Neutrality and submarine warfare: Germany and Spain during the First World War

The Spanish government maintained official neutrality during the Great War because deviating from neutrality would supposedly endanger the nation’s already limited political and social stability and even threaten the survival of the monarchic regime. In August 1914 there were no direct Spanish interests in the conflict and no benefit to be obtained from any intervention by Spain, which was very weak in military terms and in the international arena. Nevertheless, Spain’s geographic location and its commercial dependence on the Entente made it especially vulnerable to the pressures of France and Great Britain, both of which attempted to take advantage of the services that Spain could offer in the economic war; Spain’s importance increased with the prolongation of the fight. Germany, in contrast, could not hope for more from Spain than its strict neutrality because of its highly important political and economic ties with the Entente and its defencelessness before England and France, from which Germany could not protect it. Because Germany could not wait for Spain’s participation next to her, the primary target of German diplomacy had to be to resist the influence of the Entente and maintain Spanish neutrality while preventing Spain from inclining towards favouring the Allies. To achieve this objective, Berlin fed, with vague promises, the idea that a Spanish collaboration would be rewarded with the annexation of some territories. On this basis, we can begin to study German–Spanish relations during the Great War, which came to be determined by incidents that were caused by the submarine war. The dependence on the Entente also helps to explain the last evolution of the relations between Germany and Spain, which could follow no other policy than that imposed by the final development of the war: taking up a position near the winners and distancing from, and nearly rupturing ties with, Germany. Using both Spanish and German documentation allows us to reach different conclusions that aim to contribute substantially to understanding the relationship between Spain and Germany during the Great War.     

British Conservative Opinion and the Problem of Germany after the First World War

This work examines British conservative attitudes towards the Weimar Republic through the lens of several specific issues from the armistice up to the Ruhr Crisis of 1923. The author argues that a curious feature of British conservative opinion following the First World War was the consistent hostility British conservatives demonstrated towards the new German democratic state. To be sure, Great Britain had just fought a long and costly war against Germany, and there had been little time for the passions generated by the war to cool. Still, from the early days of the political changes in October and November of 1918, the German government was firmly committed to democratic principles. This was a development that the British nation claimed to favour, but the war left many British conservatives ill disposed to consider that the ‘inner change’ in Germany might be genuine or that a stable German democracy was possible. During its formative years, the Weimar Republic faced enormous challenges that would have tested any nation. Yet, even as political and economic conditions within Germany undermined prospects for democracy to succeed in that country, many British conservatives declined to take these developments seriously. Indeed, the attitudes of British conservatives substantially added to the difficulties the German government faced in dealing with the problems of the post-war world.     

Sir Edward Grey,Germany, and the Outbreak of the First World War: A Re-Evaluation

ABSTRACT

Historians have variously condemned British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey for contributing to the escalation of the July Crisis of 1914, and praised him as an heroic advocate of peace. Addressing this conundrum, this article first assesses historiographical debates around the significance of Grey's policy towards Germany in the events that led to the outbreak of the First World War. It then traces Grey's foreign policy vis-à-vis Germany on the one hand, and the Entente on the other. Finally, it provides an innovative analysis of Grey's policy from the vantage point of Berlin, arguing that in July 1914 decisions taken by the governments of other countries escalated the crisis and were taken regardless of Grey's position. The article concludes that current historiography overestimates British agency in July 1914 and that Grey was not as important to the outcome of the crisis as both his critics and his defenders have claimed. His actions could not change the minds of those on the continent who were bent on war.     

Review Article: Refighting the First World War

Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for War, 1914–1917. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xvi, 266. $60.00 (US), cloth; $17.99 (US), paper; Michael S. Neiberg. Fighting the Great War: A Global History. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2005. Pp. xx, 395. $27.95 (US); Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson. The Somme. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005. Pp. vi, 358. $35.00 (US); David Stevenson. 1914–1918: The History of the First World War. London: Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 2004. Pp. xxii, 728. £25.00.     

The Patriot Game: Russia and the First World War

D.C.B. LTEVEN. Russia and the Origins of the First World War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. Pp. 213. $25.00 (US); LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM. The Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia, 1915–1917: A Study of the War-Industries Committees. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. Pp. xix, 312. $27.50 (US); WTLLIAM OLEASON. Alexander Guchkov and the End of the Russian Empire. Independence Square, Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1983 (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Volume 73, Part 3, 1983). Pp. 90. No price available.     

Profiteering in Australia during the First World War

The effect of domestic profiteering on Australia’s war effort and economy is a field still under-represented in historical research. This paper discusses how Australian governments struggled to come to grips with profiteering and public perception of the problem during the First World War. It is also a plea for military historians and others to move beyond the Gallipoli and Anzac perspective that still dominates this field and to look at other issues that were important during the war but which remain under-studied.