Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the US–EU and US–UK relationships

A British exit from the EU would add to growing strains on the United States’ relations with Britain and the rest of Europe, but by itself would not lead to a breakdown in transatlantic relations due to the scale of shared ideas and interests, institutional links, international pressures and commitments by individual leaders. It would, however, add to pressures on the US that could change the direction of the transatlantic relationship. From the perspective of Washington, Britain risks becoming an awkward inbetweener, beholden more than ever before to a wider transatlantic relationship where the US and EU are navigating the challenges of an emerging multipolar world. The article outlines developments in the UK, EU, Europe and the US in order to explain what Brexit could mean for the United States’ approaches to transatlantic relations. By doing so the article moves beyond a narrow view of Brexit and transatlantic relations that focuses on the future of UK–US relations. In the conclusion we map out several ways in which US views of the transatlantic relationship could be changed.     

The ultimate test case: can Europe and America forge a joint strategy for the wider Middle East?

The call for a common US–European approach to the multiple problems of the wider Middle East region has become the latest truism of the transatlantic circuit. But the Middle East is also the region that has historically most divided Americans and Europeans. Steven Everts argues that, despite the different reflexes and assumptions, a joint transatlantic effort is both necessary and feasible. But it will only work if both sides are prepared to adjust policies, allocate sufficient resources and, most of all, take political risks. He sketches a joint strategy based on four pillars: a new international bargain for Iraq; keeping the two-state solution alive in Israel–Palestine; preventing the next transatlantic bust-up over Iran; and with regard to the crisis of governance, taking concrete steps to promote political reforms throughout the region. The author concludes that in the Middle East, Europe must be more strategically daring while America must be more politically astute.     

Europe and the new balance of global order

The European Union has become an important shaping factor in international relations, but how and under what conditions it can exercise influence and contribute constructively to global order are still not well analysed. In fact, the EU's contribution may resemble more that of a force in physics than of a great power in the traditional sense of international relations (which the EU is not, and will not become in the near future), and its influence depends probably more on what the EU represents and how well it manages its own realm, rather than on what it can do externally. In this sense, European influence in international relations presently benefits from past achievements, and may therefore have peaked if the twin challenges of enlargement and national structural deficiencies are not addressed effectively. But even if the European Union does master those challenges successfully, and thus manages to sustain and perhaps even enhance its influence as a force in international relations, it will still have to proceed cautiously and clearly focus its attempts on shaping its external environment and contributing to a ‘concrete’ or ‘civilized’ global order. In a global setting that, despite appearances to the contrary, seems characterized by a diffusion rather than a concentration of power and by strong tendencies towards entropy rather than order, the EU can and will probably not remain America's principal ally in sustaining Pax Americana. Nor does it seem likely to become an equal partner in a constructive, balanced transatlantic relationship, let alone a great power capable of challenging, perhaps together with others, America's apparent pre‐eminence. The most plausible assumption for the EU's future role in the new balance of global order is that of a ‘civilian force’ with a regional focus. It may best be able to contribute to global order by managing its own realm well, promoting the normative and institutional infrastructure for civilized international relations, not least in the sense of functioning statehood, and working towards effective multilateralism.     

Getting out of the Iraq trap

The Iraq crisis has been variously defined as a problem of local leadership, regional security, culture clash, arms control, neo–imperialism, transatlantic relations and international legitimacy. The competing definitions reflect the worldviews of different actors with a stake in the outcome of the crisis. Each perspective has validity for its proponent and none of them can be expected to triumph to the exclusion of the others. Consequently, it is argued here, whatever the goals of UN and/or military intervention in Iraq, at the receiving end, the experience will be at odds with what is meant or sought by such intervention. A way to understand the problem and thence to address it is ventured which combines local, regional and international perspectives and calls for a multitiered, multilateral approach to rethinking Iraq and the region. The intention is to take on 'the hawks' who claim that the United States can deliver democracy to client states, challenge their logic and propose an alternative vision that would require all parties, international and local, to take shared responsibility not only for Iraq but for Palestine too.     

Multipolar governance and global imbalances

The deficiency of financial regulation and the presence of large macroeconomic global imbalances should be considered complementary interpretations of the global economic and financial crisis. The risk we face is that a new expansionary phase will bring back large and growing external imbalances, which will keep world growth on an unsustainable path. At the international level there is a classical ‘collective action’ problem to address since if export growth oriented strategies are pursued by all major countries they will generate a deflationary bias in world demand. This article explores how multilateral cooperation and international institutions can become reengaged with, and provides a meaningful device for addressing, these new issues and problems. It is necessary to restore shared rules of the game for international macroeconomic adjustment. This means endorsing a strengthened surveillance regime for the IMF in order to induce more compatible macroeconomic policies. In this regard, the IMF should have enforcement rule incentives and mechanisms, otherwise we are going to repeat past negative experiences where peer pressure did not produce significant results.     

Climate Change: An Important Foreign Policy Issue

International climate policy is one of the most fascinating issues in foreign policy, yet in recent years it has become one of the most contentious. The failure of the conference in The Hague revealed, among other things, strongunderlying rifts in the transatlantic relationship. As the self-acclaimed worldleader, the United States is not in a position to exert leadership in this vital area owing to a mixture of constitutional constraints and an ever-growing cultural dependence on fossil fuels such as oil and gas. It therefore falls to the European Union to take up this challenge. This will require careful coalition building with the rest of the world as well as confidence in the ability of Europe to develop a united position, to stick to that position and to translate the rules of the Kyoto Protocol into stringent domestic climate policy. The climate change regime is at a crossroads. At the resumed COP-6 con-ference, the Parties must decide whether to continue the process under theassumption 'that global problems require global solutions' or whether to turn to the more regional concept of 'think globally, act locally'. In either case, steering climate policy in this century on to a successful path will require the skills and dedication not only of natural scientists and technology developers, but also of those in the foreign policy community.     

Principles in the pipeline: managing transatlantic values and interests in Central Asia

After a decade of relative neglect post‐Soviet Central Asia has become a foreign policy priority for the transatlantic community. Both the United States and Europe have engaged with the region in recent years in pursuit of new strategic interests, including maintaining military basing access in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan and securing the export of Central Asian oil and gas to the West. Despite this period of renewed engagement, however, the quality of democratic governance within the region remains poor, especially in comparison with other post‐communist regions that successfully completed their political transitions. In fact, the United States and the European Union have often tempered promoting their Central Asian democratization agendas in order to maintain access to these strategically important fixed assets. The transatlantic struggle to balance the pursuit of strategic interests and democratic values has been rendered more difficult by Russia's recent resurgence as a regional power. Backed by the Central Asian governments, Moscow has challenged the purpose and influence of western‐based international and non‐governmental organizations in the region, thereby further diminishing the transatlantic community's capacity to promote sustained democratic reforms.     

Inscribing nature: Archaeological metaphors and the formation of new sciences

Abstract

Ghanaian authorities restored Cape Coast Castle and Elmina Castle as memorials to the transatlantic slave trade in order to draw African Americans to Ghana. While this was a positive development for a travel industry that rarely caters to diaspora African needs, the Ghanaian initiative has evoked strong criticisms from concerned African Americans who feel that the restoration has erased the monuments' associated images of slavery and has removed the desired experiential effect. I focus on the complex interplay of these concerns, African Americans' previous attempts to preserve some of these monuments and the history of structural changes to the monuments. These complex issues require several layers of analysis. I situate my discussion within the debate of whether there is any such thing as original monuments and whether there is a necessary correlation between monuments per se and the experience of historical reality. For African Americans, such a strong relationship can be established. The preservation of these monuments, of global significance, calls for an international dialogue based on respect, tolerance and sensitivity.     

New Institutions for Transatlantic Trade?

In late 1994 and 1995, senior figures on both sides of the Atlantic advocated a transatlantic free trade area: in December 1995 the EU and the United States signed the New transatlantic agenda and the Joint EU–US action plan in Madrid; in March 1998, the European Commission proposed 'a new transatlantic marketplace', which was vetoed by France in the following month; and in September 1998 the Commission offered its latest plan–the Draft action plan for transatlantic economic partnership . This article examines the political and economic case for new institutions, drawing on the arguments the Commission used to support its proposal for a new transatlantic marketplace. These arguments are found to be unpersuasive. For an EU stance in trade policy matters to be improved by a French veto may be unprecedented. That is what has happened, however. The French veto actually led to the Draft action plan which provides transatlantic trade relations with a better framework than the proposal for a new transatlantic marketplace could possibly have done.     

Game Theory and Institutional Entrepreneurship: Transfer Pricing and the Search for Coordination International Tax Policy

Coordination in international tax policy is extremely problematic. Economists and political scientists have explained this lack of coordination by arguing that tax competition triggers a prisoner's dilemma. In this article I argue that not all international tax policy can be reduced to the prisoner's dilemma syndrome. Transfer pricing policy, the object of this study, can be modeled as a coordination game. By drawing upon game theory and new institutional analysis, I argue that institutional entrepreneurs who decide to play their favorite option first can facilitate the emergence of international policy coordination. This idea is examined in the context of the creation of the new Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development rules on transfer pricing. The conclusion is that coordination emerges in transfer pricing policy through a process of conflictual institutionalization.     

Transatlantic triage? European and UK ‘grand strategy’ after the US rebalance to Asia

Transition in the Middle East, the ongoing effects of the global financial crisis and the United States' rebalance to Asia are key trends that will have an impact on transatlantic relations and European defence. As US priorities shift, a common European ‘grand strategy’ could encourage the development of a shared vision to help Europe order its priorities and begin to respond to the new, post‐austerity context of world politics and shrinking defence budgets. Will these changes be enough to quicken Europe's currently shrivelled strategic thinking? In any scenario, given its relative weight and role as an interlocutor with the US, the United Kingdom will remain vital to any developing European security and strategy agenda, although its broader relations with the European Union will complicate this relationship. How it proceeds will also help to define the boundaries of this nascent European security order. This article charts these key global trends, relates them to current debates in European security and strategy and maps opportunities and constraints faced by Europe and the UK in developing a grand strategy in an increasingly ‘American‐lite’ European neighbourhood.     

Rommel's Desert War

The article discusses why and how the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) European allies came to hold such divergent opinions over what was at stake in Vietnam. It also examines how European reluctance to fight alongside the United States in South-East Asia affected relations within NATO. The voices of the smaller NATO members will also be considered. The article concludes that the transatlantic rift was contained not just because of cold-war realities but also because the Johnson and Nixon administrations took steps to repair the transatlantic relationship and because European integration acted as a binding force.     

America as a European power: the end of empire by integration?

Is the postwar partnership between Europe and America now a historical artefact? Much depends on whether the notion of America as a ‘European power’ still holds. The US attained this status through a strategy of ‘empire by integration’, extending its postwar ‘empire’ through negotiation and support for European integration, and envisaging a collectively powerful Europe as fundamental to the health of its most important security alliance. The election of George W. Bush, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the war in Iraq are often seen as producing deep ruptures both in American policy towards Europe and the transatlantic alliance. Yet, the embrace of a new US policy of ‘disaggregation’ of Europe is unproven, and in any event unlikely to mark a permanent shift. The US and Europe are surprisingly close to agreement on ends for the international order. Conflict over Iraq has obscured a significant increase in policy cooperation and convergence of strategy in the war on terrorism.     

Was there an Amerindian Atlantic? Reflections on the limits of a historiographical concept

Proponents of the increasingly prominent “Atlantic history” paradigm argue that ocean-centered, transnational perspectives shed crucial light on connections which tied together Europe, Africa and the Americas in the early modern period, and which older forms of national and imperial histories obscured. In spite of these scholars’ calls for the construction of a truly inclusive history of the Atlantic basin and all its inhabitants, Amerindian peoples have received relatively little attention in the work of Atlantic historians. This article examines the place Amerindians have held in scholarship on the early modern Atlantic. It argues that it is precisely because Atlantic history has been constructed from fundamentally Eurocentric categories like transatlantic empire and commerce that it has accorded little space to Amerindians. It points to this absence as an important shortcoming of such approaches, and suggests that Atlantic history will have to be reconceptualized in fundamental ways in order to bring Amerindians fully into the picture as historical actors.     

A new Gaullist moment? European bandwagoning and international polarity

The transatlantic partnership needs to be reassessed. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has chosen to bandwagon with the United States and to outsource its security to Washington. Bandwagoning has serious consequences when the use of force is at stake: it may lead to entrapment, where weaker allies may be involuntarily dragged into a conflict. It may also lead to abandonment, where the dominant ally may choose to discard their vital security concerns. With the evolution of the international system towards a multipolar configuration, this strategy of bandwagoning is becoming increasingly costly for Europe while the dominant power, the United States, is progressively confronted by other competitors at the systemic level. These classic dilemmas attached to an asymmetric partnership are exacerbated in a multipolar configuration. In particular, the abandonment scenario may become more and more frequent precisely because there is competition—and thus potential costs—at the international level: the United States may leave Europe alone, not by choice but by necessity. The current crisis in Ukraine illustrates this shift: while some American leaders were keen to escalate the conflict by arming Ukraine, the Obama administration's commitment to the defence of Europe has been minimal and it has largely delegated the management of the crisis to the Europeans themselves. Washington had other and more important priorities. Strategic autonomy is not an option for Europe; it has become a reality, a Gaullist moment where Europeans will have to learn to think and act strategically for themselves.     

Policekeeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of Postwar Iraq

The main problem following a US-led international intervention in Iraq will be re-establishing widespread and sustainable governance. It is probable that with the removal of repressive political authority, state control will falter and crime rates boom. This can be countered through an international civil administration with law and order as a guiding mandating principle. Order could be ensured by 'policekeeping', via a large 'blue force' of primarily Muslim gendarmerie from surrounding nations. Reliance on military peacekeeping is precarious because of the political sensitivities in the case of Iraq. The blue force would form the foundation of the new internal security architecture in Iraq, and would act to prevent fragmentation and civil war. The role of policekeeping is to preempt and combat ethnic, religious, and political violence, economic crime and the establishment of shadow networks, as well as policing regular crime including those of property and public order. A further vital task would be the development of domestic judicial and policing capacity, which provide an exit strategy for the international mission and the beginnings of a representative and regionally devolved governance structure. These tasks could be financed through a modification of the current oil for food programme, finally transferring this wealth back into Iraqi society. The goal would be to construct a self-sustaining democratic and economically functional state governed by the rule of law, one that can serve as a political beacon for the region.     

Universal vision or bounded rationality?

William Walker's article takes a strongly universalist view of the requirements of nuclear order. It finds recent American administrations deliberately unwilling to maintain international confidence in the necessary collective narrative of eventual universal nuclear disarmament, so causing a crisis of confidence in the Non Proliferation Treaty regime. This commentary examines how far realistically different recent US policies and declarations could have avoided such problems, given certain underlying realities and dynamics surrounding the management of nuclear weapons. It also questions how indispensable abstract universalism will be in containing future nuclear proliferation.     

Explaining compliance with international law: Broadening the agenda for enquiry

Current theoretical understanding of compliance with international law is based on an assumption that international law consists of a finite set of objective, compulsory rules. This image does not match reality but the two can be reconciled through theorising international law as ideology. Such an approach subsumes questions as to why states do or do not obey law and what influence international law has on foreign policy decision making. By placing the relationship of state behaviour to international law in a broader perspective it can account for previously identified determinants of compliance and provide a basis on which to assess their relative significance. At the same time, the research agenda regarding compliance is broadened by the introduction of fresh questions.     

Between national sovereignty and international power: what external voice for the euro?

Does the creation of the euro imply that the European Union is now speaking with one voice in international monetary matters? Is the EU therefore likely to challenge the hegemony of the United States on the world stage, at least in the realm of international financial diplomacy? This article analyses the current state of external representation of the common currency and asks why the issue of the euro’s single voice has not yet been resolved. Comparing other areas of common policy–making that have an external dimension, such as trade, the authors explore the specificities of monetary and financial affairs that make the conflict between national sovereignty and international efficiency so difficult to settle. In particular, the authors focus on a set of international institutional arrangements regarding economic policy–making within the EU, and external arrangements within international fora (the IMF and the G7), which have so far impeded the ability of the EU to play a coherent role on the international monetary stage. The authors argue that the fact of the euro means there needs to exist a clear system of political representation in the area of monetary and financial governance in the EU, and they explore various options for who the external voice of the euro could be. Finally, the implications of creating the euro’s external voice for transatlantic relations, for EU enlargements, and for the debate about the ‘democratic deficit’ in Europe are analysed.     

'When the shooting starts': Atlanticism in British security strategy

The evolution in the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity has led to shifting patterns of alliances in world politics. Since 9/11, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use its overwhelming military power to deal with potential or real threats. Contrary to its policy of embedded power in the economic and security institutions of the post‐1945 period, the United States increasingly views the multilateral order as an unreasonable restraint on the exercise of hegemonic power. What does this new context mean for Britain? Going back to 1997, the first New Labour government added an internationalist dimension to the traditional roles of acting as a loyal ally to the United States and serving as a bridge across the transatlantic divide. The Iraq war of 2003 showed that the bridge could not bear the weight of the disagreement between ‘Old Europe’ and the new conservatives in Washington. The Prime Minister's decision to be there ‘when the shooting starts’ shows that Britain continues to place the bilateral connection with the United States above all other obligations. This article questions whether the Atlanticist identity that underpins the strategic rationale for the special relationship is likely to succeed in delivering the interests and goals set out in the recent UK security strategy document.