Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975 Part three: January 1973–July 1975

The final volume of the Foreign relations series of documents on Indochina during the Nixon and Ford presidencies is not as detailed as those which preceded it. However, the documents do not support the view that, once the January 1973 Agreement between the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the United States had been concluded, the US was prepared to accept DRV's hegemony over the rest of Indochina, provided only that there was a ‘decent interval’ before it occurred. In fact, both the Nixon and Ford administrations did seek to prevent this from happening, but found their hands tied by congressional opposition. In the case of Cambodia, the United States also found itself the victim of its own illusions about the willingness of the People's Republic of China to support an alternative government led by the former ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Following the more or less total collapse of American policy in April 1975, some interesting ‘post‐mortems’ from various government departments on the history of US involvement in Indochina are also printed in the volume under review.     

Feminism Against Neoliberalism: Theorising Biopolitics in Germany, 1978–1993

Recent scholars have argued that feminism is the handmaiden of neoliberalism. This article suggests otherwise, offering a study of West German feminists in the 1980s. Responding to the advent of reproductive technologies, these feminists were pioneers in critically assessing the relationship between reproduction and neoliberalism. Radical feminists like Maria Mies argued that global capitalism allied with the state to coercively structure reproduction for its needs. For disability rights feminists like Theresia Degener, however, the state did not coerce; it produced citizens who willingly regulated their reproduction under a new eugenics from below. In analysing the marketisation of reproduction, German feminists developed a more sophisticated understanding of neoliberalism than critics today who simplistically theorise neoliberalism as the mere retraction of the state.     

Policy Change and Policy Stasis: Comparing Swiss Foreign Policy toward South Africa (1968–94) and Iraq (1990–91)

This article investigates how concepts from the field of public policy, in particular the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) initially introduced by Sabatier and Jenkins‐Smith, can be applied to the study of foreign policy analysis. Using a most similar comparative case studies design, we examine Switzerland's foreign policy toward South Africa under apartheid for the period from 1968 to 1994 and compare it with the Swiss position toward Iraq after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, when the Swiss government imposed—for the first time—comprehensive economic sanctions against another state. The application of the ACF shows that a dominant advocacy coalition in Swiss foreign policy toward South Africa prevented a major policy change in Swiss–South African relations despite external pressure from the international and national political levels. Actually, quite the opposite could be observed: Swiss foreign policy increased its persistence in not taking economic sanctions against the racist regime in South Africa during the 1980s and early 1990s. The ACF, with its analytical focus on policy subsystems and the role of external shocks as potential triggers for change, provided a useful framework for analyzing the factors for policy change and stasis in Swiss foreign relations toward the selected two countries.     

Changes in unemployment differentials in Sydney, 1947–76

This paper describes the historical development of spatial patterns of male and female unemployment rates within Sydney at each census year from 1947 to 1976, with two objectives: firstly to review the predictions of traditional urban theory that unemployment will be high in inner city areas because of the workforce characteristics of the residents; secondly, to assess the impact of the decentralisation of firms.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975, Part two: January 1972–January 1973

Although anticipated, the North Vietnamese ‘Easter offensive’ against South Vietnam in 1972 created problems for the United States. Having reached a rapprochement with Communist China, President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed that the attack could have serious repercussions for their attempt to balance it with détente with the Soviet Union, not to mention the US's credibility as a Great Power. They also feared it would damage Nixon's prospects for re‐election in November 1972. Despite opposition from his Defense Secretary, Nixon renewed the bombing of North Vietnam which had been stopped by President Johnson in 1968. This helped to bring the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and after complex negotiations, a draft peace agreement was ready for initialling in October 1972. However, President Thieu of South Vietnam saw significant drawbacks in the agreement and refused to go along with it. The North Vietnamese chose to have one more attempt to win on the battlefield and President Nixon, who had scaled down the bombing when peace seemed closer and won a landslide victory in the presidential election, launched another eleven days of concentrated bombing raids on North Vietnam at the turn of the year. This led to the final agreement initialled on 23 January 1973, which President Thieu reluctantly acceded to. Thieu's reservations were justified, but Nixon realized that, despite his electoral victory, he could not count on the continued support of Congress and the American people for the war. Far from bringing ‘peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia’, the January agreement was a fig leaf to cover American withdrawal.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975. Part one: January 1969–January 1972

Some have suggested that Richard Nixon's narrow victory in the US presidential election of November 1968 was due to his persuading the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) to boycott the Paris peace talks for the settlement of the Vietnam War between the US government, that of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the representatives of the communist guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. This seems doubtful. The new president had abandoned the hawkish stance he had adopted when vice‐president in the Eisenhower administration and was anxious to bring the unpopular war to an end. The question was: how? The president, together with his influential National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, adopted a policy of ‘Vietnamization’, which involved the progressive scaling down of the US military presence and the handing over of responsibility for waging the war to the GVN. At the same time, the president recognized that too precipitate an American withdrawal and, above all, one which took place under the terms of an agreement which was too favourable to the communists, would have a deleterious effect upon its allies and its own position as a Great Power. In order to bring about a satisfactory agreement with the DRV, the US employed a twin strategy: secret talks between Kissinger and senior DRV representatives in Paris, coupled with veiled threats of an escalation of the war if the communists acted unreasonably and occasional displays of military strength, such as the incursion into Cambodia in 1970. Although it seemed, briefly, that there might be a breakthrough in Kissinger's secret negotiations with the DRV later in 1971, they broke down mainly as a result of the communists' insistence that the US in effect dismantle the South Vietnamese government for them. An angry Nixon secretly considered retaliation against the DRV to force it to modify its demands and publicly revealed the existence of the negotiations and much of their content to the American people in a speech on 25 January 1972. At the same time, however, he insisted that Vietnamization would continue.     

Reflecting on a Decade of Australian Social Housing Policy: Changes in Supply and Geography, 2001–2011

This paper compares the intent of three Australian social housing policy interventions in the decade to 2011 with outcomes shown in time series data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Census. The three policy interventions are the supply stimulus that occurred in 2009 with funding to construct almost 20 000 new social housing dwellings by 2012, the push to diversify social housing supply through the transfer of public housing stock to community not‐for‐profit housing providers, and the physical renewal of public housing estates to reduce concentrations of social deprivation. Its aims are threefold: to understand how the supply and geography of social housing dwellings has changed over the past decade; to relate these changes to the objectives of social housing policy in the time period; and to identify issues for the future of social housing in Australia emerging from identified disparities between policy rhetoric and supply reality. The paper employs quantitative analysis of social housing supply for all of Australia and mapping of social housing supply changes in the east‐coast mainland state capital cities. This analysis reveals the overall stagnation of social housing supply in Australia over the previous decade, combined with evidence of stock loss in areas of renewal in some cities.     

The Indonesian Devaluation of November 15, 1978 – A Basketful of Dilemmas

The author has known Kurt Martin since the early 1960s when he was in Indonesia on an assignment to assist a new research institute (LEKNAS) in its formative years. It was the latter part of the Sukarno period, when the economy was suffering from rampant inflation, dwindling exports and foreign exchange reserves, and global political orientations that were not too favourable for the growth of the domestic economy. We remember Kurt Martin from those days as an inspiring counterpart in professional discussions, who always tested the logic and relevance of our arguments. We shall always be grateful to him for this role as intellectual sparring partner, but we were no match for his beloved chess games! Kurt is not responsible if, in later years, we have lost some of our intellectual rigour — after many years in government one tends to lose some purity of thought. The author left government in April 1978 to return to university life, but he is still suffering somewhat in the decompression chamber. He is trying to practice detachment in his observance of public affairs but finds this very difficult.     

The Decentralization Process of Rural Development Policy in Greece

This study aims at critically assessing the decentralization process of rural policy-making and delivery in Greece. Drawing upon a case study of the farm modernization scheme, research findings indicate that despite remarkable decentralization efforts, rural development in Greece seems to maintain its primarily state-emanated design and implementation. Long-standing top-down and sectoral orientation in the formulation of this policy still holds. Apart from the redistribution of responsibilities and the multiplication of competent authorities, a genuine delegation of competencies and resources is needed, coupled with a renewed awareness of integrated policies from the actors involved at all administrative levels.     

Outbidding to Radical Nationalists: Minority Policy in Estonia, 1988–1993

Abstract. Given the pressure exerted by Russia and the international alter focused on Estonia as a result, why did Estonia opt to deny citizenship to the maji of its Russian-speaking population and to disenfranchise them at a time v decisions about the basic structure of the state were being made? Com explanations for radical policy towards other ethnic groups focus on histo animosity or changes in demographics. However, I argue that these explanations insufficient to explain the changes in Estonian policy over time. Instead I focus 01 political process, dividing the Estonian drive for independence into three stags discuss the increasing relaxation of the political constraints on outbidding to rai nationalists. The conclusion examines the impact of Estonia's policies on et relations and discusses the implications for domestic and international policy.     

Making a Policy Problem of Water Export in Canada: 1960–2002

The article explores how political tensions developed around the issue of Canadian water export, how policy solutions and alternatives to the problem were offered, and how finally it came to be recognized by the national government. The water export issue reached the formal agenda after a lengthy period of being denied serious consideration. However, it is arguable that agendas are set if an issue receives attention from policy decision makers. This is because an issue's ascension to agenda status is not an indication of how it is actually going to be decided upon. The case of water export demonstrates that the government adopted a policy solution consistent with assumptions prevalent at the time and acceptable among elected decision makers. Yet, the solution was contrary to the expectations of those who demanded a complete water export ban in Canada.