Japan's response to China's rise: regional engagement, global containment, dangers of collision

Japan and China's ability to manage their bilateral relationship is crucial for the stability of the East Asian region. It also has a global impact on the security and economic development of other regions. For just as China's rise has inevitably involved an expansion of its global reach, so Japan's responses to the challenges posed by China have increasingly taken a global form, seeking to incorporate new partners and frameworks outside East Asia. Japan's preferred response to China's regional and global rise in the post‐Cold War period has remained one of default engagement. Japan is intent on promoting China's external engagement with the East Asia region and its internal domestic reform, through upgrading extant bilateral and Japan–China–US trilateral frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, and by emphasizing the importance of economic power to influence China. Japan is deliberately seeking to proliferate regional frameworks for cooperation in East Asia in order to dilute, constrain and ultimately engage China's rising power. However, Japan's engagement strategy also contains the potential to tilt towards default containment. Japan's domestic political basis for engagement is becoming increasingly precarious as China's rise stimulates Japanese revisionism and nationalism. Japan also appears increasingly to be looking to contain China on a global scale by forging new strategic links in Russia and Central Asia, with a ‘concert of democracies’ involving India, Australia and the US, by competing for resources with China in Africa and the Middle East, and by attempting to articulate a values‐based diplomacy to check the so‐called ‘Beijing consensus’. Nevertheless, Japan's perceived inability to channel China's rise either through regional engagement or through global containment carries a further risk of pushing Japan to resort to the strengthening of its military power in an attempt to guarantee its essential national interests. It is in this instance that Japan and China run the danger of a military collision.     

How Japan matters in the evolving East Asian security order

This article argues that Japan matters crucially in the evolving East Asian security order because it is embedded both in the structural transition and the ongoing regional strategies to manage it. The post‐Cold War East Asian order transition centres on the disintegration of the post‐Second World War Great Power bargain that saw Japan subjecting itself to extraordinary strategic constraint under the US alliance, leaving the conundrum of how to negotiate a new bargain that would keep the peace between Japan and China. To manage the uncertainties of this transition, East Asian states have adopted a three‐pronged strategy of: maintaining US military preponderance; socializing China as a responsible regional great power; and cultivating regionalism as the basis for a long‐term East Asian security community. Japan provides essential public goods for each of these three elements: it keeps the US anchored in East Asia with its security treaty; it is the one major regional power that can and has helped to constrain the potential excesses of growing Chinese power while at the same time crucially engaging with and helping to socialize China; and its economic and political participation is critical for meaningful regionalism and regional integration. It does not need to be a fully fledged, ‘normal’ Great Power in order to carry out these roles. As the region tries to mediate the growing security dilemma among the three great powers, Japan's importance to regional security will only grow.     

Thirty years of the Australia–Japan partnership in Asian regionalism: evolution and future directions

This article reviews the development of the Australia–Japan partnership in building regional institutions such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation over the last three decades since the NARA Treaty was signed in 1976. In a unique partnership, academics, business people, politicians and officials in both countries were central to establishing these regional economic institutions. This article, however, argues that while both countries had shared understandings on regional issues during the first two decades after the treaty, the last decade has seen divergent regional understandings, especially over the rise of China. Japan sees the growing influence of China as a political obstacle due to growing bilateral tensions arising from historical and territorial issues, while Australia finds it a great economic opportunity to promote its trade with and attract investments from China. This differing understanding on China between both countries may act as a major hurdle to the effective and functional partnership in East Asian regionalism.     

甲午战争前后东亚海权与海防的较量及其影响

一场甲午战争,使东亚海权格局剧变,由此构成中日两国命运变化的历史拐点。战前,中日两国面对西方殖民扩张的相同遭遇,展开了近30年的海军现代化建设,并在互为敌手的竞争中日益凸显于以英国为主导的东亚海权格局之中。然而,不同的战略选择决定了不同的命运,甲午战争用血与火诠释了海权与海防的本质区别及其决定性影响。正因为战败后的中国已完全置身于东亚海权格局之外,再次陷入有海无防的境地,导致海权得以坐大的日本推行"大陆政策"更加有恃无恐,在列强瓜分中国的狂潮中走上独霸东亚之路。     

A call for a new Japanese foreign policy: the dilemmas of a stakeholder state

Japanese foreign policy is at a crossroads. A global power transition is under way; while the United States remains the leading global power, across the globe non‐western developing states are on the rise. Within Asia, China is a growing presence, wielding expansive claims on islands and maritime rights, and embarking on a defence buildup. As power shifts across Asia and the wider world, the terms of leadership and global governance have become more uncertain. Japan now finds itself asking basic questions about its own identity and strategic goals as a Great Power. Within this changing context, there are three foreign policy approaches available to Japan: (1) a classical realist line of working closely with the US in meeting China's rise and optimizing deep US engagement with China by pursuing a diplomacy focused on counterbalancing and hedging; (2) a transformative pragmatist line of rejuvenating itself through Abenomics and repositioning itself in East Asia; and (3) a liberal international line of pursuing a common agenda of enhancing global liberal‐oriented norms and rules through multilateral institutions along with the United States and the Asia–Pacific countries. Current Japanese foreign policy contains a mix of all three approaches. The article argues that a greater focus on the second and the third lines would enhance the current approach; it would ensure that Japan is more in harmony with the global environment and help it work positively for global and regional stability and prosperity, thus enabling Japan to pursue an ‘honorable place in the world’ (as stated in the preamble to its constitution).     

中国及周边国家出境旅游市场互动格局动态研究

研究国家间出境旅游市场作用关系是经略周边的重要手段,对国家战略的落实具有重要意义.本研究选取位于亚太地区的22个国家,以联合国世界旅游组织公布的1995年、2005年、2017年数据为基础,采用社会网络分析法,对各国在出境旅游市场互动中的特征变迁进行刻画.结果显示:23年来,中国及周边国家的整体互动水平不断提升.时间截...     

Central Asian and Russian perspectives on China's strategic emergence

This article employs fieldwork research and literature analysis to examine contemporary perceptions of China's emergence in popular and elite opinion in Russia and the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan. It initially establishes a framework for understanding China's emergence, emphasizing a trilateral dynamic between the hegemonic position of the US in Asia, the evolution of the strategic choices of China's neighbours and the development of strategic regionalism as a mechanism for managing regional spaces. Choosing to take the Commonwealth of Independent States as a particular case of this framework, it argues that the interaction between Russia, China and the US remains highly fluid, particularly under the conditions ‘of re‐setting’ the US‐Russian relationship. This means that regional contexts are highly significant; and it establishes Central Asia as an important new strategic region for working out relations between Russia, China, and the US through their interactions with regional states. The second part of the article examines Russian and Central Asian responses to China's emergence. It looks at three categories of motivation in China's regionalism: its system for accumulative growth; its problems with weak constitutionality and transnational security in its western regions; and its concern with US/NATO encroachment on its western frontier and the US attempt to turn Central Asian elites away from their traditional alignments. The third part looks at China's promotion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as its mechanism for strategic regionalism in Central Asia. The article questions the SCO's significance in terms of its capacity for governance and functionalism, and points to the problem of institutional competition, notably with Moscow's preferred structure of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that China will be an unconventional superpower that presents different facets of itself in different regional contexts. There will not be a single model of China's emergence and it will continue to develop its international role through a mix of adaptation and experimentation. However, China's strategy will pose a problem for Russia and Central Asia since it seeks to create a strategic space that does not challenge the West, but exists substantially outside the West. Russia, in particular, has to decide whether it will be able to maintain its current stance of independence between Europe and Asia as China's rise shifts the frontiers between East and West.     

The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific 1

Any discussion of the United States' alliances in East Asia and the Pacific should include an understanding of the role that China plays in regional security in general, and the influence of such a role on the alliance system in particular. The 'China factor' in the contemporary US alliance system can be understood by asking the following questions: (1) what are China's perceptions of and concerns regarding the US alliance system as a whole and regarding specific bilateral military alliances of the US?; (2) where does China figure in the American post-Cold War worldview, and what role does the United States itself see its alliances playing in relation to China?; (3) to what extent are the current bilateral alliances of the US directed against China, in the view of US allies; and (4) how might the reshaping of the international security environ ment following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States affect China's perceptions and attitudes towards future alliance developments?     

Europe,the rise of Asia and the future of the transatlantic relationship

This article examines how, in a global strategic context presided by the rise of Asia and the US rebalance towards that region, Europeans are contributing to transatlantic burden‐sharing—whether individually or through the EU/NATO. As Asian powers reach westward and the US shifts its strategic priorities eastward, classical geostrategic delimitations become gradually tenuous. Particularly important are the ‘middle spaces’ of the Indian Ocean, central Asia and the Arctic, in that they constitute the main avenues of communication between the Asia–Pacific and the European neighbourhood. The article seeks to understand how evolving geostrategic dynamics in Europe, the ‘middle spaces’ and the Asia–Pacific relate to each other, and how they might impinge on discussions on transatlantic burden‐sharing. It is argued that the ability of Europeans to contribute to a more equitable transatlantic burden‐sharing revolves around two main tenets. First, by engaging in the ‘middle spaces’, Europe's key powers and institutions are helping to underpin a balance of power in these regions. Second, by stepping up their diplomatic and economic role in the Asia–Pacific, strengthening their security ties to (US) regional allies and maintaining an EU‐wide arms embargo on China, Europeans are broadly complementing US efforts in that key region. There are a number of factors that stand in the way of a meaningful European engagement in the ‘middle spaces’ and the Asia–Pacific, including divergent security priorities among Europeans, the impact of budgetary austerity on European defence capabilities and a tendency to confine foreign policy to the immediate neighbourhood. The article discusses the implications of those obstacles and outlines some ways in which they might be overcome.     

北极环境变化对中国的战略影响分析

北极地区的自然环境和社会环境正在发生深刻改变,将对世界和中国产生深远的战略影响。北极航道的开通将在一定程度上改变世界的海洋交通格局,在给中国带来机会的同时,也可能造成战略上的被动性。北极资源开发可行性的增大给中国增添了新的资源采购地选择和地缘经济参与机遇,同时也将带来新的挑战。北极地区地缘政治地位的上升将改变现有的世界地缘战略格局,产生新的地缘战略关系,给中国带来复杂的战略影响,中国需加强筹划应对。     

The role of US defense exports in Asia Pacific regionalism

Despite the emergence of a regional economic space, political integration in the form of institutional building has yet to take shape in the Asia Pacific. On the one hand, the area is constructed as part of a localized space articulated in terms of relatively self-contained regional economic networks. On the other hand, Asia Pacific remains fractured in geopolitical structures, relying heavily on the US to organize the region, particularly in the post-war period. This paper focuses on the nature of lagging regional political integration and examines the role that US defense trade (1989–2004), and to a lesser extent military presence, plays in this. Specifically, it shows that US geopolitical strategy, influenced heavily by a realist framework, displays a pattern of bilateral courtship where its defense trade is positively related to allies in Asia. This relationship results in stronger trans-Pacific than regional linkages, inserting an otherwise localized Asian economic space into the more diffused global US-centered geopolitical space.     

Over‐promising and under‐delivering? Ambitions and risks in US defence strategy

Recent changes to US defence strategy, plans and forces have placed the United States at greater risk of over‐promising and under‐delivering on its global security ambitions. In 2012, the Obama administration released a new defence strategic guidance document to adapt to a shifting security environment and defence budget cuts. The guidance upholds the two long‐standing American goals of global pre‐eminence and global reach, but seeks to apply this military power by using new planning and regional concepts. It revises the Department of Defense's force planning construct, an important tool used to size US military forces, and identifies the Asia–Pacific and the greater Middle East as the two regions where the US military should focus its attention and resources. There are three major risks facing this revised US strategy: emerging security threats, the role of US allies and partners, and domestic constraints in the United States. Included in these risks are the proliferation of advanced military technologies, the US response to the rise of China, the continued prevalence of state instability and failure, the capability and commitment of NATO and other US allies, additional US budget cuts, political polarization in the United States, and interservice competition within the US military. In light of these risks, the United States faces a future in which it will continue to struggle to direct its military power towards its most important geopolitical priorities, such as rebalancing towards the Asia–Pacific, as opposed simply to respond to the many security surprises that are certain to arise. If the past is any guide, American political leaders will respond to the aforementioned risks in the worst way possible: by maintaining the current US defence strategy while slashing the resources to support it.     

China's New Generation of Leaders and Regional Challenges in East Asia

A pair of Hong Kong and U.S. specialists on China examines the dynamic international environment China's new leadership now faces, focusing on East Asia. They first examine the complex balance the leadership seeks to strike between: (1) China's projection of increasing economic, military, and political power internationally; (2) the primary domestic goals of economic growth and stability; and (3) rising public awareness, demand for information access, and (in some quarters) nationalism among the Chinese people. The authors then proceed, in successive sections of the paper, to assess in greater detail China's international and regional security environment, Sino-American relations, China's relations with its East Asian neighbors, and the complex interconnections between the country's domestic and foreign policy. They conclude that Sino-American relations will continue to be pivotal to Beijing's foreign relations in general and its relations with countries in the East Asian region more specifically.     

Asia's century and the problem of Japan's centrality

Japan has long been regarded as a central component of America's grand strategy in Asia. Scholars and practitioners assume this situation will persist in the face of China's rise and, indeed, that a more ‘normal’ Japan can and should take on an increasingly central role in US‐led strategies to manage this power transition. This article challenges those assumptions by arguing that they are, paradoxically, being made at a time when Japan's economic and strategic weight in Asian security is gradually diminishing. The article documents Japan's economic and demographic challenges and their strategic ramifications. It considers what role Japan might play in an evolving security order where China and the US emerge as Asia's two dominant powers by a significant margin. Whether the US–China relationship is ultimately one of strategic competition or accommodation, it is argued that Japan's continued centrality in America's Asian grand strategy threatens to become increasingly problematic. It is posited that the best hope for circumventing this problem and its potentially destabilizing consequences lies in the nurturing of a nascent ‘shadow condominium’ comprising the US and China, with Japan as a ‘marginal weight’ on the US side of that arrangement.     

Hamashita Takeshi's research on regional Chinese history

ABSTRACT

Challenges to the historical rise of “Western-centrism” in non-Western countries are surfacing: the Japanese scholar Hamashita Takeshi, who supports a “regional concept of China,” is one of the strongest voices in this movement. Hamashita suggests that the theories of the “Asian economic circle” and the “tributary system” can be combined to form a theory of a “regional Asia,” thus reconstructing the perspective of research on Chinese and Asian history. The regional Asia model is a composite of the network model, maritime model, and the regional model. Based on the regional concept of China, Chinese history can be studied from various perspectives, such as China as a network, maritime China, and regional China; one can thus develop a long-term view on Chinese, Asian and global history from a spatial perspective, a peripheral perspective, and an Asian perspective.     

中国的和平崛起与对外移民

在中国和世界移民史的框架内,从中国的人口政策、经济发展战略、外资的引进和城市化与就业政策等角度,对中外社会经济性质及移民政策进行比较分析。认为,中国的人口政策和经济发展战略保持了极低的对外移民率;随着中国的和平崛起,未来中国国际移民与人口比例将比当时欧洲崛起时低得多、“移民峰”的时段也将比欧洲当年的时段短得多。     

近代以来日本外交战略的三次转变及其原因

近代以来150年间日本外交战略经历了一个从追求军事崛起到经济崛起,以及再到政治崛起的过程,并且为此而不断调整自己的外交战略。岛国的政治文化、内部指导思想固然是决定其战略转变的主要原因,而不可忽视的是东亚的国际环境亦成为日本对外决策的重要诱因。面对21世纪,军事失败与经济成功正反两方面的历史经验证明,顺应东亚一体化的趋势,实现与亚洲各国的和解,积极、平等地推动地区合作,将是日本外交战略的现实选择。     

Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging

China's economic, political and military influence has been increasing at a time when the United States, as sole superpower, dominates the international order. This article outlines Chinese elite perspectives on the current global order and shows not only how these perceptions have affected China's policies towards the United States, but also how they have influenced China's regional and global policies more broadly. It argues that variants of realist logic that interpret Chinese behaviour as a form of balancing are not particularly helpful, and do not capture the essence of Chinese strategies that are underpinned by an overwhelming focus on its domestic development needs. The article posits that Chinese leaders have accepted that they operate in a unipolar order and have chosen not to stick out for negotiating positions that the United States would see as seriously detrimental to its interests. However, Beijing couples this accommodating approach with policies designed to ensure that, were relations seriously to deteriorate with Washington, China could draw on deepened regional and global ties to thwart any US effort to interrupt its domestic objectives. China's hope is that a more 'democratic' international order will emerge, which means not multipolarity as such but a 'concert of great powers system' that will operate to forge multilateral cooperation among the major states.     

The limits to optimism: Australia and the rise of China

The Australian government optimistically expects that China's rise can be easily managed. They predict US–China relations will be cooperative, and reject concerns that Australia may face hard choices between them. This optimism seems to be based on the view that as China grows it will become increasingly integrated into a US-led global system. That overestimates America's power, and underestimates China's ambitions. The best we can hope for instead is that China and the US will cooperate in a concert of power, but the US will be very reluctant to make the necessary concessions to China for that to happen. So there is a real risk of even worse outcomes: Chinese primacy, sustained US–China hostility, or war. Australia therefore needs to try to persuade America to work with China in building a new ‘Concert of Asia’.     

From fashion product industries to fashion: upgrading trends in traditional industry in Taiwan

In the 1990s, China opened its economic markets and replaced the New Institutional Economics (NIEs) of East Asia as the global centre for sourcing labour. This event changed the spatial and economic structure in Asia, especially in Taiwan. Based on the historical evolution of the textile and clothing industry in Taiwan, this study examined how traditional textile and apparel manufacturing was upgraded in Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, and in Tainan, the most historical city of Taiwan, under varying resource availability and under different city policies. While referring to both second-hand information and the literature, the results of interviews with fashion industry professionals were also considered. This study revealed that the potential to upgrade the fashion industry was highly associated with regional background characteristics. Additionally, lack of talent and the limited market for domestic brands create the largest bottleneck in the current fashion industry in Taiwan. Accordingly, the optimal solution for the fashion industry in Taiwan is to promote affordable Taiwanese brands and to use e-commerce. Such integration may enhance the position of the Taiwanese fashion industry in global networks.