A spin of the wheel? Defence procurement and defence industries in the Brexit debates

Whether a ‘Brexit’ would threaten the United Kingdom's national security has become a central theme in the run‐up to the in/out referendum on EU membership. Although national security has been a central facet of both the ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ campaigns thus far, there has been little mention of the implications of a Brexit for UK defence industries or defence procurement, let alone formal debate or analysis. The article addresses this gap by analysing the potential implications of a Brexit for defence procurement and industries in the UK and the EU member states. The first section analyses the policy context for a Brexit by exploring existing levels of EU defence procurement integration in the UK's and Europe's defence industries. The second section draws on Jozef Bátora's ‘institutional logics’ framework to identify two pro‐Brexit and two pro‐Remain narratives, each employing differing assumptions on the relative benefits of national sovereignty and closer EU integration The final section analyses the way in which these ‘logics’ or narratives will be deployed by their advocates in the run‐up to the UK's EU referendum. The article concludes that the national security battleground in the 2016 referendum will be fought over competing narratives and arguments, partly because there is a dearth of data and evidence concerning UK and EU defence procurement and industries, which renders this crucial area of national security vulnerable to the politics of spin.     

National defence in the age of austerity

Preparations for the next UK defence review are under way; a struggle is imminent and the lines of battle are being drawn. There is a grave danger that in the new 'age of austerity' defence planning—and strategy generally—will be driven by tribal conflicts, either between supporters of one or other of the armed services or between contending viewpoints about the nature of conflict. And there will be others who will argue that the defence review should be driven simply by the need to reduce government expenditure, as quickly as possible. These arguments not only reduce the defence debate to a struggle between various incompatible and uncompromising tribal beliefs—'war among the fetishes', perhaps—they also miss the point. This article gauges the extent of the economic challenges which the UK defence establishment will confront over the coming decade. The authors consider how best to approach the problem of undiminished (and even expanding) commitments at a time of decreasing resources. They argue that defence planning should be driven by the notion of value (the ratio of function to cost), which in turn requires both a clear national political vision and a defence establishment which is output- rather than input-oriented. Finally, the authors assert that defence must transform itself to be able to achieve the outputs required in the most efficient and responsive manner.     

The limited capacity of management to rescue UK defence policy: a review and a word of caution

Political and media attention in the UK is devoted to three interrelated aspects of defence: policy, the management of defence resources and military operations. This article argues that the 1998 Strategic Defence Review placed excessive reliance on anticipated improvements in the management of defence resources to render Labour's defence policies affordable. The field of attempted defence management improvements is surveyed and it is concluded that no final answers were generated on the key issues of the division of tasks among uniformed personnel, civil servants and the private sector, or on whether defence should be run largely on a capability basis or on single service lines. Given the demonstrated similarity between the government's concepts of the UK's role in the world in the Strategic Defence Review (1998) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) (2010), there is a clear danger that the SDSR also relies too much on efficiency savings. By reference to the inherent complications of defence management and to three strands of management thought (complexity management, wicked problems and principal–agent theory), the article argues that some inefficiency will always be present. It suggests that the Clausewitzian concept of friction, accepted as pertinent to the area of military operations, might also be applied to efforts to generate military capability. It concludes that defence reviews should not be based on assumptions about efficiency savings and that students of international security and defence need to pay attention to both the volume of resources going into defence and the mechanisms by which they are managed.     

The Atlantic burden‐sharing debate—widening or fragmenting?

The Atlantic burden‐sharing debate during the early part of the twenty‐first century is shaping up to be very different from those of NATO’s first fifty years. The resources needed for direct defence of western Europe have fallen sharply, and further cuts are possible. The gradual strengthening of European cooperation means that the EU is becoming an actor in its own right in many international regimes. Debates about which countries are pulling their weight internationally are also taking into account contributions to non‐military international public goods–financing EU enlargement, aiding the Third World, reducing emissions of climate‐damaging pollutants. In this new multidimensional debate, it becomes more apparent that states that contribute more to one regime often do less than most in another. Germany, for example, is concerned about its excessive contribution to the costs of EU enlargement, but it spends considerably less than France and the UK on defence. European countries contribute three times as much as the United States to Third World aid, and will soon pay almost twice as much into the UN budget. Yet they were dependent on the US to provide most of the military forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and would be even more dependent in the event of a future Gulf war. This widening of the burden‐sharing debate contains both dangers and opportunities. It could lead to a fragmentation of the Atlantic dialogue, with each side talking past the other on an increasing number of issues, ranging from global warming to Balkan peacekeeping. In order to avoid such a dangerous situation, the US and European states should maintain the principle that all must make a contribution to efforts to tackle common problems, whether it be through troops in Kosovo or commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there should also be some flexibility in defining who does how much. The preparedness of some countries to lead, by doing more, will be essential if international cooperation is to have a chance to work.     

The Design of Aircraft Carriers Prior to World War II

Abstract

The design and development of the early aircraft carriers has made great demands on the interdisciplinary teams charged with these tasks. Although the same basic principles have always operated, and will continue to do so for all ships of this class, they were difficult to apply first to ships converted to carry aircraft and later to the ships specifically designed for aircraft-carrying purposes. Here these difficulties are reviewed and the compromises described as they relate to the Royal Navy and the United States Navy. Political constraints, as laid down by the Washington Treaty, played only a minor role.     

How proactive? How pacifist? Charting Japan’s evolving defence posture

After 60 years maintaining Self-Defense Forces rather than a normal military, Japan is moving towards exercising collective self-defence, long restricted by interpretations of its 1945 Peace Constitution. The merits of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's ‘proactive pacifism’ are intensely debated by those welcoming greater international contributions from Japan and others suspicious of Japanese ‘remilitarisation’. A nation’s defence posture can theoretically be hijacked by aggressive nationalists, shift to pacifist isolationism, or rely on non-military internationalism or multilateral security cooperation. This article assesses competing explanations about the post-war trajectory of Japan’s defence posture by charting variation in military doctrine and capabilities. The analysis finds that Tokyo has made incremental policy adjustments under domestic and international constraints, and is not aggressively remilitarising.     

Britain,the United Arab Emirates and the defence of the Gulf revisited

This article investigates the deepening of the UK's security and defence arrangements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In recent years there has been a flurry of diplomatic activity indicating far closer engagement between London and Abu Dhabi. Rather than being an innovative initiative of the Cameron government, the interaction has deeper roots, with this article uncovering the importance of the relatively unknown Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) of 1996, signed by the Major government. Furthermore, the UK‐UAE defence relationship is shown to have endured beyond the infamous UK withdrawal from ‘east of Suez’ in 1971. The current engagement is, however, more intense and potentially far‐reaching than it had been in recent decades, with the defence sector being placed at the forefront of UK efforts to bolster the relationship with the oil‐rich Gulf emirate. Using official statements from London and Abu Dhabi, this article suggests that the UK‐UAE relationship has always remained intact, although it lost focus following the end of the Major government until the refocusing on the Gulf by the Cameron government. The article concludes with an assessment of the expectations of the UAE, and the strategic drivers underpinning UK policy.     

The economics of UK nuclear weapons policy

The Trident replacement decision has an economic aspect that cannot be ignored, namely, its costs. This article presents a cost-benefit framework for assessing the replacement decision and its alternatives. The replacement decision is presented against the background of the defence economics problem showing the opportunities for substitution and the need for difficult defence choices in a world of uncertainty. A framework for choices is outlined showing the range and type of information needed for sensible decision-making in this area. A range of conventional force alternatives is estimated as well as alternative civil spending. The impact of the replacement decision on the UK submarine industrial base is assessed, including the challenges of reaching a partnering agreement and negotiating an incentive contract with a UK monopoly supplier. The cost figures used for the Trident replacement are illustrative only and show how the programme can be evaluated.     

Stormy waters: Britain,the Falkland Islands and UK–Argentine relations

This article considers Britain's relationship with the Falkland Islands and the wider context of UK–Argentine relations. It does so by considering three main themes. First, the current Argentine government's strategy towards the Falklands (Islas Malvinas) and the manner in which the question of disputed ownership has been tied into wider Latin American relationships designed to unsettle UK and Falkland Islands interests. Second, the debate surrounding the defence of the Falklands is examined for the purpose of considering how this issue, especially sensitive given the 30th anniversary of the 1982 conflict, brings into sharp relief the implications of recent defence and spending reviews. Finally, the article aims to assess and evaluate the manner in which the Falkland Islands community engages with and responds to worsening UK–Argentine relations. It is concluded that UK–Argentine relations are in their worst state since 1982 and that there is little or no prospect of any improvement given the Argentine government's commitment to force the UK into entering sovereignty negotiations. On its side, the UK and the Falkland Islands’ community do not believe that sovereignty is negotiable and would rather consider how more cordial relations could be established in a manner reminiscent of the late 1990s.     

British civil–military relations and the problem of risk

Drawing primarily on the experience of the UK since 2001, this article examines the increasing prevalence of risk as an organizing concept for western defence and security planning and its implications for civil–military relations and strategy‐making. It argues that there may be tensions between such approaches and the principles of good strategy‐making, which aim to link means and resources to ends in a coherent manner. Not only does risk potentially blur the relationship between means and ends in the strategy‐making process, it also exposes it to contestation, with multiple interpretations of what the risks actually are and the strategic priority (and commitment) which should be attached to them. The article examines these tensions at three levels of risk contestation for British defence: institutions, operations and military–society relations. In the case of the UK, it contends that the logic of risk has not been able to provide the same national motivation and sense of strategic purpose as the logic of threat. In this context, calls for a reinvigoration of traditional strategy‐making or a renewed conception of national interest may be missing a more fundamental dissonance between defence policy, civil–military relations and the wider security context. More widely, the strategic ennui that some western states have been accused of may not simply be a product of somehow falling out of the habit of strategy‐making or an absence of ‘political will’. Instead, it may reflect deeper social and geostrategic trends which constrain and complicate the use of military force and obscure its utility in the public imagination.     

Transatlantic triage? European and UK ‘grand strategy’ after the US rebalance to Asia

Transition in the Middle East, the ongoing effects of the global financial crisis and the United States' rebalance to Asia are key trends that will have an impact on transatlantic relations and European defence. As US priorities shift, a common European ‘grand strategy’ could encourage the development of a shared vision to help Europe order its priorities and begin to respond to the new, post‐austerity context of world politics and shrinking defence budgets. Will these changes be enough to quicken Europe's currently shrivelled strategic thinking? In any scenario, given its relative weight and role as an interlocutor with the US, the United Kingdom will remain vital to any developing European security and strategy agenda, although its broader relations with the European Union will complicate this relationship. How it proceeds will also help to define the boundaries of this nascent European security order. This article charts these key global trends, relates them to current debates in European security and strategy and maps opportunities and constraints faced by Europe and the UK in developing a grand strategy in an increasingly ‘American‐lite’ European neighbourhood.     

Is strategic geography relevant to Australia's current defence policy?

Unless you are a major power, a nation's geography is one of the most important factors driving military posture and force structure. But the idea that Australia's strategic geography primarily determines the size and shape of its defence force is being discarded in favour of expeditionary forces designed to operate in a subordinate role to allies in distant theatres. As a result the nexus between strategic geography and force structure is now broken. Purchases of expensive military equipment are being made without any clear articulation of strategic necessity. This article argues the case for force structure planning based on the abiding nature of Australia's regional strategic geography, while providing an improved (albeit still limited) expeditionary ability to support our US ally. The consistent application of strategic geography should be an iron discipline for a country with Australia's modest sized defence force and limited resources.     

After independence? The challenges and benefits of Scottish–UK defence cooperation

The Scottish government's white paper on independence, Scotland's future, sets out its defence blueprint following a ‘yes’ vote. It makes clear that its defence plans would be subject to a Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2016, as well as negotiation on the division of assets with London. However, it also provides a strong indication of how it envisages its defence posture as an independent state—a major pillar of which is founded upon strong and continued defence cooperation with the rest of the United Kingdom. Is this a realistic assumption? And, if so, how would it work in practice? Contextualized by the increased emphasis on defence cooperation which sits at the heart of NATO's Smart Defence initiative, as well as the European Defence Agency's ‘pooling and sharing’ programme, the article assesses the benefits and challenges that might be encountered in a defence cooperation agreement between an independent Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom in the event of a ‘yes’ vote in September's referendum.     

The defence dilemma in Britain

The UK faces a pressing defence dilemma. The declaratory goals of defence policy are struggling to match the demands made by operational commitments and the financial and organizational capacities. The article examines how and why this situation has come about. While recognizing that existing calls for higher defence spending, reform of the Ministry of Defence, efficiency gains or a renewal of the so‐called military covenant between the military and society may address discrete elements of the defence dilemma in Britain, it argues that current problems derive from a series of deeper tensions in the nexus of British defence more widely defined. These include a transnationalization of strategic practice, in ways that both shape and constrain the national defence policy process; the institutional politics of defence itself, which encourage different interpretations of interest and priority in the wider strategic context; and finally the changing status of defence in the wider polity, which introduces powerful veto points into the defence policy process itself. It argues that while a series of shocks may have destabilized existing policy, prompted ad hoc organizational adaptation in the armed forces and led to incremental cost saving measures from the government, a ‘dominant crisis narrative’—in the form of a distinctive and generally agreed programme of change—has yet to emerge. The article concludes by looking forward to a future strategic defence review, highlighting the critical path dependencies and veto points which must be addressed if transformative change in British defence is to take place.     

Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review

In 2010 the coalition government conducted a major review of defence and security policy. This article explores the review process from a critical perspective by examining and challenging the state‐centrism of prevailing conceptions of current policy reflected in the quest to define and perform a particular ‘national role’ in contrast to a human‐centric framework focused on the UK citizen. It argues that shifting the focus of policy to the individual makes a qualitative difference to how we think about requirements for the UK's armed forces and challenges ingrained assumptions about defence and security in relation to military operations of choice and attendant expensive, expeditionary war‐fighting capabilities. In particular, it confronts the prevailing narrative that UK national security‐as‐global risk management must be met by securing the state against pervasive multidimensional risk through military force, that military power projection capabilities are a vital source of international influence and national prestige and that the exercise of UK military power constitutes a ‘force for good’ for the long‐term human security needs of citizens in both the intervened and intervening state.     

Britain's coalition government and EU defence cooperation: undermining British interests

The formation of a coalition government by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, combined with the need for important cuts to Britain's armed forces has raised significant uncertainties about Britain's attitude to defence cooperation within the European Union. Since taking office the coalition, while grappling with the implications of Britain's fiscal challenges, has shown an unprecedented interest in strengthening bilateral defence collaborations with certain European partners, not least France. However, budgetary constraints have not induced stronger support for defence cooperation at the EU level. On the contrary, under the new government, Britain has accelerated its withdrawal from the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This article assesses the approach of the coalition to the CSDP. It argues that, from the perspective of British interests, the need for EU defence cooperation has increased over the last decade and that the UK's further withdrawal from EU efforts is having a negative impact. The coalition is undermining a framework which has demonstrated the ability to improve, albeit modestly, the military capabilities of other European countries. In addition, by sidelining the EU at a time when the UK is forced to resort more extensively to cost‐saving synergies in developing and maintaining its own armed forces, David Cameron's government is depriving itself of the use of potentially helpful EU agencies and initiatives—which the UK itself helped set up. Against the background of deteriorating European military capabilities and shifts in US priorities, the article considers what drove Britain to support EU defence cooperation over a decade ago and how those pressures have since strengthened. It traces Britain's increasing neglect of the CSDP across the same period, the underlying reasons for this, and how the coalition's current stance of disengagement is damaging Britain's interests.     

Labour and the bomb: the first 80 years

The UK government's consideration of whether to replace Trident evokes past controversies about the bomb including occasions when the Labour Party advocated unilateral renunciation of British nuclear weapons. Out of office, fierce debate engulfed the party, fuelled by, and in turn fuelling, intra-party conflict. In power, while Labour governments took different decisions on key defence issues to their Conservative counterparts, they nevertheless ensured that the UK remained a nuclear weapons state. Labour also ensured the habits of secrecy in nuclear decision-making were ingrained, though these were challenged by the current government. This article examines the development of Labour's approach to nuclear weapons since 1945. Particular attention is given to the 1980s as members of the current cabinet will have clear recollections of campaigning on an anti-nuclear policy in the 1980s. The Blair government has embarked on public debate ahead of a formal decision and should the issue of Britain's nuclear status become embroiled in a political battle over the leadership succession, anti-nuclear sentiment may re-emerge. Yet if the past is guide to the future, the history of Labour governments suggests that the real debate will be about what replaces Trident not whether it is replaced.     

Dr Fox and the Philosopher's Stone: the alchemy of national defence in the age of austerity

The history of British defence reviews has been one of repeated disappointment: a cycle in which policy failure is followed by a period of inertia, giving way to an attempt at a new policy framework which is then misimplemented by the defence leadership. Each failed defence review therefore sows the seeds of its successor. With this in mind, in 2010 the new coalition government embarked upon an altogether more ambitious exercise: a strategy review comprising a National Security Strategy and a Strategic Defence and Security Review. This article suggests, nevertheless, not only that the 2010 strategy review looks likely to follow past performance, but also that it is coming unstuck at an unprecedented rate. This is a pity since the 2010 review had much to commend it, not least the adoption of a risk‐based approach to security and defence policy‐making. What is the explanation for this outcome? Is it that the British have, as some have suggested, lost the ability to ‘do strategy’, if ever they had it? The authors offer a more nuanced understanding of the policy process and argue that the coalition government in fact has a very clear and deliberate strategy—that of national economic recovery. Yet the coalition government cannot allow national defence and security to fail. The authors conclude with an assessment of the options open to the defence leadership as they seek to address the failing 2010 strategy review and suggest a variety of indicators which will demonstrate the intent and seriousness of the political, official and military leadership of the Ministry of Defence.     

The arithmetic of defence policy

The Kosovo campaign of 1999 demonstrated unambiguously the weakness of European military forces. Recognition of the consequences of this lack of capability has put new vigour into the European defence debate. Yet decline in military capability is systemic in every European country. The Helsinki goals will do nothing to address this decline. National defence budgets over the past 15 years have been decreasing in real terms. Even if current aspirations to hold military spending levels were to be achieved, the decline in capabilities would continue. Military equipment and personnel costs rise faster than domestic inflation, and therefore fewer people and weapons systems can be afforded each year. There is no prospect of significant uplifts in defence budgets in Europe, despite the acknowledged need for a range of expensive enabling capabilities for post-Cold War operations. Palliative measures now on trial are unlikely to have a major impact. The only option for European nations is a progressive integration of their forces to realize the economies of scale that would allow effectiveness to be maintained. There are opportunities for initiatives that would produce short-term pay-offs. Despite the severe political difficulties of a long-term plan for integration, the alternative is worse. Trying to maintain sovereignty in defence provision will mean that the nations of Europe will eventually be unable either to meet the requirements of even their most modest security needs or to exercise any influence over US defence and security policies.     

Change and continuity in strategic culture: the cases of Australia and New Zealand

The relationship between strategic culture and defence policies has not yet been much explored. Australia and New Zealand provide some evidence of the impact of strategic culture on defence policy. Australia has a dominant strategic culture which is strong enough to prompt both the major political parties to adopt realist defence policies, even though Labor has a traditionally ‘idealist’ outlook. Until the 1970s, New Zealand had a similar dominant strategic culture which influenced both major political parties, but it was always less strong than Australia's. In recent years, the Labour Party has rejected that culture, and allowed an alternative strategic culture based on its ideology to influence its defence policies. The result has been that on the last two occasions when Labour has been in government, New Zealand's defence policy has changed dramatically.