论卡特政府的对韩政策

在美韩同盟关系的历史进程中,卡特政府的对韩政策具有一定的典型性。卡特政府积极推行人权外交,首次把推动韩国的政治民主建设提高到空前的高度,并首次明确提出从朝鲜半岛完全撤出美国地面部队。然而,由于美国政府内部的分歧及韩国方面的抵制,卡特政府的这两项对韩政策最终黯然收场。卡特政府的对韩政策结局,说明即使是具有理想主义色彩的卡特政府,也难以摆脱美韩安全关系为核心的同盟关系束缚;而美国对韩国的政治民主建设目标的实现,则也需要假以时日。     

“威慑”与“禁忌”:艾森豪威尔政府在韩国的核部署

朝鲜战争后,艾森豪威尔政府的对外政策力求保持国家安全与经济发展的平衡,这在美国对韩政策上则体现为裁减韩军规模和驻韩美军的"现代化"。在驻韩美军装备核武器问题上,美国国务院因顾及西方盟国的反对、李承晚借机"北进"等因素而犹豫不决,而国防部则希望尽快部署以提升美军威慑力,维持南北军事平衡;在此问题上,双方进行了持久的争论。在美韩就裁减韩军的谈判过程中,李承晚抵制裁军的顽固态度最终推动国务院接受国防部的意见,以在韩部署核武器换取韩国同意裁减韩军。至此,华盛顿最终作出了在韩国部署核武器的重大决策。     

美韩同盟与1954年日内瓦会议

1954年日内瓦会议的议题之一是朝鲜问题。在日内瓦会议之前和期间,美韩两国就韩国赴会、朝鲜统一等问题展开交涉,而美国为维护美韩同盟关系,不断向韩国提出的条件做出妥协让步。印支局势的恶化改变了朝鲜问题谈判的节奏,美韩在会议上的协调使美国态度走向强硬,成为导致会议无果而终的重要原因之一。美韩之间围绕日内瓦会议的互动为认识冷战时期阵营内部关系与两极国际格局的分化对立提供了一个历史断面。     

中美缓和与美韩同盟转型(1969—1972)

东西方关系的变动始终是影响美韩同盟战略互信的重要因素。尼克松政府上台伊始,美韩两国已处于互不信任的状态,中美缓和特别是美国采取的秘密外交的方式则进一步加剧了韩国的疑虑。虽然华盛顿一再重申对韩国的安全承诺,汉城亦不断表达推动朝鲜半岛和平的意愿,但美韩同盟内部并未重新建立互信。20世纪70年代上半期,韩国决定走向多边外交和自主国防,美国则通过各种方式防止朴正熙政府单方面进攻朝鲜。中美关系缓和不仅促使美韩同盟的性质发生转向,还在不同程度上导致日本、菲律宾和泰国等国家对美国信任度的下降,最终促使日本和菲律宾与中国建交。从这个意义上讲,中美缓和为20世纪70年代东亚国家打破意识形态壁垒、推动经济持续繁荣奠定了基础。     

二十一世纪以来对艾森豪威尔时期驻韩美军问题研究综述

朝鲜半岛与中国唇齿相依,与日本列岛隔海相望,与俄罗斯山水相连,地理位置上有重要的战略价值;美韩同盟是美国亚太战略重要组成部分;驻韩美军是维系美韩同盟的纽带。因为朝鲜半岛问题重要的学术价值和现实意义,使很多研究冷战史的学者更加关注这一地区问题的研究,对现有国内外研究成果进行梳理和分析,有利于未来对驻韩美军问题进行进一步深入的探索。     

核攻美国,武力统一 朝鲜要打“侵略者老巢”

"朝鲜半岛正进入战争倒计时",韩国一家媒体8日这样形容当前形势。持这一看法的不止一家媒体。自联合国安理会通过针对朝鲜核试验的新制裁决议,被激怒的朝鲜不断地强硬出招,扬言要对炮制制裁决议的美国进行先发制人的核打击,把"美国和南朝鲜的巢穴变成一片火海"。韩国则"以硬碰硬",美韩举行联合军演……世界的神经再次为朝鲜半岛的局势而绷紧。     

中国参战与美国——第一次世界大战时期的中美关系

1914年7月28日,第一次世界大战爆发。由于各主要交战国都在中国占有租借地和势力范围,使中外关系呈现极其复杂的局面,而日本乘机侵略山东,更使中国主权及领土受到战争的侵犯。在美国的怂恿下,中国最终对德宣战,站到了协约国一边,中国参战与美国的关系极大,但中国参战却并不符合美国政府的初衷。何以出现这种令人费解的现象?只有对一战时期的中美关系及中日关系及美日关系等进行考察,才能得出符合历史实际的结论。     

美国对韩国的援助政策：缘起、演进与结果

在冷战背景下 ,对外援助是美国巩固与盟国关系、与苏联争夺新独立的第三世界的重要手段。美国对韩国的援助亦然。从最初的占领区救济性援助开始 ,美国对韩援助的内容伴随援助政策的调整不断发生变化。从结果来看 ,援助帮助韩国建立并维护了资本主义的发展模式 ,军事援助孕育了美国化的军队 ,为军事政变和韩国政治发展模式埋下了伏笔。     

蒋介石三度出兵朝鲜战争未遂始末

１９５０年６月２５日,南北朝鲜战争爆发后,以美国为首的“联合国军“侵入朝鲜,并将战火烧到了鸭绿江边。对此,从大陆逃往台湾的蒋介石,在美国远东军总司令兼”联合国军“司令麦克阿瑟等人的怂恿下,先后三次准备派兵入朝参战,并企图借机从朝鲜半岛反攻大陆。但是,美国政府从其全球战略决策考虑,最终都拒绝了蒋介石出兵朝鲜的要求,给历史留下了一段尘封的内幕……     

蒋介石三度出兵朝鲜战争未遂始末

１９５０年６月２５日 ,南北朝鲜战争爆发后 ,以美国为首的“联合国军”侵入朝鲜 ,并将战火烧到了鸭绿江边。对此 ,从大陆逃匿台湾的蒋介石 ,在美国远东军总司令兼“联合国军”司令麦克阿瑟等人的怂恿下 ,先后三次准备派兵入朝参战 ,并企图借机从朝鲜半岛反攻大陆。但是 ,美国政府从其全球战略决策考虑 ,最终拒绝了蒋介石出兵朝鲜的要求 ,给历史留下了一段尘封已久的内幕……———题记●朝鲜战争爆发后 ,面对败局的麦克阿瑟建议台湾出兵参战 ,正中蒋介石的下怀。但是美国政府却心有余悸 ,迟迟不肯表态……１９５０年６月２５日清晨４时 ,在…     

战时合作的“中间人”:中国战区青年译员与美军的相处

太平洋战争爆发后,中美开展紧密的军事合作,在中国战区大量征调青年译员成为重要一环。译员服务于美军的工作特殊性,使美方可影响到译员的待遇水平;但译员也面临地位不明、管理混乱以及职责不清等诸多问题。中美之间在文化与体制上的"隔阂",使译员与美军的相处存有不少冲突。国民政府既要防止译员成为美方的工具,同时也要保障译员的"人格"以维护中国之"国格"。作为战时合作的"中间人",盟军机制里的中国青年译员是中国近代史上最独特的翻译群体,同时也体现了战时青年参与抗战的重要形式。     

风雪战勤——忆抗美援朝战争的后勤保障

党中央决定出兵朝鲜后 ,我为东北军区后勤司令部政委 ,负责组建战勤保障系统和调配干部的工作。由于这次出国作战是直接面对高度现代化的美国军队 ,前线的供应不能像在国内时那样由敌人提供 ,而是全要靠国内运送 ,因此需要建立可靠的后勤保障体系。针对后勤工作中出现的诸多新情况和新问题 ,我三赴朝鲜 ,了解新形势下志愿军对后勤工作的要求 ,组织发动干部群众往前线抢运食品、武器装备等物资 ,调配干部以加强前线的后勤保障能力 ,并及时总结工作经验 ,使志愿军的后勤供应有了较大地改     

Lyndon Johnson's war? Part 2: from escalation to negotiation

IThis second article on the Johnson administration's policy towards the war in Vietnam, based on published American documents, covers the period from July 1965 to March 1968. Although it is now clear that the Communist forces in Vietnam encountered considerable difficulties as a result of the steadily growing commitment of US ground forces, the Americans encountered difficulties of their own: notably the problem of persuading their South Vietnamese ally to implement what they regarded as the necessary political and military policies; and the increasing criticism of the war at home. The bombing of North Vietnam was a key issue for the administration. While the president's military advisers were continually pressing for further escalation, most of the civilians were sceptical. The latter felt that the bombing was not achieving its principal objective of reducing the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, was unpopular at home and abroad and, if increased, posed serious risks of Chinese and Russian involvement. Although the bombing was temporarily halted or restricted more than once during this period in an attempt to facilitate a negotiated settlement, nothing was achieved. On 1 November 1967 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's growing disillusionment with the war prompted him to send a lengthy memorandum to President Johnson arguing for the cessation of the bombing of the North and the stabilization of the American effort in the South. Rejected at the time, this policy was partially implemented as a result of the Communist Tet offensive of February 1968, when countrywide attacks were beaten back after failing to trigger the expected popular uprising against the Americans and the South Vietnamese government, while at the same time producing a surge of hostility to the war in the United States. Three men‐McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and White House aid Harry McPherson‐were largely responsible for persuading President Johnson to accept the fact that the war could not continue on the same basis as before and that de‐escalation was a better option. The president rejected the military's request for a huge increase in the number of US troops and, on 31 March 1968, announced a halt to the bombing north of the 20 th parallel and called for immediate peace talks. He also surprised the nation and his advisers by declaring that he would not run for the presidency in the election due in November 1968, preferring to concentrate on the search for peace during the remainder of his period in office.     

Cold War,Public Opinion,and Foreign Policy Spending Decisions: Dynamic Representation by Congress and the President

Conventional wisdom before the Vietnam War held that public opinion exerted no influence on U.S. foreign policy decisions. Scholars working in Vietnam's aftermath found episodic influence of public opinion on foreign policy, but missing in our understanding were longitudinal examinations of public opinion's influence on foreign policy. A number of post-Vietnam scholars subsequently revealed a long-term relationship between public opinion and defense spending. This study extends that work by analyzing responsiveness to public opinion in different foreign policy arenas by different government institutions, and by accounting for a critical variable not relevant in most previous studies: the end of the cold war. We construct a model explaining the influences of public opinion and the cold war on spending proposals for defense and foreign economic aid by the presidency, the House of Representatives and the Senate. Both public opinion and the end of the cold war exert direct influence on defense spending proposals by the presidency, while the Senate and the House respond primarily to public opinion inputs and the partisan composition of the Senate. In the case of foreign economic aid, the cold war's end gives occasion for increasing spending proposals, contrary to the public's expectation that the end of the cold war minimized the need for the U.S. to provide foreign economic assistance.     

也谈影响中国出兵朝鲜决策的因素

对于一个新生政权的国家领导入而言,国家安全无疑是最重要、最敏感的国家利益,但是朝鲜战争爆发以后美国的介入以及战争的不断升级,导致中国领导人的安全感逐步丧失,不安全感不断加深,并最终作出抗美援朝的决策。从中国领导人对国家安全程度的主观感受及思路来看,中国决定出兵朝鲜实属情理之中的决策。     

澳美马努斯基地使用之争--兼析战后初期的澳美关系

二战后,澳、美在如何使用马努斯基地问题上出现较大分歧并最终导致合作计划的流产,其中原因是多方面的。澳大利亚自主意识的增强、对战后美国对外战略的判断失位以及在英美之间奉行平衡政策;美国大国意识的膨胀、传统孤立主义的影响以及其对欧洲事态的关注等是造成这种结局的主要原因。澳美防务合作虽然因此而搁浅,但澳方发展与美双边关系尤其是防务合作的决心则愈加坚定。     

朝鲜战争与中国的台湾问题

中国海峡两岸的分裂是冷战时期遗留的问题,也是朝鲜战争的一个后遗症。朝鲜战争爆发导致美国直接派兵进入朝鲜,招致美国插手台湾事务,再度在政治、军事与经济上援助蒋介石,全面卷入中国内战。朝鲜战争爆发和美国介入中国台湾问题,与海峡两岸长期分裂有着直接的因果关系。     

RAF Ein Shemer: A Forgotten Case of Jewish and Arab Work in a British Army Camp in Palestine during the Second World War

This article explores lingering recollections of a marginalised sphere of participation by Jewish and Arab citizens of Mandatory Palestine in the Allied war effort. During the war, Palestine became a major staging ground for Allied troops in the Middle East. Some 15,000 Jewish and 35,000 Arab workers worked in administrative, construction, catering, and maintenances roles within the newly built army bases. The story of civilian labour in RAF Ein Shemer reveals previously neglected normative and non-normative patterns of inter-communal relations between British soldiers and Jewish and Arab workers on the social, economic, ideological, and romantic levels within the context of a colonial-era military installation.     

A Two‐Tiered Method for Identifying Trends in Media Framing of Policy Issues: The Case of the War on Terror

Research on media framing of policy issues has flourished. Yet the varied approaches to conceptualizing and operationalizing issue frames that make this literature rich also hinder its advancement. Here, we document the benefits of a two‐tiered method: the first level accounts for issue‐specific frames, while the second level tracks frames that generalize across issues. For this study, we draw on generalizable frames from prospect theory (loss vs. gain frames) and social identity theory (self‐referential vs. other‐referential frames). We discuss the theoretical merits of a two‐tiered approach, arguing that it should yield compound insights greater than the sum of its parts. Applying this method to newspaper coverage of the war on terror, we find a strong trend at the generalizable level: media framing of the war shifted over time from a predominant use of “fear” (self‐referential loss) frames to an increasing use of “charity” (other‐referential gain) frames. Our approach further reveals that the fear frames used in the lead‐up to the Iraq War were not driven by issue‐specific frames related to terrorism or weapons of mass destruction as we might have thought, but rather by frames related to the anticipated threats to U.S. troops. This study sharpens our understanding of how framing of the war evolved, but more broadly it suggests that a two‐tiered approach could be applied both within and across policy issues to advance our understanding of the framing process.     

Lyndon Johnson's War? Part 1: Escalation

At the beginning of 1964 there were around 20,000 US military ‘advisers’ in South Vietnam, working alongside the South Vietnamese army in the latter's campaign against the communist guerrillas, led and supplied by the government of North Vietnam. By the summer of 1965 there were 125,000 American troops in the country, with more pledged for future deployment. Most of these were not ‘advisers’, but combat forces openly engaged in fighting the communists. In addition, since March 1965, a sustained American bombing campaign had been waged against targets in North Vietnam. This transformation in the nature of the American commitment to South Vietnam had been brought about by two factors: the continued weakness of South Vietnamese governments as military and civilians struggled for control; and the growing strength and success of the communist guerrillas. South Vietnam was regarded as a vital American interest for two reasons: it was perceived as a test of US resolution throughout the rest of the world; and, following the famous ‘domino theory’, it was believed that the loss of South Vietnam to communism would precipitate the weakening and eventual collapse of other non‐communist states in the region. Although there was opposition to the escalation of the war, both in Congress and the administration, there were also voices notably in the military, who wished to press on further and faster. The administration adopted a middle course, gradually increasing its commitment and continually planning for the next step. Although political motives undoubtedly played a part in this more measured approach—there was a presidential election in November 1964—it is clear that President Johnson was not at all convinced that any policy he chose would save South Vietnam. At the same time, he feared the consequences of withdrawal, both at home and abroad. A deeply insecure man, he allowed himself to be persuaded by his principal advisers, to whom he felt indebted for personal as well as political reasons.