漫谈法属印度支那“坐人”硬币

法属印度支那地区位于东南亚印度支那半岛的东部,包括法属东京、安南、交趾支那、老挝和柬埔寨等地（相当于现在的越南、老挝和柬埔寨）。 印度支那地区,古称“安南”。19世纪末叶,英、法两国殖民统治者完成了对印度支那半岛的瓜分。其中英国占据了印度、缅甸等西部地区,法国则占领了越南、老挝和柬埔寨等东部地区。双方还于20世纪初签定条约,以暹罗（泰国）为所谓“缓冲区”,分别对西、东部进行殖民统治。     

简析法属印度支那硬币的种类

法属印度支那地区 ,相当于现在的亚洲印度支那半岛的东半部和东南部 ,含越南、老挝和柬埔寨。法国从 1 858年开始武装侵略越南 ,1 884年占领越南全境 ,将越南列为他的“保护国”。 1 86 3年入侵柬埔寨 ,强迫柬埔寨承认为法国的“保护国”。 1 893年又入侵老挝 ,将老挝也列为他的“保护国”。到了十九世纪末 ,仅在印度支那地区法国就占有七十多万平方公里的土地 ,比法国本土的面积还大近二十万平方公里。 1 94 0年日军侵入印度支那 ,法国驻印度支那总督屈从于日本军国主义 ;1 94 5年 3月 9日 ,日军解除了印度支那全境法军的武装。日本投降后 …     

论法国在印度支那殖民统治体制的基本特征及其影响

印度支那三国（越南、柬埔寨、老挝）是法国在东南亚的至关重要的殖民地和战略基地,法国的殖民政策在这里得到全面的贯彻和显著的体现。对１９世纪中叶以来法国在印度支那的殖民统治进行历史考察,将有助于我们进一步了解法国殖民主义的基本特征及其社会历史影响。一、法属印度支那联邦殖民政治体制的形成和特点法国从１９世纪中叶侵入越南,到这个世纪的９０年代,完成了对印度支那三国的殖民征服,建立了法属“印度支那联邦”,确立了对印度支那的殖民统治。从１８６２年侵占南圻东三省开始,到１９４０年９月日本侵入印度支那为止,将近…     

同舟共济还是同床异梦——肯尼迪与蒋介石关系的内幕(之一)

老问题困扰着新总统半个世纪以来中美关系的发展脉络表明,美国对新中国的态度从敌对、遏制走向缓和、关系正常化,再到进一步建立战略关系,是一个漫长的转变过程。肯尼迪政府对华政策是这个转变过程中的一个过渡阶段。虽然由于冷战大格局的限制和肯尼迪本人猝然遇刺,美国政府在这个时期没有     

老挝，纯净佛国的魅惑

老挝,是我柬、老、越之行中最难忘,也最怡然自得的一段。老挝,位于中南半岛北部,面积约为云南省的2/3。它北接中国滇西高原,南邻束埔寨,东界越南,西南毗连泰国,西北与缅甸接壤;境内80%为山地和高原,有"印度支那屋脊"之     

在越南丛林中大战山蚂蟥

我们赴印度支那(亦称中南半岛,此处特指“法属印度支那”,包括越南、柬埔寨、老挝等国)参加援越抗美斗争,是1965年10月16日奉命随中国人民解放军援越抗美部队五支队二十六大队(原南京军区工程兵144团)出境的. 刚到越南时,我们分队被安排驻扎在安沛某地山林之中.     

肯尼迪政府时期美国对蒙古政策研究

在雅尔塔会议上美国同意苏联参加对日作战提出的保持外蒙古现状的条件,但在20世纪40—50年代美国并没有正式承认外蒙古独立。肯尼迪政府时期美国启动了与蒙古建交的行动,正式承认其为独立主权国家,并在联合国关于蒙古入联问题上投了弃权票。由于担心蒙古不能入联引发连锁反应对美国不利,肯尼迪政府在外交上对台湾当局施压,迫使其没有在联合国行使否决权,蒙古于1961年正式成为联合国成员。然而由于国际形势的变化,特别是柏林危机和台湾当局的极力反对,肯尼迪政府未能在任内完成与蒙古建交事宜。肯尼迪政府时期美国对蒙古政策的变化反映了冷战时期美国对亚洲内陆国家外交政策的实质,即为美国的冷战战略服务。     

“反攻大陆“的梦想与美国的“限制“术——肯尼迪与蒋介石的关系内幕(四)

到底谁被谁牵着走?美国和台湾当局的关系中时而有一种奇怪现象,典型地表现在肯尼迪执政头一年同蒋介石打交道的记录中:美国几乎总是放弃较符合自己利益的选择,而迁就台湾当局。为什么会有这等怪事?从前文所述美国政府内部讨论的各种意见中可以略知答案。实际上,影响肯尼迪政府对台政策的最主要因素,还是冷战地缘政治和意识形态。中国站在与美国对立的社会主义阵营一边,台湾就成为美国遏制战略的重要一环。肯尼迪曾告诉蒋介石:“长远看来,自由世界通过增强民主制度并使之更适应世界人民的愿     

抗美援老二三事

成立援老筑路指挥部 20世纪60年代中期,美国在越南战场越陷越深。然而,美国当权者不甘心失败的结局,继续扩大印度支那战火,把魔爪伸向中国邻邦老挝。老挝人民在老挝人民党和爱国战线的领导下,面对侵略不畏强暴,抗美救国,英勇奋斗,逐步建立和发展了自己的武装力量。为了帮助老挝人民长期坚持抗美救国斗争,根据老挝人民党和老挝政府的请求,我军遵照党中央和国务院指示,向老挝提供军事援助,先后提供了大量武器装备和军需物资,帮助培训军事和技术人员,派出大批工程部队和大批防空、警卫、后勤保障部队为老挝无偿修筑公路（注：1968年至1978年10多年中,我国先后派出18个工程大队,3个民工总队,直接施工力量7万余人,修建公路822．416公里,桥梁131座,涵洞2677个,铺设沥青路面458万余平方米）。     

肯尼迪政府调节国际收支逆差的政策

肯尼迪在美国面临巨额国际收支逆差的背景下入主白宫。严重的逆差导致美国的黄金大量外流,引起西方世界对美元信用的置疑。因此,调节逆差成为肯尼迪政府的重要使命。肯尼迪政府调节逆差的政策主要体现在肯尼迪提交给国会的两份特别咨文中,即1961年2月6日的“黄金和国际收支逆差特别咨文”和1963年7月18日的“国际收支特别咨文”。以两份咨文为蓝本,有关部门展开了系列的开源节流行动。美国的逆差调节行动使美国政府内部和北约盟国间的斗争起伏跌宕,充分暴露出权力政治的实质。     

Land Policy and Farming Practices in Laos

The government of Laos has identified the eradication of poverty as a priority. Given the primarily agricultural character of the country, it has selected land reform as a core policy to reach this goal. The policy has two major aims: to increase land tenure security in order to encourage farmer involvement in intensive farming, and to eliminate slash‐and‐burn agriculture to protect the environment in a country still rich in forest resources. State intervention takes the form of land allocation, a process which combines the protection of some areas of village land with the formal recognition of private ownership in authorized farming areas. In a country with different types of geography, the effects of the policy are variable, but the research presented in this article demonstrates that the land laws have shortcomings which allow for differing interpretations depending on the local social relationships. Since local specificities are not taken into account, the reform is proving counterproductive for both forest protection and agricultural modernization, as well as having a negative social impact by marginalizing the poorest farmers.     

沿"胡志明小道"在老挝漫游

在印度支那的屋脊上 多年前,我见过一个穿印花茏基的老挝人.     

Experimental Consensus: Negotiating with the Irrigating State in the South of Laos

Abstract

It is common to view Laos as a political culture prone to “consensus”, yet it is also true that policy is constantly changing there, often radically. If everyone is always “in consensus”, what can explain this change? I suggest that the answer is found in the particular kind of consensus at play: it is informed by a wider “experimentarian” ethic evident in rural Laos, where ideas (including the latest policies) are put to the test through practical implementation. The results of these experiments are used to validate policy change and reversal. This allows rural residents a degree of manoeuvrability in their engagements with the state that is striking given the “authoritarian” status of the current regime. It can explain and is used to justify, for instance, the oft-observed gap between policy and actual practice. This room for manoeuvre comes at the price of “playing the game”, at least for a while, of the latest policy fad, sometimes with disastrous consequences for rural livelihoods. I use the example of an irrigation project that was implemented in the south of Laos from 1999–2002 to examine “experimental consensus” at work as policy was received, engaged and eventually relinquished.     

Planned Resettlement,Unexpected Migrations and Cultural Trauma in Laos

Though not officially considered a ‘policy’ by the Lao government, resettlement of ethnic minorities has become a central feature of the rural development strategy in Laos. Over the past ten years, a majority of highland villages have been resettled downhill, and the local administrations are planning to move the remaining villages in the coming years. This article draws on a national survey about resettlement in Laos, commissioned by UNESCO and financed by UNDP, that was undertaken by the authors. It focuses on the consequences of these huge shifts of population and on the social and cultural dynamics that underlie them. It shows that the planned resettlements, which are intended to promote the ‘settling’ of the highland populations by enforcing the ban on slash‐and‐burn agriculture and opium growing, actually cause increased and diversified rural mobility. This in turn complicates the implementation of the rural development policy and the political management of interethnic relationships. In other words, the ‘settling’ process promoted by the State, because of its broad and often tragic social consequences, can paradoxically generate unplanned or unexpected further migrations, which could be called ‘resettlement‐induced forms of mobility’     

Haunting the State: Rumours,Spectral Apparitions and the Longing for Buddhist Charisma in Laos

Buddhist ascetic monks and hermits that move largely outside of the institutional structures of the monastic order (sangha) have a long history in mainland Southeast Asia. In Lao Buddhism these figures seem to have largely disappeared, but due to their charismatic qualities they still occupy a crucial position in the social imaginary. This article explores rumours and narratives about the existence of ascetic monks and hermits in contemporary Laos. I argue that rumours about, and narratives of, spectral apparitions of these figures express a longing for Buddhist charisma that is partially rooted in Laos’ revolutionary past, and in recent social and economic changes. As Buddhist charisma can point to alternative, personalised sources of power, I argue that rumours and spectral apparitions can be interpreted as haunting, and therefore afflicting and challenging the current politics of religion of the Lao state.     

Harnessing the sending state: Pragmatic improvisations and negotiated memberships of the Chinese diaspora in Laos

As a form of state-led transnationalism, diaspora strategies have garnered much scholarly attention over the past two decades. Yet, the robust intellectual field still sees a dearth of works addressing how the power of the sending state is lived and experienced in the prosaic lives of transnationality. This paper fills the gap by examining the grounded ramifications of a specific approach that the Chinese government deploys to cultivate diaspora. It prioritizes coopting civil association leaders (hui-zhang) from populations abroad for diaspora governance. I unpack how street-level bureaucracies involved in the execution of this sending state strategy has been exploited by the Chinese entrepreneurs in Laos through qualitative fieldwork. My analysis reveals that these situated actors scrambled to set up their own diaspora associations in an attempt to make themselves hui-zhang eligible for the home country government's targeted engagement. In doing so, they accessed opportunities to appropriate and rework resources from the Chinese state for self-interested accumulation of symbolic and social capital. Both forms of capital are crucial to propel their wealth amassment in private career as intermediaries who extract commissions and kickbacks by brokering Chinese investments into Laos. Detailing these dynamics, the paper elucidates how the power of the sending state is disseminated and enacted through mundane and pragmatic improvisations of diasporic actors. Empirics presented also bring forward a nuanced understanding of the de facto convoluted relations between the Chinese government and the overseas Chinese populations.     

Ethnic Performance and the State in Laos: The Boun Greh Annual Festival of the Khmou

Following the 1975 revolution, the Laotian statesmen adopted a modernising discourse that targeted “backward” traditions as undesirable. But since the 1990s, authorities have mitigated this standpoint, distinguishing “good” from “bad” traditions according to their compatibility with the program of national development, and professing their will to (re)instate the former as suitable expressions of culture in a multi-ethnic nation. This is manifest everywhere from the National Constitution to TV shows and ethnic catalogues. This paper analyses the implementation of these principles through the case of the boun greh New Year festival, an invented ethnic tradition of the Khmou, the largest ethnic minority in Laos. The article demonstrates that this implementation has consequentially implied the adoption of a grammar of national ethnicity; that this official framework paradoxically allows the Khmou to articulate demands for better recognition of their group; and that this process does not mute expressions of “cultural intimacy” at variance with this matrix. The official frame of ethnicity has been eventually adopted by the Khmou, but this state effect has multiplied the layers of expressed ethnicity: it cannot be equated with a unilateral regimentation that would deprive the Khmou of their agency.