The Rebel Chief Whip: The Role of Leslie Wilson in the Fall of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1922

This article explores the crisis within the Conservative Party in 1922 over the continuation of the coalition with Lloyd George's section of the Liberal Party, focusing on the actions of the Conservative chief whip, Leslie Wilson. Previously unused papers relating to Wilson's career shed new light on his role in the fall of the coalition. Wilson co‐ordinated opposition to the continuation of the coalition in its existing form, helping to solidify the group of junior ministers opposed to Lloyd George into a cohesive and powerful faction, which then forced the Conservative Party leader, Austen Chamberlain, into making concessions. Above all, Wilson was influential in forcing Chamberlain to agree to a meeting of MPs at the Carlton Club on 19 October 1922, at which the rebels won a decisive victory, causing the resignation of Chamberlain as party leader and Lloyd George as prime minister, in one of the most important events in modern British political history.     

'The Affairs of a Distant Dependency': The Nigeria Debate and the Premiership, 1916

We provide the first full account of the intertwined corporateconflicts and political tensions behind the ‘Nigeria Debate’of 8 November 1916, the beginning of the crisis that toppledthe Asquith coalition The debate had its ongins in an attemptby the Lagos authorities and the Colonial Office to break theemerging monopoly of a ‘Ring’ of British firms overNigerian trade The government sought to encourage foreign (especiallyAmerican) investment with a highly publiazed sale of formerGerman assets. Sir Edward Carson, the recognized leader of politicaldiscontent, took up the firms' agitation against the policy,alleging official neglect of British interests. Bonar Law, whoas Colonial Secretary was the minister responsible, decidedto counter-attack. He argued that Carson, while claiming tobe a disinterested patriot, was defending the private interestsof profiteering firms. Spurning compromise, and demonstratingthat the issue was not a simple tariff reform/free trade choice,Bonar Law treated the debate as a test of Unionist support forhis leadership. Carson's followers privately acknowledged thatBonar Law won; but the strength of Carson's support, even witha bad case, and uncertainties about Lloyd George's position,persuaded Bonar Law that the administration could not continueon its present basis. For Asquith the endgame then began     

The 1892 General Election and the Eclipse of the Liberal Unionists

This article seeks to establish that the 1892 general election marked a major change in the relative positions of the parties in the Unionist alliance. Not only did it reveal the limitations of the Liberal Unionist Party's strategy and appeal in an age of increasingly organised, mass politics, but it also acted as a brake on the ambitions of the new leader of the Liberal Unionists in the house of commons, Joseph Chamberlain. It argues that the Liberal Unionist Party suffered a more severe setback in 1892 than has been recognized hitherto and that Chamberlain's attempts to revive his party both before and after the general election were now prescribed by the reality of the political position in which the party now found itself. Rather than regarding the fluid political circumstances of the 1890s as the outcome of an emerging struggle between increasingly polarised ideologies, it seeks to reinforce the significance of local political circumstances and the efficacy of party management in the growing dominance of Lord Salisbury and Arthur Balfour and the Conservative central organisers.     

Clarendon,Cavour, and the Intervention of Sardinia in the Crimean War, 1853–1855

The notorious arms trader Sir Basil Zaharoff is remembered as the archetypal ‘merchant of death’. During the First World War, he is alleged to have exercised a malign influence over statesmen in London and Paris. Recently released Foreign Office files now allow us to document Zaharoff's wartime activities on behalf of the British government as an agent of influence in the Levant. The new sources reveal that Sir Vincent H.P. Caillard, the financial director of the arms-maker Vickers, played a key role in making Zaharoff's services available to prime ministers Asquith and Lloyd George. While Zaharoff has often been portrayed as a sinister force, manipulating statesmen into pursuing his financial and political interests, the reality was the reverse. Zaharoff was a convenient tool of two prime ministers rather than a powerful political manipulator in his own right.     

The Whips of the Liberal Unionist Party in the House of Commons

This note provides the most complete list of Liberal Unionist whips in the house of commons, thus contributing to our understanding of the history of the party in parliament over the entire period of its existence from 1886 to 1912, and charts the extent of the responsibility of the party whip for the organisation of the party outside the house of commons, which peaked during the tenure of Lord Wolmer as whip from 1888 to 1892. The note concludes by observing that the division of labour regarding organisation implemented in the Conservative Party in 1911 mirrors that adopted by the Liberal Unionist Party in 1892, and that this was likely the result of Wolmer, now 2nd earl of Selborne, serving on the committee that recommended the 1911 reforms.     

‘The Costly Luxury of Protesting’: The Deselection of J.M. Maclean,MP

With the increase in the electorate as the result of the Second and Third Reform Acts in the latter half of the 19th century came a corresponding increase in the importance of political parties. With this increase in the importance of party came the fear that the Burkean definition of the MP as a representative, owing his electorate his judgment as well as his industry would be replaced by a narrower conception of the MP as a delegate, returned to vote according to the dictates of party or ‘caucus’, subject to rejection by his party prior to an election, rather than the electorate as a whole at an election. This article examines the case of J.M. Maclean, Conservative MP for Cardiff 1895–1900, deselected by his constituency executive for his opposition to the Boer War, using it to shed light on the reaction of constituency parties in instances where MPs were felt to have overstepped the proper bounds of party discipline. The article concentrates on the relations between Maclean and his constituency party, crucial in Maclean's deselection. The limits of political dissent in time of war are examined, and the limitations placed by party on the freedom of action of individual MPs. In addition, the article gives glimpses of the tensions present in the Conservative‐Liberal Unionist coalition which governed Britain between 1895 and 1906, particularly on perceptions of the controversial figure of Joseph Chamberlain among Conservative back benchers.     

The Candidates of the Liberal Unionist Party, 1886–1912*

Historians have hitherto based discussion of the electoral performance of the Liberal Unionist Party on incomplete data regarding the candidates of the party, as published sources, including F.W.S. Craig's British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885–1918, the standard reference work, include a number of cases where the party label of a Unionist candidate (either Liberal Unionist or Conservative) is uncertain or incorrect. Utilising a wide range of primary and secondary sources, this article resolves a number of these cases, and thus creates the most accurate list of Liberal Unionist candidates available. The creation of this list allows for accurate analysis of the party's history, and the article makes some preliminary observations based on the data presented. Among these observations are that the Liberal Unionists comprised a consistent percentage of the overall Unionist Party in the house of commons, that the number of seats contested by Liberal Unionists remained steady through the January 1910 election, and that existing interpretations of the electoral pact between the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives may be flawed.     

Heir Not Apparent: Douglas Hailsham,the Role of the House of Lords,and the Succession to the Conservative Leadership 1928–31*

The moment that Lord Curzon was passed over and Stanley Baldwin succeeded Andrew Bonar Law as prime minister in 1923 is generally regarded as a turning point in British political history. From this time it appeared that members of the house of lords were barred from leading political parties and becoming prime minister. In an age of mass democracy it was deemed unacceptable for the premier to reside in an unelected and largely emasculated chamber. This understanding is seemingly confirmed by the career of the Conservative politician, Douglas Hogg, 1st Viscount Hailsham. Notwithstanding a late entry into political life, he was regarded as a potential successor to Baldwin. His acceptance of a peerage to become lord chancellor in 1928 has been seen as the moment when Hailsham's claims to lead the Conservative party ended. But although Hailsham never became Conservative leader, his experience undermines the suggestion that peers were unable to lead political parties in inter‐war Britain. Despite his position in the Lords, his chances of succeeding Baldwin never vanished. The crisis in Baldwin's leadership after the loss of the 1929 general election and the lack of a suitable successor in the Commons created the circumstances in which leadership from the Lords by a man of Hailsham's ability could be contemplated. Hailsham's continuing prominence within the Conservative ranks and specifically his contributions to the party during the years 1929–31, together with the thoughts of high‐ranking Conservative contemporaries, make it clear that he very nearly emerged as Baldwin's successor at this time.     

Reform in the Canadian Parliament and the US Congress: Institutional Choices and Member Power

A spate of recent work on the Canadian Parliament highlights the importance of constituency pressures in understanding the legislative behavior of individual Members of Parliament (MPs). In light of this renaissance, we reexamine decisions by Canadian Liberal Party MPs to defy Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and his cabinet by supporting party-weakening reform in 2002. More specifically, we model votes on the question of selecting committee chairs through secret ballot as a function of factors both internal and external to the Parliament. While we find some evidence of exogenous, constituency-based forces, we find that support for reform was largely driven by internal party power dynamics. We gain additional insight into our findings by comparing this reform to analogous reforms in the US Congress. The patterns we uncover highlight the stark difference between the “double monopoly of power” held by party leaders in Westminster-style legislatures and the lack of such a monopoly in Congress. We conclude by advocating for more such comparisons, arguing that careful efforts to synthesize these and other similar reforms can improve our understanding of both legislatures despite the obvious and important differences between them.     

Australian cabinet structure and procedures: The Labor government 1972–1975

This paper discusses the Whitlam government's procedures for handling cabinet material. In order to place these procedures in context reference is also made to the structure and working of cabinet and to the role of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. It is a central assumption of the paper that the rules, procedures and structures for the handling of cabinet business all require careful understanding by the participants of the times and can be adjusted and made workable in a variety of ways. In this process the preferences and style of the prime minister are critical. He has more resources than any of his colleagues. The experience of the Whitlam government illustrates these propositions.     

福田康夫执政以来中日关系的发展与前景

自2007年9月底福田康夫担任日本首相以来,中日关系明显升温。主要表现在：两国军方的交流开启了新的篇章;福田首相2007年12月底访华。福田执政以来,日本政界最显著的变化是：执政党自民党和最大的在野党民主党在对华关系方面形成了良性的竞争。这种变化非常有利于改善中日关系。本文最后结合中日关系的最新动向指出：两国关系目前的升温,基础非常薄弱,福田个人发挥了决定性的作用。要修补靖国神社等问题对中日关系的伤害,还必须下慢功夫。     

The Lost Leader: Sir Stafford Northcote and the Leadership of the Conservative Party, 1876–85*

Sir Stafford Northcote has gone down in history as a man who fell short of the ultimate achievement of being prime minister largely because of personal weakness, and lack of political virility and drive. The picture painted by Northcote's political enemies – most notably the Fourth Party – has been accepted uncritically. Yet, political motives lay behind the actions of these supporters, and their harsh black and white portrait is not illustrative of the complexity of the situation in which Northcote found himself. Although individual characteristics undoubtedly played a part in his final political failure, underlying dynamics and structural transformations in politics and political life were more significant. It was more than simply the misfortune in succeeding the exceptionally charismatic Disraeli as leader. Northcote was faced with unparalleled disruption in parliament from Irish Nationalist MPs; the starkly polarised debate on the eastern question left him detached as a moderate. His temperament was better suited to constructive government rather than to opposition. However, following general election defeat in 1880, Northcote was denied this opportunity. Equally, his position in the lower House denied him the capacity to define a clear political critique of the Liberal government. Northcote's leadership of the party reflected the changing nature of British politics as radicals, tories, Irish Nationalists and Unionists increasingly contested the consensual style more appropriate to the political world of Palmerston and the 14th earl of Derby.     

Lewis Harcourt's Journal of the 1914 War Crisis

Lewis Harcourt, who was Colonial Secretary in Britain's Liberal government, from 1908 to 1915, kept a political journal for many years, some earlier parts of which have already been published. Reproduced below is the whole neat version of the journal from 26 July 1914, when Harcourt first mentions the events of the ‘July Crisis’, until 4 August, when Britain declared war on Germany. Originals of the entries are kept at the Bodleian Library, Oxford in file Ms. Eng. c. 8269 of the ‘Further Papers of Lewis Harcourt’, which only came to light in 2008. Historians can be grateful that Harcourt kept such a record of ministerial discussions during the July Crisis, because no official records were taken of Cabinet meetings before 1916, apart from short reports by the Prime Minister to the King. There are some diary entries, letters and memoranda from those involved, but the only source with comparative detail to Harcourt's is the diary kept by the education minister, Jack Pease, which has already been published.     

‘A Rather Novel Constitutional Experiment’: The Formation of the 1977–8 ‘Lib‐Lab Pact’

By March 1977, the Labour government which had narrowly been re‐elected in the October 1974 election, had lost its parliamentary majority, and was facing a vote of confidence tabled by the Conservative opposition. Senior Labour figures thus desperately sought to secure support from one of the minor parties. Unable to broker a deal with either the Ulster Unionists or the Scottish National Party (SNP), largely due to ideological differences, the Labour leadership entered into negotiations with the Liberal leader, David Steel. The result was that the Liberal Party agreed to provide the Labour government with parliamentary support, in return for consultation, via a joint committee, over future policies, coupled with the reintroduction of devolution legislation, and a pledge to provide for direct elections for the European parliament (ideally using some form of proportional representation). There was some surprise that Steel had not pressed for more, or stronger, policy commitments or concessions from the Labour prime minister, James Callaghan, but Steel was thinking long term; he envisaged that Liberal participation in the joint consultative committee would foster closer co‐operation between Liberals and Labour moderates/social democrats, and eventually facilitate a realignment of British politics by marginalising both the Labour left, and the increasingly right‐wing Conservatives Party.     

H.G. Wells and the New Liberalism

This article offers a new interpretation of H.G. Wells's politicalthought in the Edwardian period and beyond. Scholars have emphasisedhis socialism at the expense of his commitment to liberalism,and have misread his novel The New Machiavelli as an anti-Liberaltract. Wells spent much effort in the pre-1914 period in thequest for a ‘new Liberalism’, and did not believethat socialists should compete directly with the Liberal Partyfor votes. It was this latter conviction that lay behind hismuch misunderstood dispute with the Fabian Society. His politicalsupport for Churchill was one sign of his belief in the compatibilityof liberalism and socialism, in which he was far from uniqueat the time. He also engaged, somewhat idiosyncratically, withthe ‘servile state’ concept of Hilaire Belloc. Althoughhe did not articulate his Liberal identity with complete consistency,he did so with increasing intensity as the First World War approached.This helps explain why key New Liberal politicians includingChurchill, Lloyd George and Masterman responded to his ideassympathetically. The extent of engagement between Wells andthe ‘New Liberalism’ was such that he deserves tobe considered alongside Green, Ritchie, Hobson and Hobhouseas one of its prophets.     

中国国民党“党国”体制述评

在西方政党政治潮流及苏俄体制的影响下,中国国民党总理孙中山形成了一套颇有特色的"党治"理念,为此后中国国民党执政体制奠定了理论基础.1926年,广州国民政府初步建立起中国历史上第一个"党国"体制.1927年4月,伴随着南京国民政府成立和全国统一,中国国民党继续实施其"党国"体制."党国"体制的核心在于,作为执政党的中国国民党,以党的意识形态作为治国的基本原则,以"党政双轨制"的权力管理体系作为自上而下的行政运作模式.这一独具特色的行政管理体制,既是西方政党政治理念特别是苏俄政党体制进入中国政坛的结果,也是传统中国政治文化与西方现代政党体制及理念相互作用的产物.由于理念与利益的分化,"党国"体制不仅形成了中国现代政治制度及其运作模式的重大变革,成为中国国民党统治体系内党、政、军利益纷争的根源,也由于党、政两条管理系统并存且关系滞碍而导致行政成本倍增,进而演变为中国国民党政治制度上的一大顽症.     

A Defense Renaissance? The Canadian Conservative Government and the Military

Conservative Party leader Stephen Harper campaigned in 2006 that, if elected, his government would make major improvements to Canada’s military. Emphasizing the decline that had befallen the once proud institution under the Liberals, Harper spoke of the spending increases and new capabilities that would result if his party emerged victorious in the upcoming vote. Seven years later, and two years after the prime minister was finally rewarded with a majority government, it seems like an opportune time to examine the Harper defense record. The article will show that defense spending has increased and a string of new equipment projects have been announced. However, the article will also reveal that the spending increases are almost certainly over, while few of the capital programs are actually progressing. Thus, the Harper defense record is ambiguous, and does not constitute the dramatic change that was promised.     

The Soviet government since Khrushchev

In 1965 Khrushchev's successors reversed most of his innovations in the structure of the Council of Ministers. Since then turnover in its membership has been very low, but has lately accelerated owing to age‐related deaths and retirements and other places have been created to head new agencies, so that it is again becoming an important arena for competition for high office. New government members are of two career types: “career specialists”, who have worked mainly in the field concerned, if not the particular ministry, and “party generalists”, who have risen mainly through the regional party machine. Some expansion of the latter at the expense of the former is identified, and the distribution of the two types in various policy areas is examined. The 1965 changes sharply reduced party tutelage over the government machine, but various internal and international factors have since led to a progressive reversal of this, and the channels through which this has been pursued are considered. Next, recent and possible future developments in the “inner cabinet” are discussed in relation to the structure of supreme power, and finally the significance of continued delays in long‐promised constitutional revision is noted.     

国会解散与进步党的分裂瓦解

1913年11月4日袁世凯以非法命令取消国民党议员资格,致使国会不足法定人数而解散,这是斩断中华民国法统的重大事变.国民党被查禁后,进步党是唯一的重要政党,但熊梁内阁副署命令引发进步党分裂为国会派(议会民主派)和内阁派(开明专制派).以熊希龄、梁启超为首的内阁派基于开明专制思想,希望通过依附北洋派的专制力量推行自己的开明政策;而以国会议员为主体的国会派坚持议会政治理想,不肯通过牺牲国会的尊严来延续国会的存在.维持国会的活动终于失败,进步党也在两派纷争之中逐渐瓦解.进步党的失败标志着民初各派分享权力格局的结束和袁世凯独裁统治的开始.     

Nevile Henderson in Constantinople,Cairo and Belgrade: the prototype appeaser?

Abstract

This article will argue that far from being an inveterate appeaser, Henderson showed in Constantinople that he could be an advocate of tough measures. And that in Cairo, contrary to his reputation, he was a Foreign Office loyalist while his superior, George Lloyd, was critical of official policy. Nevertheless, Henderson's early career does offer useful insights into why, once posted to Germany in 1937, he became an advocate of accommodation. In Yugoslavia, in particular, he showed a willingness to work with authoritarian leaders and a sympathy for them, which helped him to secure the Berlin appointment.