Ideological Primary Competition and Congressional Behavior

Abstract

Primary challenges on an incumbent’s more extreme flank have become increasingly common in congressional elections. We explore the consequences on the legislative behavior of successful incumbents following these types of challenges. We propose that the effect of extreme ideological primary challenges is conditioned on whether the member belongs to the majority or the minority party. We test our expectations on primary elections from 2000 to 2012 and corresponding changes in voting behavior in the next Congress. We find that incumbents in the majority party who have defeated an extreme ideological primary challenge are less likely to support their party, especially on key votes. We expect this reaction is because they fear appearing too moderate and thereby encouraging another extreme ideological primary challenge. We find that incumbents in the minority party who face an extreme ideological challenge do not change their general voting behavior, but are more likely to vote with their party on key votes.     

Under what conditions do ethnic minority candidates attract the ethnic minority vote? How neighbourhood and candidate characteristics affected ethnic affinity voting in the Dutch 2017 parliamentary elections

Ethnic affinity voting is the term for when political party candidates with an ethnic minority background receive a larger share of the vote in ethnically dense neighbourhoods. This study is one of the first to provide a detailed test for ethnic affinity voting during a national election in an open-list proportional representation system, with the same ballots in every polling station. It tests the conditions under which ethnic affinity voting is greater, studying the proportion of votes for ethnic minority candidates at neighbourhood level in the Netherlands in 2017, when a minority-interest party entered parliament and the traditional ethnic vote for the social democratic party (PvdA) imploded. This study disentangles party and candidate effects and finds evidence for (general and specific) ethnic affinity voting at candidate level. Even though ethnic minority candidates attract fewer votes, they perform better in neighbourhoods where more minorities live, especially when the group size of co-ethnics is larger. Ethnic affinity effects are relatively strong for candidates affiliated with minority-oriented and left-wing parties, and absent or negative for ethnic candidates of right-wing parties. Moreover, whether male or female ethnic candidates are more likely to attract the ethnic vote also depends on the ethnic background and party affiliation of the candidate.     

Electoral inequalities in the 1990 federal elections

Due to the concentration of Australian Labor Party voters, that party has to poll more votes than the Liberal and National Parties to win an election. That is not a gerrymander, for no matter how fairly the boundaries were drawn, Labor would still need to poll more votes than its opponents under the preferential, single‐member constituency voting system. Nevertheless, even under perfectly fair electoral redistributions, Labor is bound to come off worst because Labor voters are more highly concentrated than non‐Labor voters.     

Compulsory voting,turnout and party advantage in Australia∗

Who votes or does not vote in a voluntary system has long been thought to have distinct benefits for different political parties. High turnout has been seen as aiding parties of the left, low turnout parties of the right. Although Australia has a compulsory system of voting, this paper shows tha there are still party advantages and disadvantages associated with the 5 percent of the eligible electorate who fail to vote. When turnout is high, Labor makes a net gain in votes, and when turnout is low, the Liberal‐National coalition benefit. Making estimates of nonvoting in Britain and applying them to Australia indicates that this pattern would persist if voluntary voting were applied to Australia, giving the Liberal‐National coalition an inbuilt advantage.     

Strategic voting and constituency context: Modelling party preference and vote in multiparty elections

We examine the role of strategic motivations in mediating the relationship between underlying political preferences and vote choice, in a multiparty, single member, simple plurality system, and examine the role of constituency context in determining the scope for strategic voting. Political preference data from the British Election Panel Survey, 1997–2001, were modelled with mixed multinomial logit models. Latent variables were used to model the stable party political traits underlying observed preferences, allowing correlation between choices and so avoiding the restrictive assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives. Ranked approval ratings were used to characterize the underlying political preferences in the presence of insincere voting. From these models we estimate that approximately 9% of votes cast may have been affected by strategic factors. In keeping with ‘Duvergers law’, the smallest of the three main parties, the Liberal Democrats, were found to be most affected by strategic voting.     

Dealignment and demobilisation? Nonvoting in New Zealand 1938–1990

New Zealand has had a reputation for high voting participation, but age‐eligible turnout has declined since 1938 and, despite a brief recovery between 1975 and 1984, continued to fall subsequently. By 1990 it was far closer to the average turnout of Western democracies. Brief analysis of aggregate data since 1938 sets the scene for more specific study of individual‐level data from the 1963, 1981, and 1990 elections, which indicates effects which are minimal for institutional factors, small for social and demographic variables, and substantial for changes in public attitudes. In particular, dealignment of the party system and voter demobilisation are associated with declining interest in politics, political efficacy, and party identification. While also associated with extra‐parliamentary mass action to the partial detriment of voting among the university‐educated in 1981, a more general mobilisation of postmaterialist issues was probably responsible for the post‐1975 turnout recovery. After 1984 the longer‐term trend was reestablished.     

Geography of contestation: A study on the Yellow Vest movement and the rise of populism in France

The rise of a geography of discontent highlighted in recent studies points to a strong association between voting for populist parties and territories with socioeconomic difficulties. While discontent has primarily been addressed through the analysis of populist votes, we provide additional elements of analysis by comparing these populist votes to the Yellow Vest movement, and we distinguish the populist votes coming from the far-left party from those coming from the far-right party. Our results show that the Yellow Vest movement cannot be confused with French populist supporters and that their sensitivity to territorial dimensions also differs from that of the latter, especially in terms of access to public services. Their behavior highlights that the geography of protest takes multiple shapes and cannot be reduced to a simple opposition between urban and mostly rural or peripheral areas. This raises serious concerns about the dynamics of territories and the deleterious effects of metropolization and the closure of public services in peri-urban and rural territories that are not specific to France.     

When Loyalty Is Tested: Do Party Leaders Use Committee Assignments as Rewards?

Theories of parties in Congress contend that one tool that party leaders possess to induce loyalty among rank-and-file members is control over committee assignments, but conventional tests of this linkage have failed to distinguish loyalty from simply voting one's preferences in accordance with party leaders. We characterize loyal legislators as having a higher propensity for voting with party leaders when it matters, even when their preferences diverge from the mainstream of their party. Testing this strong definition of loyalty on committee assignment data for 1991–2015, we show that majority party members who support their party on the subset of votes for which party leaders have taken positions in floor speeches are more likely to be rewarded with plum committee assignments, especially those members on the ideological extremes.     

Some approaches to election night forecasting in Australia

We outline the history of election night forecasting in Australia. We first identify the major structural features of the Australian voting system which determine how the problem must be approached: single‐member constituencies; preferential voting; the counting on election night, in polling booths, of first preference votes only: and the existence of a two‐party system. We note that the major statistical difficulty associated with election night forecasting in Australia is that progressive counts in a seat, far from being random samples of the votes cast, are non‐random and systematically biased samples. We finally outline the increasingly sophisticated computer models which have been used to correct for this bias, culminating in the ‘matched polling places’ model implemented by the Australian Electoral Commission at the 1990 election, which has effectively eliminated the problem of bias.     

Roll Call Votes on Cabinet Confirmations

Studies of cabinet nominations by the Senate have focused on the process and the outcomes of cabinet confirmation votes in the Senate, while the individual votes of senators have received little attention. This study examines roll call votes on all cabinet nominations since 1969 in an effort to explore the effects political and personal factors have on senators' votes on cabinet confirmations. Three basic conclusions emerge: the most significant influences on senators' confirmation votes are personal factors, especially perceptions of the nominee being a policy extremist; negatives matter more than positives; and there are partisan differences, as presidential party senators have a higher probability of voting to confirm when allegations of wrongdoing are made.     

Partisan Efficiency in an Open-Rule Setting: The Amending Process in the U.S. Senate, 1865–1945

Given significant differences between the House and Senate's amending processes, one would anticipate the Senate majority party to be far less successful when voting on the floor. However, recent work has demonstrated that majority party success on the Senate floor is remarkably similar to the House. We argue that an overlooked explanation for majority party success stems from its ability to control intra-party amending activity through coordination between members of the majority party. Utilizing a new data set consisting of all amendments receiving recorded roll call votes in the Senate from 1865–1945, we demonstrate that majority party extremists refrain from offering amendments despite the relative open-floor setting. Nevertheless, chamber majorities cannot restrict minority legislators from offering amendments designed to force them to cast uncomfortable votes and delay the legislative process.     

The Modern Presidency and Theories of Accountability: Old Wine and Old Bottles

This study attempts to reconcile two apparently conflicting characteristics of congressional voting–stability in congressional decisionmaking and efforts to influence change in congressional voting decisions–by developing a concept and measurement of congressional voting response to short-term forces. The analysis indicates that congressional members do occasionally deviate from established policy positions on a subset of votes in response to the President of their party. In general, congressional members are more likely to deviate from their general policy positions when the policy area is characterized by change.     

A revisionist interpretation of the impact of Queensland's electoral scheme

In December 1989 Queensland voters changed their government from National Party to Labor Party. Labor had been out of office since August 1957, a record period of opposition for a major party. How is that very lengthy Labor period in the wilderness to be explained? The orthodox interpretation is that there has been a gerrymander in Queensland. This article argues, however, that Queensland's electoral system is the same as that of other mainland states. While it is true that electorates are malapportioned in Queensland (and in Western Australia), nevertheless the method of single member electorates with preferential voting is in use for all mainland states. Such a system does not translate a party's percentage of votes into a similar percentage of seats in the Legislative Assembly. The elections of 1956 and 1989 each saw Labor getting a first preference vote in excess of 50 per cent— with which Labor won in excess of 60 per cent of the seats. At no election between these dates did Labor secure a majority of votes, either first preference or two party preferred.     

Multi‐member electorates and the development of Australian party politics

Australian political scientists have paid little attention to voting in multi‐member electorates apart from the working of Proportional Representation in Tasmania and the Senate. Yet the existence of such electorates and the methods of voting therein probably helped Labor parties gain their first representation in the colonial parliaments.

The strength of their organisations meant that those parties often fared well in the state‐wide electorates for the Senate after federation. From 1902 the prohibition of plumping in Senate elections fostered ticket voting. It not only introduced the first coercive element into the electoral system, but, by establishing a ‘winner‐take‐all’ method of voting, encouraged a two‐party system at federal level.     

Geographical Scale, the 'Feel-Good Factor' and Voting at the 1997 General Election in England and Wales

Many analysts associate voting patterns in Great Britain with electors' evaluations of the state of the economy, whereby those who think it has improved recently are likely to vote for the government's return to power, whereas those who think it has worsened are more likely to vote for an opposition party. Most of these studies consider the national economy only, but data derived from the 1997 British Election Study cross–sectional survey show strong relationships between votes and evaluations of recent changes in the electors' (self-defined) home areas. This paper relates those evaluations, and the resultant voting patterns, to the 'objective circumstances' in the respondents' home areas, using unemployment rates as an indicator of local economic well-being. Using specially devised data for 'bespoke neighbourhoods' around each respondent's home, we show that the probability of a vote against the government was a function of both 'objective conditions' and 'subjective evaluations', and that there were significant scale effects in this: people apparently reacted to very local variations when making their voting decisions.     

Voting technologies and residual ballots in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections

The accurate counting of ballots is essential for a functional democracy. In recent elections, particularly the exceedingly narrow presidential one in 2000, widespread concerns surfaced that votes were not being counted accurately. This paper examines major voting technologies, their advantages and disadvantages, and the significance of residual ballots (overvotes and undervotes) across U.S. counties in the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004. In the 2000 election, 1.9 million ballots were voided, as were more than 2.3 million in 2004. The analysis explores three fundamental questions: (1) Do voting technologies tend to favor one political party over its rival? (2) Do voting technologies tend to favor one ethnic group over another? (3) Do voting technologies favor urban areas over rural ones? The empirical results consistently deny the existence of any of these biases at the national level, although the possibility of local bias remains an open question. The conclusion links these issues to the on-going debate about voting technology reform.     

Attitudes Towards Divided Government and Ticket-splitting in Australia and the United States

Divided party government has become a frequent occurrence in both the United States and Australia in recent years. In the United States, Morris Fiorina has argued that this result is intentional on the part of the voters, who do not fully trust either party to govern by itself. We test this theory in both the United States and Australia by comparing the voting patterns of those who prefer divided versus united party government. It is hypothesised that Fiorina's theory will actually work better in Australia than in the United States, due to the presence of a strong party system as well as a voting system for the Australian Senate that facilitates strategic voting on behalf of small parties. Indeed, near-identical logistic regression models demonstrate that Australians' attitudes about divided government are a very significant predictor of straight-ticket voting even when a host of other factors is controlled for, whereas in the United States such attitudes are insignificant.     

Did Recent Voice Reforms Improve Good Governance within the World Bank?

Using the concept of good governance, this article assesses how voting rules in the World Bank Group's primary loan facility determine members’ ability to influence the formation of winning coalitions in the Executive Board. In weighted voting systems, the percentage of votes held by an actor does not adequately measure the ability of that actor to affect outcomes because voting weights do not account for either the possible number of coalitions that may form or the number of votes needed to pass a resolution. In short, weighted voting systems cannot be straightforwardly analysed with reference to voting weights but instead require the determination of relative voting power. Using multiple measures of a priori voting power, data are presented before and after recent voice reforms. Results indicate that the United States, as expected, holds the largest share of voting power. Also, as expected, most borrowing members have little voting power. Unexpectedly, in several voting groups a single member is able to ensure its election to the Board. Hence, other members of these voting groups have no formal influence on the Board. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of voting power analysis for the concept of good governance within the World Bank.     

Setting the Table: Majority Party Effects in the United States Senate

This article joins the growing tide of research that studies party effects in the United States Senate. Previous work has shown that certain procedural tools disproportionately advantage the majority party at the expense of the minority. We build on this research by exploiting a new dataset that allows us to study motions to table amendments from the 91st to the 111th Congress. By examining the success of these motions, analyzing the voting calculus of individual senators on procedural and substantive votes, and simulating the aggregate impact of this tool, we provide some of the strongest evidence to date that political parties (and the majority party in particular) influence the legislative process and policy outcomes in the Senate. Our findings stand in stark contrast to the traditional vision of the Senate as an individualistic body.     

A spatial interaction model of vote dispersion

How do votes disperse through a territory? Studies of spatial voting patterns have largely focused on the influence of local factors on voting. The “Friends and Neighbors” model (Key (1949)) explains the advantage of candidates running for office in the locality with which they are associated (Arzheimer and Evans (2012, 2014): Collignon and Sajuria (2018); Horiuchi et al. (2018); Jankowski (2016); Hunt (2020); Munis (2021)), and the “neighbor” effect helps to explain why votes spread. More recent studies have found that the dispersion of votes decreases with distance (Put et al. (2020); Arzheimer and Evans (2012)). However, we know little about how spatial patterns of voting emerge or the mechanism behind the neighbor effect. We argue that this effect depends on the neighbors’ access to information about a candidate, which is constrained by the way information flows. Although scholars have argued that information is a relevant driver explaining the dispersion of votes (Bowler et al. (1993); Arzheimer and Evans (2012); Evans et al. (2017); Campbell, Cowley, Vivyan, and Wagner (2019)), no research has examined the relevance of the network through which information flows. We propose that a spatial interaction model (Wilson (1971)) allows us to predict where this information flows or the voting pattern that will form. Taking advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in Brazilian legislative elections in 1974 and 1978, we show that votes spread through areas of influence created by a hierarchy of cities based on the flows of exchanges among them, including information. We then use our spatial interaction model to predict voting patterns in the elections of 1978 using data from the 1974 elections. Our findings show that the spatial interaction model results fit the data quite well and can help predict spatial patterns of voting.