The Democratic Party and the restructuring of the Italian party system

Abstract

Out of a quickly performed merger between the Left Democrats and the Daisy, a new party has made its appearance in Italy: the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico – PD). In the summer of 2007 three candidates, Walter Veltroni, Rosy Bindi and Enrico Letta campaigned in order to convince sympathizers and supporters of that, yet non-existing party, that they were worthy of the office of Secretary of the PD. The election of Veltroni contributed to the already existing tensions within the centre-left governmental coalition that led to the demise of Prodi's government and to early elections. In April 2008, though receiving 33 per cent of the vote, the Democratic Party suffered a serious defeat. This article explores the reasons of the defeat and analyses its consequences on the restructuring of the Italian party system and the future of the Italian political system. Unless the Democratic Party is capable of finding an adequate organizational model and of expanding its electoral support beyond the areas of the traditional entrenchment of the former Communist party, the centre-right seems destined to guide Italian politics for some time to come.     

The 1989 Tasmanian election: The green independents consolidate

This paper provides an analysis of the election of 13 May 1989 which was a major watershed in Tasmanian politics. Independent members of parliament were elected in each of Tasmania's five electorates with the result that neither the Liberal Party nor the ALP could govern in their own right The period following the election was marked by continuing political drama punctuated by several key events. These events included the development of the Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord between the ALP and the Independents, continued pressure from supporters of the Liberal Party for a fresh election, and arrests in relation to an alleged attempt to bribe a newly‐elected ALP member to cross the floor and support the Liberal Party. The defeat of the Gray government in a vote of no‐confidence following the recall of parliament, and the resignation of Premier Gray, led to the commissioning of a minority ALP ministry, relying on the support of the Independents.     

Harold Macmillan and appeasement: implications for the future study of Macmillan as a foreign policy actor

Harold Macmillan opposed appeasement, but the precise nature of his involvement remains unclear. It is straightforward enough to note that his assessments proved to have been perceptive, and that the pro and anti-appeasement divide remained influential within the post-war Conservative Party; but his close alignment with anti-appeasement sentiment before the war has been treated with a degree of scepticism that this article believes to be wholly unfair, and which it seeks to address by arguing that, throughout the period in question, Macmillan followed a logically consistent and sincere path based upon a nuanced understanding of the situation that was intrinsically linked to the economic policy preferences for which he was better known. From this, Macmillan can be portrayed as having been a credible opponent of appeasement, which has potentially interesting implications for future studies into the post-war Conservative Party, and how he approached the Cold War as Prime Minister.     

'Stop the Flapper Vote Folly': Lord Rothermere, the Daily Mail, and the Equalization of the Franchise 1927-28

This essay re-examines the Daily Mail's campaign in 1927–8against the Baldwin government's decision to equalize the franchiseby lowering the female voting age to 21. It argues that theMail's hostility to the ‘flapper vote’ was largelya product of the passionate anti-socialism of its proprietor,Lord Rothermere, and not, as has been suggested, the culminationof a decade of anti-feminism. Rothermere was convinced thatyoung women would vote overwhelmingly for the Labour Party andentrench it in government for a generation. But attacks on the‘flapper’ in 1927–8 were generally confinedto the paper's editorial and political columns, and contrastedwith the much more positive portrayal of young women that hadbeen typical of the Mail's output since 1918. The example ofthe Daily Express, which supported franchise equalization, isused to demonstrate that it was Rothermere's idiosyncratic politicalpinions, rather than the ‘typical’ anti-feminismof the Conservative press, that explained the Mail's stance.The article concludes that the gender discourse of interwarnewspapers has been unfairly stereotyped by historians, andthat media hostility to young, unmarried women in these yearshas been exaggerated.     

Empire, Patriotism and the Working-Class Electorate: The 1900 General Election in the Battersea Constituency

The extent to which the Unionist victory in the 'khaki' general election of 1900 was the result of patriotic sentiment arising from the South African war has long been a source of controversy among historians. Battersea has been cited as an area that was largely unaffected by patriotic and imperial fervour during this period. This article examines the general election campaign in the Battersea constituency. The sitting MP, John Burns, was re-elected despite his opposition to the war, but the Conservatives achieved their highest percentage vote of that at any parliamentary election between 1885 and 1918. While the war was not the only issue raised during the campaign, it was the most prominent and clearly benefited the imperialist and pro-war Conservative candidate. In order to retain his seat Burns had to fight a far more dynamic local campaign than his opponent, and even then he won only narrowly. Although imperial sentiment was not quite enough to oust Burns from this otherwise safe seat, it was the main reason for the strong Conservative performance.     

Did Organization Really Matter? Party Organization and Conservative Electoral Recovery, 1945-59

Organizational recovery has traditionally been considered animportant factor in any explanation of the Conservative Party'selectoral recovery during the fifteen years after 1945. Thisarticle examines the extent of this recovery in three marginalseats, which the Conservatives either held or regained to formtheir new parliamentary majority. It demonstrates that, in anumber of constituencies, whatever the wider community mighthave thought, the reality of local organization—whetherin terms of financial health, membership numbers, the deliveryof political education, election campaigning, the effectivenessof party agents, or level of activity—was considered tobe less than impressive to those involved intimately. The articleconcludes that although the value of the Conservative Party'sextensive grass roots should not be denied, the precise roleand effectiveness of local organization should be reconsidered.     

The Labour Party and the League of Nations: The Socialist League's Role in the Sanctions Crisis of 1935

When the Labour Party—influenced by the NEC and the TUCGeneral Council—decided to support League of Nations sanctionsagainst Italy in 1935 this signalled its recognition that itwas necessary to challenge the fascist dictators with collectiveforce. The way in which this decision marked the discreditingof pacifism within the Labour Party has been fully examined.The Socialist League—the organ of the Labour left—alsounsuccessfully opposed the sanctions policy. Nevertheless, existingaccounts have focused on its chairman, Cripps, and his refusalto trust the ‘capitalist’ and ‘imperialist’National Government to impose sanctions. Instead, this articleconsiders the Socialist League as a whole and highlights divisionsthat emerged within it over sanctions. The official SocialistLeague line demanded ‘mass resistance’ against theNational Government. However, a sizeable minority—particularlythose with overtly pro-Soviet affinities—decided to supportcollective security now that the Soviet Union had joined theLeague of Nations. These internal divisions seriously weakenedthe Socialist League case. They explain how the NEC–TUCwas able so conclusively to defeat its radical anti-capitalistarguments, thereby gaining a fuller mandate with which to developits policy of armed collective security before the Second WorldWar.     

1932: A Neglected Date in the History of the Decline of the British Liberal Party

There is an historical consensus that the decline of the BritishLiberal Party, whenever it began, was essentially complete by1929 or 1931 at the latest. This article suggests that the possibilityof a Liberal revival still existed in the early 1930s, but thatit was thwarted by the formalization of divisions between Liberalsand Liberal Nationals which took place in 1932. These divisionswere not accidental, but the result of clear calculations onthe part of the Liberal National leadership. It is further arguedthat the events of this year were important in determining theelectoral politics of the following three decades—dominationby a Conservative party which set out to stress its ‘liberal’credentials and to persuade the electorate that it was the logicalrepository for the country's still significant ‘Liberalvote’. Meanwhile, an independent Liberal Party survived,but one which was far smaller and less electorally powerfulthan might have been the case if the party had remained united.     

1953-1954年江苏基层普选中选举权审查的偏向与纠正

1953-1954年举行的第一次全国普选是人民代表大会制度建立的重要前提。作为全国普选的一个缩影,江苏基层普选是人民民主制度的重要实践。在试点阶段,江苏基层普选的选举权审查曾发生“左”的偏向,对此,江苏各级选举组织机构展开了有针对性的政策改进和纠偏,最终顺利完成普选。江苏对基层选举权的严格审查,既实现了人民内部最大范围的民主选举,彰显了党和政府实施民主选举的决心和能力,也进一步增强了人民群众的民主意识,推进了基层民主政治建设,具有重要的历史意义。     

‘A Rather Novel Constitutional Experiment’: The Formation of the 1977–8 ‘Lib‐Lab Pact’

By March 1977, the Labour government which had narrowly been re‐elected in the October 1974 election, had lost its parliamentary majority, and was facing a vote of confidence tabled by the Conservative opposition. Senior Labour figures thus desperately sought to secure support from one of the minor parties. Unable to broker a deal with either the Ulster Unionists or the Scottish National Party (SNP), largely due to ideological differences, the Labour leadership entered into negotiations with the Liberal leader, David Steel. The result was that the Liberal Party agreed to provide the Labour government with parliamentary support, in return for consultation, via a joint committee, over future policies, coupled with the reintroduction of devolution legislation, and a pledge to provide for direct elections for the European parliament (ideally using some form of proportional representation). There was some surprise that Steel had not pressed for more, or stronger, policy commitments or concessions from the Labour prime minister, James Callaghan, but Steel was thinking long term; he envisaged that Liberal participation in the joint consultative committee would foster closer co‐operation between Liberals and Labour moderates/social democrats, and eventually facilitate a realignment of British politics by marginalising both the Labour left, and the increasingly right‐wing Conservatives Party.     

Labour and the bomb: the first 80 years

The UK government's consideration of whether to replace Trident evokes past controversies about the bomb including occasions when the Labour Party advocated unilateral renunciation of British nuclear weapons. Out of office, fierce debate engulfed the party, fuelled by, and in turn fuelling, intra-party conflict. In power, while Labour governments took different decisions on key defence issues to their Conservative counterparts, they nevertheless ensured that the UK remained a nuclear weapons state. Labour also ensured the habits of secrecy in nuclear decision-making were ingrained, though these were challenged by the current government. This article examines the development of Labour's approach to nuclear weapons since 1945. Particular attention is given to the 1980s as members of the current cabinet will have clear recollections of campaigning on an anti-nuclear policy in the 1980s. The Blair government has embarked on public debate ahead of a formal decision and should the issue of Britain's nuclear status become embroiled in a political battle over the leadership succession, anti-nuclear sentiment may re-emerge. Yet if the past is guide to the future, the history of Labour governments suggests that the real debate will be about what replaces Trident not whether it is replaced.     

A Parliamentary Victory: The British Labour Party and Irish Republican Deportees, 1923

After the 1918 general election the Labour Party became the official opposition party at Westminster. In response to the growing Irish republican campaign to establish an independent Irish state the Labour Party had to re-assess its relationship with Irish nationalism. The Labour Party was now acutely conscious that it was on the verge of forming a government and was concerned to be seen by the British electorate as a responsible, moderate and patriotic government-in-waiting. Although it had traditionally supported Irish demands for home rule and was vehemently opposed to the partition of Ireland, the Labour Party became increasingly wary of any closer relationship with extreme Irish nationalism which it believed would only damage its rapidly improving electoral prospects. Therefore the Labour Party supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 even though it underpinned the partition of Ireland and sought to distance itself from any association with Irish republicanism as the new Irish Free State drifted into civil war. In early 1923 the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) alighted upon the new issue of the arrest and deportation without trial, to the Irish Free State, of Irish republicans living in Britain who were obviously British citizens. The attraction of this campaign for the Labour Party was that it enabled the party to portray itself as the defender of Irish people living in Britain without having to take sides in the Irish civil war. In addition the Labour Party was able to present itself as the protector of civil liberties in Britain against the excesses of an overweening and authoritarian Conservative government. One of the main reasons the issue was progressed so energetically on the floor of the House by the new PLP was because it now contained many Independent Labour Party (ILP) ‘Red Clydesiders’ who themselves had been interned without trial during the First World War. Through brilliant and astute use of parliamentary tactics Bonar Law's Conservative government was forced into an embarrassing climb-down which required the cobbling together of an Indemnity Bill which gave tory ministers retrospective legal protection for having exceeded their authority. By any standard, it was a major achievement by a novice opposition party. It enhanced the party's reputation and its growing sophistication in the use of parliamentary tactics benefited it electorally at the next election which led to the first Labour government.     

A revisionist interpretation of the impact of Queensland's electoral scheme

In December 1989 Queensland voters changed their government from National Party to Labor Party. Labor had been out of office since August 1957, a record period of opposition for a major party. How is that very lengthy Labor period in the wilderness to be explained? The orthodox interpretation is that there has been a gerrymander in Queensland. This article argues, however, that Queensland's electoral system is the same as that of other mainland states. While it is true that electorates are malapportioned in Queensland (and in Western Australia), nevertheless the method of single member electorates with preferential voting is in use for all mainland states. Such a system does not translate a party's percentage of votes into a similar percentage of seats in the Legislative Assembly. The elections of 1956 and 1989 each saw Labor getting a first preference vote in excess of 50 per cent— with which Labor won in excess of 60 per cent of the seats. At no election between these dates did Labor secure a majority of votes, either first preference or two party preferred.     

The Queensland Election of 21 March, 2009: Labor's Swim Against the Tide

This article explores the events before and during the 2009 Queensland election which saw the Bligh Labor Government returned far more easily than commentators and opinion polls had indicated. This election remains especially noteworthy for its groundbreaking firsts, including the first election of a woman state premier, and the first election for Queensland's single, merged Liberal-National Party. The article concludes that Anna Bligh's then-popular leadership, Opposition leader Lawrence Springborg's alleged poor grasp of economic realities, and fears of job losses during the global financial crisis were the prime motivators of swinging electors' vote choice.     

‘One man,one vote; one woman,one throat’: Women in New York city politics, 1890–1910

This essay challenges the assumption that women did not go into politics until they had the right to vote. In New York City at least, it was the other way around. Motivated by the municipal reform movement of the 1890s which sought to defeat Democratic Tammany Hall, women steadily took on more responsibility for electing good men to office, through meetings, canvassing and the production of literature. They did so both through their own non‐partisan reform organization and in highly partisan women's Republican Clubs. Proliferating in the 1890s, Republican women's clubs provided a steady stream of workers to elect Republican candidates, even when they opposed reformers. The Democratic Party was slow to organize women, not doing so seriously until after New York women got suffrage in 1917. However, some Democratic women organized their own clubs, which endorsed Tammany Hall candidates but did not work for them intensively.     

Not quite as British as Finchley: the failed attempt to bring British Conservatism to Northern Ireland

In a previous issue of Irish Studies Review I examined the unanticipated emergence in the late 1980s of a series of Conservative associations in Northern Ireland. In this follow-up article, I will seek to account for the subsequent swift and ignominious decline in the early 1990s of the Northern Irish Conservatives. While the fortunes of the Ulster Tories were undermined by a number of contingencies – the vagaries of parliamentary arithmetic and their own lack of political judgement foremost among them – their fate was sealed primarily by certain rather more structural concerns. In particular, the rapid decline of the Conservative associations in Northern Ireland owes its origins to the historically “loveless marriage” between Ulster unionists and the British state. The unionist community simply refused to vote in meaningful numbers for a political party at the centre of a Westminster establishment deemed hostile to the cause of the Union. In addition, the Conservative hierarchy would inevitably prove unwilling to nurture their own party associations in Northern Ireland as this “integrationist” project ran precisely counter to their own longstanding political ambitions for the region. This conflict of interests and intentions would in short order ensure the demise in all but name of the Northern Irish Conservatives. There can be few more dramatic illustrations of the mutual distrust that conjoins Ulster unionists and the British state than the string of lost deposits incurred by Conservative candidates running for office in Northern Ireland.     

‘This is Staffordshire not Alabama’: Racial Geographies of Commonwealth Immigration in Early 1960s Britain

In the 1964 general election, the English town of Smethwick outside Birmingham became infamous for the unprecedented way in which issues of immigration, race and racism entered British national politics. Conservative candidate Peter Griffiths captured the Smethwick seat in Parliament from long-standing Labour MP Patrick Gordon Walker, aided by the slogan ‘If you want a nigger neighbour, vote Liberal or Labour’—a watershed episode soon overshadowed by the rise of Powellism in the late 1960s. Debates between Griffiths, his supporters and his opponents in the early to mid-1960s about the local and national implications of ‘coloured’ immigration (particularly of Indian Sikhs) from the Commonwealth and the legacy of empire drew upon a densely entangled set of global reference points that went beyond a ‘multi-racial’ Britain being reshaped by its ‘multi-racial’, postcolonial Commonwealth. Racist rhetoric, as well as an increasingly assertive anti-racist activism by the Indian Workers' Association and other groups, turned to analogies ranging from Nazi Germany to apartheid South Africa and racial segregation in the United States, as well as to protest techniques inspired by Gandhi in colonial India and African Americans in the civil rights movement. In Smethwick c. 1964, the global met the local, illuminating transnational flows of people and ideas about race and cultural diversity nonetheless contingent upon their time and place.     

Ideas from ‘across the ditch’? Wedge politics in the 2005 New Zealand election

The 2005 New Zealand election campaign saw the use by the opposition National Party of a racialised and highly divisive ‘wedge politics’. Tensions between Mäori and Pakeha that had previously been managed through care and compromise were inflamed by talk of a New Zealand mainstream and the need for ‘one law for all’. In the context of a difficult national debate about Mäori rights to foreshore and seabed, this talk had strong echoes of recent Australian political discourse. It also had the effect of dramatically increasing the National Party vote in the election, and this research note speculates that, in a different electoral system, this may have been enough to see National form government.     

Alberta’s Premier Ed Stelmach: The Anomalous Case of Leadership Selection and Removal in a Canadian Province1

Why would a new provincial premier, having in his first general election increased his governing party’s seats in the legislature from 62 to 72 out of 83, resign just three years later? Normally, in Canada a provincial first minister remains in office so long as s/he wins elections, and either retires of his/her own accord or is forced to resign after an electoral defeat. Ed Stelmach’s brief tenure (2006–11) as premier of Alberta is a singular anomaly in that regard. Relying on interviews with the principal players, monographic and newspaper accounts, and party as well as Elections Alberta websites, this article makes systematic comparisons between the major features of Stelmach’s term in office and his predecessors, Peter Lougheed and Ralph Klein. This leads to the conclusion that popularity with the voting public simply did not translate into popularity in the backrooms of Alberta politics, where it apparently counts most.