Charles the Bald and Aethelwulf of Wessex: the alliance of 856 and strategies of royal succession

Scholars have usually supposed that the marriage of King Aethelwulf of Wessex to the daughter of Charles the Bald in 856 signified the creation of an anti-Danish alliance between the two rulers. That this union signified a royal accord is not in doubt but there is no evidence to associate it with any venture against Danes. Though the evidence is not conclusive it appears more probable that Aethelwulf's marriage to Princess Judith was part of a scheme to prevent or to undermine a rebellion in England then being fomented by Aethelwulf's son Aethelbald who desired his father's throne. For his part Charles the Bald aimed at gaining influence in England. At the time of her marriage Judith was crowned and anointed and this was a rare occurrence. When analyzed in the proper light it suggests the existence of a compact by the terms of which Aethelwulf would disinherit Aethelbald at some future date should Judith bear a son. The marriage, then, did not signify an alliance against Danes. Rather it denoted an alliance against Aethelwulf's son Aethelbald.     

Healing the nation: royalist visionaries,Cromwell, and the restoration of Charles II

ABSTRACT

The radical visionaries of the civil war era had several royalist counterparts, today often overlooked. This article examines the three most significant: John Sanders of Harborne, Walter Gostelo, and Arise Evans. God, they claimed, had directed them to press Cromwell to restore Charles II, perhaps through a marriage alliance. This alone could settle the nation, and it would usher in a millennial age of peace. Sanders combined support for the crown and Church with a remarkable call for the nailers of Birmingham to strike against their oppressive employers. His family responded to his visionary mission with deep hostility. Evans attracted far greater public interest; he and Gostelo were able to present their ideas to Cromwell in person, and Gostelo travelled to the exiled royal court. The visionaries’ message, if ultimately unacceptable, spoke to the concerns of many contemporaries anxious and uncertain about the future.     

Sir Charles Grandison,Natural Law and the Fictionalised English Gentleman

This article enquires into the relation between enlightened humanist conceptions of natural law and the period novel's fictionalization of the English gentleman in the context of its marriage plot. Marriage played a key role in enlightened theorisations of natural law precisely as an institution capable of grounding familial and civil life in an emerging concept of human nature. Yet public debate about the state's role in the regulation of marriage in mid-eighteenth-century England demonstrates that natural law lent itself to very different models of sovereignty and governance. The antinomies that characterized natural law's circulation in the English context are uniquely fictionalized in Samuel Richardson's last novel, Sir Charles Grandison (1753–54), a lengthy parallel narrative of failed courtship and matrimonial felicity that draws upon Pufendorf's model of natural law, yet is only partly implicated in its secular humanism. The novel's eponymous gentleman hero – a ‘Man of Religion and Virtue’ – exemplifies a mix of Anglican piety, civic virtue and disinterested sympathy that is sanctioned by natural law and sealed by the English marriage plot.     

Northumbria's southern frontier: a review

Northumbria's southern frontier was arguably the most important political boundary inside pre‐Viking England. It has, however, attracted little scholarly attention since Peter Hunter Blair's seminal article in Archaeo‐logia Aeliana in 1948, which later commentators have generally followed rather uncritically. This essay reviews his arguments in the light of more recent research and casts doubt on several key aspects of his case: firstly, it contests his view that this boundary was fundamental to the naming of both southern and northern England and its kingdoms; secondly, it queries the supposition that the Roman Ridge dyke system is likely to have been a Northumbrian defensive work; thirdly, it critiques the view that the Grey Ditch, at Bradwell, formed part of the frontier; and, finally, it argues against the boundary in the west being along the River Ribble. Rather, pre‐Viking Northumbria more probably included those parts of the eleventh‐century West Riding of Yorkshire which lie south of the River Don, with a frontier perhaps often identical to that at Domesday, and it arguably met western Mercia not on the Ribble but on the Mersey. It was probably political developments in the tenth century, and particularly under Edward the Elder and his son Athelstan, that led to the Mercian acquisition of southern Lancashire and the development of a new ecclesiastical frontier between the sees of Lichfield and York on the Ribble, in a period that also saw the York archdiocese acquire northern Nottinghamshire.     

Fragments of the Modern City: Material Culture and the Rhythms of Everyday Life in Victorian London

This essay analyses the influence of Charles Baudelaire's and Théophile Gautier's fetishist poetics on the early works of Algernon Charles Swinburne. If the crucial role played by the Victorian poet as a cultural ‘passeur’ between France and England has often been highlighted in recent criticism, his aesthetic delight in certain forms of sexual deviance such as podophilia has rarely been explored in relation to the verse of his French mentors. Swinburne, Gautier, and Baudelaire may have indeed shared this erotic fascination with feet: this is a fascination that was partly grounded in these poets' common interest in antique literary models, in particular in Sappho's poetry. Rather than extolling the Hellenic ‘sweetness and light’ which some of his contemporaries set so high, Swinburne indulged in dangerously eroticised Dionysian aesthetics which were perceived as both ‘too Hellenic’ and ‘too French’. I argue that the fetishism of the poetic foot may be read as one of the keys to the Victorian poet's subversive shift away from the serenity often associated with Victorian neoclassicism in favour of a Dionysian energy that anticipates Friedrich Nietzsche's works.     

AIMS AND MEANS IN THE INTER‐NORDIC CONFLICTS 1302–1319

The paper deals with the conflicts from 1302–1319 between King Birger of Sweden and his two younger brothers, the Dukes Erik and Valdemar, which also involved the kings of the two other Nordic countries, King Erik Menved of Denmark on the side of his brother‐in‐law, King Birger, and King Håkon V of Norway, mostly in alliance with the Swedish dukes. It attempts to trace the main aims of the participants, which turn out to be consistent as well as relatively realistic and in which dynastic interests had priority over national and territorial ones. In addition to the struggle over the division of Sweden, the most important issue was who was to marry Håkon V's daughter Ingebjørg who was likely to inherit the kingdom of Norway. Erik Menved's success in gaining this prize for his nephew makes him the main winner and Håkon V the main loser in the peace of Hälsingborg in 1310, whereas this situation changed in Håkon's and Duke Erik's favour when Erik married Ingebjørg in 1312 and Erik Menved had to accept the marriage the year after. Most probably, this success for the dukes led to their fall in 1317–1318, which in turn united the Swedish aristocracy behind Duke Erik's son Magnus who in 1319 became king of both Norway and Sweden, thus fulfilling all Håkon V's wishes for the future of his dynasty. Against this background, the article discusses contemporary political culture, the relationship between military and diplomatic means, the importance of dynasties and marriage alliances and the relationship between monarchy and aristocracy.     

Robert,earl of Gloucester,and the daughter of Zelophehad

Robert, earl of Gloucester, the leader of Mathilda's party in England during Stephen's reign, has a good press because the main source for his activities is his admirer, William of Malmesbury. This article re-assesses Robert's role and character by concentrating on chroniclers other than Malmesbury and on charter evidence. It finds, by these methods, that Earl Robert may have been in some ways an attractive man, but that he was also a practised curialist, a ruthless factionalist, a plunderer of church lands, and a man who made acquisition of his neighbours' lands one of his main objects. New evidence is presented to account for his behaviour in the crucial months at the end of 1135 and beginning of 1136 when Stephen made himself king. Robert is found to have had little choice but to cross to England because his lands in the southern Marches were under threat from a Welsh rising. His alienation from Stephen in the next few years is traced to a failure at court against his rivals, the Beaumont group. His subsequent private war against the Beaumonts in Dorset and Worcestershire is further evidence against Malmesbury 's portrayal of him as a man of pure principle. conduct of the war against Stephen after 1139 can be shown to have had serious flaws. The result was a rebellion against him by his own sons and the repudiation of his methods (if not his acquisitions) by his successor Earl William. Evidence is presented that Earl William sparked off the movement amongst the magnates to draw up private treaties to contain the Anarchy. In view of all this, it is not surprising to find indications that Earl Robert lacked any real commitment to the claims of his half-sister, the empress.     

Spitzka and spitzka on the brains of the assassins of presidents

Abstract

Although four American Presidents have been assassinated (Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley, Kennedy), only the assassins of Garfield (Charles Julius Guiteau) and McKinley (Leon Franz Czolgosz) were tried, convicted, and executed for their crime. In 1882 Edward Charles Spitzka, a young New York neurologist with a growing reputation as an alienist, testified at the trial of Guiteau. He was the only expert witness who was asked, based on his personal examination of the prisoner, a direct question concerning the mental state of Guiteau. Spitzka maintained the unpopular view that Guiteau was insane. In spite of aggressive and spirited testimony on Spitzka's part, Guiteau was convicted and hanged. However, even before the execution it was acknowledged, by some experts, that Spitzka was undoubtedly right. About 20 years later, in 1901, Edward Anthony Spitzka, the son of Edward Charles Spitzka, was invited to conduct the autopsy on Czologsz, the assassin of McKinley. At the time Spitzka the younger, who had just published a detailed series of papers on the human brain, was in the fourth year of his medical training. It was an unusual series of fortuitous events that presumably led to Edward A. Spitzka conducting the autopsy on the assassin of the President of the United States while still a medical student. This, in light of the fact that other experts were available. Each Spitzka went on to a career of note and each made a number of contributions in their respective fields. It is however, their participation in the ‘neurology’, as broadly defined, of the assassins of Presidents Garfield and McKinley that remains unique in neuroscience history. Not only were father and son participants in these important events, but these were the only times that assassins of US Presidents were tried and executed.     

On Dilwyn Church

Abstract

The stone castle was probably begun in the first quarter of the 13th century by Alan, the king's steward, or his son, Walter. Bute had only recently been wrested from the kingdom of Man and the Isles, whose overlord, King Håkon IV of Norway, sent two expeditions to retake it in 1230 and 1263. When Bute returned to Scottish control in 1266, the castle was strengthened by the addition of four rounded projecting towers and a gatehouse facing the sea. Rothesay played little part in the Wars if Independence from 1290 onwards. The marriage of Walter III Stewart with King Robert the Bruce's daughter, Marjorie, however, eventually resulted in the Stewarts obtaining the throne in 1371 through Marjorie's son, Robert.

Both King Robert II (1371–90) and his son Robert III (1390–1406) spent time at Rothesay Castle and carried out minor building works. James IV (1488–1513) also took a personal interest in it, and in August 1498 appointed his kinsman, Ninian Stewart, as captain and keeper. He also began construction of the large residential gatehouse, called le dungeon, that was added on to the earlier gatehouse; this work was finished under James V in 1540–42.

In 1685 the castle was burnt by the duke if Argyll, and the keeper's family abandoned it as a residence. In 1816–18, the second marquess of Bute had the courtyard cleared of vegetation and rubble; and in 1871–9, the third marquess cleared the moat and engaged the architect William Burges to carry out restoration of the masonry. The gatehouse hall was also rebuilt in 1900.     

Sister-in-Law Marriage in the Empire: Religious Politics and Legislative Reform in the Australian Colonies 1850–1900

In 1835, a statute was passed in the parliament of the United Kingdom making it illegal for a widowed man to marry his sister-in-law. 1 Lord Lyndhurst's Act (1835) 5 & 6 Will VI c. 54. Marriage to a sister-in-law after a wife's death was common practice in nineteenth-century England and colonial Australia and aunts often took on the responsibility of raising children after a sibling's death. In the 1840s, a protracted parliamentary and social debate began over whether a widowed man's marriage to his sister-in-law should be made legal and this debate lasted over seven decades. In the Australian colonies, where English law had been inherited, 2 Those Australian colonies settled prior to the passing of Lord Lyndhurst's Act inherited the English position regarding deceased wife's sister marriage at the time, that such unions were voidable in the ecclesiastical courts during the lifetime of the parties, and in those colonies established afterwards, the 1835 statute applied and deceased wife's sister unions were illegal. In both cases colonial parliaments attempted to pass legislation to clarify the law. a similar debate occurred in the 1870s. The marriage was legalised in most of Australia in the 1870s while it remained illegal in England until the turn of the century. The parallel debates in each country provide a window into the comparative effect of religious culture on the development of marriage law. One of the primary reasons for the protracted nature of the struggle for marriage reform in England was its significance for the relationship between church and state. This article explores the implications of the relationship between church and state in Britain and the colonies for marriage legislation.     

The 1444–5 expedition of the Dauphin Louis to the Upper Rhine in geopolitical perspective

In summer 1444 the Dauphin Louis, son of Charles VII of France, appeared on the Upper Rhine with a large army. The purpose of his expedition was to reconquer the territories of his future brother-in-law, Sigismund of Austria-Tyrol, from the Swiss Confederates and their allies. However, after achieving just one victory, on 26 August, the Dauphin suddenly agreed to a series of truces and then a peace treaty with the Confederates, even though this made it impossible for him to fulfil his original objective. This article reassesses the contradictory course of the Dauphin's expedition in light of the geopolitical forces that shaped it in the political world of the Upper Rhine. It first analyses the political configuration of the region and the place of the ecclesiastical Council of Basel within it, and then demonstrates that these circumstances combined to force the Dauphin radically to alter his plans in late August 1444. The article also points to the wider implications of the episode for our understanding of later-medieval European politics. Highlighting the inadequacy of national or state-oriented paradigms, it suggests that a new vocabulary is needed to make full sense of the aspects of fifteenth-century political life manifested by the Dauphin's expedition.     

The nobility of English Gascony: the case of Jourdain de l'Isle

Among the greatest obstacles to effective English authority in Gascony was a criminal element within the nobility. Lawless, acquisitive, and defiant of all authority, such individuals were especially troublesome for Edward II whose control over Gascony would have been tenuous in any event. Among the most notorious in this period was Jourdain de l'Isle, younger son of a powerful Gascon nobleman. Holding extensive territories through both inheritance and marriage, Jourdain was a violent and aggressive man who attacked indiscriminately merchants, clergy, and even his fellow noblemen. Ignoring the efforts of the ducal government to control him, Jourdain appealed to the Capetian Parlement of Paris; but the French like the English had little use for him. His only supporter was his kinsman, Pope John XXII, who sought to assist Jourdain against both ducal and Capetian authorities, after the Gascon's crimes had brought him the enmity of both. While the pope's efforts had no result, neither the English nor the French succeeded in punishing Jourdain until in 1323 he defiantly came to Paris, where he was tried and executed for his sundry crimes. Jourdain's sorry career illustrates the problems that such men created for English rule in Gascony and makes clear that in at least this situation Plantagenet and Capetian authorities were in total agreement.     

Henry IV and Charles VI: the confirmation of the twenty-eight-year truce

The deposition of Richard II in 1399 caused serious problems for the new English king, Henry IV, in foreign affairs. Contemporaries believed that his seizure of the crown would provoke an outbreak of new hostilities with the French since the wife of the deposed monarch was none other than Isabel, a daughter of Charles VI, king of France. Indeed Charles took certain belligerent measures against henry, whom he stubbornly refused to recognize as the legitimate ruler of England, but stopped short of war because Isabel still remained in English custody. Henry IV, on the other hand, desired to improve relations with France because of his own tenuous hold on the English throne. Once Charles VI became convinced early in 1400 that Richard II had died in captivity, he abruptly changed his policy towards England and announced his intention of observing the terms set forth in the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce which he had originally concluded with his son-in-law in 1396. Later in May, Henry IV similarly proclaimed his willingness to honor that agreement. How both sides avoided an open clash and eventually confirmed the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce forms the central theme of this paper.     

Henry IV and Charles VI: the confirmation of the twenty-eight-year truce

The deposition of Richard II in 1399 caused serious problems for the new English king, Henry IV, in foreign affairs. Contemporaries believed that his seizure of the crown would provoke an outbreak of new hostilities with the French since the wife of the deposed monarch was none other than Isabel, a daughter of Charles VI, king of France. Indeed Charles took certain belligerent measures against henry, whom he stubbornly refused to recognize as the legitimate ruler of England, but stopped short of war because Isabel still remained in English custody. Henry IV, on the other hand, desired to improve relations with France because of his own tenuous hold on the English throne. Once Charles VI became convinced early in 1400 that Richard II had died in captivity, he abruptly changed his policy towards England and announced his intention of observing the terms set forth in the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce which he had originally concluded with his son-in-law in 1396. Later in May, Henry IV similarly proclaimed his willingness to honor that agreement. How both sides avoided an open clash and eventually confirmed the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce forms the central theme of this paper.     

Charles the bold and the crusade: politics and propaganda

The pressures on Charles the Bold (duke of Burgundy from 1467 to his death in 1477) to lead, or lend his support to, a crusade were many. His Italian allies and the papacy all pleaded for his help and participation; and these appeals were augmented by the exhortation contained in much of the literature popular at the Burgundian court and by the presence there of refugees from the East.Charles's response was mixed. Political and moral pressures made it impossible for him to ignore the question of the crusade, but, even if his attitude should be characterized as cautious rather than as indifferent, he never did go on crusade. Equally, however, he repeatedly justified his comparative inaction and, at the same time, made propaganda against his enemies by suggesting that their hostility alone prevented him from embarking on an expedition to drive back the infidel.This response, since it was not untypical of the princes of his generation, helps explain the West's failure to unite against the Turks. From the point of view of Burgundian history, Charles's cautious attitude towards the crusade tends to support the revisionists who argue that he was far less ‘rash’ than the traditional historical view allows.     

The Father's Success and the Son's Failure: Explaining the Growth of Lebanon's Resistance to Syria's Invisible Occupation

In the 15‐year period since the Syrian military entry into Lebanon on June 1, 1976, allegedly to put an end to the civil war that broke out there a year earlier, Syria firmly solidified its control of the country, as evidenced by the signing of the “Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between Syria and Lebanon,” on May 22, 1991, which granted Syria a special status. Yet, 14 years later, on April 24, 2005, the Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon. This article seeks to explain this relatively rapid decline in Syria's standing in Lebanon by examining the strategies of the two Syrian rulers who indirectly controlled this country during those years. It examines what was right in Hafiz al‐Asad's strategy in Lebanon, and what did not work in Bashar's policy. In 2000, the year of Hafiz al‐Asad's death, Syria's status in Lebanon seemed unshakable: 1) Lebanon's president (Emile Lahoud) acted as Damascus's puppet; 2) Hezbollah, the Shi‘a militia Hezbollah largely accepted Syria's authority while it simultaneously tightened its control over southern Lebanon and also began gaining popularity in the rest of the country; and 3) finally the politics of the noble families, which had characterized Lebanon since its establishment, began to gradually give way to a politics where a political figure is measured by the level of his connections to the country's power base in Damascus. Yet, merely five years later, Syria was under immense pressure to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. This suggests that we must look at the difference between the strategies of Hafiz al‐Asad and his son Bashar for controlling Lebanon to better understand the rapid deterioration in Syria's standing in the country. We argue that the difference in the degree of anti‐Syrian pressures from Lebanon's society and political elements between the two tenures is largely rooted in the different strategies that the two Syrian presidents adopted for informally ruling Lebanon. We identify three main areas where Bashar al‐Asad made mistakes due to his failure to continue his father's methods. First, Bashar put all his cards on Hezbollah, thus antagonizing all the other groups which resented that Shi‘a dominance. Second, in stark contrast to his father, Bashar distanced himself from the regular management of Lebanon's ethnic politics. Hafiz al‐Asad made sure that all the leaders of the different ethnic groups would visit Damascus and update him on their inter‐ethnic conflicts, and then he would be the one who would either arbitrate between them or, for expediency reasons, exacerbate these feuds. Once the ethnic leaders had to manage without Damascus, they learned to get along, making him far less indispensable for the running of the country. Finally, Bashar, unlike his father, did not make a real effort to gain international and regional legitimacy (or at least de‐facto acceptance) for Syria's continued control over Lebanon. Most conspicuously, while Hafiz participated in the First Gulf War against Iraq, his son supported Sunni rebels who fought against the United States‐led coalition forces there. This foreign acquiescence was significant since the Lebanese felt they had a backing when they demanded Syria's withdrawal in 2005. These different strategic approaches of the two rulers meant that the father's policies wisely laid the ground for some of the most controversial measures which were needed as part of any attempt to monopolize control over another country, such as Lebanon (assassinating popular but too independent‐minded Lebanese presidents/prime ministers or extending tenures of loyalist ones), whereas the son's policies myopically failed to do so properly. Indeed, the article will show that while both the father and the son took these same controversial measures, the responses of the Lebanese were completely different. Admittedly, some historical developments increased the Lebanese propensity to rise up against Syria, and these meant that Bashar did in fact face a harder task than his father in maintaining Syria's informal occupation. The Israeli withdrawal from its so‐called “security zone” in south Lebanon meant that one justification for the Syrian presence was gone. More importantly, the risk of renewed eruption of the civil war (which in turn had meant for many years a greater willingness by the locals to tolerate the Syrian presence which prevented the war's resumption) declined significantly due to a variety of processes that could not have been halted even with better “management” of the interethnic strife from Damascus (i.e., making sure that the ethnic groups remained in deep conflict with each other). Nevertheless, as we will show, Bashar's mistakes played a crucial role in bringing the rival ethnic groups together by making Damascus their joint enemy.     

Between borders: Franks,Danes, and Abodrites in the trans‐Elben world up to 827

This article examines the 804 decision by Charlemagne to cede territory beyond the Elbe to the Slavic confederacy known as the Abodrites. In so doing Charlemagne attempted to create a stable buffer along the Carolingian empire's northern border, in large part as security against the growing power of the Danes. Using textual and archaeological evidence this article demonstrates the ways in which the Abodrite buffer between the Franks and Danes influenced the political and cultural development of the Slavs and set the stage for a series of major political showdowns in the first three decades of the ninth century.     

A Tale of Two Train Journeys: Lawrence Bragg,C. P. Snow and The ‘Two Cultures’

It was during two train-journey meetings with the physicist William Lawrence Bragg (1890–1971) that both Charles Percy Snow's (1905–1980) civil service career and, if the anecdotal evidence is to be believed, the ‘two cultures’ metaphor originated. The first part of this paper is concerned with the background, consequences and significance of the first of these journeys: Kettering station in 1939. It will address the somewhat hazy record of Snow's wartime work found in existing accounts, and argue that Snow's wartime experience helped shape his characterisation of the scientific side of his ‘two cultures’. The second part of this paper deals with Bragg's intellectual influence on Snow, tracing the former's interest in ‘two cultures’ arguments prior to probable encounters between the two on the Cambridge to London train in the late 1940s and early 1950s, including a historically hazy one in which together they allegedly coined the famous phrase. In examining their early relationship, it becomes clear that Bragg was a key influence and support in Snow's career as an administrator and as a cultural commentator.     

Hans Morgenthau and the Tragedy of the Nation-State

The cardinal role of tragedy in Morgenthau's theory of international politics has hardly gone unnoticed. Indeed there is now a considerable corpus of literature that established the importance of tragedy as a central concept around which Morgenthau's theory revolved. This paper builds upon this already developed framework and employs tragedy not as an analytical category but as a metaphor employed by Morgenthau to approach the nation-state. It is claimed that the idea of tragedy underpinned his notion of the nation-state inasmuch as it did his view of individual human beings. As such the notion of tragedy informed consistently Morgenthau's analyses of national tragedies that were like the self-defeating nationalism of Germany. It also informed his efforts to avert potential national tragedies from materialising as his attempts to influence US foreign policy demonstrated. It is finally claimed, that far from a descent into despair, Morgenthau's realism signified a conscious effort to go beyond the tragedy of the nation-state.