Making of the Seventh NWS: Historiography of the Beginning of the Nuclear Disorder in South Asia

ABSTRACT

Efforts to explore Pakistan's nuclear weapons options had been underway since 1972 alongside Pakistan's quest for nuclear energy. However, the American concerns about Pakistan developing a nuclear weapons capability did not surface until after the Indian test in May 1974. The Indian nuclear test marked the beginning of the nuclear disorder in South Asia and paved way for Pakistan's nuclearization. This article assesses US non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under the Gerald Ford administration from 1974 to 1977. The administration attempted to curb Pakistan's latent proliferation potential by pressuring France and Pakistan to cancel their plutonium reprocessing agreement. Though it remained unsuccessful in its attempts to restrain Pakistan's nuclear development, the administration tried to develop a quid pro quo with Pakistan by pushing the country to choose military aid over bomb. Pakistan chose the bomb for it felt that US non-proliferation policy in South Asia was skewed in favor of India.     

Disposing of the World's Excess Plutonium

We undertake three key objectives in addressing the issue of plutonium disposition at the end of the Cold War. First, we estimate the total global inventory of plutonium both from weapons dismantlement and civil nuclear power reactors. Second, we review past and current policy toward handling this metal by the United States. Russia, and other key countries. Third, we evaluate the feasibility of several options (but especially the vitrification and mixed oxide fuel options announced by the Clinton administration) for disposing of the increasing amounts of plutonium available today.
To undertake this analysis, we consider both the political and scientific problems confronting policymakers in dealing with this global plutonium issue. Interview data with political and technical officials in Washington and at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Austria, and empirical inventory data on plutonium from a variety of sources form the basis of our analysis.     

钚-239的生产与苏联核计划

苏联核计划中使用的核裂变材料主要有钚-239和铀-235,其中钚-239的生产率先取得成功,1949年8月29日苏联试爆的第一颗原子弹РДС-1所使用的核裂变材料便是钚-239。1949年之前,钚-239的生产具有试验性特征,1949年之后,钚-239进入了工业规模化的生产阶段。在钚-239的工业生产阶段,反应堆技术、放射化学技术和化学冶金技术都不断完善,实现了产能提高、成本下降、安全生产等目标,形成了完善的钚工业综合体,不仅为俄罗斯联邦留下了丰厚的钚产品,还为其钚-239的生产奠定了坚实基础。     

Iran's nuclear challenge: nine years and counting

The technical and political evidence that Iran is seeking to establish a ‘nuclear hedging’ capability has gradually increased over the past nine years. The regime in Tehran has continued to insist that its nuclear ambitions are purely civilian in nature and it has resisted the international community's dual‐track policy, encompassing both negotiations and sanctions, to persuade Iran to be fully transparent about its nuclear activities and plans, and to suspend work related to uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. While the prospects for a negotiated solution currently appear slim, the regime does not yet appear to have decided whether, or when, to produce nuclear weapons and to break out of the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty. It is essential, therefore, to maintain and if necessary to build up the pressure on Iran and to strengthen efforts to disrupt its procurement of technology and materials for its nuclear programme. It is also imperative for the international community to maintain negotiations and also consider alternative diplomatic approaches to enhance the prospects of keeping Iran focused purely on civil nuclear ambitions, while at the same time resolving questions related to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme.     

Nuclear energy and proliferation risks: myths and realities in the Persian Gulf

The use of civil nuclear power is set for major expansion among the world's developing economies. The pursuit of nuclear energy technology offers energy-hungry developing nations access to reliable large-scale electricity supplies with very low carbon emissions. But this climate-friendly energy solution comes at a security price. Historically, one third of the 30 countries that possess civil nuclear energy programmes have weaponized them. Security threats from the proliferation of nuclear weapons might become an important barrier to the further expansion of the global nuclear energy market. Nowhere is this tension more acute than in the Persian Gulf. Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) illustrate how the establishment of civil nuclear energy programmes can pose different levels of security risk depending on a country's foreign policy. While the UAE has embraced international transparent nuclear safeguards, Iran has rejected the concerns of the international community and continues to develop uranium enrichment technology that may soon lead towards a viable nuclear weapon. However, the use of proliferation-resistant thorium rather than uranium as a nuclear fuel technology might significantly reduce the threat of plutonium weaponization in Arab states. The UAE nuclear energy model deserves the political support of western nations as the best compromise between nuclear energy expansion and nuclear security threats. This article discusses the myths and realities surrounding the diversion of civil nuclear energy programmes for military use in the Persian Gulf region, and argues that proliferation of atomic weapons is a political choice, not a certain technical inevitability.     

The Iranian Nuclear Challenge

In December 2003 Iran signed an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Authority. The signing followed 18 months of mounting international pressure on Iran to prove its benign motives following revelations about past failures to declare work on uranium enrichment and plutonium separation–the two routes to producing nuclear weapons-grade material. Although Iran has strenuously denied having a nuclear weapons programme, both the United States and the European Union have been highly suspicious. However, their responses to Iran have shown a divergence in how to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The way forward on Iran will be influenced significantly by the extent to which the American and European approaches can be reconciled or otherwise.     

Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties: The US-German Feud over Brazil, 1975–7

In June 1975, Helmut Schmidt's government in West Germany sanctioned the sale of a complete nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil, including uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology. US observers in Congress, government, and the media reacted with alarm to this apparent setback to global non-proliferation efforts as spearheaded by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Using material from US, British, and German archives, this article examines how structural disparities in the US-German relationship augmented mutual suspicions and led both parties to behave uncooperatively.

Focused narrowly on commercial rivalry with the US, politicians and industry representatives in Bonn brushed aside the concerns of non-proliferation experts, who had a weak institutional base. Jimmy Carter came to office in 1977 determined to block the consummation of the Brazil deal; he also pressed the G-7 to discontinue nuclear fuel reprocessing. Carter's abrupt unilateralism offended US allies, but together the US and France put pressure on West Germany to renounce sensitive nuclear exports. Schmidt grudgingly agreed to show more caution, but few lessons were learned; many Germans came away feeling that US-led export restrictions were overbearing, hypocritical and self-serving. While cooperative within NATO and European frameworks, West Germans remained ambivalent on global problems of proliferation until the 1990s.     

How to Further Develop the Nonproliferation Regime? West German Nuclear Exports to Brazil and Iran in Context of US Criticism

ABSTRACT

Nuclear exports were a crucial part of West Germany's nuclear industry. Its domestic market was too small to keep a big nuclear industry alive. But nuclear exports were subject to a nonproliferation regime which West Germany had accepted when signing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). During the 1970s, there were major quarrels with the United States about West Germany's nuclear export policy and its approach to the nonproliferation regime. Using sources from several German archives, this article examines the nuclear export policy of West Germany and the patterns of justification as a further development of the nonproliferation regime. It is focused on two different cases, the nuclear export to Brazil and to Iran, which are strongly connected and both included sensitive technology such as reprocessing and enrichment.

The export cases touch on the issue of further development of the nonproliferation regime, the emerging nuclear world order and broader conflicts about the hegemonic and discriminatory structure of the NPT. The way West Germany handled US criticism of the exports shows West German willingness to shape its own foreign policy and the attempt to gain independence from US dominance, thus contributing to the decline of bipolarism and strengthening middle powers.     

The Making of a Non-Aligned Nuclear Power: India's Proliferation Drift, 1964–8

The article examines the strategic circumstances leading to non-aligned India's safeguard of its nuclear option during a crucial period in its proliferation trajectory, when it was one of the states closest to nuclear-weapons development, and faced US pressures to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that was being negotiated at the time. Based on Indian, US, and French primary sources, this paper demonstrates that India's regional strategic insecurities and bilateral tensions with the United States were too great for it to sign the NPT. Yet, New Delhi's capability to successfully reprocess weapons-grade plutonium permitted the developing country substantial leverage that it exploited through advancing on a slow dual-use nuclear programme.     

The Geography of Radioactive Contamination in the Former USSR

A detailed survey of the location and scope of radionuclide contamination in the former USSR examines the character and spatial patterns of such contamination by source—e.g., commercial and military reactor operation (including reactors on submarines and icebreakers); uranium mining and enrichment; plutonium production; nuclear waste storage and disposal; and “peaceful” nuclear explosions and nuclear weapons tests. Attention also is focused on updating the situation at sites known to have sustained some of the most severe radionuclide contamination—e.g., Chornobyl' (Chernobyl') and adjacent areas; Mayak, Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-26; Novaya Zemlya; the Barents and Kara Seas; Lake Ladoga; and Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. 5 figures, 8 tables, 60 references.     

对古典文学素材的汲取与超越——论芥川龙之介的《俊宽》

芥川文学的一大特色是通过对古典文学中特殊场景、特殊事件进行再加工与再创造,从而展现作家对今人的关注以及对社会问题的思考。本文从《俊宽》与其原素材的承接关系出发,在归纳古典文学中俊宽故事流变的基础上,力求探明芥川文学对古典文学的汲取与超越,思考芥川文学中取材古典的独到创作手法。     

British nuclear weapons and NATO in the Cold War and beyond

NATO has been a source of influence on British nuclear policy and strategy since the 1950s. The nature and extent of its influence has, however, been kept limited by successive British governments. This article considers how and why this has happened. It discusses evolving British attitudes towards NATO command and planning, and shows how these were reflected with regard to strategic nuclear issues from the late 1950s. The evolution of the key notion that the United Kingdom is a second centre of nuclear decision within NATO is traced, and both its utility and contradictions are examined. Overall it is argued that, both during and since the Cold War, NATO has neither been a central factor in shaping British nuclear strategy and policy, nor have British nuclear weapons been other than of limited importance and relevance for most NATO members.     

Nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use

The two books under review, The tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons , by T. V. Paul and Deterrence: from Cold War to long war. Lessons from six decades of RAND research , by Austin Long, highlight the continued interest in the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Long traces the RAND Corporation's research on the subject, exploring the role that nuclear deterrence has played as a strategy of the Cold War. The author goes on to argue for the relevance of nuclear deterrence to the future strategic environment, considering threats from peer-competitors to non-state actors. By contrast Paul considers the rise and persistence of a tradition, or informal social norm, of non-use which has encouraged self-deterrence. Employing a series of examples, Paul argues that this tradition best explains why, since 1945, nuclear states have not used nuclear weapons against non-nuclear opponents. Taken together, these books encourage further consideration of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the two practices can successfully coexist if non-nuclear states have, as Paul suggests, already begun to exploit the existence of a tradition of non-use. Such deterrence failures, real or perceived, have profound implications for relationships between nuclear and non-nuclear states.     

Invisible radiation reveals who we are as people: environmental complexity,gendered risk,and biopolitics after the Fukushima nuclear disaster

The March 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, and the subsequent tsunami and release of nuclear contamination from the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, is clearly one of the largest disasters of the past century and it has devastated large portions of eastern Japan. In this paper we explore the coping mechanisms of people navigating these landscapes of contamination, as well as examine state policies developed to deal with the disaster. We argue that there has been a significant discrepancy between state policies and the needs of people directly affected by the catastrophe. To more fully examine why this discrepancy exists – and how it is produced – we investigate the complex geographies of contamination and risk near the damaged Fukushima power plant through the conceptual lens of ‘wet ontologies’ coupled with an analysis of state strategies for the governance of the affected populations. In our research we found that Foucauldian theorizations on biopower, neoliberalism and environmental governance can help explain how nuclear power as a social institution can require states to sacrifice the well-being of hundreds of thousands of their citizens in ways that affect people in gendered and age-specific ways.     

关于我国核电发展与设立核电站布局“禁区”的思考

本文系统地阐述了我国核电站近十多年来呈现出大规模发展的态势。认为从我国的具体国情出发，需要在全国部分人口与经济密集、大中城市相对比较集中的地区设立核电布局的“禁区”。渤海沿岸是国家的政治核心与经济枢纽，渤海及其附近区域核污染关系到国家的安全。本文着重分析了渤海沿岸地带核电站发展的情况，并且认为渤海沿岸地带应该成为国家最主要的核电“禁区”，根据我国核电站发展的态势，建议在“十四五”时期，我国需要对近十年来的能源政策进行调整，要充分考虑到中国国情与国家利益，审视其可行性与合理性。在“核电绝对安全”的神话一再被破灭的情况下，重新调整核电发展方针，实行总量控制乃至逐步减少。     

Risks and Consequences in Energy Production

Abstract

The word risk is often used in association with energy production and in some case it is equated with consequences. The distinction is important and has implications for the study of energy system. Failure in a given energy system, such as nuclear power or hydroelectric dams, can give rise to human consequences, such a deaths, injuries or disease. The extent of these consequences varies from one system to another. Furthermore, the probability of such failures is a characteristic of the given system. For example, a nuclear reactor or hydroelectric dam may have a probability of one catastrophic failure in x years of operation where x is a large number. The probability multiplied by the number of deaths, injuries and illnesses caused by the failures—the consequences—can be taken as a measure of the risk, or risk index.     

COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MITOCHONDRIAL AND NUCLEAR DNA PRESERVATION IN HISTORICAL DNA EXTRACTS*

‘Historical’ DNA obtained from specimens preserved in natural history collections has proven useful for addressing a wide variety of questions, such as the spread of domesticated species or changes in genetic diversity. With the development of high‐throughput sequencing techniques, there is an increasing focus on acquiring genetic information encoded by single‐copy nuclear DNA from historical DNA extracts. The development of efficient techniques to determine the level of nuclear DNA preservation in candidate specimens is necessary to maximize the data obtained from these analyses. Although current evidence suggests that a sample's mitochondrial DNA preservation predicts its nuclear DNA preservation, we show that the relationships between mitochondrial and nuclear DNA preservation are complex.     

Comfort blanket or weapon of war: what is Trident for?

A hangover from the Cold War, Britain's nuclear capability has acquired a totemic quality and, in some unexplained way, is expected to shield us from unspecified dangers. There has been no serious attempt at cost—benefit analysis and such as there is ignores opportunity costs: policies or procurement foregone. The most important are political and the more significant—the things Britain could do or achieve if it did not have a nuclear capability—relate to our role in the world and, more specifically, to the NPT. This is a national issue which does not depend on international negotiations or agreement. In drawing conclusions, the article therefore ignores the larger question of whether the global elimination of nuclear weapons is both desirable and feasible. This international issue is addressed in a separate final section.     

Functional specialization across space: a case study of the Canadian Electricity Industry, 1971–2001

This article examines the location of functions within the electricity sector in Canada from 1971 to 2001, using a centre‐periphery model. Power generation, distribution and retailing are generally carried out by multiestablishment crown corporations. Location patterns of different functions—management, scientific, production, etc.—are analyzed via the use of occupational groups. The spatial distribution of functions is found to be generally consistent with centre‐periphery relationships, with evidence of a growing functional specialization between large metropolitan and nonmetropolitan locations. However, differences emerge depending on power generation sources: fossil fuels, hydro, nuclear, solar or biomass. The choice of a power generation source has consequences for local economies.     

Russia,nuclear leakage,and the non-proliferation regime

Abstract

Russia inherited from the Soviet Union vast holdings of nuclear weapons and of the fissile materials necessary to build them. These nuclear assets have been in the possession of a Russia in the midst of an extraordinarily difficult and turbulent political, social, and economic transformation. Never before have such enormous inventories of nuclear weapons and fissile materials existed in such circumstances of political instability and uncertainty and economic distress. The economic struggles and financial crisis experienced by Russia since it emerged as an independent state in 1991 have placed enormous stress on its society. The Russian military and the Russian nuclear complex have not been exempt from these pressures. This reality has led to concerns that the Russian state is not in a position to provide adequately for the safety and security of its nuclear assets. If true, this would raise the risk that these assets could leak out of Russia and into the hands of those who wish to acquire nuclear weapons –the so called nuclear leakage problem.