司法公正与司法效率的关系及其实现——兼论社会冲突的控制

本文将司法公正与司法效率置于社会的大背景之下来考察 ,认为司法公正与司法效率是内核和载体的关　　系 ,而司法仅仅是社会系统的一个环节 ,司法与社会互动。因此 ,必须求助于整个社会 ,从司法公正与司法效率的关系入手 ,建立和健全一个较完备的社会控制系统 ,预防和减少社会冲突 ,在全社会分摊司法成本 ,推动法律公正与观念公正的实现 ,最终达到司法公正与司法效率的统一。     

肖扬:司法公正的领路人

"公正与效率"是辩证统一的,任何司法效率都要以司法公正为前提,在保证司法公正的前提下,要尽可能地提高司法效率。没有公正,效率没有任何意义;没有效率,公正就有可能失去固有的价值。而"公正与效率"是审判工作的基本价值取向。肖扬说,司法为民重点在"司法",核心在"为民"。八十年代,肖扬在检察院任职期间,致力于反贪事业。他深知人民群众对贪官疾恶如仇。他多次强调贪官不除,难以立党;污吏不除,难以立国;腐败不除,难以立信。他亲自倡导建立了中国的法律援助制度,使许许多多"有理无钱"的农民、下岗职工、残疾人等,平等地享受到了法律的阳光,打赢了官司。"公正,只有公正,才是大法官永远的座右铭。"     

加强和改善党的领导促进司法独立

司法公正是维护社会公正的制度保障,坚持司法独立是实现法治的前提。只有坚持和保证司法独立,才能有效的防范司法腐败,确保司法公正。加强党对司法工作的领导,积极推进司法体制改革,确保司法机关依法独立、公正地行使司法权,是党坚持依法执政的重要内容。为此,实行司法独立,必须在服从党的领导这个宪法原则下进行。     

论媒体监督与司法公正的关系

在现代法治国家，媒体监督与司法公正密切相联。媒体监督由于自身所特有的开放性与广泛性，在促进司法公正、遏制司法腐败方面发挥了以其他监督形式无法替代的积极作用。然而，媒体监督同时也是一把双刃剑，缺乏制约或不当的监督也会给司法公正造成负面影响，从而妨碍或破坏司法公正。司法需要权威，言论需要自由，两者都受宪法保护。如何平衡司法活动与媒体监督之间的矛盾关系?怎样解决法治社会所要求的法律至上的理念和媒体以道德为准绳的监督之间的冲突?这些问题是我们目前亟待解决的。本文将从近年发生的聂树斌案、于欢案等案例出发，寻求媒体与司法间的关系点、平衡点以及解决问题之道。     

论司法公正的实现——探讨司法制度和司法主体的伦理基础

公正是人类社会永恒追求的价值目标。司法公正已成为现代社会的一种普遍的价值理念,司法公正要从抽象的理念变为客观的社会现实,即需要公正的司法制度。现代司法制度在设计安排和实践运行中必须考虑到这种正当性要求,使得制度本身就具有这种品格,而不是因为另有某种外在力量的强制而被迫地完成或者不能完全完成公正使命。     

从许霆案看媒体监督与司法独立的平衡

当今社会,新闻媒体与司法制度体现着一个国家民主文明的程度,司法公正是社会公正的重要内涵之一,而采取何种监督方式就成为其重要课题。媒体监督的广泛性、灵活性和针对性将监督功能最大程度的落实,然而在实践中,其片面、不实、肆意煽动等现象却为司法公正造成了巨大的压力。因此,必须构建媒体监督与司法公正协调机制,使二者形成良性互动,将两者相同的价值取向和目标归为一致。     

维护司法公正 推进基层法院体制改革

司法公正是人民法院贯彻依法治国方针的根本要求,也是人民法院推进司法改革最终追求的目标。实现司法公正既要求人民法院自身做出积极努力．更需要党的坚强领导和社会的理解支持。本文从司法公正的重大意义和目前基层人民法院司法现状及成因进行分析,找出了存在的问题,分析了问题的成因,并从基层人民法院自身建设入手．提出了解决问题的基本对策。     

司法公开的现实意义探讨

司法公开是司法实施的重大改革项目之一,在司法公开对现实的影响来说,主要有四方面的意义,即司法公开加快了司法独立;形成严格的司法惩罚制度,树立了司法权威;为实现司法公正做出表率;能够维护整个社会的正义。本文主要是探讨司法公开的现实意义。     

关于法律职业道德的一点想法

描述和分析当代法律职业伦理所遭遇的困境,法律职业道德为什么重要?这是在法律业内进行道德教育时首先要回答的问题。目前在道德问题的认识上存在着某种强烈的社会政治氛围,就使得人们在开展法律职业道德教育时,在对法律职业道德的认识上,表现出了十分明显的政策倾向。司法改革的最终目标就是实现司法公正,这不仅需要反映人类理性和良知的优秀法律和健全的司法体制,同时要有一个高素质、高效率的司法群体去执行法律。只有维护法官职业的高尚性、法官的高素质性,才能够保障我们的社会主义法制顺利进行。如何真正实现司法公正,怎样摆脱时政对司法的过多影响。     

破解司法信任危机探析

破解司法信任危机、树立司法权威是司法机关的一项重要工作,这项工作关乎党和国家工作的大局。当前,司法信任危机的具体表现为：再审申请率高、涉诉上访率高、裁判执行难、刑事错案频现和司法腐败时有发生等。面对司法信任危机,个别地方司法机关的工作存在盲目司法公开,甚至司法过度公开等问题。从司法工作本身来讲,破解司法信任危机应当坚持司法公正、司法效率、司法民主和司法公开四项措施并举。     

Judicial Bookshelf

Too little attention is sometimes directed to those supports that undergird what is valued most. For example, one current of American intellectual life in the nineteenth century sought a society that would run by itself. Despite vast differences among them, architects of experimental utopian communities, laissez-faire economists, and Marxists had at least one thing in com-mon: all anticipated a day when "the state" would shrink into a minimal background role or wither away completely. In contrast, the twentieth century demonstrated not only the endurance but also the power of political institutions. Government was here to stay, often for the better, as illustrated in the United States as much by the Herculean efforts to end the Great Depression or to conquer space as by the routine maintenance of a climate conducive to "the pursuit of happiness." Yet government could also manifest itself with a vengeance, as illustrated by the oppression and carnage wrought by totalitarianism. Anyone who has thought about why some countries are long on freedom and others short knows that many factors and conditions incline societies toward one and away from the other. Yet two essential elements stand out: limited government and rule of law. The first proclaims that there are certain policies which government may not pursue; the second codifies those restraints independent of those who administer them. The first places some objectives out of reach, and the second sets the ruler apart from the rules. Louis XIV's reputed boast "L'ëtat, c'est moi" is as alien to as it is subversive of both.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

Citizens, elected officials, legal practitioners and scholars, and most certainly readers of this journal can surely agree on one verity concerning the U.S. Supreme Court: that an abundance of literature in print and, increasingly, in digital form exists about this capstone institution of the third branch of government. For confirmation, one has only to conduct an online subject search in even a modest-sized library or at one of the Internet-based bookstores to reveal literally hundreds of titles on virtually every aspect of the Court's work as well as the Justices who have sat on its Bench.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

Some may be surprised to realize that nearly a half century has lapsed since publication of The American Supreme Court by Robert G. McCloskey. ¹ One reviewer praised the book as “unique,” one that could be read “profitably by layman, student, lawyer, and constitutional lawyer.” ² Readers familiar with that compact volume will recall the antinomy that the author put forward as the defining theme of American constitutional history: the tension between fundamental law and popular sovereignty. The latter suggests will and the former restraint. The antinomy is reflected in the founding documents of the Republic. The Declaration of Independence trumpets “inalienable rights” in the same paragraph that it emphasizes “government by the consent of the governed.” The Constitution, “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” by “We the people,” insisted in Article VI that it “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” This conflict between equally valid principles lies at the heart of judicial review in the federal courts, where appointed and politically unaccountable judges sit in judgment on the actions of the politically accountable representatives of the people. In McCloskey's view, one principle “conjures up the vision of an active, positive state; the other emphasizes the negative, restrictive side of the political problem.” ³ Opposites though these principles are, Professor McCloskey emphasized that Americans have managed to cling simultaneously to both. “But like most successes in politics and elsewhere, this one had a price. The failure to resolve the conflict between popular sovereignty and fundamental law perhaps saved the latter principle, but by the same token it left the former intact. And this meant that fundamental law could be enforced only within delicately defined boundaries, that constitutional law, though not simply the creature of the popular will, nevertheless had always to reckon with it, that the mandates of the Supreme Court must be shaped with an eye not only to legal right and wrong, but with an eye to what popular opinion would tolerate.” ⁴