‘Therefore They Shouldn’t Exist’: The Carter Administration,the ‘Israel Lobby’ and the Sinai Settlements

Abstract

The Israeli settlements in Sinai could have been a fatal obstacle to Egyptian–Israeli peace, but the Jimmy Carter administration overcame it. The established narrative of how Israel ceded the Sinai settlements focuses on the Camp David summit. However, the real battle over the fate of the settlements was fought previously. In February–April 1978, the Carter administration attempted to turn pro-Israeli supporters in the United States against the Israeli position, according to which the Sinai settlements should remain in place. The Menachem Begin government mobilized to counter that push but lost the battle. Contrary to his image as an awkward political operator, Carter won over supporters of Israel effectively. The case raises questions regarding the oft-mentioned role of the ‘Israel lobby’ in preventing peace.     

Iran as a ‘pariah’ nuclear aspirant

This article demonstrates that Iran conforms to Richard K. Betts' model of a ‘pariah’ nuclear aspirant, as its nuclear program is driven by a potent combination of security, normative and domestic political motivations. The regime's commitment to its nuclear program is influenced by Iran's long-standing sense of vulnerability to both regional and international adversaries, and an enduring sense of national humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, in parallel with a powerful belief in the superiority of Persian civilisation. This has resulted in the development of a narrative of ‘hyper-independence’ in Iran's foreign policy that simultaneously rejects political, cultural or economic dependence and emphasises ‘self-reliance’. The presumed security benefits that a nuclear weapons option provides are seen as ensuring Iranian ‘self-reliance’ and ‘independence’. This suggests that current strategies that focus exclusively on Iran's security motivations or on a heightened regime of sanctions are fundamentally flawed, as they fail to recognise the mutually reinforcing dynamic between Iran's security and normative/status-derived nuclear motivations.     

Pakistan,Uranium and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1970–1980

ABSTRACT

This article explores how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assisted Pakistan with exploring the front end of the fuel cycle. Drawing on new primary sources gathered from extensive fieldwork in Pakistan as well as the IAEA's archives, this article sheds new light on the changing direction and performance of the Pakistani nuclear program during the 1970s, focusing on the exploration of uranium. The analysis highlights the competing priorities faced by the IAEA at this time – specifically, how to handle the increasingly politicized balance between technology diffusion and non-proliferation – and how this affected the Agency's support for the nuclear program in Pakistan, as the program was secretly shifting away from nuclear energy toward a weapons project.     

Peace for Atoms. US Non-Proliferation Policy and the Romanian Role in the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969–1971

ABSTRACT

By 1970, the United States had undergone a remarkable volte-face on dealing with People's Republic of China as a nuclear weapon state, from outspoken opposition to political recognition. Aware of the importance of co-opting Beijing in the emerging multipolar order, President Richard Nixon sought any possible opening to the Chinese leadership. One secret backchannel passed through Bucharest, whom Washington rewarded with sensitive atomic assistance for its good offices. If in the mid-1960s dealing with China was regarded as detrimental to the cause of non-proliferation, by the early 1970s, the United States relaxed its nuclear exports policy towards useful adversaries, such as Romania, all in pursuit of geopolitical interests.     

Securitizing Development Assistance: India’s Nuclear Program and Canadian Societal Views on Nuclear Reactor Exports, 1974–1978

This article examines an often overlooked but nevertheless important element of Canada’s Cold War-era development assistance policies—the export of nuclear reactors to the developing world. In particular, the focus is on societal responses to India’s explosion of an underground nuclear device in May 1974, an accomplishment made possible in part through the export of Canada’s nuclear expertise, technology, and material. India’s entrance into the nuclear club sparked an intense and wide-ranging debate in Canadian society concerning the nature of Canada’s development and foreign policies, and more specifically, the types of policies that would enable the country to fulfill its main international purpose as a middle power—contributing to conditions of international peace and security. The protracted debate which involved not only politicians but many civil society actors revealed stark divisions among Canadians centered on the extent to which nuclear reactor exports served Canadian national interests.     

The evolution of early Egyptian civilization: Issues and evidence

Egypt's cultural evolution between 4000 and 2000 B.C. is reviewed in and related to methodological and theoretical issues in contemporary archaeology. Recent archaeological evidence from the Nile Delta is analyzed in the context of the cultural integration of the Nile Valley and Delta after about 3200 B.C.     

Building détente in Europe? East–West trade and the beginnings of Romania's nuclear programme, 1964–70

This article examines the connection between détente in Europe and East–West nuclear technology transfers through the lens of Romania's co-operation policy in the field of atomic energy in the 1960s. It argues that until 1967 the bourgeoning relations between Western Europe and Romania did not stem from a desire to overcome the artificial division of Europe, but rather from the pursuit of unilateral economic benefits. This situation worked to the advantage of the Romanians, who acquired an important nuclear research reactor from the British by playing West European countries against one another. Afterwards, in order to boost their competitiveness, the West Europeans started pooling their nuclear industries together, although traditional rivalries such as the Anglo-French competition endured. Despite these efforts to achieve closer integration, the West Europeans failed to sell a nuclear power plant to Romania because of internal problems within their nuclear–industrial complexes, and because of Soviet meddling in the internal affairs of its satellites. This research adds to our understanding of Romania's détente policy during the 1960s, while also shedding light on the development of East–West relations in the field of atomic energy.     

钚-239的生产与苏联核计划

苏联核计划中使用的核裂变材料主要有钚-239和铀-235,其中钚-239的生产率先取得成功,1949年8月29日苏联试爆的第一颗原子弹РДС-1所使用的核裂变材料便是钚-239。1949年之前,钚-239的生产具有试验性特征,1949年之后,钚-239进入了工业规模化的生产阶段。在钚-239的工业生产阶段,反应堆技术、放射化学技术和化学冶金技术都不断完善,实现了产能提高、成本下降、安全生产等目标,形成了完善的钚工业综合体,不仅为俄罗斯联邦留下了丰厚的钚产品,还为其钚-239的生产奠定了坚实基础。     

论埃及托勒密王朝王权与神权的关系

托勒密王朝是古代埃及史上一个重要历史时期。法老埃及的王权与神权之间从来就不是和谐统一的,始终存在矛盾和斗争。但是,在托勒密王朝,二者的关系发生了重大变化,王权有效地控制了神权。这主要是因为托勒密王朝的国王借鉴了法老埃及的经验,采取了有利于王权的政治、经济政策,等级和阶级关系决定了宗教祭司集团不可能干涉世俗政权,文化背景也使托勒密国王从意识深处拒绝给予宗教和祭司各种权力。托勒密王朝王权与神权之间是赤裸裸的利用与被利用的关系,这也正是托勒密王朝逐渐失去本土埃及人支持的重要原因之一。     

以色列哈西德派初探

哈西德派是18世纪末产生于东欧的一支犹太民间教派。二战后,部分在纳粹大屠杀中劫后余生的哈西德信徒在犹太人的故地巴勒斯坦进行社团重建。哈西德派不是犹太复国主义者,其对该运动的态度经历了从强烈反对到逐步接受的过程。自视为犹太传统的真正捍卫者、拥有独立教育体系的哈西德派在以色列社会是一个相对隔离和孤立的宗教文化群体。为塑造以色列国家的犹太性和确保自身在宗教事务上的发言权,哈西德派有节制地参与以色列的政治生活,并形成政坛上一支相对稳定的力量。哈西德派的服兵役豁免权成为其与世俗犹太人矛盾与冲突的焦点。经济贫困和与主流社会的疏离已成为当前制约以色列哈西德派健康、正常发展的两大难题。     

"希腊化"还是"埃及化"——托勒密埃及希腊移民的文化地位研究

以托勒密埃及的希腊移民为考察对象．从婚姻、语育、宗教几个文化层面来探究托勒密埃及的希腊移民文化地位的变迁．对人们重新认识希腊化问题具有重要意义。希腊移民在托勒密王朝早期还能保留文化传统,到了公元前三世纪末以后。希腊移民认同和吸纳了埃及的一些文化因素,出现了“埃及化”的倾向．尤其是在宗教信仰方面。