The Commonwealth and the Cold War,Neutralism, and Non-Alignment

In the Cold War era, the Commonwealth represented a global sub-system which both permitted and enabled multiple identities. Between 1949 and 1990, as a direct product of British decolonisation, the Commonwealth came to include forty-nine members of varying size with very different agenda and developmental needs to those larger members from the global ‘North’. Its heterogeneous membership included: NATO countries; ANZUS; the Non-Aligned Movement; the OAU; CARICOM; and the Organisation of East Caribbean States. As a ‘unique sovereign regime’, the Commonwealth defied ideological typecasting. It possessed organisational structure and bureaucratic support; it combined economic, financial, technical, and scientific association, and privileged the role of diplomacy through the latitude permitted to its Secretary-General. The Commonwealth's two sustained ‘grand strategies’ were the pursuit of racial justice (in Rhodesia, South West Africa/South Africa) and social justice through the promotion of development, focusing on the principal preoccupations of newly independent states and their nation/state-building projects. These intersected with, but were by no means defined by, the Cold War, and represented a collaboration of West/South, rather than the confrontation of East/West.     

‘This Community Which Nobody Can Define’: Meanings of Commonwealth in the Late 1940s and 1950s

Assessments of early postwar understandings of the power and potential of the Commonwealth have suggested the body either failed to shield the British public from a sense of national decline or that it comforted them that there was no need to worry about decolonisation because the organisation enabled the maintenance of British authority by other means. However, historians and political scientists who provided public comment on the present and future of the body in the late 1940s and 1950s complicate such assessments, wracked as they were by a profound uncertainty over what the Commonwealth could achieve. Their sense of uncertainty was not derived from a pessimistic reading of the tangible events and processes of the period that we might today assume blunted commentators’ faith in Commonwealth cohesion, such as Britain’s relationship with Europe, neutralism, apartheid, or even Suez. Instead, uncertainty over the Commonwealth’s capacity to realise a latent potential supposedly rooted in its members’ willingness to work together was rooted in something more elemental, namely sustained uncertainty regarding the nature of the body’s connections and functions. The body was judged an abstraction, a nascent and unparalleled experiment whose bonds were extensive yet impossible to measure. Its perceived opacity rendered it neither a cause for concern nor a salve to a wounded British morale.     

By invitation only: Lord Mountbatten,Prince Philip,and the attempt to create a Commonwealth ‘Bilderberg group’, 1964–66

This article examines the attempt between 1964 and 1966 to create new conference for the Commonwealth modelled on the secretive Euro-American Bilderberg group, and considers the roles of Earl Mountbatten of Burma and the Duke of Edinburgh in the venture. This was the only major initiative on the structure of the Commonwealth to originate with the government of Harold Wilson during its first term in office. Consideration of the scheme was suspended as a result of Rhodesian UDI and was never reopened. Although short-lived, the Bilderberg initiative offers important insights into a number of issues. It suggests that the original Bilderberg group had assumed a considerable importance to senior figures in the Labour Party by 1964. It also illustrates the distinct ambivalence with which members of the British elite viewed the changing nature of the Commonwealth, and points to a desire among some of them to recreate the atmosphere of a more exclusive ‘club’. Above all it sheds light upon the highly idiosyncratic negotiating style of Lord Mountbatten, and suggests a desire on the part of Prince Philip to establish for himself a fully independent role within the Commonwealth.     

‘Get into a Crack Force and earn £20 a Month and all found…’: The Influence of the Palestine Police upon Colonial Policing 1922–19481

The development of a ‘colonial’ police model has typically been linked to the Irish Constabularies. Little consideration has been given to the influences of the Palestine Police. The British section of the Palestine Gendarmerie was created in 1920 with the recruitment of former members of the Royal Irish Constabulary and Black and Tans. Meanwhile training for colonial police officers continued in Northern Ireland until 1932. At this point it was the Palestine Police that provided the recruiting and training ground for senior colonial policemen until its disbandment in 1948. Thereafter, its ‘colonial’ policing practices and traditions were carried throughout the British Empire and Commonwealth by its former members.     

Campaigning Against Apartheid: The Rise,Fall and Legacies of the South Africa United Front 1960–1962

ABSTRACT

The international struggle against apartheid that emerged during the second half of the twentieth century made the system of legalised racial oppression in South Africa one of the world’s great moral causes. Looking back at the anti-apartheid struggle, a defining characteristic was the scope of the worldwide efforts to condemn, co-ordinate, and isolate the country. In March 1961, the international campaign against apartheid achieved its first major success when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd chose to withdraw South Africa from the Commonwealth following vocal protests at the Heads of State Summit held in London. As a consequence, it appeared albeit briefly, that external pressure would effectively serve as a catalyst for achieving far-reaching and immediate political change in South Africa. The global campaign, centred on South Africa remaining in the Commonwealth, was the first of its kind launched by South Africa’s national liberation movements, and signalled the beginning of thirty years of continued protest and lobbying. The contributions from one organisation that had a role in launching and co-ordinating this particular transnational campaign, the South Africa United Front (SAUF), an alliance of liberation groups, have been largely forgotten. Leading members of the SAUF claimed the organisation had a key part in South Africa’s subsequent exit from the Commonwealth, and the purpose of this article is to explore the validity of such assertions, as well as the role and impact it had in generating a groundswell of opposition to apartheid in the early 1960s. Although the SAUF’s demands for South Africa to leave the Commonwealth were ultimately fulfilled, the documentary evidence suggests that its campaigning activities and impact were not a decisive factor; however the long-term significance of the SAUF, and the position it had in the rise of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) has not been fully recognised. As such, the events around the campaign for South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth act as a microcosm of developments that would define the international struggle against apartheid.     

To Swear or Not to Swear?: Britain,Southeast Asia and the Attempt to Reform the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 1964–1971

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to explore the British government’s perception of the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as a method of strengthening cohesion amongst the Commonwealth community, and in particular delves into the constitutional and diplomatic challenges that the British government faced in its attempt to utilise the Judicial Committee in order to maintain close ties with its former Southeast Asian colonies in the 1960s. Suggestions were made by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Privy Council Office from the mid-1960s that newly-independent republics such as Singapore and Malaysia should be allowed to send its citizens to London as members of the Judicial Committee in order to dilute the prejudice against the Committee as a remnant of colonial rule. However, the proposals were rejected by the Lord Chancellor’s Office on the grounds that Asian judges were of insufficient calibre to sit as members of the Judicial Committee, and that citizens of republics were unable to swear an oath of loyalty to the British monarch as was required for all Privy Counsellors. The Privy Council Office were of the opinion that a new system could be introduced whereby the Judicial Committee member would not have to be a fully-fledged Privy Counsellor and therefore would not have to swear the oath, while the Commonwealth Secretariat put forward its argument that Asian judges were good enough to ensure standards of the Judicial Committee would not be lowered. However, the Lord Chancellor’s Office argued that such non-Privy Counsellors would only be ‘second-class’ constituents of the Judicial Committee whose rulings would be unacceptable to countries such as Australia and instead proposed the creation of a Commonwealth Court of Appeal which the Foreign Office deemed unrealistic. In the end, no judges from the Asian republics were allowed sit on the Judicial Committee, resulting in Malaysia and Singapore abolishing their appeals to the Judicial Committee in 1984 and 1994 respectively.     

Are you willing to be made nothing? Is Commonwealth reform possible?

A new round of Commonwealth reform proposals commenced at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting of 2009. An ensuing report, titled A Commonwealth of the people: time for urgent reform, contained a long list of proposals that eventually resulted in 2013 in the adoption of the Commonwealth Charter. Many classic international organizations are in need of reform, but this is, of course, challenging. This new Commonwealth reform process will not lead to satisfying changes and will not make it a more relevant actor in global governance. The year 2015 marks the Commonwealth Secretariat's first half‐century. We take this symbolic marker to push for a forward‐looking exercise, arguing that because the true nature of the Commonwealth is often misunderstood, a better understanding of the organization is essential before embarking on any successful change‐management project. In the article we identify four different kinds of Commonwealth: three of a ‘formal’ nature (the official, bureaucratic and the people's Commonwealth) and a fourth ‘informal’ one (Commonwealth Plus). By describing the potential of these four different kinds of Commonwealth, we can anticipate better the challenges with which the Commonwealth network is faced, both internal (including its mandate, its British imperial past and dominance, the organization's leadership and its membership) and external (other international organizations, other Commonwealths, rivalry with regional organizations and the rise of global policy networks). Consequently, this should lead to a better and more sustainable debate about the Commonwealth's future role in global governance.     

Written Differently: A Survey of Commonwealth Constitutional History in the Age of Decolonisation

ABSTRACT

This article provides a survey and definition of the field of Commonwealth constitutional history since 1918, especially during and after global decolonisation. It asks what is Commonwealth constitutional history and how it differs from its English and Imperial counterparts. The article puts forward a working definition of Commonwealth constitutional history and introduces key and diverse writers who illustrate the range and potential of this history. The article provides an historiography and survey of constitutional history in the Pre-Commonwealth and Post-war Commonwealth periods while also assessing the opportunities of Post-British Commonwealth constitutional history. The objective of this article is to show how Commonwealth constitutional history can contribute to the historical study of state power and to see its worth to other disciplines and fields of history. Commonwealth constitutional history is a necessity to examine the politics, power and consequences of the British empire during the long age of decolonisation.     

British Policy Towards Military Cooperation with the Republic of South Africa, 1961–1975

The early 1960s were a turbulent time in South Africa; the Sharpeville Massacre provoked condemnation from the international community, which, with the acceleration of decolonisation, was turning increasingly against Pretoria. The decision to withdraw its re-application to the Commonwealth in October 1960 further isolated South Africa. Despite this, UK–South African military cooperation remained largely unaffected until the pivotal Simonstown Agreement's termination in 1975. This article explores this relationship and explains why British policy-makers consistently maintained links with an overtly racist regime. UK–South African military cooperation was persistently controversial and engendered frequent criticism from African members of the Commonwealth and from campaigning groups such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement, whose membership included Labour ministers. Concurrently, Pretoria was viewed as an important Cold War ally, particularly in the context of the build-up of Soviet naval incursions into the Indian Ocean from 1968 onwards. This article will analyse how British officials attempted to navigate its military relations with South Africa under such heated circumstances.     

Breaking the Bad News: Plans for the Announcement to the Empire of the Death of Elizabeth II and the Proclamation of Her Successor, 1952–67

This article uses recently released official papers to examine British planning for the announcement of the death of Elizabeth II to the Empire/Commonwealth, and for the involvement of Commonwealth representatives in the proclamation of her successor. The planning process was complicated by the complex and varied nature of the relationship between the Crown and different parts of both the colonial Empire and the independent Commonwealth. While the debates generated by this process tended to revolve around relatively minor issues of protocol, they were informed by a much more serious concern: the extent to which the institution of the British monarchy should adapt to meet the needs of the ‘new’ Commonwealth. Those advocating flexibility saw this as essential if the Crown was to continue to have a unifying role within the Commonwealth. Traditionalists, however, feared that reform would weaken the value of the monarchy as the focus of a specifically British national identity.     

Australian Federal Government Road Funding 1972–1986

Increasing Commonwealth Government desire to establish national priorities for road expenditure was successfully thwarted by constitutionally powerful State Governments until the early 1980s Political considerations interfered with the consistently efficiency-orientated national priorities suggested by the Commonwealth Government's advisory organisation. The paper evaluates efficiency, equality and equity as potential bases for road funding, before analysing what happened over the period 1972-86. The 1982 ABRD program allowed the Commonwealth to impose its priorities in an area of State constitutional authority.     

The 1999 Republic Referendum: Is there a Cycle?

There are many ways to interpret the results of the 1999 Australian referendum on whether the Constitution should be altered 'to establish the Commonwealth of Australia as a republic with a president appointed by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Commonwealth Parliament'. One possible interpretation that has not been investigated so far suggests that the result reflects the fact that there is a 'preference cycle' over the three constitutional models that dominated the debate preceding the referendum. This research note uses survey data and public choice theory to investigate whether this interpretation sheds any further light on the referendum results.     

From Commonwealth Responsibility to the National Interest: Australia and Post-war Decolonisation in South-East Asia

This article re-examines the drivers of post-war Australian foreign policy in South-East Asia. The central argument is that the motive of Commonwealth responsibility has not been given sufficient explanatory weight in interpreting Australia's post-war engagement with South-East Asia under both Australian Labor Party and Liberal-Country Party (Coalition) governments. The responsibility expressed by Australian policy-makers for the decolonisation of the Straits Settlements, Malayan Peninsula and British Borneo Territories cannot be adequately understood within a cold war ideological framework of anti-communism. Nor can it be explained by the instrumental logic of forward defence. The concept of responsibility is theorised as a motivation in foreign policy analysis and applied to Australian involvement with British decolonisation in South-East Asia between 1944 and 1971. The article finds that in its approach to decolonisation, Australia was driven as much by normative sentiments of responsibility to the Commonwealth as it was by instrumental calculations of cold war strategic interest. This diminished with the end of Indonesia's ‘Confrontation’ of Malaysia in 1966 and subsequent British commitment to withdraw from East of Suez. Australia's policy discourse becomes more narrowly interest-based after this, especially evident in Australia's negotiations with Malaysia and Singapore over the Five Power Defence Arrangements from 1968 to 1971.     

Britain,the Old Commonwealth and the Problem of Rhodesian Independence, 1964–65

This article uses new sources from the National Archives of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom to examine the consultation and cooperation between Britain and the Old Commonwealth in dealing with the problem of Rhodesian independence. It demonstrates that Canada developed a proactive approach towards the Rhodesian problem but Britain, Australia and New Zealand gave only limited encouragement to Canadian initiatives to avert Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). This article also argues that problems in British policy formulation – especially the weakness of its attempts to deter Rhodesia from unilateral action and its hesitant contingency planning for a UDI – strained the relationship with its Old Commonwealth partners. This is significant because it belies the impression that the problem of Rhodesian independence divided the Commonwealth simply along racial lines.     

The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, 1933–59: Precursors of the Tri-sector Commonwealth

One of the unique features of the Commonwealth as an international association is the width and depth of its non-political manifestations. At recent Commonwealth conferences political and official consultations have been held in parallel with large civil society, business and youth forums and, in some cases, inter-faith dialogues. Growing collaboration between the political, civil society and business elements gives rise to the notion of the ‘tri-sector Commonwealth’. The concept of an ‘association of peoples’ as well as one of nations, does, however, have a long pedigree. Between 1933 and 1959 a series of Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, organised by Chatham House and its overseas affiliates, were held at roughly five-yearly intervals to analyse the implications of the most recent Imperial Conferences. Politicians and civil servants joined with lawyers, academics, editors, military men, agriculturalists and trade unionists. In contrast to the political Commonwealth, women had a part in the unofficial conferences. And among more than 400 participants at Toronto 1933, Lapstone 1938, London 1945, Bigwin 1949, Lahore 1954 and Palmerston North 1959 were fifty-five academic historians and other writers of history, who included most of the leading authorities on the Commonwealth of the 1930s and 1940s.     

An Amnesty Assessed. Human Impact on Shipwreck Sites: the Australian Case.

In 1993 a nationwide amnesty was declared in Australia, calling for members of the public who were in possession of historic shipwreck relics to declare them to their respective State cultural heritage management agencies. The amnesty was instituted in response to an amendment in the Commonwealth Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 , which introduced 'blanket protection' for all shipwrecks and associated relics in Commonwealth waters which were at least 75 years old. This paper reports on a recent assessment of the process, consequences and implications of the amnesty, and discusses the significance of the results.
© 2008 The Author     

Britain's central role in the search for an international peacekeeping force for Cyprus, 1963–64

Abstract

This work examines the way in which the British, Greek and Turkish Governments established a peacekeeping force, the Joint Truce Force, in Cyprus in December 1963 and how the United Kingdom, aided by the United States, subsequently handled the creation of a replacement international peacekeeping force. Although the United Kingdom did everything in its power to keep peacekeeping efforts under its own control for as long as possible, when this was no longer feasible it tried to create a NATO-based peacekeeping force. This was opposed by the (Greek Cypriot) Government of Cyprus which favoured a United Nations peacekeeping force. Given the tensions between the British Government and the Government of Cyprus over which of these two international bodies should be responsible for peacekeeping it is strange that the United Kingdom never took seriously Greek Cypriot calls to have the Commonwealth considered as an alternative to the other two. This work examines these processes and analyses why the United Kingdom favoured NATO, opposed the UN and to all intents and purposes ignored the Commonwealth.     

A ‘Murderous Affair in Lincoln County’: Politics,Violence, and Memory in a Civil War Era Kentucky Community

The 1867 assassination of Unionist James H. Bridgewater typified politically motivated community violence in central Kentucky during the Civil War Era. His assassins, members of a band of ‘regulators,’ viewed Bridgewater as representative of ongoing federal interference in the Commonwealth and thus a hindrance to their local agenda. Regulators used terror tactics both to stymie political competition for the building blocks of state power, including the offices of sheriff and magistrate, and to impose a white supremacist social order after the formal abolition of slavery. Like‐minded partisan editors sought to legitimize both the actions of these night riders and of state and local elected officials by arguing that ‘outlaws’ such as Bridgewater had to die so that law and order might be restored, while assuring readers that such things did not happen to ‘good citizens.’ In so doing, these editors laid the foundation for a usable memory of the Civil War and Reconstruction in Kentucky.     

Bringing Order Out of Chaos: Stanisław August Poniatowski’s Political Patronage of Architectural Classicism in the Late Eighteenth-Century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

This article examines the political uses of classical architecture in the late eighteenth-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It focuses specifically on the direct connection between the rise of the classical idiom on the eve of the collapse of the Commonwealth and the ill-fated idea of political recuperation of the deteriorating and dysfunctional state under the aegis of King Stanis?aw August Poniatowski (r. 1764–95). In particular, it outlines the extent and character of Polish-Lithuanian architectural classicism’s political engagement in the last decades of the eighteenth century. It also underscores the specific role of this architectural idiom as a political symbol and instrument of propaganda, which served to represent the idea of restoring political order to the Commonwealth and building a strong and self-sustaining political community headed by the king. Finally, it presents a selection of characteristic buildings and publications that contributed to this political discourse, and examines the ways classical architecture retained a political importance in the immediate aftermath of the destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795.     

Macmillan,Nkrumah and the 1961 Application for European Economic Community Membership

The views held by African Commonwealth leaders are absent from the historiography of the Britain's first EEC application, despite their value for understanding why the Macmillan government experienced such difficulty in reorienting its foreign policy towards Europe. Between July 1961, when Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah established his opposition to the application, and January 1963, when it was vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle, the Anglo-Ghanaian relationship was characterized by tension and acrimony. This article seeks to understand the impact of Nkrumah's objections to the application and Macmillan's reaction to Nkrumah's concerns. Though the Ghanaian President alone did not alter the course of Britain's approach to the Community, he did add to the tense atmosphere in which London considered how to approach the Commonwealth. Furthermore, Macmillan's efforts to maintain a positive relationship with Nkrumah, in the context of the Cold War, demonstrate the reluctance with which the prime minister loosened ties with the Commonwealth.