Northern Ireland Representation at Westminster: Constitutional Conundrums and Political Manœuvres

This article focuses on the issue of Northern Ireland's representation at Westminster. It investigates the political context of the decision to increase Northern Ireland's representation in the house of commons at Westminster from 12 members to 17 in 1978–9. Exploring this episode in more detail, it is argued, provides a more informed overall understanding of the history of devolution in the UK and of the way issues concerning Northern Ireland often overlapped with questions of constitutional change in Scotland and Wales. The article also throws light on the matter of Northern Ireland MPs and their voting rights at Westminster during Northern Ireland's experience of devolution prior to 1972.     

Lord Falmouth and the Parallel Political Worlds of Ultra‐Toryism, 1826–32

The parallel political worlds of ultra‐toryism were those of Westminster and the provinces. Hoping to defend the protestant constitution from what they regarded as ruinous attacks, between 1826 and 1832 many ultra‐tories were unrelenting parliamentary opponents of constitutional change. However, far less is understood about their simultaneous involvement in the political world away from Westminster, apart from analysis of the duke of Newcastle's electoral activities and several county studies. This article examines the 1st earl of Falmouth's dogged ideological defence of the protestant constitution, as well as exposing his political pragmatism in Cornwall, thereby highlighting the lengths to which some ultras were prepared to go in pursuing their beliefs. Falmouth also exemplifies those ultras who, from March 1827 when Lord Liverpool resigned, became far more prominent in the struggle against ‘Revolution by due course of law’, beginning with their opposition to Canning becoming prime minister. Furthermore, a study of Falmouth's career between 1826 and 1832 at Westminster and in Cornwall, also highlights several of the ideological tensions within ultra‐toryism at this time.     

Indigenous Participation in Constitutional Development

In 1950 the first four Solomon Islanders were nominated for the Advisory Council. Further constitutional reforms were made between 1960 and 1978, slowly preparing the Protectorate for a transfer of power through a unitary state operating under the Westminster system. British policy was guided by previous colonial experiences in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and to a limited extent by local circumstances, particularly through constitutional review committees. This paper addresses three central questions. Did Solomon Islanders make their own decisions when establishing the structure of their constitution and parliament, or were these decisions made for them by British and other advisers? What attempts were made to include Indigenous political structures in the governing process? To what extent did events elsewhere influence Solomon Islands political development?     

民主党派与抗日战争时期的民主宪政运动

民主党派在抗日战争时期参与的民主宪政运动极大地推进了抗日战争时期中国政治民主化进程,深刻影响了未来中国政治发展的走向。追求民主政治的强烈意愿是民主党派参与民主宪政运动的根本动因;国民党的独裁专制统治是其参与民主宪政运动的直接原因;国内外要求民主的强烈呼声是其参与民主宪政运动的外在动力;共产党的引领和帮助是其参与民主宪政运动的重要条件。民主党派经过民主宪政运动的历练,日渐成为中国政治舞台上一支不容忽视的力量;民主党派经过民主宪政运动的实践,对民主的理解更为深刻,对国民党蒋介石的本质认识得更加清楚;民主宪政运动是共产党与民主党派合作共事的成功实践,为革命胜利后中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度莫定了基础。     

Succession of government in the post‐colonial states of the South Pacific: New support for constitutionalism?

The mechanisms for changing governments in the post‐colonial states of the South Pacific constitute a unique variant of the Westminster mechanisms earlier adopted in the Dominions and in the ex‐British colonies of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. This is so to the point where we can speak of a ‘South Pacific model of succession’. In this model, the power to appoint governments is given to parliament, the head of state has no discretionary role on questions of succession, and the convention that a Prime Minister should resign following the passing of a no‐confidence motion is encoded. In contrast to the experience of most other post‐colonial societies, these constitutional mechanisms have actually governed the way in which power has changed hands. Force has not been used either to remove or entrench a government. Central to an explanation of this experience is that no significantly sized group within these states has felt itself to be fully excluded from the possibility of gaining government or from having some representatives of their interests in power. This, however, may not be the case in the future as many of the factors currently contributing to the legitimacy of constitutional succession of government are undergoing rapid change.     

The President and the Public: Inaugural Addresses in American History

This article examines presidential inaugural addresses to gain a perspective on the changing relationship between the people and the presidency throughout American political history. The analysis suggests three distinct models of inaugural address—constitutional, party, and plebiscitary—each articulating a different understanding of presidential leadership and the relationship between the presidency and the people. The constitutional presidents see themselves largely as restrained, constitutional officers with a minimal relationship to the people. The party model yields a role for the president which is more tied to the people's will, especially as expressed through party. Even though tied more strongly to the public, party presidents recognize constitutional limits on their roles and powers. Plebiscitary presidents often eschew party affiliation and the guise of constrained constitutional officer, and cast themselves as engines of the American political system fully tied to public opinion. Plebiscitary presidents often make few references to other political actors or to the Constitution. Beyond helping us to better understand the contours of American political development, this analysis challenges the prevalent assumption in studies of the presidency that nineteenth-century presidents were not popular or “public” leaders.     

Unstable properties: British Columbia,aboriginal title,and the “new relationship”

In the span of a few years, Premier Gordon Campbell transformed himself from a strong political critic of Aboriginal peoples in British Columbia to their apparent champion within a “new relationship.” The subsequent sudden collapse of Campbell's alliance with First Nations is a window into federal‐provincial relations, constitutional change, Aboriginal political organization, and the consequences of decisions made more than a century ago. Drawing on Nietzsche, we argue that Campbell's intentions, either to control or support Aboriginal peoples, were almost irrelevant; our focus should be on the “will to power” and efforts to stabilize power through territory. As a result of the collision of Aboriginal political mobilization, the expansion of natural resource development, and a series of court decisions, the unresolved nature of Canada's territorial claim to most of the land that is now British Columbia has finally reached a point where it can no longer be ignored, either politically or legally. However, the province lacks the legal authority to recognize or deny Aboriginal title, leaving the provincial government and indigenous peoples in British Columbia equally held hostage by the federal government.     

民国前期的立宪主义及其实践

北洋集团掌握中央政权的民国前期,政局比较混乱,社会思想也比较复杂,但立宪主义思潮意外呈现出活跃态势,开国会、制宪法成为一些当权者以及广大宪政主义者的重要诉求,在此背景下开展的一系列制宪活动,也取得了值得称道的宪法性成果和制度性成果。时人对宪政的内在价值了解有限,当权者的政治表现也不完美,但这不能抵消立宪的积极意义。民国前期的立宪主义及其实践,构成了近代中国政治进程的重要一环,书写了中国宪政运动史的重要一页。     

Theory and the analysis of Australian politics

Sharman's 1989 APSA Presidential Address is a welcome critique of the interpretation of Australian politics, but the questions that it raises need to be taken further. The importance of Australian political experience in the formation of an indigenous political tradition is recognised, but it is misleading to see it as stemming from the desire to limit executive power. This article explores the nature of this indigenous governmental tradition, and goes on to consider what we learn from this debate about the nature of constitutional theory, and the relationship of academic debate to constitutional models.     

国民公德与宪政框架——梁启超的政治文明整体发展观

由传统集权政体向现代立宪政体的转换,是梁启超一生的执着追求.梁氏认为,在这一历史性的转换过程中,宪政体制的建构、权力制约机制的确立固然十分重要,但起主导、能动作用的,始终是活生生的人.只有实现人的现代化与政体的现代化同步推进,双向互动,才能较好的实现预期目标,实现政治文明的整体和谐发展.这就是梁启超"政治文明整体发展观"给我们的主要启示.     

Of maps and eating bitterness: The politics of scaling in China's South-North Water Transfer Project

Based on extensive fieldwork as well as a discourse and content analysis of relevant government documents, we identify two important rescalings around China's South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP), the world's largest water project to date. These rescalings work in tandem with a discourse around the long-held Chinese ethic of “eating bitterness” (enduring hardship or chiku) and serve to include and exclude stakeholders and manufacture public acceptance of the project in the face of significant social, economic, and ecological trade-offs. We focus on two rescalings—one a more orthodox upscaling to the central government and one that relies on a fragmented, geographically disembodied, subnational scalar construction. Both rescalings operate in representational spaces, but also have important material dimensions. The case of the SNWTP demonstrates how rescaling is not only about power struggles between administrative political units, but can also be used as a political tool to exert power over particular groups of people.     

A fragile political sphere

The Italian political sphere is characterized by an endemic fragility whose origins can be traced back to the post-unification practice of trasformismo and the ensuing system originally summarized by Paolo Farneti as ‘monopolist coalition’. Here, through shifts in alliances and personal agreements, a powerful centre coalition permanently holds power and blocks the opposition from becoming a possible alternative government. The ruling class fails to function as a party and uses parliament and the government as organizational tools of its hegemony. As a consequence, the functioning of the democratic system is distorted and the role of the public sphere inhibited. From the Risorgimento, through fascism, to the First and Second Republics and Berlusconism, this article assesses the fragility of Italy's political sphere as a recurrent constant in the history of the nation and the result of ‘tare storiche’ that remain unhealed.     

High Court Review 2007–08: A Changing Bench,But Business as Usual?

This year's High Court Review analyses the major developments in the Court's composition and jurisprudence for the two-year period from 2007 to 2008, with a primary focus on the Court's role as chief interpreter of the Commonwealth Constitution, the political implications of the Court's vision of the federal compact and its interpretation of the concept of representative democracy in Australia. As an inherently political institution with considerable policy influence, the first part of the Review analyses the changing composition of the bench with reference to two new appointments made in 2008. The second half of the Review turns to developments in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence. The Court's role as an arbiter of federal-State relations is explored through two important section 51 decisions concerning the scope of the Commonwealth government's legislative power: Attorney-General (Vic) v Andrews and Thomas v Mowbray. Finally, the Review analyses the Court's construction of the Constitution as providing for a system of representative government in two cases concerning voting rights: Bennett v The Commonwealth and Roach v Electoral Commissioner.     

论清末东北宪政改革的特点

以实施宪政为中心的政治改革是清末东北政治现代化的重要特征。具体表现在 :一是通过官制改革调整了地方行政机构 ,加强了地方公署对边疆的控制 ,为东北实施宪政铺平了道路。二是把司法独立作为实施宪政的关键 ,完善了近代地方司法体系。三是以地方自治为实施宪政的基础 ,促进了东北近代民主运动的发展。四是以谘议局为实施宪政的后盾 ,扩大了谘议局参政的深度和广度 ,并充分利用谘议局与商会的特殊关系 ,使公署、谘议局、商会形成一个有机体 ,从而东北的宪政改革得以顺利进行。     

Political Staff in Executive Government: Conceptualising and Mapping Roles within the Core Executive

Political advisers are attracting increasing attention in Westminster jurisdictions. Typically, scholars focus on the corrosive impact they allegedly have on elements of Westminster convention and practice. We argue that a concern with accountability detracts from other important matters, including understanding and theorising ministerial advisers' roles. In this article we address these issues using primary data from a survey of ministerial advisers in New Zealand. We draw on Maley's typology to classify advisers' activities according to the contribution they make to executive government policy-making. We then theorise these activities through the lens of the core executive. We conclude that ministerial advisers are increasingly important actors in governing environments characterised by complex resource dependencies, modes of operation that are as often relational as they are hierarchical, and bargaining relationships that are often positive and not zero-sum in nature.     

Explaining the growth of government expenditure: Australian government department appropriations since world war two

Political economists have concentrated on explaining the growth of total government expenditure rather than individual governmental institutions. This paper applies four models of governmental behaviour from the public administration and public choice areas to the growth of the major Australian government departments in the period 1947–1979, and provides forecasts of expenditure for the years 1980–1982. The three models are: budgetary incrementalism, based on the auto‐correlation of departmental appropriations; the degree of bureaucratic monopoly power vis‐a‐vis its financial sponsor; a macro model incorporating social, political and economic incentives for governmental expenditure (e.g. unemployment); and a model based on measurements of the demand of the median voter for government services. The results suggest that a simple budgetary incrementalism model, using a first order autoregression provides the best explanation for institutional growth over the past thirty years and the best forecasts.     

Chiang Kai-shek and the 1947 Reorganization of the National Government

When the Guomindang (GMD) took charge in 1927, it implemented the “political tutelage” system. Participation of other parties in politics was disallowed. But after the Anti-Japanese War (1937–45), under the combined effect of internal and external pressure, the GMD needed to adopt a constitution, reorganize government and establish multi-party participation. The April 1947 governmental reorganization was the starting point of a transformation from a “political tutelage” system to a constitutional system. Though this reorganization introduced many non-GMD members into the government, it did not change the GMD’s one-party dominance. Its desired transformation of China from one-party “political tutelage” into a constitutional democracy still remained limited.     

An Alternative Approach to Canadian House of Commons Reform

Empowering backbench Members of Parliament in order to restore the effectiveness of the House of Commons has been a central theme in Canadian parliamentary reform for at least fifty years, but results are widely seen as disappointing. This article argues that unrealistic expectations, fostered by adherence to a traditional conception of the Westminster model of representative and responsible government, are part of the problem. A modernized conception of parliamentary government, recognizing the House as a forum for competing political parties between elections, could help us to better understand the House and improve its contribution to democratic governance. The proposed approach suggests innovative procedural options for legislative debate, Question Period, and other activities. It also offers a consistent basis for addressing issues such as floor-crossing, coalitions, and prorogations. More broadly, it points to the need for an integrated approach to the House, elections, political parties, public education, and citizen engagement in order to respond to contemporary democratic challenges.     

Topping Off and Bottoming Out: Setting Budget Priorities Through Executive Power

This article examines the role of the institutional power of executives in public budgeting; specifically, how executives change spending on particular budget items. Leveraging extant theories of the policy process concerning preference expression, attention, and institutions, we argue that executives deepen large cuts and boost large increases in budgetary change. The strictures of the budgetary process force trade-offs for executives in preference expression such that increases to preferred categories typically require decreases in other categories. Literatures in public policy and political representation suggest that all executives would like to express fiscal preferences, thereby contributing to categorical budget oscillations; however, not all executives are created equal. We employ quantile regression to examine whether the institutional strength of governors determine cuts, stasis, and expansion in spending across all budget functions in the American states between 1985 and 2009. Our model includes a host of political and economic variables found in the literature of fiscal policymaking, such as partisanship and divided government. The desire to change policy may be widely shared across executives, but we find that the ability to “top off” categorical increases and bottom out categorical decreases is a function of an executive's capacity to call attention to preferred categories via agenda-setting power and to secure those changes via veto power. The findings show strong governors are well positioned to influence public policy through the budgetary process.     

Constitutional change: an explanation

This paper first distinguishes the explicit changes that have been made in the text of the Italian constitution from others that have affected how constitutional balances work (e.g. new electoral laws), before considering both together. The turning point in both cases was 1989 and the transition from the first to the second Italian political party system. Down to that time the first system that originated in the Cold War fractures in Italian politics remained in force with only marginal and incremental changes. After 1989, however, both Italy's highly centralized structure and its system of proportional representation were called into question, resulting in the constitutional reform of 2001 that increased the powers of the regions and the electoral law reforms (which were not changes to the constitution). In both cases the consequences of these changes have proved to be contradictory, which is why reform of the Senate is now being contemplated to make the project for increasing the powers of regional and local government more coherent, as well as the form of government and the electoral laws in ways that will produce the majorities needed to make governments more cohesive and stable.