European Ukrainians and their fight against Russian invasion

Is there evidence of significant ethno-linguistic/ethno-national rallying around the nation in Ukraine—as social science would have us expect in times of conflict? And, if so, might we expect this ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identity to rise with the prolongation of war? Or instead, is Ukrainian “civic-ness” the primary rally call that shaped and shapes collective identity in Ukraine? And if this collective identity is not ethno-linguistic in orientation then what values and political dispositions are bringing Ukrainians together in a time of crisis and war? Whilst political science might suggest that violence and extended periods of war can produce rallying to ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identity—original panel survey data collected among the Ukrainian population in March/April 2019, January/February 2021, and 2 December 2021/16 February 2022 coupled with a cross-sectional nationally representative survey collected 19–24 May 2022 provide evidence that ongoing regional war, crises, and now all-out invasion by Russia have shored up civic and not ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identities. Moreover, this civic identity is bounded to pro-European pro-democratic orientations.     

An assessment of attributing public healthcare infrastructure damage in the Donbas five years after Euromaidan: implications for Ukrainian state legitimacy

ABSTRACT

From the onset of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, significant damage has been wrought to the public health infrastructure of the Donbas region. To date however, the full extent of that damage which is substantial, has not been documented: attribution of blame for that damage has not been attempted; and the implications for the region’s residents in terms of access to clinics and hospitals has been difficult to assess. This paper presents a spatial database of damaged facilities and relates that to the fighting to assess whether the damage incurred was collateral or targeted. The concept of state capacity is used to frame a discussion of what the consequences are for those residents remaining and for the challenges this crisis presents to the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government.     

Clearing the Fog of War: public versus official sources and geopolitical storylines in the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Abstract

Military action undertaken by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2014 has had enormous geopolitical ramifications. This resulted in what is almost certainly a permanent change in sovereign territory, with the former gaining and the latter losing the strategic Crimean peninsula. But Russia’s moves also set in motion a violent conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Although the United States and the NATO alliance have advocated a geopolitical storyline that attributes blame for this to Russia, close scrutiny of the evidence they have adduced in this regard fails to establish this culpability conclusively. However, by utilizing data collected and analyzed in the public realm, it is possible to determine with more certainty that, in certain places and at given times, Russia was indeed the aggressor. The rapidly increasing amount of public-sourced information globally and the growing sophistication of analytical methods by non-governmental groups presages more complete understanding of such conflicts without reliance on official information.     

A tale of two regions: geopolitics,identities, narratives,and conflict in Kharkiv and the Donbas

In 2014 Russia occupied and then annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea, and subsequently incited and later directly supported a rebellion in southeastern Ukraine, ostensibly in both cases to protect the Russian-speaking population. Although the Crimean gambit was quickly resolved in Russia’s favor, at least on the ground, the fighting in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine continues with huge loss of life, well over 2 million internally displaced persons, and massive damage to infrastructure. On the other hand, in the neighboring Kharkiv region, the population remained loyal to the Ukrainian state and Russian incitements to rebellion were rebuffed. This paper delves deeper into the mindset of the residents of eastern Ukraine to ascertain why support for Russia differs between these two regions. It focuses on the identities, memories, and narratives of the main groups of residents inhabiting the Donbas and Kharkiv Oblast. Then it compares the attributes of these main groups to each other to illustrate their differences. It characterizes the geopolitical narratives promoted by Russia to generate support for its actions to re-construct the Russian geostrategic area of control and demonstrates where and with which group these emotive narratives were successful and where and why they failed.     

Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine

The roots of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are to be found in two areas. The first is the revival of Tsarist imperial nationalist and White Russian émigré nationalist denials of the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Russian imperial nationalists believe the eastern Slavs constitute a pan Russian nation of Great Russians, Little Russians and White Russian branches of one Russian nation. The second is the cult of the Great Patriotic War and Joseph Stalin and the revival of Soviet era discourse on Ukrainian Nazis (i.e., nationalists). A Ukrainian nationalist in the Soviet Union and Vladimir Putin's Russia is any Ukrainian who seeks a future for his/her country outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Russian World and who upholds an ethnic Ukrainian (rather than a Little Russian) identity. The Russian World is the new core of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin's alternative to the EU's Eastern Partnership. In the contemporary domain, Ukrainian nationalists are Nazi's irrespective of their language preference or political beliefs and if they do not accept they are Little Russians. Putin's invasion goal of denazification is a genocidal goal to eradicate the ‘anti-Russia’ that has allegedly been nurtured by Ukrainian nationalists and the West.     

Nation-building from (below) the grassroots: Everyday nationalism in Ukraine's bomb shelters

Life has profoundly changed for Ukrainian citizens since the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine war. While millions have fled Ukraine as refugees and displaced persons, others have remained in their cities to take up arms, volunteer, and/or shield for safety. Despite the devastation at all levels of society caused by Russia's ongoing attacks, Ukrainians' expressions and practices of nationhood have endured and even evolved in light of their country's war-torn reality, as is especially evident in the country's bomb shelters. As hegemonic theorising in nationalism studies often centres on the territorial state and its institutions, this paper instead considers the experiences of ordinary individuals who hold important colloquial and vernacular knowledge. Specifically, the project examines the everyday lives of Ukrainians at—or below—the grassroots within bomb shelters in the heavily attacked cities of Chernihiv, Kyiv, and Kharkiv to reveal how Ukrainian nationalism has manifested and even been (re)produced amidst the conflict. In demonstrating that nationalism has served as both a sentiment and expression of self, the findings emphasise its significance in the current conflict as a motivating and unifying force in Ukrainians' everyday lives.     

Existential nationalism: Russia's war against Ukraine

‘If Russia stops fighting, there will be no war. If Ukraine stops fighting, there will be no Ukraine’ is the sentiment used by Ukrainian protesters mobilising against Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Such a sentiment signifies the stakes of a war where Ukraine is a democratic nation-state fighting for its right to exist against a Russian invasion. Meanwhile, Russia is fighting for a version of Ukraine that is subservient to Russia's idea of what Ukraine should be as a nation-state: under a Russian hegemon geopolitically, where Ukraine's national idea and interpretation of history can be vetted and vetoed by the Russian state. While nationalism scholarship equips us to study Russia's war against Ukraine through the lens of Russian ethnic nationalism and Ukrainian civic nationalism, the ethnic/civic dichotomy falls short of unpacking the more pernicious logics that pervade Russia's intentions and actions towards Ukraine (demilitarisation and de-Nazification). Instead, this article explores the logics of Russia's war and Ukraine's resistance through the concept of existential nationalism where existential nationalism is Russia's motivation to pursue war, whatever the costs, and Ukraine's motivation to fight with everything it has.     

Ukraine’s national integration before and after 2014. Shifting ‘East–West’ polarization line and strengthening political community

ABSTRACT

This article addresses the question of Ukraine’s societal polarization along the East-West line and the state of cohesion and endurance of its political community. In both political and academic discourses, Ukraine is often characterized as a country split between Western and Eastern regional and societal parts belonging to some wider geopolitical and cultural entities. Moreover, the recent upheavals in the life of the country – Euromaidan Revolution, illegal annexation of Crimea and Russian-Ukrainian war in Donbas – have actualized the allegations about Ukraine as a feeble state structure on the brink of disintegration and collapse. The findings in this study challenge both of these claims and it is argued that Ukraine is not a deeply divided or failed state. In practice, the East-West political polarization line is not clearly defined, but to the extent that it does surface in the political and electoral contests, this line has been moving from west to east since the early 1990s. The shifting of the polarization line implies that political and cultural identities in Ukraine are not fixed and, at the same time, reflects a strengthening cohesion of Ukraine’s political and cultural space. These findings are confirmed by the improved and ever-increasing convergence of Ukrainian society following the Euromaidan and Russian military aggression.     

Imagining Ukraine: Regional Differences and the Emergence of an Integrated State Identity, 1926–1994

Abstract. When Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, it did not possess an integrated Ukrainian state identity. Serious differences between those regions which entered the Russian empire and the Soviet Union before 1939 and those annexed since 1939 hampered the creation of a post-Soviet state identity. Just as the Ukrainian and Russian languages dominate in different regions in Ukraine, attitudes towards economic reform also vary by region. Russian-speaking areas are more conservative in regard to economic reforms than Ukrainian-speaking ones. But despite these regional differences, Ukraine is not on the verge of civil war. Two public opinion polls taken in 1991 and 1994 in Lviv (in Western Ukraine) and in Donetsk (in Eastern Ukraine) document that the citizens of Ukraine possess a common desire for peace and stability. This desire overshadows Ukraine's regional differences and will help create the new post-Soviet Ukrainian state identity.     

The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine as a Conflict of Identities: Where to Search for the Prospects of Reconciliation? A Reflection in the Light of the Theories of Paul Ricoeur and John Paul Lederach

Abstract

After the independence of Ukraine in 1991 there emerged or re-emerged four churches that derive their roots from ancient Kyiv Christianity. Those churches conflict with each other, the main cause of the split and tensions being the issue of cultural and social–political identities in the country. Such conflicting narrative identities have to be reconciled by the mutual recognition of their diversity when churches in Ukraine want to become a real force for transformation in society. Among the different models of the search for rapprochement in this article I refer to the theories of Paul Ricoeur and John Paul Lederach. According to the ethics of memory of Paul Ricoeur, traditional Ukrainian churches should abandon endless circles of melancholia about their losses and create new identities through the process of mourning. Because the tensions among traditional Christian denominations in Ukraine are not likely to be solved by institutional measures as history proves, churches should concentrate their efforts on working on social and relational platforms. Here I refer to the ethics of moral imagination of John Paul Lederach that envisions focusing the reconciliatory activities on locations of interaction between people that should finally contribute to the rapprochement.     

Ukraine after five years of conflict

ABSTRACT

The “Euromaidan” revolution, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and the proxy war in eastern Ukraine through Europe and the West’s relations with Russia into crisis in 2014. Five years later, while the domestic scene has stabilized to some extent and Russia’s control of Crimea seems unassailable, the war in eastern Ukraine drags on, the status of Crimea is contested, and Ukrainians roundly rejected the government that came to power after the revolution. The papers in this special issue of the journal consider several outstanding issues in Ukraine and in its relations with Russia and the West.     

State building and European integration in Ukraine

ABSTRACT

The article analyzes the impact on statebuilding as an aspect of Ukraine’s integration with the EU. The Euromaidan had a profound, yet hardly recognized, effect on EU-Ukraine relations, particularly in terms of the EU’s subsequent support of domestic reforms in Ukraine. Following the Euromaidan, the EU supported Ukraine’s aspirations to enter “economic integration and political association” by concluding an Association Agreement – an agreement which exceeded the capacity of the Ukrainian state to implement it. To increase this capacity, the EU has supported reform of public administration and has provided far-reaching assistance on capacity building in the government. This article posits that since 2014 European integration has become tantamount with (re)building the state structures in Ukraine. Therefore, the significance of European integration for Ukraine goes beyond the implementation of the Association Agreement and extends to root-and-branch reform of Ukrainian state structures.     

War,state and society in Ukraine

ABSTRACT

This collection of papers examines the impact of revolution and war on the development of the Ukrainian state and its sovereignty since 2014. Comparative literature on the state shows that aspects of statehood and sovereignty are shaped by war, and that domestic and international dimensions of statehood do not necessarily covary. The four papers in this collection examine these issues in detail. They show that Ukrainian statehood is strengthening internally and that the European Union is providing substantial external help in building the institutions of the Ukrainian state. However, the breakaway territories in Donetsk and Luhansk are also beginning to build some internal aspects of statehood, to go with the massive support they receive from Russia. These competing statehoods may make the impasse in eastern Ukraine even harder to solve.     

Asymmetrical international integration and Ukrainian national disunity

This article examines the impact of international integration on ethno-regional relations in multiethnic states. It argues that when ethno-regions in such a state have different geographic patterns of foreign ties, national unity suffers. “Asymmetrical international integration” (AII) hinders national cohesion by reducing the cultural similarity of the ethno-regions, sharpening their disputes over foreign policy, and intensifying their disparate identities. This argument is evaluated using the case of Ukraine. Analysis of a survey distributed to approximately 1000 elites in two key Ukrainian cities in 1994–95, as well as of other data, demonstrates that AII exists, is believed by Ukrainians to weaken national unity, and in fact does weaken national unity.     

Elements of a theory of Ukrainian ethno‐national identities

Despite winning independence in 1991, Ukraine remains an amorphous society with a weak sense of national identity. One possible explanation is ‘late’ nation‐creation, but in this article emphasis is laid on a continuing plurality of identity projects and the legacy of the ‘failed’ identity‐building projects of the past. Ukraine’s most important distinguishing feature – the existence of a substantial middle ground between Ukrainian and Russian identities – has considerable capacity to resist the logic of consolidating statehood.     

Digital humor against essentialization: Strategies of Baltic Russian-speaking social media users

This paper asks what happens to the civic identity of people who have hybrid, transnational identities during times of geo-political tensions when the interests of individuals' historical/symbolic homeland clash with those of individuals' country of current residence. We focus our inquiry on the digital spaces where much of identity work and exercise of citizenship takes place today. Inspired by the concepts of “digital acts of citizenship” (Isin & Ruppert, 2015) and “affective publics” (Papacharissi, 2015), we report the results of a case study that explores the performative, playful forms of digital citizenship enacted by members of the Russian-speaking audiences in the ex-Soviet, Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia. Against the backdrop of the on-going crisis in Ukraine, members of this group tend to use these forms of digital citizenship to resist the emotionally charged pre-election discourse of essentialization and securitization, and to de-politicize complex, painful issues of geo-politics and nation-building. The strategies utilized by them reveal that transnational audiences actively employ digital devices in order to maintain their hybrid identity, and civic autonomy and dignity and to “make peace” during times of geo-political conflict.     

Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules

The Russian military interventions in Ukraine, which have led to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and to the entrenchment of separatist enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, directly challenge the post‐Cold War European state system. Russia has consistently denied any wrongdoing or illegal military involvement and has presented its policies as a reaction to the repression of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. This article argues that it is important to examine and contest unfounded Russian legal and political claims used by Moscow to justify its interventions. The article proceeds to assess in detail three different explanations of the Russian operations in Ukraine: geopolitical competition and structural power (including the strategic benefits of seizing Crimea); identity and ideational factors; and the search for domestic political consolidation in Russia. These have all played a role, although the role of identity appears the least convincing in explaining the timing and scope of Russian encroachments on Ukrainian territorial integrity and the disruption of Ukrainian statehood.     

Ukraine’s unfinished natural gas and electricity reforms: one step forward,two steps back

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to explain Ukraine’s natural gas and electricity sector reforms, to outline the challenges facing these two sectors going forwards and to identify prospects for renewables. It makes three core arguments: First, the regulatory templates promoted by the European Union do not lend themselves to swift implementation. This is because the EU’s approach has been supply-driven, in the sense that it exports regulatory templates already developed within the EU; it is not, therefore, a suitable problem-solving measure for a crisis-stricken country with limited capacities and powerful vested interests. Second, there has been very slow progress made in innovative and creative shifts in Ukrainian energy transition policy, showing a lack of commitment to the transformation and modernisation of energy systems that should in principle be based on the promotion of new business models backed up by reformed political, regulatory and industrial infrastructures. Third, Ukrainian elites have been formally open to the flow of rules as evidenced by a number of agreements concluded between the EU and Ukraine. But, in practice, the pre-existing, deep-seated preferences of those elites have perpetuated the opaque gas trading system, resulting in them being very selective about the rules that they are actually prepared to adopt.     

All is quiet on the Russian front: ceasefires and the pursuit of legitimacy by self-proclaimed “republics” in Ukraine

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the pursuit of legitimacy by the self-proclaimed “republics” in Ukraine. While these “republics” are illegal, questions of their legitimacy are commonly discussed almost entirely through Weberian rule-conformity. We argue that this one-dimensional view of legitimacy overlooks the rich context of normative aspects of power relationships. If the occupied Donbas is to be reintegrated into Ukraine, it is essential to understand the perceived legitimation of the political institutions in this region. We use David Beetham’s framework of legitimacy—consisting of legality, morality, and consent—to analyze the “republics’” pursuit of legitimacy. Our analysis leads to the proposition that while the “republics” are illegal, their supporters’ normative perceptions of the right to govern have ascribed more validity to the fake “governments” than what would have been expected from a legal point of view. Additionally, while a ceasefire between the Russian proxies and Ukraine’s forces has reduced violence, it has also levied temporal effect on the legitimation of illegitimate institutions. Our treatment of the process of legitimation over time helps us identify potential strategies of delegitimization should DPR and LPR reincorporate with Ukraine-controlled territory. Without dismantling internal perceptions of institutional legitimacy among inhabitants of nongovernment-controlled areas, a re-integration could not be accomplished.     

Who identifies with the “Russian World”? Geopolitical attitudes in southeastern Ukraine,Crimea, Abkhazia,South Ossetia,and Transnistria

Abstract

The concept of the Russian world (Russkii mir) re-entered geopolitical discourse after the end of the Soviet Union. Though it has long historical roots, the practical definition and geopolitical framing of the term has been debated and refined in Russian political and cultural circles during the years of the Putin presidency. Having both linguistic-cultural and geopolitical meanings, the concept of the Russian world remains controversial, and outside Russia it is often associated with Russian foreign policy actions. Examination of official texts from Vladimir Putin and articles from three Russian newspapers indicate complicated and multifaceted views of the significance and usage of the Russkii mir concept. Surveys in December 2014 in five sites on the fringes of Russia – in southeastern Ukraine, Crimea, and three Russian-supported de facto states (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria) – show significant differences between the Ukrainian sample points and the other locations about whether respondents believe that they live in the Russian world. In Ukraine, nationality (Russian vs. Ukrainian) is aligned with the answers, while overall, attitudes toward Russian foreign policy, level of trust in the Russian president, trust of Vladimir Putin, and liking Russians are positively related to beliefs about living in the Russian world. In Ukraine, the negative reactions to geopolitical speech acts and suspicions about Russian government actions overlap with and confuse historical linguistic-cultural linkages with Russia, but in the other settings, close security and economic ties reinforce a sense of being in the Russian “world.”