从外交部开放档案看20世纪50年代中以接触始末

中以关系是中国对外关系中比较特殊的一对双边关系。1950年以色列就承认了中国,但1992年中以才正式建立外交关系。这期间中以接触不多,大部分接触发生在20世纪50年代。从20世纪50年代中以之间接触的整个进程来看,在中以建交问题上,中方的态度变化是由热到冷,以方的态度则由最初的犹豫不决到坚决谋求与中国建交。     

The failure to formulate a national science policy: Israel's Scientific Council, 1948–1959

This article analyzes the failure to formulate a national science policy in Israel's early years by tracing the administrative genealogy of the Scientific Council (1948–59), which was established to manage and coordinate civil applied scientific research in Israel. The failure of the council is analyzed as part of wider debates concerning the future of the academic and scientific research systems and the implementation of Israeli state ideology (mamlakhtiyut) in this period. The story of the council sheds light on important aspects of the formation of Israeli higher education and scientific research institutions and on the close but complex relations between science and politics in the early years of the state.     

Enter the ‘Far East’: Korean culture in early South Korea–Israel relations

Diplomatic relations between South Korea and Israel were formed only in 1962. Furthermore, as the two countries from both ends of the continent cooperated in various areas during the 1960s and 1970s, relations were becoming more complicated and even officially rather cool in light of Korea’s evolving relations with the Arab world. Against this backdrop, and based on the reading of contemporaneous Israeli press, the study argues that culture mattered very much in the early stages of the relations. Cultural contacts between Koreans and Israelis started well before the establishment of full diplomatic relations, and cultural diplomacy played a significant role in maintaining them in the decades that followed. Like today, both parties often emphasized the cultural and historical affinities between the two peoples, and in the process, the Israeli public was exposed to early glimpses into Korean culture while images of Korea and its people were created as well.     

Peripheral Players? German Colonial Interests,The Press,and the Spirit of Locarno

The Locarno Conference, held on 5–16 October 1925, represented the culmination of nearly two years of diplomatic communication between the foreign offices of Germany, Britain, and France. The conference was an attempt to normalize relations between the former Allied powers and Germany's new Weimar Republic and more tightly bind Germany's politics and economy to Western Europe. Colonial German lobbies hoped that the Locarno talks heralded the return of empire and an end to Germany's banishment from the work of the ‘civilizing mission’ and the humiliating experience of being a ‘postcolonial state in a still colonial world’. Public scrutiny from false press reports about the restoration of the German colonies emanating from Germany, France, Britain and its colonies and dominions, and even the United States complicated matters for Locarno delegates by forcing discussion of off-agenda topics. This article interrogates how the Colonial German lobby influenced the Locarno Conference through activity in the international public sphere, how they managed a partial victory in the wake of Locarno, and more importantly, the Colonial German lobby learned new and better strategies for playing properly to public opinion and international bureaucracies.     

Israel,Nigeria and the Biafra civil war, 1967–70

The Biafran secession of 1967 and ensuing civil war presented Israel with an acute dilemma. Israel sought to maintain correct relations with the Federal Government of Nigeria, which viewed as a hostile act any support rendered to the Biafran separatists. At the same time, the plight of the Igbos reminded many Israelis of the Holocaust. This article makes use of Israeli archival material to shed new light on how Israel shaped its policy towards the conflict. The Israeli public, press and parliament called for assistance to Biafra, evoking their country's deep moral obligation to help a people in distress. Israel aided Biafra, including, in a clandestine manner, the supply of weapons for which the secessionists pressed, in addition to humanitarian assistance. At the same time, Israel also sold arms to Nigeria, seeking to prevent a diplomatic rupture with the Lagos government that would have affected Israel's position in all of black Africa.     

论中国与印度尼西亚建交

中国与印度尼西亚建交是冷战时期中国与东南亚外交关系发展的重大事件。尽管印度尼西亚建国初期曾有其总工会代表团赴华与中共高层接触,但正式向中国政府提出两国建交问题的却是印度尼西亚前宗主国荷兰。荷兰利用荷—印(尼)联盟主导者的身份,企图在保留与台湾当局外交关系以及不支持中国加入联合国的情况下,以印度尼西亚与中国建交作为荷中建交的交换条件,并以此保持在华各类利益,但此举为中方所拒。荷兰不得已放弃对台湾当局的外交承认,由此台湾当局撤销驻印度尼西亚外交机构。在印度尼西亚方面,尽管美国施加了外交压力,但苏加诺总统仍采取了平衡外交政策,而中方也获得苏联对中国与印度尼西亚建交的支持。在两国的努力下,中国与印度尼西亚于1950年4月13日建交。     

the Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel

During the last two decades, a surge of historical revisionism has commanded considerable attention in both academia and the public sphere, as historians have linked their understandings of the past to salient problems and identity crises of the present. Increasingly, the histories of nations have been problematized and have become the object of commemorative battles. Historiographical disputes thus reveal no less about contemporary political sensibilities than they do about a nation's history. This article situates the proliferation of historical revisionism within the context of ongoing negotiations regarding the meaning of the nation at the end of the twentieth century. Through a comparison of recent historians' disputes in Germany and Israel, I explore the relationship between revisionism and collective memory, and the ways in which both are reflective of and contribute to the reformation of national identification. While national identities are usually predicated on continuities with the past, new German and Israeli identities are being defined in opposition to the founding myths of their nation-states. Both are continuously reassessing their pasts, negotiating the balance between a commitment to universal (democratic) values and the persistence of particularistic (ethnic) traditions. To be sure, national pasts have been contested before, but until recently the primacy of the nation itself was not significantly challenged. I suggest understanding the ongoing phenomenon of national demystification in the context of changing state–society relations. States no longer enjoy the same hegemonic power over the means of collective commemoration. In contrast to the state-supportive role of historians during the formative phase of nationalism, collective memory has become an increasingly contested terrain. In both countries, revisionists from the left and right self-consciously struggle to provide historical narratives of their nation's past to suit their present political views of the future.     

The German question in Jakarta Indonesia in West Germany’s foreign policy, 1955–65

This article explores a hitherto unexamined chapter of German Cold War politics: West Germany’s relations with Indonesia between 1955 and 1965. Indonesia was a peculiar case, as in the late 1950s and early 1960s, President Sukarno turned his country into a radical champion of ‘anti-imperialism’. This included actions directed against the Netherlands, Britain, Malaysia, and the United States. As part of a comprehensive strategy to isolate East Germany in the ‘Third World’, West German diplomacy nevertheless tried to maintain solid relations with Sukarno’s increasingly unpredictable Indonesia, even if that meant undermining the position of Western allies.     

中国与南斯拉夫建交始末

南斯拉夫是最早承认新中国的国家之一,但中南两国的建交却拖延了五年才得以实现。苏联与南斯拉夫关系的变化是中南建交延搁和实现的主要原因。建国初期,尽管南斯拉夫符合新中国的建交原则,但中国不得不首先考虑苏联的立场和中苏同盟的利益。随着苏南双方外交关系的恢复以及南斯拉夫与东欧国家关系的改善,中南才最终得以建交。     

Australia's foreign policy links with Latin America: distant relations

In more recent years, Australia's relations with the countries of Latin America have taken on more importance as the trade and investment links between the two regions have grown. Besides this recent activity, Australia has a long history of diplomatic relations with the countries of Latin America, even though the links between the two regions have at times been fairly superficial. This relationship, like many others, has tended to concentrate on mainly trade relations and, despite Latin America's often turbulent political history, has not been affected much at all by political issues. The purpose of this article is to analyse the development of foreign policy links between Australia and the countries of Latin America in their formulative stage between 1901 and 1973.     

中印建交与新中国外交抉择

新中国成立后,印度是第一个同中国进行建交谈判的国家,也是资本主义国家中第一个同我国建交的国家。同印度建交是新中国外交的一次重要实践,它不仅确立了中国同其他国家先谈判后建交的外交原则,还赋予了"一边倒"更丰富的内涵,开创了中国周边外交的新局面。     

Former Nazi Officers in the Near East: German Military Advisors in Syria, 1949–56

In the early days of the Cold War, Syria was the first Arab country where former officers of the German Wehrmacht played an active role as military advisors. This was due, in part, to the fact that Germany was not burdened by its past political relations to Arab states for, in contrast to the Western powers, Germany which had never had territorial ambitions in the Near East. Even in the very early stages, German advisors contributed considerably to the development of Syria's armed forces and military intelligence. The advisory activities of German experts became even more intensive as a result of increased trade between the two countries; however, in 1956 the political situation in Syria worsened and the country began moving towards the Eastern Bloc putting an end to the non-official activities of German military advisors.     

Defying Moscow: East German-Chinese relations during the Andropov-Chernenko interregnum, 1982–1985

Using newly available East German and Chinese sources, this article sheds light on how East Germany actively defied Moscow's objections to expand relations with China in the early 1980s. Amidst increasing East German-Soviet tensions, East German leader Erich Honecker actively sought relations with China not only for reasons of prestige but also to gain a potential market for East German goods. This interest was initially reciprocated on the Chinese side, as Beijing looked towards East Germany as a leading industrial state for potential economic lessons during Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening Process.     

Facing Assad. American Diplomacy Toward Syria, 1973–1977

In the wake of the 1973 October War, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad led the United States and Syria in reviving their long-dead diplomatic relationship. This process began amidst the diplomatic effort that would lead to the unprecedented Syrian–Israeli Disengagement Agreement of 1974, matured in the difficult period of stalemate that followed, and produced a paradoxical diplomatic concord as Syria, Israel and the United States grappled with Lebanon's civil war. This is at once the tale of 40 months of negotiations, deceit and maneuvers, and the beginning of the troubled American relationship with the Assad dynasty.     

Iran in the Nazi New Order, 1933–1941

Despite a succession of scholarly studies over the years, the relationship between Reza Shah’s Iran and National Socialist Germany has not been fully explored. Rather than focusing on the supposed Aryan ideological sympathies that bound the two countries together, this article argues that the real driver of the German–Iranian relationship in the 1930s was economic and based in the mutual interaction of state economic initiatives. It states that Iran’s place in Nazism’s economic system was the outcome of two factors: the “New Plan” of Reich Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht, and its focus on clearing agreements as a motor for depression-era trade, and the connections of Schacht’s system to Reza Shah’s strategy to modernize Iran. In exploring this issue the article focuses on relations between Germany and Iran during three distinct moments: first, the period from 1918 to 1928 and the working out of a new relationship after the First World War; secondly the period of Schacht’s New Plan in Iran in the mid-1930s; and finally the period from the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 to the British–Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. During this last period Iran both belonged to the Nazi–Soviet trade zone created by the Pact and attempted to defend its neutrality.     

Sidelining the Hardliners: A 2 + 1 Solution for Israel‐Palestine

This article presents a modified two‐state solution to the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict. A “2 + 1 solution” would see the establishment of a State of Palestine in the West Bank whose constitution proscribes the participation in government of any party whose platform calls for the elimination of Israel; Gaza would accede upon the reform or demise of Hamas. Achieving a state in the West Bank should be the proximate, urgent goal of the Palestinian people. Ideologically motivated Israeli settlement of the West Bank continues apace and threatens the viability of a two‐state solution. Meanwhile, religiously motivated policies of colonization hide behind a security narrative conflating Hamas with Fatah and suggesting that the Palestinians pose an existential threat. The 2 + 1 solution, by excluding Hamas from a State of Palestine, directly addresses Israel's legitimate security concerns and thus carries the potential to lay bare the extent to which ideology informs Israeli policy. The approach also gives moderate Palestinians the opportunity to define the civic values and attributes of Palestinian national identity in a way that supports a lasting two‐state peace.     

Israel and Post‐Mubarak Egypt: Perils of Historical Analogy

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has perceived the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 as a replica of Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. Drawing on the apparent similarities between the two revolutions—both made against dictators who reigned over secular, Western‐oriented regimes advocating coexistence with Israel, and both having Islamists as the best‐organized opposition force—Netanyahu appears to have concluded that the outcome for Israel would be the same: the advent of an aggressive Islamist regime in Cairo that would initiate a larger conflict. Based on this historical analogy, the Netanyahu government has adopted policies that are meant to help Israel defend against the potential deterioration in relations with Egypt. However, looking at Iran 1979 to draw on lessons about Egypt 2011 is misleading and does not take into account the significant differences that would rather lead Egypt to preserve the peace. This article analyzes Netanyahu's employment of this historical analogy and examines other appropriate lessons that Israel could draw from Iran's Islamic revolution, and proposes that Israel should instead engage the Egyptian revolution and reach a peace deal with the Palestinians so that it avoids misperception and maintains the Egyptian–Israeli peace.     

Attempts at an Arab‐Jewish agreement in Palestine during the thirties

The article argues that a central aspect of Israeli-Polish relations before 1967 was their tripartite nature, involving the two states and Polish Jewry. The main goal of Israeli diplomacy in Poland, to which it subordinated a variety of interests, even those that were central to Israel's foreign policy, was the immigration to Israel of Polish Jewry. The three elements of the triangular relations (Israel, Poland, and Polish Jewry) influenced one another through their policy and behavior, monitored each other, interpreted each other's actions, and reacted accordingly. The aliyah from Poland engendered a new dynamic in the relations. Israel was able to implement its nation-building policy through the immigration of a desired element, and the Polish authorities, by allowing emigration of an unassimilable ethnonational minority, homogenized the nationalizing Polish state. After the massive emigration of the Jews, another element connecting and reshaping the three sides of the triangle emerged: the competition to represent the memory of Polish Jewry, conceived, too, as an instrument in the nation-building process of both states.     

The Querelle Between Alain Badiou and Éric Marty,Contrasted With Régis Debray's Lettre Ouverte to Élie Barnavi and Barnavi's Response

This article contrasts two major debates in book form on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, so central to French political discussion today—the ‘quarrel’ between Alain Badiou (with Cécile Winter, in Circonstances 3: Portées du mot ‘juif’) and Éric Marty (Une querelle avec Alain Badiou, philosophe), and the debate between Régis Debray and Élie Barnavi (À un ami israélien, by Debray with a response from Barnavi). The Badiou/Marty exchange is hostile and polarised, Badiou arguing strongly against the existence of a separate Israeli state and Marty vehemently in its favour, while À un ami israélien evidences what I describe as Debray's post-Zionism in dialogue with Barnavi's Left Zionism. What emerges from the two exchanges is, it is argued, a taxonomy of attitudes towards Israel substantially more complex than the traditional, and often misleading, polarity between ‘Zionist’ and ‘anti-Zionist’.     

毛泽东与新中国谈判建交的开创

谈判建交是新中国独立自主外交的一项重要实践,是毛泽东将中华民族争取独立、平等和获得尊重的努力与国际法相结合的一次成功创新。毛泽东不仅是谈判建交的首倡者,而且在具有开创意义的中国同印度和英国的建交谈判中,扮演了决策者、设计者和领导者的角色,起到了举足轻重的关键作用。