Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran

Since the mid-1980s, Israel, thGawdat Bahgate United States, and other Western powers have accused Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons capability. Iranian officials have categorically denied these accusations and claimed that their nuclear program is designed for civilian purposes. This essay examines the history of Iran's nuclear program since the late 1950s and analyzes the forces that shape the country's nuclear policy. These forces include perception of security threats from Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, and the United States; domestic economic and political dynamics; and national pride. The following section will discuss the European and Russian stance on Iran's nuclear ambition as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency's efforts to reach a compromise that would satisfy the international community's concerns and Tehran's demands. The essay concludes with some predictions on how Iran's nuclear program is likely to evolve in the next few decades.     

Iran's ISIS policy

This article assesses Iran's strategy in dealing with the threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It examines the implications of the rise of ISIS in Iran's immediate neighbourhood for Tehran's policies in Syria and Iraq and investigates how each of these countries affects Iranian national interests. It provides an overview of the major events marking Iran and Iraq's relations in the past few decades and discusses the strategic importance of Iraq for Iran, by looking at the two countries' energy, economic and religious ties. It also considers Iran's involvement in Syria since the beginning of the Syrian conflict. The article sheds light on the unilateral action taken by Tehran to counter ISIS, the adjustments it may have to make to its involvement in Syria, and the potential areas for tactical cooperation between Iran and the United States, as well as other key regional states such as Saudi Arabia. The article investigates three likely scenarios affecting the developments in Iraq and Iran's possible response to them as the events in the Middle East unfold.     

Iran: Island of Stability orLand in Turmoil

Iran is a critical state in international relations because of its natural resources, its strategic location, its controversial conservative Islamic regime and its effect on shifting the balance of power in the Middle East. As a result, Iran is facing pressure from all sides. There are currently four possible future scenarios for Iran: the Iranian regime will remain stable; the Iranian regime will become increasingly unstable; the stability of the Iranian regime depends on international action; the Iranian regime will reform itself from within. It is only by improving its image, that the U.S. can positively affect any of these scenarios. Iran has historically been an essential actor in the international arena because ofits strategic location and its position as a major oil producer; Iran is currently the fourth largest producer of crude oil, the third largest holder of proven oil reserves and the second largest holder of natural gas reserves. Today, Iran remains a critical state, not only because of its strategic location and its abundance of natural resources, but also because of its alleged role as a “state sponsor of terror,” its nuclear program, its human rights abuses, its controversial conservative Islamic regime which is at odds with America, and its effect on shifting the balance of power in the Middle East, especially in light of the U.S. removal of the Taliban and Hussein regimes, two of Iran's biggest threats (Stockman, 2004). It is because of a combination of these factors that the Iranian government is feeling much pressure from all angles. Domestically, the Iranian regime is feeling pressure from the Iranian society as the regime is shifting back from a trend towards liberalism as represented by the Khatami government, towards Ahmadinejad's more conservative and traditional regime. Manifestations of this disapproval were seen in the 2007 municipal elections, in which reformers won the plurality of votes (Not Pro‐Prez or Pro‐Reform, 2006). Internationally, Iran has been accused of being a state sponsor of terror and has been labeled by the American government as a member of the “axis of evil,” and as a violator of human rights. Finally, within the regime itself, Ahmadinejad's confrontational foreign policy has caused a split within the conservative block; dividing the pragmatists who want to engage in trade and resume relations with the West, and those who adhere to a strict interpretation of the Islamic Revolution by welcoming confrontation with the West. Furthermore, tensions exist, not only between the reform minded Majlis and the conservative Council of Guardians, but also between the Majlis and the president, who has recently been criticized for his aggressive foreign policy that is isolating Iran from the world.     

Iran's nuclear challenge: nine years and counting

The technical and political evidence that Iran is seeking to establish a ‘nuclear hedging’ capability has gradually increased over the past nine years. The regime in Tehran has continued to insist that its nuclear ambitions are purely civilian in nature and it has resisted the international community's dual‐track policy, encompassing both negotiations and sanctions, to persuade Iran to be fully transparent about its nuclear activities and plans, and to suspend work related to uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. While the prospects for a negotiated solution currently appear slim, the regime does not yet appear to have decided whether, or when, to produce nuclear weapons and to break out of the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty. It is essential, therefore, to maintain and if necessary to build up the pressure on Iran and to strengthen efforts to disrupt its procurement of technology and materials for its nuclear programme. It is also imperative for the international community to maintain negotiations and also consider alternative diplomatic approaches to enhance the prospects of keeping Iran focused purely on civil nuclear ambitions, while at the same time resolving questions related to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme.     

Iran and the United States: Reconcilable Differences?

Hostility between Iran and the United States has intensified since the mid-2000s. America's allegations regarding Iran's nuclear program and its association with terrorist organizations are the main drive for this rising tension. This study focuses on the latter. Specifically, it examines Tehran's ties to militant groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories. I argue that although American and Iranian interests in the region are very different, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.     

Iran as a ‘pariah’ nuclear aspirant

This article demonstrates that Iran conforms to Richard K. Betts' model of a ‘pariah’ nuclear aspirant, as its nuclear program is driven by a potent combination of security, normative and domestic political motivations. The regime's commitment to its nuclear program is influenced by Iran's long-standing sense of vulnerability to both regional and international adversaries, and an enduring sense of national humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, in parallel with a powerful belief in the superiority of Persian civilisation. This has resulted in the development of a narrative of ‘hyper-independence’ in Iran's foreign policy that simultaneously rejects political, cultural or economic dependence and emphasises ‘self-reliance’. The presumed security benefits that a nuclear weapons option provides are seen as ensuring Iranian ‘self-reliance’ and ‘independence’. This suggests that current strategies that focus exclusively on Iran's security motivations or on a heightened regime of sanctions are fundamentally flawed, as they fail to recognise the mutually reinforcing dynamic between Iran's security and normative/status-derived nuclear motivations.     

The Shah's détente with Khrushchev: Iran's 1962 missile base pledge to the Soviet Union

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran is commonly portrayed in Cold War historiography as a loyal client of the United States. Yet, the shah also pursued détente with Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, culminating in Iran's September 1962 pledge to the Soviet Union that no foreign missile bases would be permitted on Iranian territory. Drawing on American and British documentary sources, as well as the memoirs of several Iranian participants, this article suggests that the shah's 1962 pledge was not simply a ploy to leverage more arms from the United States. Rather, it represented the shah's first modest step towards a more independent foreign policy during the Cold War.     

Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment

For years, mounting instability had led many to predict the imminent collapse of Yemen. These forecasts became reality in 2014 as the country spiralled into civil war. The conflict pits an alliance of the Houthis, a northern socio‐political movement that had been fighting the central government since 2004, alongside troops loyal to a former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, against supporters and allies of the government overthrown by the Houthis in early 2015. The war became regionalized in March 2015 when a Saudi Arabia‐led coalition of ten mostly Arab states launched a campaign of air strikes against the Houthis. According to Saudi Arabia, the Houthis are an Iranian proxy; they therefore frame the war as an effort to counter Iranian influence. This article will argue, however, that the Houthis are not Iranian proxies; Tehran's influence in Yemen is marginal. Iran's support for the Houthis has increased in recent years, but it remains low and is far from enough to significantly impact the balance of internal forces in Yemen. Looking ahead, it is unlikely that Iran will emerge as an important player in Yemeni affairs. Iran's interests in Yemen are limited, while the constraints on its ability to project power in the country are unlikely to be lifted. Tehran saw with the rise of the Houthis a low cost opportunity to gain some leverage in Yemen. It is unwilling, however, to invest larger amounts of resources. There is, as a result, only limited potential for Iran to further penetrate Yemen.     

How to talk and listen to Iran (Respond to this article at http://www.therai.org.uk/at/debate)

In this editorial, the author seeks to understand the cultural dynamics behind Iran's nuclear negotiations.     

Reading Iran: American Academics and the Last Shah

Despite the nature of American influence in postwar Iran, and despite the fact that Iranian studies has grown into a flourishing field in the United States, scholars have not explored the field's origins during the Cold War era. This article begins with the life of T. Cuyler Young to trace the critical genealogy within the field as it developed, in cooperation between American and Iranian scholars, during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. It proceeds to analyze two cohorts of American scholars whose political inclinations ranged from liberal reformism to revolutionary Marxism. As revolutionary momentum swelled in Iran in the late 1970s, critical scholars broke through superpower dogmas and envisioned a post-shah Iran. However, Cold War teleologies prevented them from fully grasping Iranian realities, particularly Khomeini's vision for Iran. This article argues that the modern field of Iranian studies in the United States was shaped by multiple generations of critical voices, all of which were informed by historically situated encounters with Iran and expressed through a range of methodological and theoretical perspectives.     

The German Argentines between Nazism and Nationalism: The Patagonia Plot of 1939

Abstract

When seizing control of the US embassy In Tehran in November 1979 during the Iranian revolution, militant students not only took sixty-one US citizens hostage, but also captured thousands of pages of official documents. During the 1980s, they published seventy-seven volumes of selections in order to prove to the world that the United States had colluded with the Pahlavi regime, and to discredit Iranian moderates by revealing their former ties to US officials. In keeping with the militants' perception of the embassy's role in Iran's domestic politics, they entitled the publications Documents from the US Espionage Den (Asnad-i Lanah-yi Jasusi).¹ Surprisingly, among the papers published is one by Harvard University anthropologist Michael M. J. Fischer entitled ‘Religion and Progress in Iran’, apparently written for a state department colloquium on Iran held on 25 May 1979. In the introduction, Fischer characterizes the Islamic Republic as a ‘challenge to modernization theory’: ‘Iran has been a major test case for modernization theory throughout the 1960s and 1970s. It was the case where the constraint of capital was theoretically removed, and therefore the case where transformation from the third world into the first world was expected to be most feasible.’²     

‘Real men want to go to Tehran’: Bush,pre‐emption and the Iranian nuclear challenge

The desire for regime change in Iran has coloured the Bush administration's approach to the challenge presented by Tehran's apparent desire to build a nuclear weapons capability. Yet the threat of military force either to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure and/or to eff ect regime change has proved counterproductive to the simultaneous eff orts to stop the Iranian programme through diplomacy. Indeed, the entire Bush policy towards Iran of simultaneously wishing to coerce, undermine and replace the regime while also seeking to persuade it to abandon its nuclear programme through diplomacy has proved both strategically inconsistent and consistently counterproductive. In failing to decide whether it prioritizes a change of regime or a change of behaviour it has got neither. This article elucidates the rationale behind the Bush administration's policy approach, demonstrating how in seeking both objectives simultaneously it has achieved neither. It sets out instead a set of policies to regain the initiative in US‐Iranian relations and to prioritize and coordinate American policy goals within a broader Middle East policy.     

‘What They Need is Management’: American NGOs,the Second Seven Year Plan and Economic Development in Iran, 1954–1963

Following the August 1953 coup d'etat, the government of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in Iran embarked upon an economic development program. While financial backing for the program came from the Anglo-American oil companies running Iran's oil industry, Iran's semi-independent Plan Organization and its administrator Abu'l-?asan Ebtehāj turned to American non-governmental organizations for administrative expertise, in order to turn Iran's oil power into economic improvements and a basis for the regime's lasting stability. The work of these organizations was hampered by internal disagreements and divisions, discontent among Iranians over the foreign infiltration of their development program, and skepticism from the US government regarding the capacity of Iran to accomplish an integrated development effort on such a scale. Such feelings were influenced by cultural prejudices and perceptions of Iranians as corrupt and incompetent. Ultimately American non-government organizations were pushed out by the shah who seized control over Iran's development during the 1963 White Revolution. The course of Iran's Second Seven Year Plan illustrate how Western technical and administrative ‘know-how’ were tied to the efforts harnessing new oil wealth, and how the relationship between American and Iranian developmentalists was undone by politics, prejudice and opposing view of how progress could come from petroleum.     

Iranian Membership in the World Trade Organization: An Unclear Future

Iran is the largest economy that is not currently included in the World Trade Organization (WTO). This paper addresses why Iran has not yet joined the WTO and whether it is ready to join. Iran's interaction with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948 marks the beginning of the relationship between Iran and the WTO. To determine why Iran has not yet entered the WTO, the role and penetration of powerful members of the WTO and Iran's economic position are examined. To determine whether Iran is ready to join the WTO, literature is reviewed concerning the effects of joining for the five most-affected major industries in Iran. The major disadvantages of joining the WTO are described as short-term effects, and the advantages of joining are described as long-term goals. Currently, no clear scheme has been offered to handle the negative effects on the Iranian economy. As the major player, the Iranian government could achieve the long-term goals with a realistic and well-planned strategy or miss the mark through its inattention to the critical economic effects.     

European Union Constructive Engagement with Iran (2000–2004): An Exercise in Conditional Human Rights Diplomacy

In 2002, the European Union (EU) announced that it would enter a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran. The deepening of economic and diplomatic relations between the EU and Iran was, however, linked by the Commission to progress in four areas: human rights, non-proliferation, terrorism and the Middle East Peace Process. This article argues that the current focus on efforts to find a solution to Iran's nuclear ambitions has overshadowed the dynamics of EU human rights diplomacy towards that country. Unlike diplomatic pressure on the non-proliferation issue, the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue did not only enjoy great support by politicians and human rights activists, but did indeed result in changes in legislation and policies aimed at the protection of human rights. Europe's multi-track strategy allowed Iranian activists and members of the legal profession to approach the notion of human rights from within the Shi'a notion of justice and rationality and thus managed to assert Islamic roots for human rights and uncovered the very secular realities of human rights violations in the Islamic Republic. The Dialogue was launched at a critical juncture in Iran's reformist movement and helped likeminded politicians, particularly the executive and parliament, to gain momentum domestically and credibility internationally. While efforts at reform were and still are often impeded by the country's competing centers of power, this article argues that efforts to promote and protect human rights in Iran must not be sacrificed for concerns over the nuclear issue.     

Sanctions,Smuggling, and the Cigarette: The Granting of Iran OFAC Licenses to Big Tobacco

This paper seeks to understand the political economy implications of nicotine addiction in Iran, focusing on the US Office of Foreign Asset Control's granting of Iran operations licenses to American tobacco companies. Presuming that tobacco taxes, levied both as import duties and ad valorem, would financially benefit the Iranian government, the introduction of a highly desired US product to the market would be antithetical to the sanctions regime currently in place. By comparing Iran's tobacco industry, and the attendant public health crisis that has arisen from high rates of nicotine addiction, to conditions in Turkey, it can be demonstrated that Iran is uniquely unable to extract revenues from the sale of tobacco products. The primary point of comparison between Iran and Turkey is smoking-attributable annual productivity losses of each country, as estimated through the use of Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Morbidity and Economic Costs Software (SAMMEC) and the available related literature. According to the calculations derived from the SAMMEC model, Iran is burdened with an astonishing economic cost due to the high prevalence of smokers. It is concluded that an awareness of this condition enables OFAC to award licenses to Big Tobacco without fear of undermining current foreign policy initiatives.     

Anglo-Iranian Treaty Negotiations: Reza Shah,Teymurtash and the British Government, 1927–32

From 1927 to 1932, wide-reaching negotiations took place between Reza Shah's court minister, ‘Abdolhossein Khan Teymurtash, and the British Legation in Tehran, the aim of which was to resolve all outstanding issues and to normalize relations between the two countries on the basis of a general treaty. This article examines these Anglo-Iranian negotiations with a particular focus on the thorniest issues—Iran's territorial claims in the Persian Gulf, particularly its claims to sovereignty over Bahrain, Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands. Though an agreement was never reached, an examination of the content and conduct of these negotiations offers some valuable insights into the unique features of Iranian nationalism and Iranian ambitions in the Persian Gulf during the Reza Shah period.     

Promoting the Advancement of Women: Baha'i Schools for Girls in Iran, 1909–35

In the early twentieth century, Iranian Baha'is were at the forefront of efforts to promote modern schooling for girls in Iran. Using previously untapped published primary sources and archival records, this article examines the history of the Baha'i schools for girls in the context of modern schooling of Iranian girls and assesses their contribution to female education in Iran. This contribution was significant and all the more remarkable considering the Iranian Baha'is’ numbers and resources and the restrictions under which they operated. Most notably, in the spring of 1933, less than two years before the forced closure of Baha'i schools by the Pahlavi state, 4 percent of all females in Iran's accredited schools were enrolled in Baha'i schools. The Baha'i community's most prestigious school, Tarbīyat-i banāt in Tehran, was by this time Iran's largest girls’ school. Outside Tehran, in some localities, the only girls’ schools were run by Baha'is, and in others a significant portion of all female pupils were enrolled in Baha'i schools.     

Living with nuclear hedging: the implications of Iran's nuclear strategy

For the past decade, much attention has been devoted to the potential consequences of a nuclear‐armed Iran. Yet the binary ‘acquisition/restraint’ lens through which the Iranian nuclear issue is frequently viewed is limiting. There is now much evidence to suggest that Iran is engaged in a strategy based on nuclear hedging, rather than an outright pursuit of the bomb. This does not change the need to contain Tehran's proliferation potential, yet it does add another layer of complexity to the challenge. Iran will retain a low level of latency whatever the final outcome of longstanding diplomatic efforts to constrain the scope and pace of its nuclear efforts. This article will explore the implications of Iranian nuclear hedging and consider how regional rivals might interpret and respond to Tehran's nuclear strategy. On a larger scale, the article will explore the potential impact of the international community's approach to the Iranian case—implicitly recognizing, even giving legitimacy to, hedging—both in terms of the future of the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the ability of the international community to limit the negative effects of this form of proliferation behaviour.     

Cultural Engineering Under Authoritarian Regimes: Islamization of Universities in Postrevolutionary Iran

The purpose of this article is to analyze the efforts that have been made to Islamize Iranian universities, specifically since the emergence of hardliners in 2005. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Islamic regime relentlessly intensified its efforts to Islamize universities to train a new generation of ideologically driven students. In the three decades following the Revolution, three major periods of university Islamization have been implemented. The Cultural Revolution, which started in 1980, was the first step in the Islamization of Iran's universities: to cleanse the higher education systems from students and professors who criticized the new established Islamic regime. By increasing the number of students and the development of universities throughout Iran in the Rafasanjai era, the second wave of the Islamization of the university was triggered by Ayatollah Khamenei in 1994. During the reform era, the Islamization of universities slowed because of the many confrontations between the Supreme Leader and the reformist administrations. With the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential election, the Islamization of universities intensified. While there are a few publications about the Islamization of universities, they mainly focused on the first and second decades following the 1979 Revolution. Focusing on the third period, this article will investigate the different strategies and tactics for the Islamization of universities, as well as reasons for its failures.