Post‐communism and the Russian public

This book, based on a survey by the Sociology Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences completed in April 2011, provides, in the opinion of this reviewer, one of the most comprehensive accounts so far published of Russian opinion during the twenty years since the fall of communism. Based on a carefully weighted sample of respondents, it makes full allowance for the great variations of opinions according to age, income group and place of residence. It also allows for changes in opinion by drawing on surveys of earlier years. The finished product provides a wealth of information on subjects ranging from leisure to moral attitudes. The book sees little conclusive evidence of xenophobic attitudes towards the outside world, and suggests that ethnic hatred within Russia is a reflection of stress rather than racism. One salient finding is that very few Russians support the idea of the ‘minimum state’ or unregulated free market. Most Russians believe in some kind of a mixed economy in which the state nevertheless plays a key role. The idea of democracy, according to this book, is regarded with ‘benevolent scepticism’; that is, support in principle coupled with considerable doubts whether it would work in present‐day Russia. Given the impossibility of voting the present government out of office, Russians are increasingly resorting to other means of protest, including street demonstrations. The level of discontent is illustrated by the fact that only 10 per cent in the survey said they were better off as a result of the post‐communist reforms, while 25 per cent said they were worse off. Nevertheless, the majority of Russians have no wish for yet another upheaval and this may explain the continued public acceptance of President Putin's rule.     

Russian geopolitical culture and public opinion: the masks of Proteus revisited

In this paper, we build on the work of Graham Smith, who was developing a critical geopolitics of Russia in his posthumous paper of 1999, published in this journal. Like Smith, we link the evolving geopolitical orientations of Russia to the search for a post-Soviet identity amongst its citizens and its political leadership. While Smith saw a core concept in Russian geopolitics having Protean masks, it is the leadership of the Russian state, specifically President Putin, who has successfully adopted a Protean strategy to appeal to the disparate elements of the Russian geopolitical spectrum. Based on a nationwide survey in spring 2002, we identify six clusters in Russian public opinion by socio-demographic characteristics and we connect each cluster to the main geopolitical orientations competing in contemporary Russia, including democratic statism and the increasingly marginalized Eurasianism that formed the core subject of Smith's paper.     

Participation and Rights in Athenian Democracy: A Habermasian Approach

This article analyzes the actual interaction of private and public immunities in ancient Athens, and argues that ancient democracy echoed to a greater extent than traditionally assumed the general dynamics and normative foundations of deliberative democracy. Without denying the important differences that distinguish ancient democratic Athens from modern democracy, I analyze the Athenian situation in light of Habermas's theory of deliberation, and argue that civic and individual liberties in Athens were democracy-enabling because they undergirded the exercise of collective political power. In Athens, the considerable respect accorded to the rule of law (as distinct from majority rule), legitimated private autonomy and created the circumstances that made collective self-government possible. Thus, this article contradicts the dichotomous approach to liberty held by some of the most prominent critics of Athens such as Isaiah Berlin and Benjamin Constant.     

From Pristina to Tskhinvali: the legacy of Operation Allied Force in Russia's relations with the West

This article reviews the main developments in the Kosovo crisis in the context of relations between Russia and NATO/the West. For Moscow, Operation Allied Force constituted a flagrant breach of international law, a threat to post-Cold War European security governance and a challenge to Russia's status in the international order. Official Russian interpretations, heavily influenced by domestic politics, reflect a perception among Russia's political elite that, rather than upholding liberal democratic values, NATO's intervention constituted a selective defence of the interests of the leading western powers.
Such views have influenced Moscow's position on the thorny question of Kosovo's independence and Russia's more assertive foreign and security policy in the recent period, not least in the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008. Ultimately, Operation Allied Force resulted in the Russian governing elite reassessing its views on statehood, the international order and the norms underpinning international society.     

贵族话语与雅典民主政治的关系——以“刺杀僭主”叙事为中心

传统观点认为,虽然古典时期的雅典人创造了民主制,但并未发展出相应的民主政治话语,贵族的传统价值观和意识形态始终在民主政治中居于主导地位。然而,对"刺杀僭主"叙事的分析表明,贵族发明的话语传统可以在公共空间内被大众转化为城邦的政治话语,进而在新的历史语境中被民主化,为民主政治话语提供符号、仪式和形象,成为民主制的有机组成部分。这说明,古典时期雅典民主政治对旧时代政治符号的继承,并不等于贵族话语对民主政治的胜利。能够在新的政治语境中对旧叙事进行创造性改编,反而说明民主政治有能力利用旧传统的养分,创造出属于自身的政治话语。     

Slavic,European, or Asiatic? F. H. Duchinski on the Origins of the Russian People

The emergence of Russia as a dominant force in Europe from the early nineteenth century onward was characterized by growing tensions between Russians and Poles as seen in the recurring Russian suppression of Polish uprisings. F. H. Duchinski (1817–93) who, like other Polish intellectuals, tried to uncover the root causes of these political tensions, concluded that Russians were neither Slavic nor European, but Asians, and it was this fact alone, he believed, that accounted for the continuing Russian hostility toward the Poles.     

Social groups,sport and political engagement in New Zealand

Many prominent social theorists contend that memberships in voluntary associations make major contributions to making citizens more engaged with democracy. Although substantial attention has been directed at the potential role of sports groups, previous studies using survey data have not found membership in sports groups to be associated with political activity. New Zealand presents an important context for testing this theory, given its high levels of public participation in sports groups. We find that membership in sports and other social groups is associated with higher levels of political engagement. We discuss how these findings advance our understanding of the role that specific group memberships may have in democratic societies.     

Alternative identity,alternative religion? Neo‐paganism and the Aryan myth in contemporary Russia

ABSTRACT. As in all post‐Soviet states, the Russian intelligentsia has been preoccupied with the construction of a new national identity since the beginning of the 1990s. Although the place of Orthodox religion in Russia is well documented, the subject of neo‐paganism and its consequent assertion of an Aryan identity for Russians remains little known. Yet specialists observing the political and intellectual life of contemporary Russia have begun to notice that the development of references to ‘Slavic paganism’ and to Russia's ‘Aryan’ origin can be found in the public speeches of some politicians and intellectual figures. This article will attempt, in its first section, to depict the historical depth of these movements by examining the existence of neo‐pagan and/or Aryan referents in Soviet culture, and focusing on how these discourses developed in different spheres of post‐Soviet Russian society, such as those of religion, historiography, and politics.     

Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules

The Russian military interventions in Ukraine, which have led to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and to the entrenchment of separatist enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, directly challenge the post‐Cold War European state system. Russia has consistently denied any wrongdoing or illegal military involvement and has presented its policies as a reaction to the repression of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. This article argues that it is important to examine and contest unfounded Russian legal and political claims used by Moscow to justify its interventions. The article proceeds to assess in detail three different explanations of the Russian operations in Ukraine: geopolitical competition and structural power (including the strategic benefits of seizing Crimea); identity and ideational factors; and the search for domestic political consolidation in Russia. These have all played a role, although the role of identity appears the least convincing in explaining the timing and scope of Russian encroachments on Ukrainian territorial integrity and the disruption of Ukrainian statehood.     

A. V. Dicey and English constitutionalism

The jurist A. V. Dicey’s study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) has been since its publication the dominant analysis of the British constitution and the source of orthodoxy on such subjects as parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. This canonical status has obscured the originality of Dicey’s ideas in the history of legal and political thought. Dicey reworked the traditional idea of sovereignty into two separate concepts – legal and political sovereignty – in order to square the common law notion of the sovereignty of parliament with the democratic idea of the sovereignty of the people. He forged a new concept – ‘the rule of law’ – to explain the legal basis of liberty in common law countries in a manner that was both Benthamite and constitutionalist. Finally, he provided a democratic and anti-federalist rationale for maintaining the Union of Great Britain and Ireland. This majoritarian, centralist and utilitarian constitutionalism has been one of the most enduring products of Victorian scholarship. This article seeks to recover it in its original context and, in so doing, to show the value of reintegrating legal thought into the mainstream of modern British history and the history of political thought.     

Who identifies with the “Russian World”? Geopolitical attitudes in southeastern Ukraine,Crimea, Abkhazia,South Ossetia,and Transnistria

Abstract

The concept of the Russian world (Russkii mir) re-entered geopolitical discourse after the end of the Soviet Union. Though it has long historical roots, the practical definition and geopolitical framing of the term has been debated and refined in Russian political and cultural circles during the years of the Putin presidency. Having both linguistic-cultural and geopolitical meanings, the concept of the Russian world remains controversial, and outside Russia it is often associated with Russian foreign policy actions. Examination of official texts from Vladimir Putin and articles from three Russian newspapers indicate complicated and multifaceted views of the significance and usage of the Russkii mir concept. Surveys in December 2014 in five sites on the fringes of Russia – in southeastern Ukraine, Crimea, and three Russian-supported de facto states (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria) – show significant differences between the Ukrainian sample points and the other locations about whether respondents believe that they live in the Russian world. In Ukraine, nationality (Russian vs. Ukrainian) is aligned with the answers, while overall, attitudes toward Russian foreign policy, level of trust in the Russian president, trust of Vladimir Putin, and liking Russians are positively related to beliefs about living in the Russian world. In Ukraine, the negative reactions to geopolitical speech acts and suspicions about Russian government actions overlap with and confuse historical linguistic-cultural linkages with Russia, but in the other settings, close security and economic ties reinforce a sense of being in the Russian “world.”     

The Crimea conundrum: legitimacy and public opinion after annexation

ABSTRACT

The widespread international condemnation of the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 is at odds with the strong local support for the transfer of territory in the peninsula. Though regarded as illegitimate by most governments as indicated in a UN General Assembly vote, the Russian government argued that the transfer was justified since it reflected the majority opinion in Crimea. The examination of attitudes in December 2014 through a representative survey in Crimea confirmed the support for territorial transfer and indicated that most residents believed that their well-being would improve as a result. Most lamented the end of the Soviet Union but strongly trusted President Putin and his policies as a way to improve the local economy. Nearly everyone had Russian citizenship less than a year after the annexation. There was little difference between the biggest demographic groupings, Russians and Ukrainians, in attitudes and beliefs. Exceptionally, the Tatar minority consistently demonstrated opposition to the annexation, distrust of Putin and supported a return to the circumstances that the peninsula had experienced after 1991. With the exception of this minority, the annexation continues to garner wide popular approval despite international opprobrium, sanctions against Russia and sustained geopolitical tensions in the Black Sea region. This is the Crimea conundrum.     

Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine

The roots of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are to be found in two areas. The first is the revival of Tsarist imperial nationalist and White Russian émigré nationalist denials of the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Russian imperial nationalists believe the eastern Slavs constitute a pan Russian nation of Great Russians, Little Russians and White Russian branches of one Russian nation. The second is the cult of the Great Patriotic War and Joseph Stalin and the revival of Soviet era discourse on Ukrainian Nazis (i.e., nationalists). A Ukrainian nationalist in the Soviet Union and Vladimir Putin's Russia is any Ukrainian who seeks a future for his/her country outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Russian World and who upholds an ethnic Ukrainian (rather than a Little Russian) identity. The Russian World is the new core of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin's alternative to the EU's Eastern Partnership. In the contemporary domain, Ukrainian nationalists are Nazi's irrespective of their language preference or political beliefs and if they do not accept they are Little Russians. Putin's invasion goal of denazification is a genocidal goal to eradicate the ‘anti-Russia’ that has allegedly been nurtured by Ukrainian nationalists and the West.     

试论协商民主何以成为可能——基于理性分析的视角

20世纪后20年,一种新型的民主理论一协商民主在西方政治学界开始兴起、发展,并成为人们讨论和研究的焦点。作为一种可能的新型民主,从理性分析的视角来看,协商民主能够化解自由与秩序的矛盾,维护社会的平等和正义,能够在公开的理性下实现政治的合法性,解决现有民主制度的困境与挑战。     

A Bible,an Ax,and a Tablet: Tocqueville's Newspapers and Everyday Political Discourse

The relationship between the free press and democracy is at the core of much modern political theory. With the advent of digital media and the decline of newspapers, there is a need to reexamine this relationship. Tocqueville was an astute observer of the importance of newspapers to democratic life and the drawbacks of the medium. This article examines the central features of Tocqueville's view of newspapers, the issues he saw with the tone of newspapers in Jacksonian America, and the value of newspapers. I argue that this analysis shows the importance of a free press to democratic life but that digital media often lacks the local element that Tocqueville saw as an essential feature of newspapers, and this deficiency is problematic for maintaining democratic liberty.     

The ‘R’ in BRICs: is Russia an emerging power?

The concept of emerging powers presupposes several features shared by the states in question including regional preponderance, aspiration to a global role and the contesting of US unipolarity. This article assesses the role of Russia as an emerging power. It asks how Russians interpret the international system, what kind of system they would prefer, what they are trying to do in the current system and why, and how these considerations affect their relations with the US hegemony, other centres of power such as the EU, and other emerging powers. The author discusses the structural, liberal and regional interpretations of state behaviour and how they relate to the Russian model, arguing that Russia's policy is strongly affected by its domestic economic and political context. Russia is highly responsive to trends in the former Soviet Union and regions it perceives to be in its own space (e.g. EU and NATO Europe and north-east Asia). In the larger international system, Russia's approach is a mix of partnership or acquiescence on matters of vital interest to the hegemonic power, and more competitive behaviour on issues deemed central to Russian but peripheral to US interests. The article concludes that Russia is not an emerging power in the conventional sense. Its foreign policy is dominated by efforts to reverse the decline of the 1980s and 1990s. This entails fostering international conditions conducive to allowing reconsolidation without external hindrance. Its second major priority is regional: to restore Russian influence over the former Soviet states. In essence, Russian policy aims to limit further losses and promote conditions that will allow it to re-emerge as a great power.     

The last refuge of a scoundrel: patriotism,militarism and the Russian national idea*

In a nation‐state, where ethnic and territorial borders coincide, patriotism may easily have an exclusivist‐nationalist component, and be used to serve the goals of politicians hoping to mobilise the population for destructive goals. In a multinational state like Russia, the militaristic patriotism that Yeltsin's and Putin's administrations promote can also carry that risk. The Russian state leadership's use of a militaristic patriotism as a means to generate popular support risks unleashing ethnic chauvinism and the military domination of civilian institutions. Such phenomena cast doubt on the prospects for Russia's state‐building process to proceed along liberal democratic lines. Non‐governmental organisations, such as Russia's Committee of Soldiers' Mothers , however, have devised an alternative vision of patriotism, relying on rule of law and the observance of civil rights, and thereby hold out a slim hope for reframing Russian patriotism and building a peaceful democracy.     

1894—1914年俄国酒销售垄断的初衷及效果

俄国一直面临着既要保证税收又要减少酗酒的艰巨任务。俄国预算中酒税收入举足轻重;而俄国人酗酒成风,成为严重的社会问题。俄国为了保证稳定的酒税收入,交替运用国家垄断、包税制和消费税形式,其中酒垄断因简单易行和效果明显而历时最长。政府热衷于酒税收入的同时,也助长了酗酒。1894年财政大臣维特实施的酒销售垄断,名为解决酗酒问题和恢复良好民风,实为增加国家岁入。税收目标和社会目标实难两全,这是认识和评价此次酒销售垄断的关键所在;而数百年来俄罗斯人沿袭下来的饮酒习俗则是滋生酗酒的土壤,解决酗酒问题绝非一朝一夕之事。     

Golden age,apathy or stealth? Democratic engagement in Britain, 1945–1950

This article revisits democratic engagement in post-war Britain in a context of debates about political disaffection in the current period. The study systematically reanalysed volunteer writing in the Mass Observation Archive and represents a significant methodological advance on previous studies. Little evidence was found to support common existing interpretations: whether ‘golden age’ narratives of deference to authority, partisan alignment and high voter turnout or revisionist accounts of apathy. Instead, evidence was found of something akin to what Hibbing and Theiss-Morse call ‘stealth democracy’. Citizens thought democracy to be important and felt a duty to vote, but wished for government by experts in the national interest. This ‘stealth’ interpretation builds on existing studies of duty, populism and expertise in twentieth-century Britain. It helps to move discussion of democratic engagement after the Second World War beyond the binaries of self/collective and private/public, and to explain the paradox of high voter turnout in a context of hostility to party politics. It also promises to inform debates about declining political support in the current period.     

International Regimes and Democratic Governance: Political Equality and Influence in Global Institutions

Proponents of cosmopolitan democracy rely primarily on institutional design to make their case for the feasibility of democratic governance at this level. Another strategy seems more plausible: proposing a 'non-ideal' theory in Rawls's sense that examines the social forces and conditions currently promoting democracy at the international level. The strongest forces operating now are various transnational associations that help to produce and monitor regime formation and compliance. Such a highly decentralized form of governance suggests that democratization is thereby promoted by a dense network of associations in international civil society, a global public sphere, and responsive political organizations. However much these forces disperse power through the normative principle of equal access to political influence, they could also fall well short of realizing desirable ideals such as free and open deliberation. In order not to devolve into an interest group pluralism, the decentralized strategy requires that a richer democracy be realized through the legal institutionalization of free and equal access to the global public sphere.