The Determination of Policy and Politics in the American States, 1948–1974*

The picture of the American state policy-making process which emerges from this analysis is one of a system where politics as well as economics matter a great deal. Partisanship and legislative competition are shown to have demonstrable effect on policy output. The control partisan preference exerts over policy decisions is severely constrained in taxing and spending areas, however, and is conditional on forces external to the model presented here. Surpassing the control over policy output exhibited by partisanship is the extent to which the electorate, or the electoral process, holds the parties responsible for policy performance. Apparently the public doesn't believe that “politics doesn't matter.”     

马歇尔计划与战后法国政治中右化

战后,处于“冷战”前沿的法国成了美国重点争取的对象,而法国的共产党势力始终又是美国的心腹大患,美国必欲除之而后快。通过积极插手战后法国内部事务,美国如愿以偿地坐视法国共产党被赶出联合政府。在马歇尔计划的鼓舞下,法国建立了亲美的中右翼政权,法国政治由此开始向右转。美国成功地实现了从政治上对法国的控制。     

The Politics of HDTV in the United States

Policies adopted by the United States government between 1987 and 1993 regarding high definition television (HDTV) were made primarily by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). A brief effort by members of Congress and their bureaucratic and industrial allies to link HDTV to broader industrial policies was thwarted by the George Bush Administration between 1988 and 1990. The FCC's policies with respect to simulcasting and digital signals reflected the concern of that agency to protect the interests of consumers, broadcasters, and electronics manufacturers. The first two interests traditionally were protected by the FCC, whereas the protection of electronics was somewhat unusual and was influenced by perceptions of declining United States competitiveness. In addition, United States policymaking in this area depended strongly on the framing effect of policies adopted in Japan and Western Europe.     

The United States, Algeria, and the Fall of the Fourth French Republic

The relative alacrity with which the United States accepted the collapse of the Fourth Republic in France in May 1958 stands in marked contrast to the obsessive concern with French internal stability that characterized the earlier postwar period of U.S.-French relations. Indeed, the Americans appear to have played a considerable role in undermining the very stability of the regime they had done so much since 1947 to help preserve. Much had changed in the intervening period that helps explain the revised American attitude. The French economy, precarious and dependent on American assistance in the years 1947 to 1952, was now robust and growing, and the threat of the French Communist party, which the Americans believed strong enough to seize power virtually at will in 1947, was now much reduced. The French army had been built by Washington into a powerful military force, meant to be the linchpin of European defense against a Soviet invasion, but it was now heavily embroiled in Algeria, and its role was on the way to being assumed by a restored German army, negotiated on the heels of the failure to construct a European Defense Community in 1954.¹ Finally, in the immediate postwar period, Paris and Washington had acted as allies, the United States offering military assistance and almost fully financing the Indochina War by 1953, although the French goal, to preserve their crumbling empire, became obscured by the American obsession with the possible expansion of Soviet power. In Algeria, in contrast, the conflict began in November 1954, following the humiliating French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and withdrawal from Indochina. In the absence of communism as a salient issue, American anticolonial attitudes came into play, and frustration grew with the French inability to bring a conclusion to a war that, as viewed in Washington, increasingly appeared to play into the hands of Soviet ambitions.     

Empire by denial: the strange case of the United States

The issue of empire has once again become a major political question in American foreign policy discourse. But whereas in the 1960s the discussion was one that mainly concerned the radical left, over the past few years the debate has largely been conducted within neo-conservative circles. The discussion is one that should be taken seriously-in part because of its intrinsically interesting character and in part because of what it tells us about the Bush grand strategy. In the end, though, the issue of whether or not there is-or is not- an American empire, is perhaps of less importance than the fact that most Americans deny that such an empire exists. This has consequences both for the conduct of American foreign policy and for its successful execution.     

Empire and Cultures of Militarism in Canada and the United States

While Canadians have been described as an “unmilitary people,” their historic affections for empire have contributed to a conspicuous reluctance to criticize past military exploits. A tradition of anti-imperialism, meanwhile, has colored American attitudes to war, and produced a powerful current of antiwar sentiment throughout US history – even as that nation developed into a dominant imperial power. This essay finds the source of these national discrepancies in the founding myths of each country and in subsequent demographic, economic, strategic, and ideological transformations which have both reinforced and challenged each nation's traditional responses to empire. The result is a relationship between war, imperialism, and national identity that is multifaceted, often paradoxical, and in certain instances, surprisingly antiquated.