THE ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS

The topic here is whether broad public interests in consumer rights, a clean environment, and political reform have the organizational strength to be represented effectively when policy-making is the responsibility of bureaus and administrative agencies. The most persuasive explanation of why such interests could not be effective on a sustained basis is the collective action theory of Mancur Olson. The paper supports research arguing for modifications of Olson's theory by showing how public interests have been at least partially successful in maintaining effectiveness over time based on four concepts: the similarity of public interest groups to social movements, the use of purposive and solidary incentives, the use of material incentives to support lobbying as a by-product of other activities, and the role of organizational entrepreneurs supported by new technology, notably the computerized mailing list.     

INTEREST GROUPS AND LITIGATION

Interest groups engaged in litigation are faced with questions of litigation strategy and of allocation of resources. Planned constitutional litigation, part of mobilization of the law, is problematic, as is the choice of forum in which the litigation is brought. Litigation by interest groups is affected by the political environment, including judicial rulings; the complexity of litigation itself; inter-organizational relations; and, most importantly, a series of intra-organizational factors. The latter include control of litigation, group longevity, relations between lawyers and organization, and organizational structure. These elements of interest group litigation are explored in this article.     

TRUST IN THE TECHNICAL INFORMATION PROVIDED BY INTEREST GROUPS: THE VIEWS OF LEGISLATORS, ACTIVISTS, EXPERTS, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC

The timely provision of information is crucial to the success of interest groups seeking to influence policymakers, the public and their own members. This paper examines the extent to which legislators, citizens, and policy area experts and activists trust the information provided by specific interests in the water resources managment area. It is shown that citizens and policy area activists are less trusting than are legislators and experts, and that they also discriminate more among information sources than either of those types of actors. On the individual level, multiple regression analysis is employed to investigate the extent to which partisanship, ideology, environmentalism and degree of informedness influence the level of trust accorded particular interest groups among citizens, legislators, activists, and experts.