middle East) which increase the risks of state defection from the anti‐terror regime.     

Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign policy in the Middle East

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring the Middle East has plunged into a state of instability. The United States has responded to these rising insecurities in a region of strategic importance with hesitation or half‐hearted commitments. The Obama administration, plagued by the increasingly difficult decision of defining America's role in an apolar world while managing the political and economic legacy of the Bush administration, has relied on a policy of delegation. Obama neither refrained from military options nor showed any willingness to commit American ground troops to one of the strategically and operationally most complex environments of the world. Instead, Obama's preferred way of war is one relying on surrogates—both human and technological—that allow the United States to externalize, partially or wholly, the strategic, operational and tactical burden of warfare. Unlike any other previous US administration surrogate warfare has become the principal means of protecting US interests in the Middle East that are perceived to be all but vital. The need for deniability and legitimacy, cost–benefit considerations as well as the lack of capability have made warfare by surrogate a preferred option in the Middle East. The consequences for US policy in the region are profound, as the lack of control and oversight have empowered surrogates whose long‐term interests are not compatible with those of the United States. More severely, the US might have jeopardized its standing as the traditional guarantor of security in the Middle East— something that partners and adversaries alike have exploited.     

‘An Angel Directs the Storm’: The Religious Politics of American Neoconservatism

Abstract

In his inaugural speech, President George W. Bush suggested that the mission of America to spread freedom and democracy in the world is a divinely authored mission. The intention first announced in Bush's inaugural to globalize an American Christian vision of freedom and democracy, and of free market capitalism, reflects the theological underpinnings of the neo-conservativism of the Bush administration. In this article I trace the remarkable continuities between the neo-conservative political theology of Bush and his acolytes and more mainstream Niebuhrian approaches to democracy and the ‘manifest destiny’ of America. I then subject the emergence of an American imperium, and the political theology associated with it, to a critique in dialogue with early Christian critics of Roman Empire, and with the Christian pacifist tradition as recently retrieved by North American theological ethicists John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas.     

Does a Change in Presidency of the US Really Matter in an Age of Economic Globalization?

Abstract

This article exposes the cracks in the US economy, in politics and in its image in the world. The US has, particularly in the Bush era, strayed away from the values enshrined in the lives and witness of its founders. It has refused to recognize and use creatively its potential in playing a constructive leadership role in the world. In fact many of its actions have contributed to the erosion of global commitments. The focus is on the impact the crisis the US economy has on the world. In such a context, it asks the question as to whether a change in Presidency of the US really matters? The article challenges the churches to address the structural consequences of globalization and to critique neo-liberal corporate capitalism and engage in the search for alternatives. The churches have acted with compassion and charity to eradicate poverty and to serve the people. What is required now is for the churches to put aside their reluctance to speak out boldly, whether they be from the North or the South, and engage in radical actions for transformation.     

The second North Korean nuclear crisis

In 2002 the inclusion of North Korea by the Bush administration within the 'axis of evil' portended a break from the Clinton policy of engagement. Despite the apparent inconsistencies of this categorisation, North Korea's undoubted possession of some weapons of mass destruction capability seemed to make it a possible target for US containment if not preemption. However, Pyongyang's chief motive in such weapons development might actually be to guarantee regime survival. The revelation that North Korea had been developing a covert uranium enrichment program led US policymakers in the Bush administration to contemplate a policy of quarantine and containment. The wider policy community is divided on the question of whether Pyongyang was seeking a new bargain with the US, or whether this program was intended to produce a deterrent from possible US attack. These alternatives prescribe, respectively, a new negotiating approach or a strategy designed to dissuade. But the actual policy choice hinges on the outcome in Iraq.     

‘Real men want to go to Tehran’: Bush,pre‐emption and the Iranian nuclear challenge

The desire for regime change in Iran has coloured the Bush administration's approach to the challenge presented by Tehran's apparent desire to build a nuclear weapons capability. Yet the threat of military force either to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure and/or to eff ect regime change has proved counterproductive to the simultaneous eff orts to stop the Iranian programme through diplomacy. Indeed, the entire Bush policy towards Iran of simultaneously wishing to coerce, undermine and replace the regime while also seeking to persuade it to abandon its nuclear programme through diplomacy has proved both strategically inconsistent and consistently counterproductive. In failing to decide whether it prioritizes a change of regime or a change of behaviour it has got neither. This article elucidates the rationale behind the Bush administration's policy approach, demonstrating how in seeking both objectives simultaneously it has achieved neither. It sets out instead a set of policies to regain the initiative in US‐Iranian relations and to prioritize and coordinate American policy goals within a broader Middle East policy.     

American power before and after 11 September: dizzy with success?

One of the most interesting consequences of the war against international terrorism is the discovery by many analysts of American power. However, if the experts had been more attentive they might have noticed that a power shift in favour of the United States is not just some recent phenomenon arising from US victory over the Taliban or the new Bush military build-up. Rather, it can, and should be, traced back to important trends of the early 1990s. What the war has done is to reveal the extent of America's renaissance in the postwar decade while its position as true hegemon was being consolidated. However, victory in war may not bring order in peace if the United States does not draw the correct lessons.     

Enlightenment and nuclear order

Applying the method of enlightenment correctly to the area of nuclear non‐proliferation would require a major effort to critically evaluate ideologies. Liberal arms control—despite its many successes and merits—has devised over the years a whole set of ideological tenets and attitudes. Some of them have been transformed into beliefs that could be termed myths. The most prominent ideological myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that the Nuclear Non‐proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT) was in essence a disarmament agreement, not a non‐proliferation treaty. To depict the negotiations as a premeditated effort of enlightenment, where the governments of this world came together to solemnly decide that some of them would be allowed to have some nuclear weapons for an interim period while the others would renounce their possession immediately, is pure. It would be equally wrong to qualify the ‘grand bargain’ as one between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have‐nots. Another myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that—in order to gain support for the NPT—the superpowers had altered their nuclear weapons strategy in the 1960s. Again, this contention is not borne out by the development of nuclear strategies and doctrines. The third myth is the contention that there was an abrupt shift in US non‐proliferation policy as George W. Bush came into power. The major changes in US non‐proliferation policy had already started during the Clinton administration and some of them can be traced back to the tenure of President George W. H. Bush senior. They all reflected the changed international environment and represented necessary adjustments of the non‐proliferation strategy. The Clinton administration left some of the traditional paths of arms control and rightly undertook some changes that were necessary because traditional instruments of arms control were no longer adequate. The Bush administration continued that policy, but in a more radical way.