The evolution of maritime Chinese historiography in the United States: toward a transnational and interdisciplinary approach

ABSTRACT

Once considered a marginal side-story to the Fairbank-inspired narrative of an agrarian-centered, land-bound China, Chinese maritime history has received increasing attention in the United States as a research field in its own right. Through sustained engagement with trends in regional, comparative, military, and global histories, and dialogue with European and Asian academia, the efforts of several generations of scholars after Fairbank have slowly broken down his paradigm. Studies of maritime China are increasingly showing a broad, integrated maritime East Asian region comprising the seas and their littoral from the Sea of Japan to the Strait of Melaka. This article surveys the historiographical development of the field. It also highlights my work-in-progress on autonomous overseas Chinese polities along the Gulf of Siam littoral in mainland Southeast Asia during the eighteenth century as one possible future path for the study of maritime Chinese history.     

1919 in dynamic East Asia: March First and May Fourth as a starting point for revolution

Abstract

The March First Movement and the May Fourth Movement are like mirrors reflecting each other’s relationship. This article uses the concept of “simultaneity” in global history to reevaluate the significance of both events in world history. It also examines the differences exhibited by the simultaneity of the two events from the perspective of an “interconnected East Asia.” After entering the world-system, imperial Japan, semi-colonial China, and colonial Korea occupied different positions within its hierarchical structure. Here we need to pay attention to the status-diverse but mutually influential conditions in East Asia. To see through the complexity of (semi)colonial modernity and find the inherent opportunities to overcome modernity, it is useful to analyze the “double project” of adapting to modernity and overcoming modernity. Since the 1920s, the two events have been continually reinterpreted in the vein of socio-historical changes. The question of how to remember the two is not only a historical question but also a practical question for the present. Now is truly the methodological turning point in exploring and reinterpreting the two events. The author will use the terms “March First Revolution” and “May Fourth Revolution” in an attempt to tackle this issue. The mass gatherings that took place during March First and May Fourth provide sufficient evidence to support the use of “revolution” to describe them. Although March First and May Fourth are part of two respective histories of Korea and China, at the same time they are part of East Asia’s and the world’s interconnected history.     

The “Chinese World Order” Encounters the “East Asian World Order”— Post-War Japanese Historians’ Debates on the Tribute System

In this paper, I trace the post-war Japanese genealogy of studies on China’s tribute system (imperial China’s relatively tolerant approach to its foreign relations) in relation to the English-language work of historian John King Fairbank (1907–91). I emphasize that, together with the sporadic Chinese studies into China’s tribute system prior to the 1950s, it was the post-war research of Japanese historians that inspired Fairbank, who, in turn, further stimulated critical debates on the topic in Japan. I first concentrate on post-war Japanese debates concerning an “East Asian world order” based on a “system of investiture/tribute.” This notion, developed by the Japanese historian Nishijima Sadao in 1962, precisely corresponds to Fairbank’s 1941 understanding of the “tribute system” or “Confucian world-order,” but contrasts with Fairbank’s later, controversial understanding of a “Chinese world order” as proposed in 1968. In the second part of this paper, I introduce Japanese historian Hamashita Takeshi’s 1980s and 1990s arguments on the “tribute trade system” as representative of the younger generation within this genealogy, contrasting it with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank. In the third part, I locate this Japanese genealogy within the wider historical context of post-war Japanese intellectual cultural politics. This means that I examine Japanese historians’ arguments both from the angle of historiography and from the perspective of post-war Japanese intellectual history.     

华人网络的再认识：一个空间的视角

现有关于华人跨国网络的研究,为我们描绘了华人网络的三张面孔,即作为“文化载体”、“社会纽带”和“经济圈”的华人网络。本文从空间的角度,对以上研究进行了补充。它以香港及其邻近的东南亚地区的华人移民经验为依据,在检讨了滨下武志、王赓武和和斯金纳等人有关中国社会经济地理、文化中心和市场结构理论的基础上,提出了一个东南亚华人网络空间结构的理论模型。该模型以国际大都会为中心,形成了“去中心”、“多层次”和“多维度”的钻石型网络结构。在该模型中,华人网络的经济、社会和文化的面向获得了互动和统一。若干类似的子网络相互联结,共同构成了全球华人网络的宏观地域系统。     

In defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia's new strategic map

The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper categorically termed Australia's zone of strategic interest the Indo-Pacific, the first time any government has defined its region this way. This raises questions about what the Indo-Pacific means, whether it is a coherent strategic system, the provenance of the concept and its implications for Asian security as well as Australian policy. Indo-Pacific Asia can best be understood as an expansive definition of a maritime super-region centred on South-East Asia, arising principally from the emergence of China and India as outward-looking trading states and strategic actors. It is a strategic system insofar as it involves the intersecting interests of key powers such as China, India and the USA, although the Indo-Pacific subregions will retain their own dynamics too. It suits Australia's two-ocean geography and expanding links with Asia, including India. The concept is, however, not limited to an Australian perspective and increasingly reflects US, Indian, Japanese and Indonesian ways of seeing the region. It also reflects China's expanding interests in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that the Chinese debate may shift towards partial acceptance of Indo-Pacific constructs alongside Asia-Pacific and East Asian ones, despite suspicions about its association with the US rebalance to Asia. Questions about Australia's ability to implement an effective Indo-Pacific strategy must account for force posture, alliance ties and defence diplomacy, as well as constraints on force structure and spending.     

Politics or profits along the “Silk Road”: what drives Chinese farms in Tajikistan and helps them thrive?

Abstract

China’s influence in neighboring Central Asian states is growing at a fast pace. Since the launch of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative to accelerate China’s engagement in Central Asia and beyond, nearly all Chinese activity in this region has been gathered under OBOR. OBOR now seems to cover a plethora of spatially and temporally expanding state and privately driven projects. In this paper, I discuss large- and small-scale Chinese farm enterprises in Tajikistan, in which discussions around China’s “global land investments” and OBOR intersect. Beneath abstract conceptualizations of OBOR and the Chinese presence in Central Asia, my analysis shows that Chinese land investments in Tajikistan are shaped by Chinese dynamics of agrarian change and are contingent upon country-specific conditions. Rather than state-led endeavors as is often assumed, the main Chinese actors in Tajik agriculture are capitalist yet partially state-embedded enterprises driven by profit-oriented goals. Chinese farm enterprises tap into specific market demands that are either unanswered or underdeveloped in Tajikistan, or which have emerged due to the growing number of Chinese consumers in Tajikistan. The nature and drivers of Chinese land acquisitions in Tajikistan shed light on the various, sometimes competing, factors driving China’s broader foreign “land rush,” in Central Asia (and beyond).     

Japan’s strategic interests in the South China Sea: beyond the horizon?

Japan has a national interest in the South China Sea issue. Although its direct commitment is ultimately limited in a material sense due to a lack of military capabilities, as well as political and constitutional constraints on the Self-Defense Force, Japan has maintained its firm stance to uphold international maritime rules and norms, and nurtured strong diplomatic relations and conducted maritime capacity-building programs with the South-East Asian states, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. These actions contribute to consolidating the rule of law at sea and provide those claimant states an opportunity to withstand pressures from China. Given the Trump administration’s unclear South China Sea policy and South-East Asia’s strategic uncertainty, Japan is becoming a key player in maintaining regional maritime stability in East Asia through diplomacy.     

历史、文化与民族:20世纪前期中国文化史的兴起

20世纪初,西方“文化”概念成为整理传统中国历史遗产的重要概念工具。国人编纂文化史有意展现传统中国的文化成就,反映出中西文化竞争下,国人隐秘的文化争胜意识。“文化”与“历史”结合,逐渐成为历史叙事的核心概念。文化史在史学研究的对象、价值判断、时代分期、研究方法等方面发展出自身特征,亦反映出西方文明史、文化史在理论和实践方面对中国“新史学”的影响。文化史在实践中注重对民族历史生活的呈现,表现出民族史的特征,其叙述特定群体或民族社会生活的方方面面,揭示群体的精神内核。历史、文化与民族融会一体,在西学东渐、传统文化权威失坠的情况下,文化史构建了一种彰显社会凝聚力的叙事。     

The privatisation of maritime security in Southeast Asia: the impact on regional security cooperation

This paper examines the involvement of new modes of governance (NMoG)/new actors, in establishing new regional regulatory frameworks in Southeast Asia. The basis for this discussion is a framework suggested by Kanishka Jayasuriya who argues that the activities of NMoG can facilitate the establishment of such regional regulatory frameworks. Concentrating on maritime services provided by one new actor, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), this paper suggests that the current activities and working practices of PMSCs in Southeast Asia are more likely to undermine regional security cooperation and regional governance, thus challenging some of the tenets of Jayasuriya's framework.     

Going West and Going Out: discourses,migrants, and models in Chinese development

Abstract

In 1999 China announced the launching of the Open up the West campaign, sometimes called “Going West,” to help western China finally catch up to the much wealthier eastern, coastal areas after several decades of lagging behind. The same year, China also announced a “Going Out” strategy to encourage Chinese investment abroad. The 15 years since then have witnessed dramatic Chinese government investment in various development activities in western regions of China, as well as around the world. Though rarely considered together, we argue that there are significant parallels in development discourse, the centrality of physical infrastructure, the characteristics of Chinese labor migration and the nature of migrant-local relations, and the application of “models from elsewhere” in Going West and Going Out. Considering these parallels can help shed light on Chinese development discourse and practice, as China becomes increasingly important in the field of development once dominated by Western countries. Finally, we also consider direct connections and convergences between the two strategies in China’s neighboring countries of Asia and in the One Belt One Road initiative.     

Russia,China, and the universalism of modernity: the “Account of the Reforms of Peter the Great” by Kang Youwei

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes a short essay by Kang Youwei (1858–1927) – one of the intellectual and political protagonists of late imperial and early Republican China. In it, he interpreted the historical experience of Russian modernization under Peter the Great (1672–1725) and used it as a “success story” for the renewal of Chinese monarchical institutions. It was written in 1898 and presented to the Manchu throne under the title “Account of the Reforms of Peter the Great”, and for our purposes will be the departing point for a “global intellectual circuit” through which the following questions will be addressed: Why was seventeenth and eighteenth century Russia considered as a model for China by the author? How did he manage to adapt the historical experience of Russia into a social and political conceptual framework for China? What was Kang’s historiographical method, and what kind of philosophy of history framed his reflections? What does this short essay tell us about Kang’s view on “Westernization”, on the concept of “modernity” itself, and on its use for historiographical purposes?     

全球史视野与国家史观念:近代边疆史研究的两个维度

近代边疆研究日益引起学术界广泛关注,既是学术研究内在学理自然发展之结果,也与当代社会各界关注边疆问题的历史性反思有着密切关联。对近代边疆史的研究,既不能割裂其与古代边疆史的延续性,也不能拘泥于断代史的话语诠释;既不能忽略边疆问题的殊相,也不要陷入地方史的思维;既要有纵向的深入思考,也要有横向的宽广视野。须从整体思维出发,在全球史视野下审视近代中国边疆问题与全球化进程中国际秩序重构的复杂关系,以国家史观念从全局上把握近代边疆问题与中国国家建设之间密切不可分割的互动关系。     

网络、国家与亚洲地域秩序：华人研究之批判性反思

以华人网络、国家和亚洲地域秩序为切入点,分析和反思了海外华人研究中若干关键性的理论和方法论问题;探讨了华人网络与市场、社会与国家、地方化与全球化的互动关系;解构和重估了华人社会和商业网络的历史性、空间化、制度性和局限性,华人网络在与国家和市场的频密互动中发挥作用,并在这一进程中调适自身的机制和功能。     

Aleppo in Asia: Mercantile networks between Syria,China and post-Soviet Eurasia since 1970

ABSTRACT

Indian Ocean and Mediterranean studies have highlighted the limitations imposed on our understanding of the dynamics of West Asia by the paradigm of area studies and the category of the ‘Middle East’. But less attention has been paid to how expansive perspectives that do not invoke an explicitly maritime geography might enrich our understanding of the region's formative connections. This article seeks to locate the modern city of Aleppo in a trans-regional Asian geography by tracing the shifting history of mercantile networks that connected Aleppo to other parts of Eurasia – notably, parts of the formerly Soviet world and the city of Yiwu in Southeast China. It highlights the importance of trans-regional flows of Soviet patronage, and then Chinese state subsidies and credit, in embedding Aleppo into these expansive circuits. It also argues that these flows have fostered the emergence of a hitherto-unstudied business class in Syria.     

Competing Visions of the Rule of Law in Southeast Asia: Power,Rhetoric and Governance

Abstract

This article introduces a special issue on the emergent relationship between the rhetoric and implementation of the rule of law concept in Southeast Asia. It thematically introduces four country case studies (Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam), and the case of ASEAN’s adoption of the rule of law in region-building, which are included in this special issue. We highlight how ideals that are arguably central to the “tradition” of the rule of law are being excised, marginalised, defended and/or undermined in Southeast Asian contexts. We emphasise how the very concept is deeply contested and far from neutral – at stake is the very notion of “law” for whom, and for what. The article offers insight into the social dynamics affecting how the rule of law is being interpreted by political actors and how it is being contested and consolidated via governance practices in the region, and proposes new avenues for research in assessing how the rule of law is operating in transitional and authoritarian state settings.     

The East Asian War and trade between Kyushu and Southeast Asia in the late sixteenth century: Centered on Katō Kiyomasa's trade with Luzon

Abstract

This article uses Japanese, Chinese, and Western European sources to discuss the plan of the main Japanese general Katō Kiyomasa 加藤清正 to trade with Luzon in the course of the war to invade Korea in the 1590s. In December 1593, Katō Kiyomasa sent a letter from Korea to his territory of Higo directing them to send one of his “Tang boats” to import large quantities of goods such as wheat and silver. At the time, Tang boats were generally used for long-distance routes, and wheat was one of the main goods imported from Japan to Luzon, so this Tang boat may have been sent to Luzon 呂宋. As the East Asian War dragged on, Katō Kiyomasa was very worried about lacking munitions (particularly gunpowder), so he planned on using profits from the Luzon trade to supplement the ever-growing military expenses.

In late-sixteenth-century East Asia, military consumables such as lead and saltpeter were mainly imported through three routes to Japan: the Portuguese Macau–Nagasaki trade, the Chinese smuggler Fujian–Kyushu trade, and the relay trade from China or Southeast Asia through Luzon to Kyushu. However, around 1593, due to the impact of the East Asian War, munitions imported from China to Luzon fell sharply, and the Spanish were also faced with a lack of munitions. On the other hand, while Japan's gold demand as a means of making military expenditures was surging, Katō Kiyomasa certainly planned on importing gold from Luzon and using this to gather munitions like lead and saltpeter in the Japanese domestic market. In addition, starting in the 1590s, apart from Luzon, Japanese merchant ships also started visiting mainland parts of Southeast Asia and trading with them, showing that the red-seal ship trade of the early seventeenth century had origins in the late sixteenth century.     

宅兹中国——重建有关中国的历史论述

班纳迪克·安德森认为所谓庞大的很多国家,实际上只不过是通过想象构成的一个共同体,并不具有实质国家的意义;杜赞奇说,我们不要用现代的民族国家的概念来讨论历史问题,要把历史从民族国家里救出来;施坚雅而以城市为研究对象,改变了将中国作为整体来研究的方式,改变了政治行政区域为单位的研究;日本、韩国强调亚洲史、东亚史,弱化中国与中国史,认为中国不是一个“历史单位”;1996年以后“新清史”诞生,形成一股大潮。看起来似乎只是国外中国学界各种理论、学派、观点的争鸣,但实际上掩藏了很多悬而未决的大问题,“中国”、“中国史”这些概念,面临被消解、结构的困境,学术争鸣的后面又藏着政治的背景。国内学界如何应对,如何解决,本文提出了自己独特的看法。     

THE TRUE FACE OF MOUNT LU: ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PERSPECTIVES AND PARADIGMS1

From a hermeneutic point of view, understanding is always conditioned by one's own horizon and perspective. as the great poet Su Shi remarks, we do not know the “true face of Mount Lu” because what we see constantly changes as we move high or low, far off or up close. But the point of the “hermeneutic circle” is not to legitimize the circularity or subjectivity of one's understanding, but to make us conscious of the challenge. How do we understand China, its history and culture? What should be the appropriate paradigm or perspective for China studies? More than twenty years ago, Paul Cohen argued for a “China‐centered” approach to understanding Chinese history, but to assume an insider's perspective does not guarantee adequate understanding any more than does an outsider's position guarantee emancipation from an insider's myopia or blindness. By discussing several exemplary cases in China studies, this essay argues that neither insiders nor outsiders have monopolistic or privileged access to knowledge, and that integration of different perspectives and their dynamic interaction beyond the isolation of native Chinese scholarship and Western Sinology may lead us to a better understanding of China and its history.     

Changes in Japanese strategy in 1939–1940 and the internationalization of the Sino–Japanese War

In the early stage of the Sino–Japanese War, Japan was trying hard to limit the conflict to within a scope where it could be resolved bilaterally between only the two nations involved. However, her actual behavior was in stark contrast to her wishful desire to be at peace with the United States, pushing the latter step by step instead in the direction of aiding China and thwarting Japan. Caught in a dilemma created as the United States abrogated the American–Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and faced with the changes in the European situation, Japan’s policy makers were eventually pushed by their obsession with the “New East Asian Order” and by their yearning for the “Extended New East Asian Order” which was to include Southeast Asia, deciding to steer the Sino–Japanese War in the direction of “international resolution,” which was just an alternate route to the same goal sought by China. Subsequently, not only did Japan refuse to withdraw from China, she actually took one step further in an expansion southwards, trying to kill several birds with one stone. The war thus spilled over from China to encompass a much greater area. In this process, Japan’s diplomatic corps was often several steps ahead of the military, reflecting the carefully considered background in Japanese policymaking.     

New Historiography for the cultivation of the character of the “new citizen”: Liang Qichao’s ideas of history education and their practice

ABSTRACT

An advocate for modern Chinese historiography, Liang Qichao’s “new historiography” was ideologically quite closely tied to traditional Confucian historiography: his idea of “historiography” was both a form of scholarship for the provision of knowledge, as well as a type of learning for the cultivation of moral character. The fundamental objective of “new historiography” was to use the history of national development and evolution to educate the people, helping them to become nationally conscious “citizens.” However, according to Liang Qichao’s conception of history, the nationalist aspect of “new historiography” ultimately rested in the cultivation of individual character, not in imparting the concept of nationhood. During the movement to “systematize national heritage,” in his practicing of historiography, Liang primarily studied and compiled Chinese academic and intellectual histories, focusing particularly on Confucian history: he interpreted Confucianism and the cream of Chinese scholarship as a kind of “philosophy of life.” Liang’s historiographical practices eventually took shape as a form of moral education to cultivate the leading talents of society when the country was going through a transformation, while in the process signaling his profound repudiation of the empirical emphasis in historical research of the times.