Analysing international nuclear order

William Walker's article, ‘Nuclear enlightenment and counter‐enlightenment’, raises fundamental questions about the history of efforts to construct order in international politics in relation to nuclear arms and weapons‐related capabilities. However, Walker's ‘enlightenment’ and ‘counter‐enlightenment’ tropes are clumsy and unsatisfactory tools for analysing contemporary policies concerning nuclear deterrence, non‐proliferation and disarmament. Walker holds that in the 1960s and 1970s most of the governments of the world came together in pursuit of ‘a grand enlightenment project’. This thesis cannot withstand empirical scrutiny with regard to its three main themes—a supposed US‐Soviet consensus on doctrines of stabilizing nuclear deterrence through mutual vulnerability, a notion that the NPT derived from ‘concerted efforts to construct an international nuclear order meriting that title’, and the view that the NPT embodied a commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament. Walker's criticisms of US nuclear policies since the late 1990s are in several cases overstated or ill‐founded. Walker also exaggerates the potential influence of the United States over the policies of other countries. It is partly for this reason that the challenges at hand—both analytical and practical—are more complicated and dif cult than his article implies. His work nonetheless has the great merit of raising fundamental questions about international political order.     

The end of the NPT regime?

In the context of rising regional instability and conflict, along with increased incidents of global terrorism, in a dynamic, uncertain security environment, emerging nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction threats—both state proliferation and terrorism—are seen as growing dangers giving rise to increasing global insecurity. The international nuclear nonproliferation regime, the centerpiece of which is the Nuclear Non‐proliferation Treaty (NPT), is essential to current and future non‐proliferation efforts and needs to be maintained and strengthened, not replaced. The normative and legal weight of the regime is important for counterterrorism as well as non‐proliferation, but it will not likely directly affect the behaviour of so‐called ‘rogue states’ and terrorists. Preventing them from achieving their objectives if they attempt to wield nuclear and radiological weapons may deter and dissuade them, as may a credible prospect of punishment. The interaction of non‐proliferation and deterrence, so clear during the Cold War history of the NPT, remain crucial parts of an increasingly complex picture.     

Rethinking the NPT's role in security: 2010 and beyond

As the states parties to the nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT) plan for the May 2010 review conference, they are faced with recurring political challenges that call into question the long‐term sustainability of the presently constituted non‐proliferation regime, notwithstanding the important role the NPT and its related institutions have played in slowing the pace of proliferation for four decades. Even if the review conference is deemed a success, its outcome is unlikely to address the regime's core structural weaknesses and normative contradictions. Frustration with the continuing status and benefits accorded to nuclear‐armed states outside as well as within the NPT, will continue to diminish confidence in the effectiveness of traditional non‐proliferation and deterrence practices. The progressive reframing of security in terms of creating a world without nuclear weapons may be little more than rhetoric for some leaders, but it has widespread public support. A growing number of governments are now expressing interest in new approaches and steps, including consideration of a nuclear weapons convention as a practical objective to work towards. The article discusses the challenges and options for the non‐proliferation regime and concludes that efforts to halt future proliferation will increasingly focus on reshaping the norms and rules to pave the way for negotiating a new nuclear security compact, based on a verified process to prohibit and eliminate the possession as well as the use of nuclear weapons.     

The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence

NATO's nuclear deterrence posture has since the late 1950s involved risk‐and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Since 1991 gravity bombs, deliverable by US and allied dual‐capable aircraft, have been the only type of US nuclear weapons left in Europe. Although many other factors are involved in the alliance's deterrence posture and in US extended deterrence—including intercontinental forces, missile defences, non‐nuclear capabilities and declaratory policy—recent discussions in the United States about NATO nuclear deterrence have focused on the future of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. The traditional view has supported long‐standing US and NATO policy in holding that the risk‐ and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on US nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence and war prevention; provide assurance to the allies of the genuineness of US commitments; and make the extended deterrence responsibility more acceptable to the United States. From this perspective, no further cuts in the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe should be made without an agreement with Russia providing for reductions that address the US—Russian numerical disparity in non‐strategic nuclear forces, with reciprocal transparency and verification measures. In contrast, four schools of thought call for withdrawing the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe without any negotiated Russian reciprocity: some military officers who consider the weapons and associated arrangements unnecessary for deterrence; proponents of ambitious arms control measures who accept extended deterrence policies but view the US weapons in Europe as an obstacle to progress in disarmament; nuclear disarmament champions who reject extended nuclear deterrence policies and who wish to eliminate all nuclear arms promptly; and selective engagement campaigners who want the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies on the grounds that they could lead to US involvement in a nuclear war.     

Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’

Russia's military incursion into Georgia in August 2008 and formal recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia raise fundamental questions about Russian regional policy, strategic objectives and attitudes to the use of armed force. The spectacle of maneouvre warfare on the periphery of Europe could form a watershed in post‐Cold War Russian relations with its neighbourhood and the wider international community. The speed and scale with which Russia's initial ‘defensive’ intervention to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’ led to a broad occupation of many Georgian regions focuses attention on the motivations behind Russian military preparations for war and the political gains Moscow expected from such a broad offensive. Russia has failed to advance a convincing legal case for its operations and its ‘peace operations’ discourse has been essentially rhetorical. Some Russian goals may be inferred: the creation of military protectorates in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; inducing Georgian compliance, especially to block its path towards NATO; and creating a climate of uncertainty over energy routes in the South Caucasus. Moscow's warning that it will defend its ‘citizens’ (nationals) at all costs broadens the scope of concerns to Russia's other neighbour states, especially Ukraine. Yet an overreaction to alarmist scenarios of a new era of coercive diplomacy may only encourage Russian insistence that its status, that of an aspirant global power, be respected. This will continue to be fuelled by internal political and psychological considerations in Russia. Careful attention will need to be given to the role Russia attributes to military power in pursuing its revisionist stance in the international system.     

Existential nationalism: Russia's war against Ukraine

‘If Russia stops fighting, there will be no war. If Ukraine stops fighting, there will be no Ukraine’ is the sentiment used by Ukrainian protesters mobilising against Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Such a sentiment signifies the stakes of a war where Ukraine is a democratic nation-state fighting for its right to exist against a Russian invasion. Meanwhile, Russia is fighting for a version of Ukraine that is subservient to Russia's idea of what Ukraine should be as a nation-state: under a Russian hegemon geopolitically, where Ukraine's national idea and interpretation of history can be vetted and vetoed by the Russian state. While nationalism scholarship equips us to study Russia's war against Ukraine through the lens of Russian ethnic nationalism and Ukrainian civic nationalism, the ethnic/civic dichotomy falls short of unpacking the more pernicious logics that pervade Russia's intentions and actions towards Ukraine (demilitarisation and de-Nazification). Instead, this article explores the logics of Russia's war and Ukraine's resistance through the concept of existential nationalism where existential nationalism is Russia's motivation to pursue war, whatever the costs, and Ukraine's motivation to fight with everything it has.     

NATO expansion: ‘a policy error of historic importance’

European security depends on the effective collaboration of the five major powers; it will be undermined by the extension of NATO, a policy driven by US domestic politics. The main threats to security are: the breakdown of political and economic stability; unintended nuclear proliferation and/or failure of the START process; Russia's evolving political and territorial aspirations. All three will remain marginal as long as Russia is constructively engaged with the West. NATO expansion threatens that engagement. It is seen by all strands of Russian opinion as violating the bargain struck in 1990 and will likely lead to the withdrawal of cooperation. Invitations to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic cannot be rescinded, but the consequences can be mitigated by refraining from integrating them into NATO's military structure, by ceasing to insist that NATO membership is open to all, and by perpetuating the de facto nuclear‐weapons‐free zone that presently exists in Central and Eastern Europe. Britain's stance could be pivotal.     

Contest and conquest: Russia and global internet governance

For more than a decade, Russia's foreign policy has sought to challenge the international consensus on a number of issues. Today, as the international internet ecosystem is becoming more volatile, Moscow is eager to shift the western narrative over the current global internet governance regime, in which the United States retains considerable leverage. In a context wherein states increasingly forge links between cyberspace and foreign policy, this article explores Russia's deepening involvement in internet governance. The disclosure by Edward Snowden of the US government's wide net of online surveillance contributed to legitimize the Russian approach to controlling online activity. While the struggle around the narrative of internet governance has been heating up since then, Russia actively seeks to coordinate internet governance and cyber security policies with like‐minded states in both regional forums and the United Nations. By introducing security concerns and advocating more hierarchy and a greater role for governments, Moscow is contributing to the politicization of global cyber issues and seeking to reshape the network in accordance with its own domestic political interests. Indeed, the Russian leadership has come to consider the foreign policy of the internet as the establishment of a new US‐led hegemonic framework that Washington would use to subvert other sovereign states with its own world views and values.     

The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis

Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that his country's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was partly in response to NATO enlargement. NATO leaders counter that eastern enlargement is not a cause of the Ukraine crisis, and they argue that enlargement does not threaten Russia, but rather it creates stability for all of Europe. This article examines the history of NATO–Russian tensions over enlargement, considers how NATO's enlargement policy factored into the Ukraine crisis, and reviews options for the future of enlargement. Drawing on diplomatic history and geopolitical theory, the article explains Russia's persistent hostility towards NATO's policy of eastward expansion and highlights NATO's failure to convert Russia to its liberal world‐view. The alliance's norm‐driven enlargement policy has hindered the creation of an enduring NATO–Russia cooperative relationship and helped fuel the outbreak of conflict in Georgia and Ukraine. In light of this, NATO should alter its current enlargement policy by infusing it with geopolitical rationales. This means downgrading the transformative and democratization elements of enlargement and, instead, focusing on how candidate countries add to NATO capabilities and impact overall alliance security. A geopolitically‐driven enlargement policy would prioritize countries in the Balkan and Scandinavian regions for membership and openly exclude Georgia and Ukraine from membership. Ultimately, this policy would have the effect of strengthening NATO while giving it more flexibility in dealing with Russia.     

The death of Europe? Continental fates after Ukraine

The unravelling of the post‐Cold War security order in Europe was both cause and consequence of the crisis in Ukraine. The crisis was a symptom of the three‐fold failure to achieve the aspirations to create a ‘Europe whole and free’ enunciated by the Charter of Paris in 1990, the drift in the European Union's behaviour from normative to geopolitical concerns, and the failure to institutionalize some form of pan‐continental unity. The structural failure to create a framework for normative and geopolitical pluralism on the continent meant that Russia was excluded from the new European order. No mode of reconciliation was found between the Brussels‐centred wider Europe and various ideas for greater European continental unification. Russia's relations with the EU became increasingly tense in the context of the Eastern Partnership and the Association Agreement with Ukraine. The EU and the Atlantic alliance moved towards a more hermetic and universal form of Atlanticism. Although there remain profound differences between the EU and its trans‐Atlantic partner and tensions between member states, the new Atlanticism threatens to subvert the EU's own normative principles. At the same time, Russia moved from a relatively complaisant approach to Atlanticism towards a more critical neo‐revisionism, although it does not challenge the legal or normative intellectual foundations of international order. This raises the question of whether we can speak of the ‘death of Europe’ as a project intended to transcend the logic of conflict on the continent.     

Burma and North Korea: conventional allies or nuclear partners?

During the third quarter of 2009, there was a spate of reports in the news media and on the Internet accusing Burma and North Korea of engaging in a range of activities that potentially threatened regional security. It was claimed that the Naypyidaw regime had developed a close relationship with Pyongyang that included North Korea's sale to Burma of conventional weapons, assistance in the development of Burma's defence infrastructure and arms industries, and even collaboration on a nuclear weapons program. Given the lack of hard evidence, however, these reports raised more questions than they answered. Burma's nuclear status remains unknown. Another puzzle is why no government or international organisation has yet made an official statement on this particular issue, despite all the publicity it has attracted. Should it be determined that Burma does indeed have a secret nuclear weapons program, then a key question would be whether the generals are likely to be any more receptive to international concerns than they have been in the past, on other issues.     

Deterrence dogma? Challenging the relevance of British nuclear weapons

In December 2006 the British government released a White Paper announcing its intention to begin the process of replacing its current Trident nuclear weapons system, thereby allowing it to retain nuclear weapons well into the 2050s. In March 2008 the government released its National Security Strategy that stressed the long‐term complexity, diversity and interdependence of threats to British security with a clear focus on human rights, justice and freedom. This article asks how the threat to kill tens if not hundreds of thousands of people with British nuclear weapons fits into the National Security Strategy's world view and questions the relevance of an instrument of such devastating bluntness to threats defined by complexity and interdependence. It argues that the government's case for replacing the current Trident system based on the logic of nuclear deterrence is flawed. First, Britain faces no strategic nuclear threats and the long‐term post‐Cold War trend in relations with Russia and China—the two nuclear‐armed major powers that could conceivably threaten the UK with nuclear attack—is positive, despite current tensions with Moscow over Georgia. Second, the credibility and legitimacy of threatening nuclear destruction in response to the use of WMD by ‘rogue’ states is highly questionable and British nuclear threats offer no ‘insurance’ or guarantee of protection against future ‘rogue’ nuclear threats. Third, nuclear weapons have no role to play in deterring acts of nuclear terrorism whether state‐sponsored or not. Fourth, British nuclear threats will be useless in dealing with complex future conflicts characterized by ‘hybrid’ wars and diverse and interdependent sources of insecurity. The article concludes by arguing that the government's fall‐back position that it must keep nuclear weapons ‘just in case’ because the future security environment appears so uncertain, makes no sense if British nuclear threats offer no solution to the causes and symptoms of that uncertainty.     

Waiting for Kant: devaluing and delegitimizing nuclear weapons

Expectations of significant progress towards a nuclear weapons‐free world continue to shape global nuclear politics. Progress towards nuclear disarmament will require diminishing the value of nuclear weapons to the point where it becomes politically, strategically and socially acceptable for nuclear‐armed states to relinquish permanently their nuclear arsenals. Key to this are the concepts and processes of ‘devaluing’ and ‘delegitimizing’ nuclear weapons that have steadily coalesced in global nuclear discourse since the mid‐1990s. This article builds on current research by developing three images of nuclear disarmament under the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT): ‘surface’ devaluing, ‘deep’ devaluing, and delegitimizing nuclear weapons. The first represents codification by the nuclear‐weapon states of the transformation of the Cold War environment through reductions in the size and role of nuclear arsenals that leaves the logic of nuclear deterrence and nuclear prestige largely unchanged. Deep devaluing is framed as a reconceptualization of the political, strategic and military logics that underpin nuclear‐weapons policies and practices. Delegitimizing represents a more radical normative project to transform collective meanings assigned to nuclear weapons. The analysis examines conceptions of devaluing nuclear weapons from the perspective of non‐nuclear weapon states and the relationship between devaluing nuclear weapons and the idea of a spectrum of nuclear deterrence. It concludes by highlighting the tension between surface and deep devaluing, the emergence of a delegitimizing agenda, and the political implications for the current NPT review cycle set to culminate in the next quinquennial Review Conference in 2015.     

The UK,threshold status and responsible nuclear sovereignty

The example of the UK is used to explore two linked ideas relevant to the current international politics of nuclear weapons: that of the threshold state, whereby a state moves from possession to non‐possession of weapons rather than in the opposite direction; and that of responsible nuclear sovereignty, adapting the notion of responsible sovereignty to the nuclear context. The UK regards itself as an exemplar of responsible nuclear sovereignty and is closest to the disarmament threshold, being driven closer by military and economic stresses. Nuclear disarmament will require all nuclear‐armed states to approach and cross this threshold, a journey assisted albeit ambiguously by the shared practice and norms of responsible nuclear sovereignty. Yet the nine nuclear‐armed states' relations to the threshold differ markedly, raising more questions about the feasibility of the popular model of coordinated disarmament. Although coordination remains desirable, the UK seems more likely to abandon its nuclear force by deciding that ‘enough is enough’ than through the conclusion of a grand multilateral initiative.     

The false promise of continental concert: Russia,the West and the necessary balance of power

The war in Ukraine is revelatory of a malaise in Europe's security order created by Russia's resistance to western institutions on the one hand and the western desire to maintain these institutions while partnering with Russia on the other. Absent a sense of priorities, western policy risks contributing to the erosion of Europe's security order that Russia seeks in opposition to western ambition. Europe's order is premised first and foremost on a distinctively western concert of nations—whereby Euro‐Atlantic states coordinate policy according to a common purpose layered into both NATO and the EU—that forms part of a wider balance of power between Russia and the West. Western policy should aim to strengthen the concert and clarify the balance. However, the prevalent desire to include Russia in the concert confuses matters in a major way, eroding both the underlying sense of priorities and the foundation for order. This article examines this threatening erosion and traces it to three underlying trends: political contestation with regard to the meaning of ‘restoration’ post‐1989; military instability following from the unpredictability of ‘hybrid war’; and moral equivocation on the part of the West when it comes to defending the Euro‐Atlantic security order. The article concludes that given the depth of contestation, western allies should learn to distinguish concert from balance and act on the condition that the former, a vibrant western concert, is a precondition for the latter, a manageable continental balance.     

The future of the NPT1

Despite the 2005 NPT Review Conference ending problematically, there remains no real alternative to that regime for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. Any replacement of the current regime would only compound existing problems and challenges. We cannot afford to live in a world where ‘more nuclear weapons are better’. To do so would be to avoid disarmament and create a divisive security environment. A better approach would be for the global community to strive for a true partnership in achieving non-proliferation goals.     

Enlightenment and nuclear order

Applying the method of enlightenment correctly to the area of nuclear non‐proliferation would require a major effort to critically evaluate ideologies. Liberal arms control—despite its many successes and merits—has devised over the years a whole set of ideological tenets and attitudes. Some of them have been transformed into beliefs that could be termed myths. The most prominent ideological myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that the Nuclear Non‐proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT) was in essence a disarmament agreement, not a non‐proliferation treaty. To depict the negotiations as a premeditated effort of enlightenment, where the governments of this world came together to solemnly decide that some of them would be allowed to have some nuclear weapons for an interim period while the others would renounce their possession immediately, is pure. It would be equally wrong to qualify the ‘grand bargain’ as one between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have‐nots. Another myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that—in order to gain support for the NPT—the superpowers had altered their nuclear weapons strategy in the 1960s. Again, this contention is not borne out by the development of nuclear strategies and doctrines. The third myth is the contention that there was an abrupt shift in US non‐proliferation policy as George W. Bush came into power. The major changes in US non‐proliferation policy had already started during the Clinton administration and some of them can be traced back to the tenure of President George W. H. Bush senior. They all reflected the changed international environment and represented necessary adjustments of the non‐proliferation strategy. The Clinton administration left some of the traditional paths of arms control and rightly undertook some changes that were necessary because traditional instruments of arms control were no longer adequate. The Bush administration continued that policy, but in a more radical way.     

Russia's European policy under Medvedev: how sustainable is a new compromise?

This article argues that Dmitry Medvedev's term in office, despite the continuity in Russia's foreign policy objectives, brought about a certain change in Russia's relations with the European Union and the countries of the Common Neighbourhood. The western perceptions of Russia as a resurgent power able to use energy as leverage vis‐à‐vis the EU were challenged by the global economic crisis, the emergence of a buyer's market in Europe's gas trade, Russia's inability to start internal reforms, and the growing gap in the development of Russia on the one hand and China on the other. As a result, the balance of self‐confidence shifted in the still essentially stagnant EU–Russian relationship. As before, Moscow is ready to use all available opportunities to tighten its grip on the post‐Soviet space, but it is less keen to go into an open conflict when important interests of EU member states may be affected. The realization is slowly emerging also inside Russia that it is less able either to intimidate or attract European actors, even though it can still appeal to their so‐called ‘pragmatic interests’, both transparent and non‐transparent. At the same time, whereas the new modus operandi may be suboptimal from the point of view of those in the country who would want Russia's policy to be aimed at the restoration of global power status, it is the one that the Kremlin can live with—also after the expected return of Vladimir Putin as Russia's president. Under the current scheme, the West—and the EU in particular—does little to challenge Russia's internal order and leaves it enough space to conduct its chosen course in the former Soviet Union.     

The inconsequential gains and lasting insecurities of India's nuclear weaponization

India's nuclear breakout in 1998, foreshadowed as early as 1974, may have been understandable for reasons of global nuclear politics, a triangular regional equation between China, India and Pakistan, and domestic politics. Yet the utility of India's nuclear weapons remains questionable on many grounds. Nuclear deterrence is dubious in general and especially dubious in the subcontinent. Nuclear weapons are not usable as weapons of compellence or defence. They failed to stop the Pakistani incursion in Kargil in 1999 or the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008. They will not help India to shape the military calculations of likely enemies. And India's global status and profile will be determined far more crucially by its economic performance than nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, they do impose direct and opportunity costs economically, risk corrosion of democratic accountability, add to global concerns about nuclear terrorism, and have not helped the cause of global nuclear non‐proliferation and disarmament. Because the consequences of a limited regional war involving India could be catastrophic for the world, others have both the right and a responsibility to engage with the issue. For all these reasons, a denuclearized world that includes the destruction of India's nuclear stockpile would favourably affect the balance of India's security and other interests, national and international interests, and material interests and value goals.     

Book reviews

Book reviewed in this issue: International Relations theory Critical International Relations theory after 25 years. Edited by Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell‐White. The political economy of global security: war, future crises and changes in global governance. By Heikki Patomäki. Foreword by Richard Falk. National interest and international solidarity: particular and universal ethics in international life. Edited by Jean‐Marc Coicaud and Nicholas J. Wheeler. Human rights and ethics Torture and the twilight of empire: from Algiers to Baghdad. By Marnia Lazreg. International law and organization The prohibition of propaganda for war in international law. By Michael G. Kearney. United Nations sanctions and the rule of law. By Jeremy Matam Farrall. Foreign policy Progressive foreign policy. Edited by David Held and David Mepham. China—Europe relations: perceptions, policies and prospects. Edited by David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhou Hong. Honor in foreign policy: a history and discussion. By Michael Donelan. Conflict, security and armed forces Why we are losing the war on terror. By Paul Rogers. Worst‐case scenarios. By Cass R. Sunstein. On nuclear terrorism. By Michael Levi. Cabinets and the bomb. By Peter Hennessy. Politics, democracy and social affairs Worst of the worst: dealing with repressive and rogue nations. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg. The construction of democracy: lessons from practice and research. Edited by Jorge I. Domínguez and Anthony Jones. Diplomacy with a difference: the Commonwealth Office of High Commissioner, 1880–2006. By Lorna Lloyd. Political economy, economics and development Billions of entrepreneurs: how China and India are reshaping their futures and yours. By Tarun Khanna. Russia's capitalist revolution: why market reform succeeded and democracy failed. By Anders Åslund. Creating a world without poverty: social business and the future of capitalism. By Muhammad Yunus. One economics many recipes: globalization, institutions and economic growth. By Dani Rodrik. Business, power and conflict in international environmental politics. By Robert Falkner. Ethnicity and cultural politics The Kurds in Iran: the past, present and future. By Kerim Yildiz and Tanyel B. Taysi. Energy and environment Nuclear power is not the answer. By Helen Caldicott. Bioviolence: preventing biological terror and crime. By Barry Kellman. Integrated transboundary water management in theory and practice: experiences from the new EU eastern borders. Edited by Geoffrey Gooch and Per Stålnacke. History Brothers: the hidden history of the Kennedy years. By David Talbot. Europe The European superpower. By John McCormick. The European Union and conflict resolution: promoting peace in the backyard. By Nathalie Tocci. Russia and Eurasia Putin: Russia's choice (second edition). By Richard Sakwa. Chechnya: Russia's ‘war on terror’. By John Russell. Russia—lost in translation: the Yeltsin and Putin legacies. By Lilia Shevtsova. The new Cold War: how the Kremlin menaces both Russia and the West. By Edward Lucas. How Russia really works: the informal practices that shaped post‐Soviet politics and business. By Alena V. Ledeneva. Middle East and North Africa Contesting the Saudi state: Islamic voices from a new generation. By Madawi al‐Rasheed. Making Israel. Edited by Benny Morris. A possible peace between Israel and Palestine: an insider's account of the Geneva initiative. By Menachem Klein. Translated by Haim Watzman. Israël, Palestine. Vérités sur un conflit. By Alain Gresh. Iran and its place among nations. By Alidad Mafinezam and Aria Mehrabi. Sub‐Saharan Africa Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: the story of UNAMSIL. By‘Funmi Olonisakin. Cyril Ramaphosa. By Anthony Butler. Asia and Pacific Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the global nuclear weapons conspiracy. By Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott‐Clark. The dragon looks south: China and Southeast Asia in the new century. By Bronson Percival. Charm offensive: how China's soft power is transforming the world. By Joshua Kurlantzick. China rising: peace, power and order in East Asia. By David Kang. Contemporary Hong Kong politics: governance in the post‐1997 era. Edited by Lam Wai‐man, Percy Luen‐tim Lui, Wilson Wong and Ian Holliday. North America American power after the Berlin Wall. By Thomas H. Henriksen. The paradox of a global USA. Edited by Bruce Mazlish, Nayan Chanda and Kenneth Weisbrode. Latin America and Caribbean Highland Indians and the state in modern Ecuador. Edited by A. Kim Clark and Marc Becker. Forgotten continent: the battle for Latin America's soul. By Michael Reid.