China's Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia and the Middle East

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims at connecting the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa through a combination of infrastructure projects and soft‐power programs. All of the six land bridges and maritime routes under the BRI extend westward, mostly passing through Central Asia and the Middle East on land or by sea. Cooperation with countries in these regions will, according to China's design, meet its domestic energy needs, and grow the country's economy. China recognizes, however, that in Central Asia and the Middle East, the risks posed by what it calls the “Three Evils” — terrorism, extremism, and separatism can impact the success of the BRI. They can also impact stability in its own adjacent areas, including Xinjiang. Therefore, in concert with the BRI, China is also identifying and deploying bilateral and multilateral diplomatic mechanisms aimed at security coordination with BRI countries in these two volatile regions. This article provides an overview of BRI developments in the two regions and examines some of the diplomatic mechanisms China is using to coordinate security and reduce risks.     

Economic statecraft in China's new overseas special economic zones: soft power,business or resource security?

China's rapidly growing economic engagement with other developing countries has aroused intense debates, but these debates have often generated more heat than light. The Chinese government is clearly pushing its companies to move offshore in greater numbers, and state‐owned firms figure prominently in many of the major investments abroad. Yet relatively little research exists on when, how and why the Chinese government intervenes in the overseas economic activities of its firms. China's state‐sponsored economic diplomacy in other developing countries could play three major strategic roles: strengthening resource security, enhancing political relationships and soft power, and boosting commercial opportunities for national firms. This article examines China's programme to establish overseas special economic zones as one tool of Beijing's economic statecraft. It traces the process by which they were established and implemented, and investigates the characteristics of the 19 zones initially selected in a competitive tender process. The article concludes that even in countries rich in natural resources, the overseas zones were overwhelmingly positioned as commercial projects. Particularly in the Asian zones, China is following in the footsteps of Japan. The zone programme, and the Chinese foreign investment it hoped to foster, represents a clear case of the international projection of China's developmental state. However, in Africa (but not generally elsewhere) discourse surrounding the zones publicly positions them as a transfer of China's own development success, thus potentially enhancing China's political relationships and soft power on the continent.     

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Views from the ground

The Chinese government promotes the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a global strategy for regional integration and infrastructure investment. With a projected US$1 trillion commitment from Chinese financial institutions, and at least 138 countries participating, the BRI is attracting intense debate. Yet most analysis to date focuses on broad drivers, risks, and opportunities, largely considered to be emanating from a coherent policy imposed by Beijing. In this special issue, we instead examine the BRI as a relational, contested process - a bundle of intertwined discourses, policies, and projects that sometimes align but are sometimes contradictory. We move beyond policy-level, macro-economic, and classic geopolitical analysis to study China's global investments “from the ground”. Our case studies reveal the BRI to be dynamic and unstable, rhetorically appropriated for different purposes that sometimes but do not always coalesce as a coherent geopolitical and geoeconomic strategy. The papers in this special issue provide one of the first collections of deep empirical work on the BRI and a useful approach for grounding China's role in globalization in the critical contexts of complex local realities.     

Surplus precaritization: Supply chain capitalism and the geoeconomics of hope in Myanmar's borderlands

The Thai-Myanmar border represents one of the most protracted displacement situations in the world, while the Myanmar-Bangladesh border is now home to nearly one million displaced Rohingya, making it the world's most populated refugee camp. During the period of “democratic transition,” pre-emptively terminated by the February 2021 military coup, foreign direct investment continued to flow into Myanmar despite ongoing humanitarian crises. Rather than being presented as exacerbating ethnic tension, economic development was frequently deployed as a panacea for conflict in ways that rendered borderland residents increasingly precarious. In this article, we draw on multi-sited ethnographic research carried out between 2014 and 2020 in Myanmar's borderlands and along the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor to examine how aid donors' support for displaced ethnic minority populations is supplanted by widespread geoeconomic hope for the ameliorating effects of capitalism. We home in on the role of aid flight, special economic zones, and China's Belt and Road Initiative to argue that geoeconomic hope surrounding Myanmar's deepening integration into circuits of global capital obscures processes of surplus precaritization in which populations progressively approach the point at which they become absolutely surplus or beyond reabsorption into labor markets. The article contributes to emerging scholarship on migrant labor exploitation, supply-chain capitalism and the geoeconomics of BRI in Myanmar's borderlands and beyond.     

Not-so-new silk roads: Japan's foreign policies on Asian connectivity infrastructure under the radar

Scholarly narratives concerning China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) tend to contextualise this project within China's rivalry with the United States and Japan. Such interpretations often reduce and misconstrue Japan's initiatives in Asian infrastructure finance as mere reactivity to China's advances. This paper will showcase Japan's own foreign and financial policies regarding infrastructure in Asia and the New Silk Road regions since the end of the Cold War. I argue that Japan's presence in that field is underappreciated and under-researched, as Japan's infrastructural footprint in the New Silk Road significantly pre-dates the BRI. Furthermore, I stress the fact that Japan's foreign policy in Asian infrastructure finance featured important cooperative postures toward China, especially within multilateral development banks. The paper makes a contribution to emerging scholarship on the BRI—often reliant on strategic communications and projections—by highlighting Japan's role in regional infrastructure to show how our understanding of international relations and international political economy in Asia can be better informed by economic history and area studies.     

Is a pixel worth 1000 words? Critical remote sensing and China's Belt and Road Initiative

As a novel means of researching China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this article advances a critical remote sensing agenda that connects the view from above provided by satellite imagery with the grounded, qualitative methodologies more typical of political geography such as ethnographic fieldwork. Satellite imagery is widely used to produce empirics relating to the BRI, and the Chinese state is showing increasing interest in applying Earth observation data to governance. A more critical approach attentive to the politics of remote sensing, especially in light of China's emergence as a space and satellite power and its embrace of big data, is needed to more precisely reveal what changing pixels represent on the ground and expose the potential issues with data captured from high above the planet. This paper offers three theoretical and methodological objectives for critical remote sensing. First, I reflect on the geopolitics involved in the production and analysis of satellite imagery. Second, through analysis of night light imagery, which captures illuminated anthropogenic activities, I interrogate metanarratives of development. Third, I engage with qualitative methods by “ground-truthing” remote sensing with ethnographic observations along China's borders. I also seek to avoid the methodological nationalism often present in remote sensing research by situating these mixed-methods case studies at scales above and below the nation-state. As one of the largest development interventions in history materializes, pursuing critical remote sensing can create opportunities for social scientists to leverage quantitative and geospatial methods in support of more equitable and sustainable futures.     

Disciplinary geopolitics and the rise of international development studies in China

There has been a growing political and scholarly interest in the re-emergence of Chinese development cooperation and this work explores the construction of South-South spatial matrix of knowledge, power and imagination. The paper examines the critical geopolitics of producing international development studies in China as an intellectual project over the last 5–10 years, in close relation to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Drawing on eight months' fieldwork in Beijing, it develops a political economic geography of individuals, institutions and ideologies that have shaped the geographically and politically situated processes of inventing Chinese international development studies. The paper traces the spatial genealogy of the disciplinary regime, making visible the rise of a division of social scientific labour at a complicated moment of geopolitical flux, especially against the backdrop of intensifying US-China rivalry. It also maps out the tensions and nuances in an uneven field of knowledge and power. The future of the nascent state-disciplinary apparatus is uncertain, not least dependent on China's ongoing reinterpretation of its national identity and national mission.     

An empirical study on the modification of China's current urban social security system

This study challenges the conventional correlation between economic performance and the level of the development of social security systems. By focusing on China's urban areas, we provide an overview of the components and benefits, from a comparative perspective, of China's current social security system. We also create a comprehensive and generally applicable method using factors such as economics and population, among others, as standards to evaluate the efficacy of China's system. In order to demonstrate our primary hypothesis – that the Chinese Communist Party government has to modify its social security system to adapt to or bring about changes in the basis of its legitimacy – we analyse Chinese social security records and other related data after 1949 by statistical methods. The formula we provide in this study can be used to forecast China's expenditure on its urban social security system, and other scholars can apply our methods to countries in which conditions are broadly similar.     

Converging anticipatory geographies in Oceania: The Belt and Road Initiative and Look North in Fiji

Anticipatory geographies are state-driven initiatives promoting economic hope through the language of rejuvenation, prosperity and connectivity. As a discursive process, anticipatory geographies reconfigure spaces and identities. These narratives have proliferated in an age of intensified connectivity as states aim to imprint their political and economic visions. Oceania has become a site of multiple anticipatory geographies external and internal to the region with the presence of China as an enabling factor. In 2006, Fiji reintroduced a Look North policy to globalize economic connectivity placing Fijian agency at the centre, and in 2015, Beijing included Oceania into China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework. This work examines the processes when two anticipatory geographies meet. Adapting critical geopolitics, the research presents the findings of a critical discourse analysis of Chinese and Fijian texts referencing Look North and BRI. The work reveals the entanglement of anticipatory geographies in Fiji has generated a co-produced discourse of prosperity displaying continuity from Look North to the BRI. Although there is a shift toward defining the Sino-Fijian relationship through BRI, it does not signal an overwrite of an indigenous policy framework. I argue Look North has been ‘re-placed’ into the BRI to co-produce a narrative that permits the ongoing articulation of Fijian interests. With the Belt and Road becoming the defining framework for China's relations with countries across Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas, this work suggests Fiji's handling of BRI's impact on its domestic spaces and policies is an indicator of how other states will reposition their promises of economic hope to civil society.     

‘Aerial Silk Roads’: Airport Infrastructures in China's Belt and Road Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is widely touted as China's answer to development through international connectivity. The scheme has often been linked to China's objectives of crafting a new world order centred on itself and/or stabilizing its economy through externalizing surplus capacity. While important in broadly framing China's relationship with the world, this article posits that such a fixation on state-centric visions of development leaves the door open for misinterpretation, mistaking the BRI for a coherent set of projects imposed ‘from above’. Delving into the execution of infrastructure planning on the ground, this article argues that taking a practice-oriented approach to large-scale developmental schemes can more accurately shed light on their internally fractured processes. Two airport projects in central China branded as part of the country's ‘aerial Silk Roads’ are examined to illustrate these dynamics, with particular attention paid to the airports’ shifting conceptualizations, the competitive motivations behind their (re)construction, and the social relations sustaining them. The authors argue that closely tracking the unfolding of a range of infrastructure planning practices within specific projects can demystify modern-day developmental programmes like the BRI, by revealing how their ‘grand’ visions are often reinterpreted, altered and frustrated at local levels, even before they have a chance to influence the world.     

Japan's response to China's rise: regional engagement, global containment, dangers of collision

Japan and China's ability to manage their bilateral relationship is crucial for the stability of the East Asian region. It also has a global impact on the security and economic development of other regions. For just as China's rise has inevitably involved an expansion of its global reach, so Japan's responses to the challenges posed by China have increasingly taken a global form, seeking to incorporate new partners and frameworks outside East Asia. Japan's preferred response to China's regional and global rise in the post‐Cold War period has remained one of default engagement. Japan is intent on promoting China's external engagement with the East Asia region and its internal domestic reform, through upgrading extant bilateral and Japan–China–US trilateral frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, and by emphasizing the importance of economic power to influence China. Japan is deliberately seeking to proliferate regional frameworks for cooperation in East Asia in order to dilute, constrain and ultimately engage China's rising power. However, Japan's engagement strategy also contains the potential to tilt towards default containment. Japan's domestic political basis for engagement is becoming increasingly precarious as China's rise stimulates Japanese revisionism and nationalism. Japan also appears increasingly to be looking to contain China on a global scale by forging new strategic links in Russia and Central Asia, with a ‘concert of democracies’ involving India, Australia and the US, by competing for resources with China in Africa and the Middle East, and by attempting to articulate a values‐based diplomacy to check the so‐called ‘Beijing consensus’. Nevertheless, Japan's perceived inability to channel China's rise either through regional engagement or through global containment carries a further risk of pushing Japan to resort to the strengthening of its military power in an attempt to guarantee its essential national interests. It is in this instance that Japan and China run the danger of a military collision.     

China and the emerging regional order in the South Pacific

As China rises, it has become increasingly aggressive in applying its soft power in the Pacific. What does China's arrival mean for the emerging regional order in the Pacific? What is it up to in the strategic backwater of the Pacific, which has traditionally been regarded as an ‘American lake’ and Australia's ‘special patch’? Setting my analysis in the broad context of China's new global diplomacy, I argue that the pattern of China's assertive behaviour in the Pacific is no different from its approach to other regions in the global South. I further argue that with only limited strategic, diplomatic and economic investment in the Pacific, China has become a regional power by default. The arrival of China, therefore, is unlikely to provoke any new round of great power competition. Rather, it offers opportunities for the world's second most formidable development challenge.     

Framing the “Polar Silk Road” (冰上丝绸之路): Critical geopolitics,Chinese scholars and the (Re)Positionings of China's Arctic interests

China's release of a White Paper to document its Arctic Policy in 2018 has attracted widespread academic and popular commentaries. In particular, Beijing's ambition to build a “Polar Silk Road” (冰上丝绸之路) in the Arctic so as to link Asia and Europe via logistic and transportation networks have garnered intense ‘external’ speculations about whether China is using the initiative to gain geopolitical power and domination in the region. This paper however focuses on the under-researched dimension of how the idea of the Polar Silk Road is understood, debated and portrayed in the Chinese scholarly community. Specifically, by hinging on the conceptual and methodological tenets offered by framing theory, I seek to critically examine the representational themes and tropes that are mobilized by Chinese scholars in their discussions of the Polar Silk Road amidst China's increasing forays into the Arctic. Indeed, I argue that Chinese academic discourses about the Polar Silk Road evoke positive frames broaching a diversity of concerns (economic, environmental, diplomatic and so on) to not only justify but also defend China's ongoing interests and interventions in the Arctic region. By engaging in this study, this paper responds to critical geopolitics' call to pay nuanced attention to under-represented ‘non-Western’ geopolitical ideas, philosophies and traditions. Moreover, given the claim that the academic and foreign policy realms in China are intertwined in intimate and complex ways, the viewpoints of Chinese scholars thus becomes critical and relevant to understand insofar as they help to signal to the possible future developmental trajectories of China's approach in the Arctic (and beyond).     

Projections of China's normative soft power

Fuelled by unparalleled recent development, China has by necessity been reaching outward in search of foreign resources and international recognition. The three books reviewed in this essay all speak to China's spectacular global ascendency of the past two decades—and to the political consequences and international reactions that have followed. What unites these three volumes—Tongdong Bai's China: The Political Philosophy of the Middle Kingdom (2012), Peter Nolan's Is China Buying the World? (2012) and William Callahan and Elena Barabantseva's edited volume, China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy (2011)—is their focus on the uniquely Chinese norms that now underpin China's soft power in the twenty-first century. How will China go about ordering the world and will it succeed? The answers to these questions, as these authors demonstrate, may have less to do with China's present than with its ancient past.     

The emergence of NGOs in China and their transnational linkages: implications for domestic reform

In addressing the question of how China's rapid socioeconomic transformation is changing the nature of its international engagement we need to move beyond a traditional focus on state-centric analysis. Obviously a major stimulus for China's international engagement over the past 25 years of reform and opening has come from non-state economic activity. Growing economic interdependence, accelerated after China's accession into the World Trade Organization, provides the strongest argument in favour of a peaceful rise of China scenario in which both regional and global security are enhanced rather than threatened. Far less attention, however, has been given to the role and influence of Chinese non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and their transnational linkages. I argue in this article that in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of China's ongoing process of reform and opening to the outside world we need to incorporate a civil society dimension into our analysis. This is of particular relevance to ongoing foreign policy debates over democracy and human rights promotion in China. Indeed, in the absence of a more detailed understanding of current developments taking place at the grassroots, international support for progressive reform runs the risk of undermining positive change from below.     

Coupling national geo-political economic strategies and the Belt and Road Initiative: The China-Belarus Great Stone Industrial Park

The joint development by Belarus and China of the Great Stone Industrial Park (GSIP) is designed to establish a high-tech industrial zone and an eco-friendly satellite city of Minsk as a key node on the Eurasian Land Bridge linking China with the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union. The development and organization of the GSIP are explained in the light of a coupling of the strategic goals of the two countries in the context of a new Chinese model of external engagement called an emergent geo-political economic culture. These goals include Belarus' desire to reduce its dependence on Russian gas and oil, upgrade and diversify its economy, strengthen its integration with Eurasia and find new partners, by attracting Chinese and other foreign direct investment in the context of China's Going Out and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). An analysis of the roles of national leaders Aliaksandr Lukashenka and Xi Jinping and of different stakeholders in the predominantly top-down design, development and governance of the park reveals the way in which a BRI cooperation platform permits the coupling of Chinese and Belarusian interests and strategies in ways through which each side expects to benefit.     

Remote Sensing,Land Quotas and Mass Relocation: China's Governance of Farmland

There is increasing interest in understanding China's environmental governance through the lens of governmentality. This article contributes to that discussion by using the Foucauldian analytical apparatuses of discipline and security to understand China's governance of farmland. It argues that the Chinese state applies these two apparatuses simultaneously: on the one hand, it disciplines and deters local states from illegal land grabs by utilizing surveillance tools such as remote sensing and national land surveys; on the other hand, it relies on indirect governance through the land quota market to achieve grain security, transforming both local states and peasants into autonomous market players, and reconstructing China's rural landscape by launching mass peasant relocation programmes. The study also reveals the contingent effects of those power tactics: the state's governance is compromised by the local states’ counter‐conduct, such as data fabrication and concealment, and by the peasants’ denial of their new subjectivity as market players. When the tactics are effective, as in the case of local states actively assuming roles of land quota producers and traders, the villages and peasant households suffer from deprivation of land rights.     

Trans-Himalayan power corridors: Infrastructural politics and China's Belt and Road Initiative in Nepal

This article examines the shifting dimensions of Chinese infrastructural aid in Nepal, focusing on the politics of anticipation and enunciation that shape Nepali perceptions of Chinese-facilitated development and negotiations concerning Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Drawing from ethnographic research focused on sites of ongoing and planned infrastructure development in Nepal's two northern districts of Rasuwa and Gorkha, we analyze the uncertain remaking of these areas into trans-Himalayan power corridors. Our examination reveals the gamut of transitions, opportunities, reorientations, and expectations that the BRI and other forms of Chinese investment evoke in Nepal, showing how politics articulate infrastructures, and vice versa. After reviewing the historical context of Nepal-China relations, our empirical analysis begins in late 2014 when China became the single largest source of foreign direct investment in Nepal, continues through several rounds of negotiations about the BRI and other forms of Chinese infrastructural investment and aid, and concludes with a review of significant Nepal-China agreements at the Second Belt and Road Forum, held in Beijing in April 2019. Tacking between remote construction sites, scenes of diplomatic debate, borderland villages, investment summits, and speculative media coverage, we demonstrate how the Belt and Road Initiative is differently enacted and co-constructed by a variety of Nepali and Chinese actors who interpret, reimagine, and rhetorically appropriate the BRI within their own narrations of future possibility.     

Following the caterpillar fungus: nature,commodity chains,and the place of Tibet in China's uneven geographies

Following caterpillar fungus as it travels from the Tibetan Plateau to wealthy Chinese consumers, this article makes several interventions into geographical studies of commodity chains. First, it argues for an expansion beyond the usual call to connect the political economy of production with cultures of consumption; the cultural politics of production and political economies of consumption must also be considered. Second, it argues for bringing together political economy and more-than-human analytical approaches to commodity chains, showing how nature and the nonhuman play a key role in an assemblage that has allowed Tibetans to navigate livelihoods in a rapidly changing economy. This challenges a tendency to assume a universal figure of ‘the human’ in more-than-human geographies. Third, by connecting the erasure of Tibetans from representations of various natures used to sell caterpillar fungus with the broader politics of Tibetans within the People's Republic of China, we show that commodity fetishism can conceal not just labor relations, but also political struggles not reducible to class. Finally, we show that following a small fungus can shed light on the unevenness of China's capitalist development obscured in monolithic narratives of China's rise, demonstrating the value of expanding commodity chain studies beyond those that end with Western consumers.     

China's strategic partnership with Latin America: a fulcrum in China's rise

China has over the last two decades been committed to creating a strategic partnership with Latin American states by persistently extending its economic and political involvement in the continent. China's efforts in this regard reflect not only its desire to intensify its economic cooperation and political relations with nations in Latin America, but also its strategic goals of creating its own sphere of influence in the region and enhancing its ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power in order to elevate China's status at the systemic level. With access to Latin American markets, resources and investment destinations, China may sustain its economic and social progress that bases its long cherished dream of restoring its past glory of fuqiang (wealth and power) and rise as a global power capable of reshaping the current world system. The enormous economic benefits deriving from their economic cooperation and trade may persuade Latin American nations to accept the basic premise of China's economic strategy: that China's rise is not a threat, but an opportunity to gain wealth and prosperity. This will help China gain more ‘soft’ power in and leverage over its economic partners in Latin America, and thereby help it to rise in the global power hierarchy.