Who identifies with the “Russian World”? Geopolitical attitudes in southeastern Ukraine,Crimea, Abkhazia,South Ossetia,and Transnistria

Abstract

The concept of the Russian world (Russkii mir) re-entered geopolitical discourse after the end of the Soviet Union. Though it has long historical roots, the practical definition and geopolitical framing of the term has been debated and refined in Russian political and cultural circles during the years of the Putin presidency. Having both linguistic-cultural and geopolitical meanings, the concept of the Russian world remains controversial, and outside Russia it is often associated with Russian foreign policy actions. Examination of official texts from Vladimir Putin and articles from three Russian newspapers indicate complicated and multifaceted views of the significance and usage of the Russkii mir concept. Surveys in December 2014 in five sites on the fringes of Russia – in southeastern Ukraine, Crimea, and three Russian-supported de facto states (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria) – show significant differences between the Ukrainian sample points and the other locations about whether respondents believe that they live in the Russian world. In Ukraine, nationality (Russian vs. Ukrainian) is aligned with the answers, while overall, attitudes toward Russian foreign policy, level of trust in the Russian president, trust of Vladimir Putin, and liking Russians are positively related to beliefs about living in the Russian world. In Ukraine, the negative reactions to geopolitical speech acts and suspicions about Russian government actions overlap with and confuse historical linguistic-cultural linkages with Russia, but in the other settings, close security and economic ties reinforce a sense of being in the Russian “world.”     

Russian-occupied Crimea and the state of exception: repression,persecution, and human rights violations

ABSTRACT

Since annexing Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014, Russian authorities there have introduced harsh repressive measures to silence opposition to the ongoing occupation, chiefly targeting the indigenous Crimean Tatars and others pro-Ukrainian individuals. From the legally subversive methods it employed to orchestrate the annexation to the rhetoric of anti-extremism with which it has continually justified its occupation, the Kremlin has inaugurated a new “state of exception” in Crimea, invoking the prerogative to circumvent normative legal and juridical procedures in response to a perceived emergency. While Crimea’s state of exception resembles those initiated elsewhere by some Western states and Russia itself as part of the global War on Terror, the state of exception has provided the pretext for a particularly severe degree of repression, persecution, and human rights violations in occupied Crimea. In conjunction with the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, this article discusses the theoretical groundings of the state of exception, its broader applications within the Russian Federation, and its troubling repercussions for residents of Crimea. Casting the Kremlin’s actions as belonging to a state of exception helps draw attention to its alarming human rights violations, and may bolster resistance to the creeping normalization of the Russian occupation of Crimea.     

Ukraine after five years of conflict

ABSTRACT

The “Euromaidan” revolution, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and the proxy war in eastern Ukraine through Europe and the West’s relations with Russia into crisis in 2014. Five years later, while the domestic scene has stabilized to some extent and Russia’s control of Crimea seems unassailable, the war in eastern Ukraine drags on, the status of Crimea is contested, and Ukrainians roundly rejected the government that came to power after the revolution. The papers in this special issue of the journal consider several outstanding issues in Ukraine and in its relations with Russia and the West.     

Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules

The Russian military interventions in Ukraine, which have led to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and to the entrenchment of separatist enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, directly challenge the post‐Cold War European state system. Russia has consistently denied any wrongdoing or illegal military involvement and has presented its policies as a reaction to the repression of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. This article argues that it is important to examine and contest unfounded Russian legal and political claims used by Moscow to justify its interventions. The article proceeds to assess in detail three different explanations of the Russian operations in Ukraine: geopolitical competition and structural power (including the strategic benefits of seizing Crimea); identity and ideational factors; and the search for domestic political consolidation in Russia. These have all played a role, although the role of identity appears the least convincing in explaining the timing and scope of Russian encroachments on Ukrainian territorial integrity and the disruption of Ukrainian statehood.     

The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis

Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that his country's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was partly in response to NATO enlargement. NATO leaders counter that eastern enlargement is not a cause of the Ukraine crisis, and they argue that enlargement does not threaten Russia, but rather it creates stability for all of Europe. This article examines the history of NATO–Russian tensions over enlargement, considers how NATO's enlargement policy factored into the Ukraine crisis, and reviews options for the future of enlargement. Drawing on diplomatic history and geopolitical theory, the article explains Russia's persistent hostility towards NATO's policy of eastward expansion and highlights NATO's failure to convert Russia to its liberal world‐view. The alliance's norm‐driven enlargement policy has hindered the creation of an enduring NATO–Russia cooperative relationship and helped fuel the outbreak of conflict in Georgia and Ukraine. In light of this, NATO should alter its current enlargement policy by infusing it with geopolitical rationales. This means downgrading the transformative and democratization elements of enlargement and, instead, focusing on how candidate countries add to NATO capabilities and impact overall alliance security. A geopolitically‐driven enlargement policy would prioritize countries in the Balkan and Scandinavian regions for membership and openly exclude Georgia and Ukraine from membership. Ultimately, this policy would have the effect of strengthening NATO while giving it more flexibility in dealing with Russia.     

The triumph of Russian national security policy? Russia’s rapid rebound

Russia’s return to prominence in international affairs has been in many respects surprising. Russia’s easy seizure of Crimea, its role in Syria and its ambitious pivot eastward have emboldened Moscow at a time of crisis for the liberal order. This article characterises Russian national security policy as a deliberate ‘rebound’ strategy, designed to deliver a rapid return to power and status. The author defines rebounding in respect to four characteristics: a relatively short timeline for the rebounding state to achieve its goals; a strategic (re-)emphasis on territory and hard power; the construction of alternative networks of influence via institutions; and active efforts to undermine existing normative and legal orthodoxies. The author then assesses these in terms of specific Russian national security policy objectives, including in the key domain of information operations. The article concludes that Vladimir Putin has skilfully employed conventional material capabilities and geopolitics, combined with the exploitation of contemporary information networks for instrumental purposes. Paradoxically, though, those same factors will constrain Russian national security objectives in the future.     

Soft power,Russia and the former Soviet states: a case study of Russian language and education in Armenia*

Abstract

As in human relations, attraction can be an influential force in international relations. A well-known tool in Western countries, in Russia ‘soft power’ has come into play mainly under Putin’s presidency in the 2000s. This paper focuses on language and education as sources generating ‘soft power’. It looks first on the institutional framework progressively established to attract and integrate culturally the former Soviet space. Second, it studies the evolution of the Russian language and education in Armenia. The findings suggest that even if the previous decline in the usage of Russian has been reversed, the monopoly once enjoyed by this language seems to be over. Russian is promoted in a multicultural environment – alongside English, French, German or Chinese – which reflects the new geopolitical reality. Multicultural landscape characterises also the Armenian higher education system.     

Illiberal geographies: popular geopolitics and Russian biopolitical regionalism

In this article, we focus on how a variety of illiberal discourses construct a scene for new geopolitical and geocultural imageries of the post-Soviet space, Europe, and Eurasia. Academically, our approach falls into disciplinary niches known as popular geopolitics (when it comes to territories) and biopolitics (when it comes to people). More specifically, we try to see how Russian artistic personalities and public intellectuals contribute to the re-imagination of the post-Soviet space along the lines of Russian illiberal – and largely anti-Western – thinking. Among our protagonists are Valery Gergiev, Iosif Kobzon, Yulia Chicherina, Gleb Kornilov, Ivan Okhlobystin, and Zakhar Prilepin. All of them are important cultural figures who produce cultural justifications for imperial foreign policy in general, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea and de facto occupation of Donbas in particular. Our main argument is that the illiberal imagery of the post-Soviet world drastically reduces the validity of the major pillars of international society, such as state territorial borders, national jurisdictions, citizenship, and legal obligations and commitments. Instead of the rule of law Russian performative illiberalism puts a premium on a series of loosely defined yet foundational for this type of imagery concepts such as patriotism, national spirit and pride, and “natural,” “organic” bonds defining the sense of belonging to Russia as a trans-border political community.     

Cartoon epic heroes in indigenous Siberian revival: The meaning of ethnicity in Putin's Russia (Respond to this article at https://www.therai.org.uk/publications/anthropology-today/debate)

This article outlines a motivation for the Russian Federation's incursion into the Crimea, which concerns the Putin administration's relationship with Russia's citizens, rather than the outside world. I use a case study from Siberia – the Sakha people's revival of their national epic, the Olongkho – to explore the possibility that Putin's behaviour during the Ukrainian crisis serves to legitimate his authority within Russia, by appealing to conceptions of ethnicity that have their roots in Soviet‐era social engineering. Rather than deducing the Putin administration's motives from the events and relationships they immediately concern, I explore motivations emerging from the configuration of values, perceptions, and conventions that shapes and reproduces social difference in Russia. The Sakha Olongkho revival shows how the perceptions of ethnicity fostered during the Soviet era have become powerful indexes of morality and authority. Individual Sakha citizens now demonstrate their identities and values through adopting a stance towards a reified conception of Sakha ethnicity expressed in their choices of recreation, fashion and consumption. Sakha ethnicity has become integrated into the process whereby hierarchical social groupings emerge within Sakha society according to their avowal of specific tastes and norms. The relatively small size of the Sakha population – which is nevertheless the dominant ethnic group in their republic, Sakha (Yakutia) – enables us to see trends affecting the rest of Russia in microcosm. Thus, I suggest that former Soviet ethnicity has become so closely woven into Russia's morality that Putin's invasions of foreign states, in the name of the ethnic Russian community, bolster his claim to be a moral person and a legitimate and authoritative national leader.     

Islamic radicalization in Russia: an assessment

To what extent does Russia face the threat of Islamic radicalization? This article provides an assessment of the nature and severity of the threat and its changing dynamics from the Yeltsin to the Putin periods in post‐Soviet Russia. It argues that, contrary to many accounts, the threat was at its greatest during the late 1990s and in the Yeltsin period. Moreover, the Putin administration adopted a series of policies that have had some significant successes in stemming the flow of Islamic radicalism within Russia. This has involved a policy mix, including repression and coercion, most notably in the military campaign in Chechnya; diplomatic efforts in the Middle East and broader Muslim world to improve Russia's image; pro‐active domestic policies to co‐opt and support moderate Russian Muslim leaders and their communities; and attempts to construct a national identity and ideology which supports the multi‐confessional and multinational nature of the Russian state and recognizes the Muslim contribution to Russian statehood and nationality. Although these policies have had their successes, there are also significant limitations, the most notable of which is the failure to address the problems of poor governance in the North Caucasus, which has sustained the Islamist insurgency in the region. The failure to develop an intermediary Muslim civil society in Russia more generally also contributes to the continuing appeal of Islamist radicalism, particularly among younger Russian Muslims.     

Clearing the Fog of War: public versus official sources and geopolitical storylines in the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Abstract

Military action undertaken by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2014 has had enormous geopolitical ramifications. This resulted in what is almost certainly a permanent change in sovereign territory, with the former gaining and the latter losing the strategic Crimean peninsula. But Russia’s moves also set in motion a violent conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Although the United States and the NATO alliance have advocated a geopolitical storyline that attributes blame for this to Russia, close scrutiny of the evidence they have adduced in this regard fails to establish this culpability conclusively. However, by utilizing data collected and analyzed in the public realm, it is possible to determine with more certainty that, in certain places and at given times, Russia was indeed the aggressor. The rapidly increasing amount of public-sourced information globally and the growing sophistication of analytical methods by non-governmental groups presages more complete understanding of such conflicts without reliance on official information.     

A tale of two regions: geopolitics,identities, narratives,and conflict in Kharkiv and the Donbas

In 2014 Russia occupied and then annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea, and subsequently incited and later directly supported a rebellion in southeastern Ukraine, ostensibly in both cases to protect the Russian-speaking population. Although the Crimean gambit was quickly resolved in Russia’s favor, at least on the ground, the fighting in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine continues with huge loss of life, well over 2 million internally displaced persons, and massive damage to infrastructure. On the other hand, in the neighboring Kharkiv region, the population remained loyal to the Ukrainian state and Russian incitements to rebellion were rebuffed. This paper delves deeper into the mindset of the residents of eastern Ukraine to ascertain why support for Russia differs between these two regions. It focuses on the identities, memories, and narratives of the main groups of residents inhabiting the Donbas and Kharkiv Oblast. Then it compares the attributes of these main groups to each other to illustrate their differences. It characterizes the geopolitical narratives promoted by Russia to generate support for its actions to re-construct the Russian geostrategic area of control and demonstrates where and with which group these emotive narratives were successful and where and why they failed.     

The Budapest Memorandum and Russia's intervention in Ukraine

Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States extended security assurances to Ukraine in December 1994 in an agreement that became known as the Budapest Memorandum. This agreement was part of a package of arrangements whereby Ukraine transferred the Soviet‐made nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia and acceded to the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non‐nuclear weapon state (NNWS). Russia's violations of the Budapest Memorandum, notably its annexation of Crimea, could have far‐reaching implications for nuclear non‐proliferation and disarmament because of the questions that Russia's behaviour has raised about the reliability of major‐power security assurances for NNWS parties to the NPT. Doubts about the reliability of such assurances could create incentives to initiate, retain or accelerate national nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, because the Budapest Memorandum included restatements of UN Charter provisions and principles articulated in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co‐operation in Europe, Russia's disregard for the Budapest Memorandum has raised fundamental questions about the future of international order. The Russians have demonstrated that, despite economic sanctions and international condemnation, they are prepared to disregard longstanding legal and political norms, including those expressed in the Budapest Memorandum, in pursuit of strategic and economic advantages and the fulfilment of national identity goals. Unless Russia reverses its dangerous course, the fate of the Budapest Memorandum may in retrospect stand out as a landmark in the breakdown of international order.     

An Enlightened path towards conservatism: critical junctures and changing elite perceptions in early nineteenth-century Russia

This article explores the historical roots of Russian conservatism by analyzing the evolution of Russia’s Westernized, Enlightenment-minded nobility to a conservative segment of Russian society in the early nineteenth century. The events of 1789 and 1812 were critical junctures that made the Russian nobility painfully aware of their own deep level of Westernization. The article first describes the reverberations of the French Revolution among the Russian elite. It also discusses the internal and external scrutiny of Russia’s relations with France under Napoleon, which made Russian conservatism a contingency. It then describes the evolution between 1789 and 1812 of a corpus of conservative ideas ranging from traditionalism to ardent patriotism and xenophobia. Napoleon’s 1812 campaign against Russia overshadowed the generational gap and diverging political and literary preferences among the elite. The reaction to it illustrates the intrinsic duality of the Russian elite: culturally Westernized, yet politically conservative. Yet the influence of several Western defenders of the ancien régime on Russia’s conservatives shows that the essentially conservative Russian identity as propagated by Putin these days originally might have been more pan-European than purely Russian.     

‘New Cold War’ or twenty years’ crisis? Russia and international politics

President Vladimir Putin's foreign policy can be characterized as a ‘new realism’, repudiating some of the exaggerated ambitions of Yevgeny Primakov's tenure as foreign minister in the late 1990s while asserting Russia's distinctive identity in world politics. Rather than acting as a classic ‘balancing’ power prescribed by classic realist theory as the response to the hegemonic power of a single state, Russia under Putin tended to ‘bandwagon’ and the country has been a vigorous ‘joiner’. Putin insisted that Russia retains its ‘autonomy’ in international politics while moving away from earlier ideas that Russia could constitute the kernel of an alternative power bloc. However, the opportunity to integrate Russia into the hegemonic international order may have been missed because of what is seen in Moscow as the resolute hostility of groups in the West who continue to pursue Cold War aims of isolating and containing Russia. The Cold War was transcended in an asymmetrical manner, and this has given rise to four major failures: political, strategic, intellectual and cultural. The world faces the danger of the onset of a new era of great power bloc politics, thus restoring a Cold War structure to the international system. With none of the major strategic issues facing the international community at the end of the Cold War yet resolved, we may be facing a new twenty years’ crisis.     

The political geographies of religious sites in Moscow’s neighborhoods

Abstract

This paper addresses the spatial politics of Russia’s increased religiosity in Moscow. It analyzes the rights of minority Muslim communities within the context of increased political support for expressions of Russian Orthodoxy in Moscow’s public space. Moscow’s Russian Orthodox and Muslim religious leaders claim that their communities have a lack of religious infrastructure, with one church per 35,000 residents and one mosque per three million residents, respectively. The Russian Orthodox Church has been more successful than Muslim organizations at expanding their presence in Moscow’s neighborhoods. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, religious spaces are examined as sites of dissent as well as participatory, active citizenship at three different sites in Moscow. Protests over Russian Orthodox Church construction in one neighborhood are contrasted with the protests over mosque construction in two neighborhoods. This paper provides insights into how civil society and religious groups have increased their public presence in Moscow and shows the unequal access that different groups have to public space in that city.     

Russia's economic agenda to 2020

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union the role of Russia in international relations has been in flux—a reflection of its changing capacities, positions and interests. To a certain extent, this variability has been defined by the Russian economy, which in the 1990s passed through a stage of deep structural transformation and severe financial crisis, but which then benefited from a period of fast and mainly stable economic growth in the first years of the twenty‐first century. Now, the serious economic decline as a result of the global crisis of 2008–2009 has been replaced by an unstable and uncertain recovery. In the 2000s a very specific political regime of personalized power under Vladimir Putin—set to be back as president in 2012—was established in Russia. During his next term Putin will face the most serious challenges to Russia's economic policy yet. According to some scenarios, these challenges could significantly destabilize the country's politics and economy. Russia is facing a demographic trap; the ageing of the population is increasing the pension burden on the budget, while the shrinking labour force will surely become an obstacle to growth. The dependence of the budget and balance of payments on the price of oil has grown so great that even price stabilization becomes a threat to macroeconomic stability. The poor quality of the investment climate leads to falling private investment which, in turn, hinders the much‐vaunted modernization of the economy. If combined, these problems will lead to the widening of the gap in technology and living standards between Russia and developed countries. Elimination of political competition and the impossibility of replacing political leaders through elections have led to widespread corruption and abuses, crony capitalism, and the complete undermining of the independence of the courts and law enforcement which further complicates the search for adequate responses to the mounting economic challenges. As there are no reasons to believe that Vladimir Putin is going to reform the country's current political system, the gradual accumulation of economic problems could well become the main threat to his presidency as Russia heads towards 2020.     

巨文岛事件中的英国外交活动

巨文岛事件是近代东北亚国际关系史上的一个热点问题。从地缘政治观察,该事件是以朝鲜为地理中心的区域政治参与势力在当时的东亚权力格局下进行的一场国际政治博弈;从全球政治观察,是英俄两国在全球争夺势力范围矛盾激化背景下,在东亚地区的区域历史反映。作为事件主角的英帝国,在事件过程中运用“以中国为轴”的外交策略周旋于区域势力的外交压力之中,最后“借力中国”,用巨文岛这枚政治棋子与俄国达成局外妥协,成功地实现了遏制俄国海军进驻朝鲜的东亚战略目标。而中国则审时度势,在险恶的局势中谨慎的开展外交活动,有力地利用了局势施压俄国,实现了维护其在朝鲜半岛宗主权的初衷。     

Factors underlying inflation in Russia 2000–2015

Abstract

This paper examines the problem of continuing inflation in Russia in the period from 2000 to 2015. Although factors causing high inflation changed during this period, such factors as money supply, wages, gas and electricity prices, and ruble exchange rate have been essential factors when analyzing inflation in Russia. This paper focuses on gas and electricity prices that represent state-regulated prices in natural monopoly sectors and that have been factors of price increases specific to Russia. They have been raised by the state in order to narrow the gap between their domestic and international prices. It is suggested that there was a turnaround in 2008 when the role of each inflation factor changed significantly. Concerning the rebound of inflation rate since 2014, the overwhelming influence of depreciation of the ruble is indicated. Institutional factors such as the monopolistic structure of the economy that have kept the inflation rate high in Russia are also suggested.     

Russian geopolitical culture and public opinion: the masks of Proteus revisited

In this paper, we build on the work of Graham Smith, who was developing a critical geopolitics of Russia in his posthumous paper of 1999, published in this journal. Like Smith, we link the evolving geopolitical orientations of Russia to the search for a post-Soviet identity amongst its citizens and its political leadership. While Smith saw a core concept in Russian geopolitics having Protean masks, it is the leadership of the Russian state, specifically President Putin, who has successfully adopted a Protean strategy to appeal to the disparate elements of the Russian geopolitical spectrum. Based on a nationwide survey in spring 2002, we identify six clusters in Russian public opinion by socio-demographic characteristics and we connect each cluster to the main geopolitical orientations competing in contemporary Russia, including democratic statism and the increasingly marginalized Eurasianism that formed the core subject of Smith's paper.