20世纪70年代初台湾当局对美“外交”与联合国中国代表权问题

1971年第26届联合国大会前一年内,在尼克松政府的要求和现实的压力下,台湾当局在联合国中国代表权问题上不断让步,但最终还是没能保住其在联合国的席位。在决策过程中,蒋介石表面上不断展示强硬立场,实质上却并非如此。他手下的高级"外交官"们为保住台湾当局在联合国的席位而倾向于妥协,但在威权体制下难于向蒋介石进言。     

分歧与协调:佐藤内阁对联合国中国代表权问题的政策选择

亲台反华的日本佐藤内阁在1971年联合国中国代表权问题上费尽心机,不仅是为台湾当局继存于联合国的“逆重要问题案”的始作俑者,甚至一度对美国将安理会席位交归中华人民共和国的主张持“保留意见”。但随着尼克松访华计划的公布,视日美关系为日本对外关系核心的佐藤内阁迅速调整政策,公开与美国政府在联合国图谋“两个中国”并存局面。佐藤内阁顽固追随美国在联合国中国代表权问题上的政策立场,不仅遭到日本国内要求调整对华关系的反对力量的猛烈攻击,同时也使执政的自民党在对华政策上的内部分歧越发难以调和,并最终导致佐藤内阁失去调整对华政策的历史契机。     

美英在联合国中国代表权问题上的分歧与协调(1950-1951)

有关中国在联合国的代表权问题,美国的基本立场是反对中国代表权变更,尽管在朝鲜战争爆发前后有微妙的区别,此前主要是私下操纵,此后则公开阻挠。英国的投票立场经历了从弃权、赞成中国代表权变更到最终支持美国在联合国搁置对中国代表权问题讨论的演变过程。而且,英国赞成新中国取得合法代表权并不意味着取缔国民党集团的非法代表,其政策转轨亦不同步。在1950年1-6月,英国开始由弃权走向有条件赞成新中国取得席位,美英分歧凸现,各自为自己的立场游说其他安理会成员国。1950年6月-1951年1月是美英分歧与协调的高峰时期,英国逐渐走向赞成接纳新中国代表同时驱逐国民党非法代表的立场。美国则不遗余力地反对中国代表权的变更。1951年2-6月,英国由赞成中国代表权变更转向支持美国在联合国搁置对这一问题的讨论,美英纷争基本平息。美英在这一问题上的分歧除了反映两国对华政策的差异外,也折射出两国对联合国组织的不同理念。     

美国与1966年联合国中国代表权问题

1964年以后,国际社会支持中国恢复在联合国席位的力量日益增强。在1966年联合国关于中国代表权问题的讨论中,为阻止中国进入联合国,美国投入了极大的精力。在这一过程中,美国及其盟国和蒋介石集团发生了尖锐的矛盾,经过讨价还价,美国在盟国的压力下作了相应的让步,美蒋最终达成妥协,中国仍然被排除在联合国之外。     

尼克松竞选，自愿公布个人财产

尼克松在中国最出名的,是打破了两国间多年隔绝的坚冰;他在美国最出名的,则是“水门事件”中险遭弹劾,史无前例地成了美国历史上第一位辞职的总统。不过,尼克松的历史意义远不止于此。20世纪60年代初,曾因时评写得好而获过普利策奖（1985年）的美国专栏作家默里·肯普顿就说过：虽然二战名将德怀特·艾森豪威尔是1952年到1960年的美国总统,尼克松只是他的副总统,但“20世纪50年代不是艾森豪威尔的时代而是尼克松的时代。这是中产阶级的下层以此公领衔,开始在美国历史上勒石留名的十年”。     

毛泽东“没有想到”的胜利——回忆我国恢复在联合国席位的过程

周总理正告基辛格:你们要在联合国制造“两个中国”,中国政府一定公开批驳。基辛格说:请你们对我们的总统少用些尖锐的形容词。 1971年5月,巴基斯坦方面转来美国总统尼克松的口信,说他准备来北京同中国领导人交谈中美关系正常化以及彼此关心的问题,为此先     

1961年美蒋关于外蒙古联合国代表权问题的争论

20世纪60年代,国际社会支持中国恢复联合国席位的力量日益增加,为了阻止中国进入联合国,美国搬出外蒙古问题,企图通过让外蒙古进入联合国这一“迂回”手法,达到保护国民党席位的目的。在策划该计划的过程中,美蒋发生了激烈争吵。经过数轮讨价还价,美蒋最终达成妥协,从而为外蒙古进入联合国打开了方便之门。     

台美英围绕联合国中国代表权问题的交涉（1951-1955）

中国代表权问题不仅是美苏为首的两大阵营对抗的最重要的冷战问题之一,而且是美国阵营内部歧见纷呈的问题。朝鲜战争爆发后,维护台湾在联合国的中国代表权符合美国的战略利益,但是英国并不紧随美国的指挥棒合拍地起舞。台湾利用美苏阵营的尖锐对抗,以小搏大,竭力争取美国支持直接否决反对台湾在联合国的中国代表权的方案。台美英三方均有各自的立场与考量,有时限的“缓议案”是三方博弈后的产物。随着美苏阵营对抗的渐趋缓和,台湾当局所能做的必定越来越多的是妥协与退让。     

回首“文革”（上）

（一）下乡“四清”和“文革”序幕１９６６年,是暴风骤雨的一年,是我国社会剧烈分化动荡的一年,也是我终生难忘的一年。这年春节刚过,我和丈夫老韩便分头奔赴青海省“四清运动”的第一线。老韩担任湟源县社教团团长,我则被分配在互助土族自治县一个山区的生产大队任工作组长。那时我们的两个较大的孩子小明、小秀,都已由我于１９６５年暑假专程去北京接到青海（当时党中央组织部有个通知,动员在外地工作的干部把子女接离北京）。我们两口都将下乡,四个孩子,最大的不满１５岁,最小的不满１０岁,如何安排好他们的确是个大问题。老…     

基辛格1971年北京之行

1971年7月、10月,基辛格作为美国总统尼克松的特使,两次赴华与周恩来等中国领导人进行秘密会谈。基辛格北京之行的目的,在于就一系列国际和双边问题与中国形成谅解和共识,打下中美两国信任关系的基础,筹备尼克松总统对中国的历史性访问。     

Nixon,Kissinger and the rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

Few would have predicted in 1969 that the new Republican administration of Richard Nixon would initiate a rapprochement between the United States and communist China during his first term as president. That he succeeded in doing so was helped by the severity of the Sino‐Soviet dispute, which erupted into armed clashes in the spring and summer of 1969. By the end of 1970 China made it clear that it would not only be willing to receive a presidential envoy, but also the president himself. Two missions to Beijing by Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger—one secret in July 1971 and the other public in the following October—paved the way for a presidential visit in February 1972. The talks in July and October 1971 and February 1972 covered a whole range of issues including the war in Indochina, the potential threat from Japan and relations with the Soviet Union. The most dif cult problem, however, proved to be that of Taiwan, where the American‐backed Nationalist government not only laid claim to be the legitimate government of the whole of China, but occupied the Chinese seat in the United Nations. A modus vivendi was eventually reached in February 1972, helped perhaps by the United Nations General Assembly vote in October 1971 which unseated the Taiwan regime in favour of mainland China. The US negotiating position was not made any easier by the intense rivalry between Kissinger and the State Department and the latter's exclusion from much of the negotiation process led to a last‐minute crisis which threatened the success of the entire project. While neither the United States nor China achieved all that they had hoped, Nixon's visit to China had an enormous symbolic impact and contributed to a reconfiguration of the global balance of power.     

华沙渠道与中美关系解冻:华盛顿决策内幕

在冷战的国际大背景下,尼克松政府对苏实施的“缓和”战略使得华盛顿打出“中国牌”,致力于改善同北京的关系。而1969年3月中苏边界武装冲突则为美提供了一个契机。在寻求同中国对话的渠道上,华盛顿首先想到的是华沙渠道,即第135次和136次中美大使级会谈,并为此做了充分的准备。尽管史实证明:华沙渠道的进展不像华盛顿期望的那样顺利,但基本上完成了预期的任务:表达了改善对华关系的愿望,并阐明了不会同苏联合作主宰东亚事务的立场。在华沙渠道完成了既定任务之后,华盛顿又将同北京的联络转为巴基斯坦渠道。     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975 Part three: January 1973–July 1975

The final volume of the Foreign relations series of documents on Indochina during the Nixon and Ford presidencies is not as detailed as those which preceded it. However, the documents do not support the view that, once the January 1973 Agreement between the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the United States had been concluded, the US was prepared to accept DRV's hegemony over the rest of Indochina, provided only that there was a ‘decent interval’ before it occurred. In fact, both the Nixon and Ford administrations did seek to prevent this from happening, but found their hands tied by congressional opposition. In the case of Cambodia, the United States also found itself the victim of its own illusions about the willingness of the People's Republic of China to support an alternative government led by the former ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Following the more or less total collapse of American policy in April 1975, some interesting ‘post‐mortems’ from various government departments on the history of US involvement in Indochina are also printed in the volume under review.     

Peace for Atoms. US Non-Proliferation Policy and the Romanian Role in the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969–1971

ABSTRACT

By 1970, the United States had undergone a remarkable volte-face on dealing with People's Republic of China as a nuclear weapon state, from outspoken opposition to political recognition. Aware of the importance of co-opting Beijing in the emerging multipolar order, President Richard Nixon sought any possible opening to the Chinese leadership. One secret backchannel passed through Bucharest, whom Washington rewarded with sensitive atomic assistance for its good offices. If in the mid-1960s dealing with China was regarded as detrimental to the cause of non-proliferation, by the early 1970s, the United States relaxed its nuclear exports policy towards useful adversaries, such as Romania, all in pursuit of geopolitical interests.     

Parliament and the Press: Forging the United Nations in Wartime Britain, 1939–45

During the Second World War, not only the United States but also Great Britain played a leading role in planning and establishing the United Nations (UN) as a new international organisation to replace the League of Nations. While scholarship on post-war planning is extensive, relatively little exists on how the planning process was discussed and depicted publicly in Britain. The purpose of this article is to fill such lacunae by examining the two most important domains for public discussion at the time, the press and parliament. It will argue, first, that the League of Nations’ experience – its inability to use collective force and its optimistically democratic structure – overwhelmingly shaped public discourse in reference to the UN. By referring to the past, the press and politicians alike in Britain were content to relinquish interwar ideas such as equal rights and equal representation for all nations. Second, apart from the lessons of history, the less democratic structure of the new world organisation was justified from the perspective of great power politics. The desire to make the grand alliance between Britain, the United States of America, and the USSR functional despite all mutual suspicions, directed the view of the UN, and typically overrode all other concerns relating to post-war planning. Finally, throughout the wartime planning of the UN, public opinion, in so far as press and parliament were concerned, held fast to the idea that the British empire was not to be touched by the UN. In public, the establishment of the UN was hardly considered as a starting point for decolonisation. Instead, the UN was designed to become the post-war embodiment of the grand alliance, a vehicle through which the victory over the Axis powers would be managed at the global level: such management did not envision the need to let empire go. Viewed this way, it also becomes clear that nationalism and internationalism were not mutually exclusive or binary visions, but coexisted and shifted in importance throughout the period examined.     

Rommel's Desert War

The article discusses why and how the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) European allies came to hold such divergent opinions over what was at stake in Vietnam. It also examines how European reluctance to fight alongside the United States in South-East Asia affected relations within NATO. The voices of the smaller NATO members will also be considered. The article concludes that the transatlantic rift was contained not just because of cold-war realities but also because the Johnson and Nixon administrations took steps to repair the transatlantic relationship and because European integration acted as a binding force.     

Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging

China's economic, political and military influence has been increasing at a time when the United States, as sole superpower, dominates the international order. This article outlines Chinese elite perspectives on the current global order and shows not only how these perceptions have affected China's policies towards the United States, but also how they have influenced China's regional and global policies more broadly. It argues that variants of realist logic that interpret Chinese behaviour as a form of balancing are not particularly helpful, and do not capture the essence of Chinese strategies that are underpinned by an overwhelming focus on its domestic development needs. The article posits that Chinese leaders have accepted that they operate in a unipolar order and have chosen not to stick out for negotiating positions that the United States would see as seriously detrimental to its interests. However, Beijing couples this accommodating approach with policies designed to ensure that, were relations seriously to deteriorate with Washington, China could draw on deepened regional and global ties to thwart any US effort to interrupt its domestic objectives. China's hope is that a more 'democratic' international order will emerge, which means not multipolarity as such but a 'concert of great powers system' that will operate to forge multilateral cooperation among the major states.